Читать книгу An Enquiry into an Origin of Honour; and the Usefulness of Christianity in War - Bernard Mandeville - Страница 3

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I take it for granted, that a Christian is not bound to believe any Thing to have been of Divine Institution, that has not been declared to be such in Holy Writ. Yet great Offence has been taken at an Essay, in the First Part of the Fable of the Bees, call'd An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue; notwithstanding the great Caution it is wrote with. Since then, it is thought Criminal to surmise, that even Heathen Virtue was of Human Invention, and the Reader, in the following Dialogues, will find me to persist in the Opinion, that it was; I beg his Patience to peruse what I have to say for my self on this Head, which is all I shall trouble him with here.

The Word Morality is either synonimous with Virtue, or signifies that Part of Philosophy, which treats of it, and teaches the Regulation of Manners; and by the Words Moral Virtue, I mean the same Thing which I believe Every body else does. I am likewise fully persuaded that to govern our selves according to the Dictates of Reason, is far better than to indulge the Passions without Stop or Controul, and consequently that Virtue is more beneficial than Vice, not only for the Peace and real Happiness of Society in general, but likewise for the Temporal Felicity of every individual Member of it, abstract from thee Consideration of a future State, I am moreover convinced, that all wise Men ever were and ever will be of this Opinion; and I shall never oppose Any body, who shall be pleased to call this an Eternal Truth.

Having allow'd and own'd thus much, I beg Leave to make a short Grammatical Reflection on the Sounds or Letters we make use of to express this rational Management of ourselves: For tho' the Truth of its Excellency is Eternal, the Words Moral Virtue themselves are not so, any more than Speech or Man himself. Permit me therefore to enquire which Way it is most probably, they must have come into the World.

The Word Moral, without Doubt, comes from Mos, and signifies every Thing that relates to Manners: The Word Ethick is synonimous with Moral, and is derived from [Greek: ithik], which is exactly the same in Greek, that Mos is in Latin. The Greek for Virtu, is [Greek: arete], which is derived from [Greek: ares], the God of War and properly signifies Martial Virtue. The same Word in Latin, if we believe Cicero, comes from Vir; and the genuine Signification likewise of the Word Virtus is Fortitude. It is hardly to be conceived, but that in the first Forming of all Societies, there must have been Struggles for Superiority; and therefore it is reasonable to imagine, that in all the Beginnings of Civil Government, and the Infancy of Nations, Strength and Courage must have been the most valuable Qualifications for some Time. This makes me think, that Virtus, in its first Acceptation, might, with great Justice and Propriety, be in English render'd Manliness; which fully expresses the Original Meaning of it, and shews the Etymology equally with the Latin; and whoever is acquainted with that Language must know, that it was some ages before the Romans used it in any other Sense. Nay, to this Day, the Word Virtus by it self, in any of their Historians, has the same Signification, as if the Word Bellica had been added. We have Reason to think, that, as First, Nothing was meant by Virtus, but Daring and Intrepidity, right or wrong; or else if could never have been made to signify Savageness, and brutish Courage; as Tacitus, in the Fourth Book of his History, makes use of it manifestly in that Sense. Even Wild Beasts, says he, if you keep them shut up, will lose their Fierceness. Etiam sera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviseuntur.

What the Great Men of Rome valued themselves upon was active and passive Bravery, Warlike Virtue, which is so strongly express'd in the Words of Livy: Et facere & pati fortia Romanum est. But besides the Consideration of the great Service, All Warriours received from this Virtue, there is a very good Reason in the Nature of the Thing it self, why it should be in far higher Esteem than any other. The Passion it has to struggle with, is the most violent and stubborn, and consequently the hardest to be conquer'd, the Fear of Death: The least Conflict with it is harsh Work, and a difficult Task; and it is in Regard to this, that Cicero, in his Offices, calls Modesty, Justice and Temperance, the softer and easier Virtues. Qui virtutibus bis lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, justitia temperantia, &c. Justice and Temperance require Professors as grave and solemnn, and demand as much Strictness and Observance as any other Virtues. Why lenioribus then; but that they are more mild and gentle in the Restrain they lay upon our Inclinations, and that the Self-denial they require is more practicable and less mortifying than that of Virtue itself, as it is taken in it proper and genuine Sense? To be Just or Temperate, we have Temptations to encounter, and Difficulties to surmount, that are troublesome: But the Efforts we are oblig'd to make upon our selves to be truyly Valiant are infinitely greater; and, in order to it, we are overcome the First, the strongest and most lasting Passion, that has been implanted in us; for tho' we may hate and have Aversion to many Things by Instinct, yet this is Nothing so generally terrible, and so generally dreadful to all Creatures, rational or not rational, as the Dissolution of their Being.

Upon due Consideration of what has been said, it will be easy to imagine how and why, soon after Fortitude had been honoured with the Name of Virtue, all the other Branches of Conquest over our selves were dignify'd with the same Title. We may see in it likewise the Reason of what I have always so strenuously insisted upon, viz. That no Practice, no Action or good Quality, how useful or beneficial soever they may be in them selves, can ever deserve the Name of Virtue, strictly speaking, where there is not a palpable Self-denial to be seen. In Tract of Time, the Sense of the Word Virtus received still a grated Latitude; and it signify'd Worth, Strength, Authority, and Goodness of all Kinds: Plautus makes use of it, for Assistance. Virtute Deûm, by the Help of the Gods. By Degrees it was applied not only to Brutes, Est in juveneis, est in equis patrum Virtus, but likewise to Things inanimate and was made Use of to express the Power, and peculiar Qualities of Vegetables and Minerals of all Sorts, as it continues to be to this Day. The Virtue of the Loadstone, the Virtue of Opium, &c. It is highly probable, that the Word Moral, either in Greek or Latin, never was thought of before the Signification of the Word Virtue had been extended so far beyond its Original; and then in speaking of the Virtues of our Species, the Addition of that Epithet became necessary, to denote the Relation they had to our Manners, and distinguish them from the Properties and Efficacy of Plants, Stones, &c. which were likewise call'd Virtues.

If I am wrong, I shall be glad to see a better Account, how this Adjective and Substantive came to be join'd together. In the mean Time, I am very sure, that this is Nothing strain'd or forc'd in my Supposition. That the Words, in Tract of Time, are be come of greater Importance, I don't deny. The Words Clown and Villain have opprobrious Meanings annex'd to them, that were never implied in Colonus and Villanus, from which they were undoubtedly derived. Moral, for ought I know, may now signify Virtue, in the same Manner and for the same Reason, that Panic signifies Fear.

That this Conjecture or Opinion of mine, should be detracting from the Dignity of Moral Virtue, or have a Tendency to bring it into Disrepute, I can not see. I have already own'd, that it ever was and ever will be preferable to Vice, in the Opinion of all wise Men. But to call Virtue it self Eternal, can not be done without a strangely Figurative Way of Speaking. There is no Doubt, but all Mathematical Truths are Eternal, yet they are taught; and some of them are very abstruse, and the Knowledge of them never was acquir'd without great Labour and Depth of Thought. Euclid had his Merit; and it does not appear that the Doctrine of the Fluxions was known before Sir Isaac Newton discover'd that concise Way of Computation; and it is not impossible that there should be another Method, as yet unknown, still more compendious, that may not be found out these Thousand Years.

All Propositions, not confin'd to Time or Place, that are once true, must be always so; even in the silliest and most abject Things in the World; as for Example, It is wrong to under-roast Mutton for People who love to have their Meat well done. The Truth of this, which is the most trifling Thing I can readily think on, is as much Eternal, as that of the Sublimest Virtue. If you ask me, where this Truth was, before there was Mutton, or People to dress or eat it, I answer, in the same Place where Chastity was, before there were any Creatures that had an Appetite to procreate their Species. This puts me in mind of the inconsiderate Zeal of some Men, who even in Metaphysicks, know not how to think abstractly, and cannot forebear mixing their own Meanness and Imbecillities, with the Idea's they form of the Supreme Being.

There is no Virtue that has a Name, but it curbs, regulates, or subdues some Passion that is peculiar to Humane Nature; and therefore to say, that God has all the Virtues in the highest Perfection, wants as much the Apology, that it is an Expression accommodated to vulgar Capacities, as that he has Hands and Feet, and is angry. For as God has not a Body, nor any Thing that is Corporeal belonging to his Essence, so he is entirely free from Passions and Fralities. With what Propriety then can we attribute any Thing to him that was invented, or at least signifies a Strength or Ability to conquer or govern Passions and Fralities? The Holiness of God, and all his Perfections, as well as the Beatitude he exists in, belong to his Nature; and there is no Virtue but what is acquired. It signifies Nothing to add, that God has those Virtues in the highest Perfection; let them be what they will, as to Perfection, they must still be Virtues; which, for the aforesaid Reasons, it is impertinent to ascribe to the Diety. Our Thoughts of God should be as worthy of him as we are able to frame them; and as they can not be adequate to his Greatness, so they oughts at least to be abstract from every Thing that does or can belong to silly, reptile Man: And it is sufficient, whenever we venture to speak of a Subject so immensly far beyond our Reach, to say, that there is a perfect and compleat Goodness in the Divine Nature, infinitely surpassing not only the highest Perfection, which the most virtuous Men can arrive at, but likewise every Thing that Mortals can conceive about it.

I recommend the fore-going Paragraph to the Consideration of the Advocates for the Eternity and Divine Original of Virtue; assuring them, that, if I am mistaken, it is not owing to any Perverseness of my Will, but Want of Understanding.

The Opinion, that there can be no Virtue without Self-denial, is more advantagious to Society than the contrary Doctrine, which is a vast Inlet to Hypocrisy, as I have shewn at large [1]: Yet I am willing to allow, that Men may contract a Habit of Virtue, so as to practise it, without being sensible of Self-denial, and even that they may take Pleasure in Actions that would be impracticable to the Vicious: But then it is manifest, that this Habit is the Work of Art, Education and Custom; and it never was acquired, where the Conquest over the Passions had not be already made. There is no Virtuous Man of Forty Years, but he may remember the Conflict he had with some Appetites before he was Twenty. How natural seem all Civilities to be a Gentleman! Yet Time was, that he would not have made his Bow, if he had not been bid.

[Footnote 1: Fable of the Bees. p. ii. P. 106.]

Whoever has read the Second Part of the Fable of the Bees, will see, that in these Dialogues I make Use of the same Persons, who are the Interlocutors there, and whose Characters have been already draw in the Preface of that Book.