Читать книгу Brian Lenihan - Brian Murphy - Страница 12

3 IN MEMORY OF BRIAN LENIHAN: A PERSONAL REFLECTION

PAUL GALLAGHER

AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF our last Cabinet Meeting on 8 March 2011, it was Brian Lenihan’s turn to speak and say his goodbyes. He began with a short recitation of Milton, effortless and poignant. He finished exuding his usual confidence and positivity. He was the only Fianna Fáil TD from a Dublin constituency to retain his seat. He was still working hard. There were difficult outstanding banking issues to be dealt with. Brian had his papers with him and he had earlier been discussing an issue that needed to be resolved prior to the change of government. He was still energised and quietly defiant. Though he knew death was approaching, it was difficult for the rest of us to believe this to be the case. He spoke and acted as if, like his colleagues, he were merely moving on to the next chapter of his life.

This reflection is offered as a personal insight derived from my very significant contact with Brian in the last few years of his life. The focus is on Brian and the context in which he discharged his public duties.

Brian was a remarkable man. His courage and determination were evident in the manner in which he met, without complaint, the great trials and obstacles he faced in the last few years of his life. Brian’s life changed utterly in the summer of 2008. From then, until his death three years later, his life was dominated by political and personal challenges. He has left a great legacy of courage and determination and provided an example of what the human spirit can achieve no matter how constrained by circumstances.

It will take much calmer reflection at a national level to recognise the true enormity of the challenges, arising from the financial and economic crisis, faced by Brian Lenihan and his Government colleagues between June 2008 to March 2011. The challenges were unrelenting in their ferocity, their scale, their complexity and their novelty. There was little guidance to those who had the unenviable task of dealing with the challenges and of making urgent and critical decisions on matters of great complexity and consequence. There was no consensus amongst experts here or abroad as to how those challenges should be met. There were so many uncertainties and so many unknown and uncontrollable factors rendering any decision difficult and risk prone. The one certainty was that avoiding decisions was not an option.

In this personal reflection, I do not attempt to portray in detail the atmosphere and environment of the time or the context in which Brian had to operate. It is important, however, to understand that context in a general way in order to understand Brian and his achievements. It must also be recognised that throughout his period of office, as is well known, Brian received great support from his colleagues in government and, in particular, from the Taoiseach. The Minister for Finance is a member of government and the major decisions that he takes are approved by government. Brian also received great support from the Secretary-Generals in the Department of Finance and from so many other civil servants and advisers. In reflecting on Brian’s achievements, it is very important that the role of others should not be overlooked.¹

Brian was a brilliant young barrister, but it was clear that politics was the great love of his life. He could have enjoyed great and enduring success at the Bar. He had, in fact, become a Senior Counsel in 1997 but ultimately the call of public service drowned out any thought of personal gain. Brian’s reward for this selfless public service came when he was appointed Minister for Justice on 14 June 2007.

Brian was a dynamic and very hard-working Minister for Justice. He was full of new ideas and had very definite views on what he needed to do as Minister. I was always impressed by his deep understanding of his responsibilities and, in particular, his great respect for the law and the Constitution. He also had a deep understanding of politics and of the political system. This was of immense help to him in proposing and securing the passage of legislation. He had an intense interest in the legislative agenda and committed himself to some critical legislative projects (which his short time in the portfolio prevented him from bringing to a conclusion), including Civil Partnership and Immigration,² the latter being designed to implement very significant reforms in immigration law and procedures. He had an excellent understanding not only of the legal problems which his legislation sought to address, but also of the technicalities of the legislation and of the practicalities in terms of what could be achieved. Above all, Brian had great integrity and a deep belief in the Rule of Law.

In 2008, during the Slovenian Presidency of the European Union, I accompanied Brian on a trip to Ljubljana for a Council of Ministers’ meeting in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. At the meeting, he was fully in command of his brief and was clearly highly respected by his European colleagues. My abiding memory of the trip, however, related not to the official business, but to Brian’s deep interest in a little known Irish saint, St. Coloman of Stockerau, who as an Irish pilgrim travelling to the Holy Land was tortured and hanged near Vienna on suspicion of being a spy. St. Coloman had travelled through Slovenia on his journey to the Holy Land. Brian, being deeply interested in history and all things Irish, was interested in learning more about St. Coloman’s connection with Slovenia, despite the fact that, at best, St. Coloman was one of history’s footnotes. I was struck by Brian’s effortless knowledge of this little known saint and his quite extraordinary hunger for more knowledge about him. This, of course, was very characteristic of Brian. There was no subject, however, arcane or esoteric, in which he was not interested and very few matters about which he did not display a very impressive This ability to store and assimilate information was to stand him in good stead in the forthcoming challenges of which he was then blissfully unaware. knowledge, not only of the general subject matter, but of the detail.

Brian had great enthusiasm for all aspects of his Justice brief and displayed the surefootedness and insight of a longstanding and very experienced minister. A life in politics had prepared him well. These were qualities that were very apparent to his colleagues. Taoiseach Brian Cowen made an inspired decision in choosing Brian as his Minister for Finance in May 2008. It was in this latter office that Brian will be long remembered. Much has been said about Brian in that role. Much has been made of Brian’s ministerial inexperience, his lack of any qualifications in finance or economics and of the fact that he had little time to prepare for the financial maelstrom, which hit the financial systems of Europe and the United States in late summer 2008.

Those comments are usually stated by way of an implied criticism, but, in my view, they miss the point. It is true that Brian had been a Minister for less than a year when he was appointed Minister for Finance, but few elected representatives ever had such a profound and instinctive knowledge of the operations of government and of parliamentary democracy. Brian had been acquiring political knowledge all his life, having grown up in a deeply political environment. It is also true that Brian had no formal qualifications in finance or economics, but very few Ministers of Finance in Ireland or, indeed, elsewhere have had such qualifications. He had other qualities which were of equal if not greater importance. He had the ability to rapidly absorb complex information and to apply it to the practical reality confronting him. He also had the confidence and judgment to make decisions. He knew when to listen and when to act. He canvassed many opinions from many different people. These served not to impede his decision-making process, but contributed to it. He readily segregated good and bad advice and was not afraid to reject advice from any quarter if, after consideration, he did not agree with it. He was open to ideas and to suggestions, but never feared having to make a decision and to take responsibility for it. From time to time, I have heard commentators suggest that Brian may not have had an understanding of technical details. I do not agree. There were, undoubtedly, many things he had to learn. He, undoubtedly, made mistakes. He did, however, possess the capacity to master technical information and issues confidently and quickly and, when he needed to make important decisions, he ensured that he had a thorough understanding of the technical complexities.

In order to understand the context and, more particularly, what Brian and the Government faced in September 2008, it is necessary to describe briefly some of the international events which brought much of the western world’s financial system to the brink of destruction. It must be remembered that Ireland initially faced this crisis entirely on its own and without the financial or economic resources enjoyed by the large states and without the monetary tools necessary for this purpose. Ireland was a member of the Economic and Monetary Union, (EMU), but it retained sovereignty and responsibility in respect of its own financial system. Under the then European Treaties,³ the European Central Bank (the ECB) was responsible for monetary policy, but it not only had no responsibility for intervening to prevent the collapse of a Euro member’s financial system, but was expressly prohibited by law from doing so.⁴ In fact, as Governor Mario Draghi was later to demonstrate, the ECB could have done much more than it did in those early critical months. Jacques Delors, one of the Euro’s chief architects, in a speech in Brussels on 28 March 2012, criticised the ECB’s approach at that time. When Governor Draghi took over the ECB he reversed the interest rates increases in November/December 2011 and expanded the pre-existing longer term refinancing operations (LTRO), which permitted banks to borrow large amounts of money from the ECB for terms as long as three years and demonstrated that much could be done by the ECB within its legal constraints.

Many would say that the financial crisis, which led to what is now known as the ‘Great Recession,’ began in 2007 in the US with the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market.⁵ The problems in financial markets gathered pace in 2008. In March 2008, the US Federal Reserve, supported by the Treasury, contributed almost $30 billion to facilitate the takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan. International financial markets were getting very uneasy. However, there was still great optimism with regard to the future and little sense of the impending calamity. Governor Jean-Claude Trichet, in June 2008, at a ceremony in Frankfurt’s Opera House to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the ECB, hailed the Euro as a ‘remarkable success’ and stated that he had no wish to name and shame those who predicted it would fail.⁶ However, unlike other Central Banks, such as the US Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England, the ECB could not act to regulate liquidity and interest rates in capital markets by making large-scale purchase of government bonds. Under the then interpretation of its mandate and powers, it in effect was an interested but powerless bystander. As mentioned above, the ECB’s legal mandate to address the dramatic events of September 2008, which triggered, certainly in this country, a financial and economic crisis of unprecedented proportions, was limited. The ECB did, of course, have power to cut interest rates, but it refused to do so until October 2008. The 4 per cent overnight rate that prevailed in August 2007 did not fall to 3.25 per cent until November 2008 and did not get as low as 2 per cent until January 2009. By contrast, the Federal Reserve was virtually 0 per cent by December 2008. This situation undoubtedly made it more difficult, particularly for a small country like Ireland, to address the problems created by the financial crisis.

On 16 September 2008, the US Federal Reserve had to extend a loan of $85 billion to AIG, the American insurance giant to save it from collapse. Morgan Stanley was also in trouble. It borrowed heavily from the Primary Dealer Credit Facility set up by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors to lend money to securities firms by broadening the range of eligible collateral. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs applied to the Federal Reserve to become banks in order to obtain the protection which was available to banks. Merrill Lynch was about to collapse and was sold to Bank of America in order to save it. Washington Mutual, the nation’s largest savings and loan association and the sixth largest bank of any kind, failed on 25 September 2008. All this followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008.

Around the same time in Germany, Hypo Real Estate Bank had to be supported with a €35 billion credit arranged by the German Finance Ministry because of a liquidity run. The proposed deal fell apart on 6 October 2008 and the Bundesbank had to arrange a new line of credit, this time for €50 billion and subsequently the bank was nationalised in 2009.

Following the collapse of Washington Mutual in the United States, there was a silent run on Wachovia, the US’s fourth largest bank (it was twice the size of Washington Mutual). The market value of Wachovia’s ten-year bonds dropped from 73 cents in the Dollar to 29 cents. In effect, the bonds of America’s fourth largest bank were then junk bonds. Wells Fargo stepped in on 3 October 2008 under government pressure to save Wachovia and, on the same day, the US Congress passed a modified version of the Troubled Assets Relief Programme (‘TARP’).⁷

On 25 September 2008, rumours circulated that Fortis, a gigantic banking insurance investment conglomerate, based in the Benelux countries, was in difficulty. The Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherlands Governments offered support to Fortis. They announced that the banking division would be nationalised, with the three countries investing a total of €11.2 billion in return for about two-thirds ownership. A few days later, Dexia, a substantial Belgian bank with worldwide operations, came under severe pressure and sought State Aid. It received a capital injection and State guarantee of its liabilities and subsequently had to be nationalised in October 2011.

On 29 September, the US House of Representatives rejected the TARP. After its rejection, the US Stock Market fell almost 9 per cent the next day, destroying about $1.25 trillion of wealth – representing twice the monies for which TARP had provided.

On 11 October 2008, an emergency meeting of the Euro Group launched a comprehensive plan in an attempt to save their banking systems. The plan consisted of thirteen points and provided for the ECB to intervene in the financial turmoil to boost liquidity. Eurozone governments undertook to underwrite bank debt until the end of the following year and committed to preventing the collapse of ‘systemically relevant institutions through appropriate means, including recapitalisation.’

The Euro Group had been encouraged to adopt this rescue plan by the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, who emphasised that government guarantees for inter-bank lending were ‘absolutely critical’ to freeing up the banking paralysis. The French Government announced that it would legislate on similar guarantees, while Chancellor Merkel and her government prepared draft emergency plans which were reported to factor in up to €300 billion for underwriting German bank debts issuance.

The UK Government the previous week announced a three part £550 billion programme, which involved the injection of £50 billion into bank capital reserves, £250 billion to guarantee loans between banks and involved lending another £250 billion directly to commercial banks.

On 23 November 2008, the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a joint press release bailing out CitiGroup, the giant conglomerate which was the nation’s largest bank at the time, and they agreed to guarantee a designated pool of US$306 billion in assets.

The great Central Banks of the world, the most experienced of politicians and finance ministers and the most celebrated economists struggled to cope with and control ‘the Great Recession.’ There were no tried and tested solutions to the problem. The ECB had no answer and its powers were limited. The scale of what was emerging, the enormous uncertainty created by the events which were occurring, the difficulty in predicting what would happen and the inability to control exogenous factors and, in particular, developments in other states and international market forces, posed an enormous and unprecedented threat to Ireland’s financial and economic survival.

It is easy at this remove to lose sight of Ireland’s isolation and its complete inability to control international events and, in particular, events on the financial markets having the most profound consequences for Ireland and its financial system. This lack of control coupled with the inherent difficulty in devising workable solutions made the problems faced all the more intractable and daunting. Added to these problems were the difficulties in predicting financial markets and their ongoing impact on the economy.

The instantaneous assessments and reactions of international markets, the suddenness of financial economic developments and the frequent imminence of potentially catastrophic consequences required decisiveness and a clear vision and, above all, the courage and ability to make decisions and, when the occasion demanded, to make them quickly. Brian had these qualities in abundance and when making decisions he had the ability to consider varied and multifaceted problems and to assimilate great volumes of information. The scale of what faced him and what needed to be done would have overwhelmed most people, but not Brian. He was never daunted by the circumstances in which the decisions had to be made, by the necessity to make immediate decisions, by the impossibility of being certain as to the effect or outcome of the decisions or by the requirement to make decisions when there were so many matters relevant to that decision over which he had no control. I found it remarkable that during this period he never once sought to avoid issues or problems. In fact, the contrary was the case. He was always looking ahead to identify the problems that were likely to develop and he would consider how they might be addressed if they did develop. This ability to think ahead and to anticipate problems was of immense importance because it provided an additional opportunity for consideration of issues and problems which ultimately had to be confronted. Most people would have wished existing problems away and would not have had the time or the energy or the willpower to begin thinking about problems that had not yet emerged. Brian was very different from most people.

Added to these external pressures on Ireland was the domestic collapse, the scale of which was enormous. Real GDP fell by 3 per cent in 2008, 7 per cent in 2009 and unemployment rose to almost 14 per cent by the end of 2010. These domestic developments and the rapidity with which they occurred, greatly exacerbated the problems for the domestic banks. They also created great difficulties in developing a budgetary strategy that could cope with, on the one hand, the huge collapse in public finances and, on the other, the continuing demands on those public finances – not least because of the large increase in unemployment. This and the financial support for the banks led to a huge increase in Ireland’s budget deficit. Ireland moved from a surplus of 0.1 per cent GDP in 2007 to deficits of 7.3 per cent and 14 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 2009 and plunged to a 31.2 per cent deficit in 2010.⁸ The resulting budgetary challenges were immense, both at the level of principle and at a political level. At the level of principle, a means had to be found to bring public finances under control. At a political level, great care had to be taken to ensure that not only would the necessary measures be approved by the Oireachtas, but that the cuts would not lead to social disruption and a breakdown of societal cohesion. Brian understood what needed to be done and never flinched from these challenges. Again his understanding of what was politically possible and what would be accepted by the people was of vital importance. Brian was very conscious of the effect of cutbacks on those who needed State support and it required great determination and focus to take the necessary steps to address the budgetary problems. I remember Brian speaking to me about this with great sadness and compassion on a number of occasions.

By the middle of 2009, it was clear that the Irish banks had a large number of problem loans which were not being addressed and, unless some solution was found, it was feared that this would result in ‘zombie’ banks, which would be unable to engage in the lending which a real economy required. In a situation where the value of troubled assets was continuing to decline, some action was required to address the problem. There was no tried and tested formula anywhere for solving the problem and the financial and legal issues that needed to be addressed as part of any solution were of immense complexity. There was also the political reality that any attempt to remove bad loans from the banks would be seen and represented as helping the banks and, worse still, helping the developers whose loans were now so severely impaired.

The proposal for the National Asset Management Agency Bill was published for the purpose of public consultation at the end of July 2009. The proposal was quite unique. It contained the change and refinement following public consultation and further internal review. The proposal described in detail how NAMA was to operate and how it would affect the participating banks and their debtors. Between the publication of the proposal and the eventual passage of the Act on 22 November 2009, Brian participated in the very animated and, at times, bitter public debate on the proposal and provided careful explanation of what the NAMA Act would involve and how it would affect the banks and others. The change in public attitude to the proposed NAMA Act, which ultimately facilitated its passage through the Oireachtas in November 2009, was in large part due to his indefatigable defence of the proposal and his willingness to engage in public on the detail of the proposals and on the concerns raised about them. His mastery of the detail of the complex legislation and his deep understanding of the rationale for the legislation and its necessity, in terms of dealing with the problems created by the volume and extent of impaired bank loans, enabled him to respond to the trenchant criticisms of the proposal and to convert many who were sceptical about it. When Brian spoke, people listened and trusted him. Brian was convinced, as was clear from his public statements, of the necessity of this Bill in order to deal with the problems of the financial system, but it took great courage to be so publicly associated with a proposal that initially looked as if it would certainly be defeated. It also took great courage to champion a proposal that involved such an enormous commitment by the State and the success or otherwise of which would only be determined many years in the future. detailed provisions of the Bill which were to be subject to further.

NAMA was, of course, only one of the many challenges Brian faced in 2009. In legislative terms, Brian also introduced legislation to provide for a substantial reduction in the remuneration of public servants. This meant that all persons employed or holding office in public service bodies, which embraced in effect the wider public service and, therefore, a very significant part of the electorate, were to be subjected for the first time to reduction⁹ in remuneration from 3 per cent to 10 per cent, depending on their salary. Ensuring the passage of such a measure through the Houses of the Oireachtas was a major achievement. In 2009, Brian was also responsible for the introduction and passage of a number of other very important legislative measures affecting financial matters, including the Finance Act, the Financial Services (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Act, and the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act, (No. 2) Act, 2009.

Brian’s work rate in 2009 was astonishing. He was indefatigable and continued to engage fully in all aspects of political life. He was always optimistic that the measures taken would improve Ireland’s financial situation. Nothing could have prepared him, or the rest of us, for the tragic news that Brian was to receive a few days before Christmas 2009 and nothing could have prepared him for what was to be the greatest challenge of his life. Brian had no inkling in December 2009 that he had any serious illness. The diagnosis of his illness came as a complete shock. Brian’s reaction to his illness was as awesome as it was inspiring. I remember talking to Brian about his diagnosis shortly after it was made. He was his usual courteous self and appreciative of the inquiry and concern. He was able to talk about his illness and what it meant in a detached but very focused and realistic way. He made no complaint about his diagnosis. Above all, there was no element of self-pity.

The diagnosis was very serious and the prognosis for recovery was very poor, as he well knew. His decision to continue in office and to carry out his public duties was a reflection of his sense of public duty and of his great personal courage. He spoke of his decision as if it were the only obvious decision to make and certainly expected no thanks or commendation for it. It was, in fact, a momentous and courageous decision. He could so easily have given up the struggle against the unremitting tide of financial and economic problems battering the State and nobody would have blamed him for doing so. To gain any appreciation of the courage involved in the decision, one has to understand the scale of the challenges he continued to face and the enormity of the burden, which he continued to carry and that he knew was unlikely to diminish.

Throughout 2010 I would have seen Brian at cabinet and would have met him or spoken to him every few days. His performance levels were remarkable. He had no difficulty meeting the tremendously tight timelines in which decisions had to be made and issues confronted and had no difficulty in confronting the issues. He did not waste time lamenting his condition nor did he seek sympathy. I remember mentally remarking on many occasions that, if I did not know he was ill, I would not have even suspected it. He behaved precisely as he did before and even when he appeared at cabinet after treatment he conducted his usual workload. I did not notice any diminution in his capacity or determination. His only apparent concession to his illness was to bring a couch into his office to enable him to take a rest during the course of the day, when he needed to do so, and to develop a passion for green tea, but apart from these nods to his illness and a reduction in the large number of public and political commitments which he undertook, he continued to perform at a level which made it very difficult to believe that there was anything really wrong with him. Every now and again there would, however, be some little reminder of what he was confronting. I remember one day sympathising with him over some problem he had to deal with. He looked at me, smiled and shrugged and said that every day you are alive is a great day. I will never forget the remark. It was, as usual, made without self-pity or sorrow. It was a remark as simple as it was inspiring.

Many remember the dispiriting days of November 2010, but few remember the important external events which transformed the cautious optimism of early 2010 into the deep pessimism of November. As Donovan and Murphy point out,¹⁰ in a narrow and financial sense 2010 began relatively well for Ireland. Although the economy was still in deep recession, the NTMA continued to borrow at rates which, although slightly higher than normal, were well within an acceptable range. In the spring of 2010, it became clear that Greece was in real trouble and it applied, in April 2010, for a bailout. The emergency support for Greece did not calm the markets. In May 2010, shortly after the launch of the Greek Programme, EU member states decided on the creation of a €750 billion support fund for states cut off from market funding.¹¹

As the true scale of the Greek problem became apparent and as it emerged that Greece had entered the EMU on the basis of fraudulent government statistics and had continued to report false numbers, the markets reacted angrily and Irish Government bond yields rose steadily from May 2010. In August 2010, Standard & Poors issued a very unfavourable rating assessment of Ireland. Market sentiment was worsened by the Deauville Declaration which followed a bilateral summit between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy. The Declaration issued on 18 October 2010 suggesting that lenders in the sovereign debt market might face losses in future bailouts, had the effect of causing immense increases in Irish bond yields. These external developments created enormous problems for Ireland. In addition, the ECB was greatly concerned with its financial exposure to Ireland and the statement by ECB President Trichet in September 2010 expressed concern about the amount of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) outstanding to Anglo Irish Bank.

The Cabinet decided on Sunday 21 November 2010 to apply for financial assistance from the EU. Brian had to fly out to Brussels that Sunday morning to finalise the agreement and the bailout terms. He rang me from Baldonnell airport. Weather conditions were appalling. He had been up late the night before and had attended the Cabinet meeting at which the decision to apply for a bailout was made. As always, he was very focused. He was aware of the immensity of what he was doing and its consequences for Ireland. He gave no consideration to himself or what it might mean for him. His only concern was to achieve the best possible outcome for his country. Again, there was no sense of self-pity or regret that he had to discharge this unenviable task. It was an extremely poignant and historical moment. He was doing something which no other Finance Minister ever had to do. He knew too that he would forever be associated with this event and that all of his decisions since becoming Minister for Finance would be closely questioned and evaluated. He realised this evaluation would be conducted, in many cases, by those who were only too willing to criticise with the benefit of hindsight and with the luxury of never having had to make such difficult decisions and, particularly, decisions in such extraordinary and unforgiving circumstances. He also knew, only too well, that the bailout would have huge political consequences for him and his party. Again, however, there was no trace of self-pity or despondency and, above all, no regret that he had continued to fight the battle after the diagnosis of his illness.

Following the bailout, there was still much for Brian and the Government to do. A budget had to be introduced based on the economic programme prepared by the Government prior to the bailout and which was, in substance, adopted by the Troika, as the basis for the financial conditionality reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding to which Ireland was obliged to subscribe in order to obtain the benefit of the bailout. This budget inevitably carried very serious political consequences, as he and the Government acknowledged publicly at the time.

In December, Brian also introduced the Credit Institutions Stabilisation Bill, an extremely important and complex piece of legislation designed to provide a resolution framework for failing banks, while avoiding the ever-present risk of triggering a bond default consequent on such resolution, which would have had disastrous consequences for the banks and the economy generally. This was in large part unchartered territory. Brian steered this Bill through the Dáil and Seanad under an immensely tight time schedule. Its passage was essential to facilitate urgent State investment in the banks, including a vitally important investment in Allied Irish Banks the following day, and its passage was a condition of Troika support. The legislation was extremely controversial, but it provided a resolution framework for dealing with the troubled banks and for reducing the entitlements of subordinate bondholders.

The events of November and December 2010 would have overwhelmed even the strongest of people. It had been a truly momentous year for Brian, who must have encountered the full range of human emotions and, in addition, great stress and personal anxiety. It was a year which would have been mentally and physically exhausting for the toughest and fittest person. One can only wonder how any person could have survived all of this while undergoing treatment for his illness and yet perform so remarkably. Late on the evening of 23 December 2010, when most had given up any thought of any work until after Christmas, Brian contacted me and asked that we go for a drink to discuss important work that needed to be completed over the remaining life of the Government. By this stage, it was clear that the Government had only a very limited lifespan, as the Green Party had indicated its desire to leave Government after the budgetary measures had been passed. We went over to a nearby hotel together. Brian explained in detail and with clarity what he wished to achieve.

Brian’s only focus was on the country’s interest. He displayed no consideration for his personal convenience or comfort. Completing his public duty was his only objective. The meeting was relaxed and convivial, but there was no mistaking his determination to achieve these objectives and his willingness to do whatever was required of him in order to achieve them. Shortly before we got up to go, Brian spoke to me in words which are indelibly etched in my memory and which were said without self-pity or fear. He said: ‘You know I have only a very short time to live.’ That was the first and only time he had ever said that. He had always conducted himself as if his own survival was never an issue. It was impossible to respond in any meaningful way. I do not know what defines heroism or what makes people heroic and we should be very slow to use such an exalted term but for me that was the closest encounter I ever had with heroism.

Given Brian’s fondness for Milton, it is perhaps ironic that Milton’s Lycidas best expresses the overwhelming sense of loss at the passing of one who did so much and promised even more:

Bitter constraint and sad occasion dear

Compels me to disturb your season due;

For Lycidas is dead, dead ere his prime,

Young Lycidas, and hath not left his peer,

Who would not sing for Lycidas? he knew

Himself to sing, and build the lofty rhyme.

He must not float upon his wat’ry bier

Unwept, and welter to the parching wind,

Without the meed of some melodious tear.¹²