Читать книгу The life of Isambard Kingdom Brunel, Civil Engineer - Brunel Isambard - Страница 16

Table of Contents

ORIGIN OF THE ORDINARY GAUGE OF RAILWAYS—ADOPTION BY MR. BRUNEL OF THE BROAD GAUGE ON THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY—REASONS FOR ITS ADOPTION—THE PERMANENT WAY—REPORTS OF MR. NICHOLAS WOOD AND MR. JOHN HAWKSHAW, 1838—EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF DIRECTORS OF GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY (DECEMBER 20, 1838)—EXTENSION OF THE BROAD GAUGE SYSTEM—BREAK OF GAUGE—ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE GAUGE OF RAILWAYS, 1845—LETTER OF MR. BRUNEL ON THE BROAD GAUGE (AUGUST 6, 1845)—GAUGE ACT OF 1846—THE MIXED GAUGE—REPORT OF RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS, 1847—NORTHERN EXTENSIONS OF THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY—ADVANTAGES OF THE BROAD GAUGE—PARTIAL ABANDONMENT OF THE BROAD GAUGE.

THE railways designed by Mr. Brunel were, with a few exceptions, distinguished from those in all other parts of England by a peculiarity in the width between the two rails forming each line of way, or in what is called the gauge. In most railways, the distance between the internal edges of the rails is 4 feet 8½ inches, being what is termed the narrow gauge; on Mr. Brunel’s railways, it was seven feet, or what is termed the broad gauge.

The gauge of the earlier railways, which were but a modification of the old wooden tramway, was made that of the tram plates which they superseded; and this had been originally fixed to suit the distance between the wheels of the country carts in the north of England.

When Mr. George Stephenson introduced the locomotive engine, the gauge of the lines in the Northumberland district had been already fixed. In laying out the Stockton and Darlington line (1821-1825) he saw no reason to depart from the gauge he had previously adopted; and, indeed, some of the waggons to be used on this line were brought from the Northumberland collieries. In this way the first important railway in England was made with the gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches; not from a deliberate choice of this width on the ground of any peculiar advantages, but from the mere fact of its already being established elsewhere.

In the construction of the Manchester and Liverpool Railway, in 1826, the same gauge was adopted as on the Stockton and Darlington; this course was also followed by the Grand Junction and the London and Birmingham Railways, and thus the 4 feet 8½ inches gauge became established in that part of the country.

Long experience appears to have determined the general type of wheeled vehicles: the wheels being of somewhat large size, and the body placed between them, so as to come down close upon the axle-tree.

This type, which gives obvious advantages in a mechanical point of view, appears to have been adhered to in all railway vehicles used before the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway; these, however, were chiefly coal-waggons. But on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway it was soon perceived that the great increase of carrying power which the railway afforded must be met by a corresponding increase of space in the rolling stock, as it was necessary to accommodate light bulky goods and passenger traffic. The available width between the wheels was limited to about 4 feet 6 inches, and to carry in this width any large amount of cotton goods, or of passengers, would have required a train of an inordinate length. To meet this difficulty a new form of vehicle was designed; the wheels were made small, and the body was raised and widened out, projecting on either side over the tops of the wheels.

The earliest description of this form of waggon is contained in the second edition of Wood’s ‘Practical Treatise on Railroads,’ published in 1832, about two years after the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. In Plate III., Mr. Wood shows a truck with a raised platform overhanging the wheels, and adapted for carrying loose boxes of coals; adding, in the description:

Although the drawing shows only the form of boxes used for the conveyance of coals, yet it will readily occur that the form can be varied to suit the carriage of any kind of articles; the framework or body of the carriage being raised above the wheels, the breadth can be extended to any width which the distance between the railways [i.e. between the up and down lines of road] will admit (p. 75).

Such was the state of matters when, in the year 1833, Mr. Brunel was appointed Engineer of the Great Western Railway. With the view of leaving the question of gauge open for future consideration, he procured the omission in the Great Western Act of a clause defining it. He came to the conclusion that it would be desirable to adopt a wider gauge, and he recommended this measure to the Directors in a report dated October 1835.[47]

In October 1836 a Royal Commission, consisting of Mr. Drummond, Under-Secretary for Ireland, Mr. R. Griffith, Colonel (now Field-Marshal) Sir John Burgoyne, R.E., and Professor Barlow, of Woolwich, was appointed to report on the establishment of railways in Ireland. They considered carefully the question of gauge, and their arguments in favour of an increase in the gauge were afterwards stated by Mr. Brunel to be identical with his own.

They drew attention to the advantage of large wheels, the use of which would be facilitated by a wider gauge; and they thought it a matter of importance to be able to place the bodies of the carriages between the wheels, instead of over them.

It was the width of the carriages, and not the distance between the rails, that determined the general dimensions, and therefore the cost, of the works of a railway. Mr. Brunel saw many advantages to be gained by an increase in the gauge, even while retaining the existing dimensions of carriages; and he thought it unwise at the commencement of a work of such magnitude as the Great Western Railway to retain a limit the inconvenience of which had already become apparent.

He says, in his evidence before the Gauge Commission:

Looking to the speed which I contemplated would be adopted on railways, and the masses to be moved, it seemed to me that the whole machine was too small for the work to be done, and that it required that the parts should be on a scale more commensurate with the mass and the velocity to be attained. (Q. 3924.)

The width between the rails being the fundamental dimension of ‘the whole machine,’ on which its entire development must depend, Mr. Brunel proposed to begin by the enlargement of this dimension, and recommended that on the Great Western Railway the gauge should be seven feet. He considered that the whole of the parts of the railway and of its rolling stock would be susceptible of continual, though gradual improvement, and that it was highly advisable to remove, in the outset, a great obstacle in the way of this progress.

He did not in the first instance propose any important change in the details as consequent on the wider gauge; and in regard to one of the principal points, the diameter of the wheels, he said:—

I am not by any means prepared at present to recommend any particular size of wheel, or even any great increase of the present dimensions. I believe they will be materially increased; but my great object would be in every possible way to render each part capable of improvement, and to remove what appears an obstacle to any great progress in such a very important point as the diameter of the wheels, upon which the resistance, which governs the cost of transport and the speed that may be obtained, so materially depends. (Report in Appendix I. p. 532.)

Mr. Brunel also looked forward to the advantages which a wider gauge would give for the construction of the locomotive engines. Difficulties had been already experienced from the limited width between the wheels, which cramped the machinery, rendering it difficult of access for repairs; it also limited the size of the boiler and fire-box, on which the power depended. For this reason Mr. Brunel considered that a wider gauge would present great advantages, as it would allow the locomotives to be constructed of greater power, and with their machinery arranged in a more advantageous manner. He also thought that the greater width of base for the carriages would give increased steadiness and smoothness of motion, with greater safety, particularly at high speeds, and that there would be the advantage of being able to use larger wheels for the carriages. Moreover, he had in view the possibility which the broad gauge would give of adopting wheels of a still larger diameter without raising the centre of gravity, the body of the carriage being placed between them, as in the original type of common road vehicles.

The broad gauge was also considered by Mr. Brunel in prominent connection with the peculiarly favourable circumstances of the Great Western line, in regard to its gradients and curves. He thought that ‘it would not have been embracing all the benefits derivable from the gradients of the Great Western Railway, unless a more extended gauge was adopted.’ In the first place, it was evident that a diminution of the frictional resistance would present the greatest advantage where the gradients were flat. In regard to curves, the wider gauge was at that time considered by him to be more advantageously applied where the curves were of large radius than where they were sharp.[48] On the Great Western Railway both gradients and curves were remarkably good; with the exception of two inclines of 1 in 100, on which auxiliary power was proposed to be used, there was no gradient between London and Bristol steeper than 1 in 660, the greater part of the line being nearly level, and except between Bath and Bristol there was no curve sharper than about one mile radius.

For these reasons Mr. Brunel thought that unusually high speed might easily be attained for passengers, and great tractive power for goods. He said:—

I shall not attempt to argue with those who consider any increase of speed unnecessary. The public will always prefer that conveyance which is the most perfect, and speed, within reasonable limits, is a material ingredient in perfection in travelling. (Report in Appendix I. p. 532.)

In deciding that the distance between the rails should be seven feet, Mr. Brunel seems to have been guided by the principle that the wheels should be put sufficiently far apart to admit of an ordinary carriage body being placed between them.[49]

Mr. Brunel did not anticipate that the difference between the gauge he proposed and that of other railways would lead to any important inconvenience. The views he held on this subject were expressed fully by him in a report of December 13, 1838. He says, speaking of the difficulty of communication between the Great Western and other railways:—

This is undoubtedly an inconvenience; it amounts to a prohibition to almost any railway running northwards from London, as they must all more or less depend for their supply upon other lines or districts where railways already exist, and with which they must hope to be connected. In such cases there is no alternative.

The Great Western Railway, however, broke ground in an entirely new district, in which railways were unknown. At present it commands this district, and has already sent forth branches which embrace nearly all that can belong to it; and it will be the fault of the company if it does not effectually and permanently secure to itself the whole trade of this portion of England, with that of South Wales and the south of Ireland; not by a forced monopoly, which could never long resist the wants of the public, but by such attention to these wants as shall render any competition unnecessary and hopeless. Such is the position of the Great Western Railway. It could have no connection with any other of the main lines, and the principal branches likely to be made were well considered, and almost formed part of the original plan; nor can these be dependent upon any other existing lines for the traffic which they will bring to the main trunk.

Mr. Brunel was not singular in holding the opinion that it would be desirable to allot a given district to one railway, which might conveniently serve it by means of a trunk line and branches of a special gauge. In the Eastern Counties line, designed in 1836, by Mr. Braithwaite, and opened in 1839, a gauge of 5 feet was adopted; and Mr. Robert Stephenson, as engineer of another line, the Northern and Eastern Railway, branching out from the Eastern Counties to the northward, adopted the same gauge. It was not till the Northern and Eastern line was extended, some years afterwards, that the rails of the whole system were altered to the narrow gauge.

Mr. Brunel’s recommendation was adopted by the Directors of the Great Western Railway; and, in their report of August 25, 1836, after observing that the generally level character of the line would greatly facilitate the attainment of a higher speed of travelling, they pointed out the advantages of the broad gauge, and stated that engines had been ordered specially adapted to the nature of the line, which would be capable of attaining with facility a rate of from thirty-five to forty miles per hour.

The line was opened between Paddington and Maidenhead on June 4, 1838, and the performance of the engines was considered satisfactory, trains of eighty tons and upwards being drawn at speeds of from thirty-eight to forty miles per hour.

Notwithstanding these favourable results, the change in regard to the gauge did not pass unquestioned. Attacks were made on it in various quarters, and considerable excitement was caused among the shareholders and the public.

It was asserted that the width of 4 feet 8½ inches was exactly the proper width for all railways, and that a deviation from it was tantamount to the abandonment of an established principle which experience had proved to be correct. It was further alleged that the cost of all the works connected with the formation of the line would be greatly increased; that the carriages must be stronger and heavier, that they would not run round the curves, and would be liable to run off the rails, and particularly that the increased length of the axles would render them liable to be broken. These were not advanced as difficulties which, existing in all railways, might be somewhat increased by the increase of gauge, but they were assumed to be peculiar to the broad gauge, and fatal to it. Some urgent representations appear to have been made to the Directors; for in their report of August 15, 1838, they state, that as the gauge and the permanent way, which had also been the subject of adverse criticism, had been sources of some anxiety to them, they had applied to three of the most eminent authorities on the construction and working of railways—Mr. James Walker, President of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Mr. Robert Stephenson, and Mr. Nicholas Wood, of Newcastle-on-Tyne—to undertake a thorough inspection of the line, to investigate the working of it, and to give their opinion on the plan adopted.

Mr. Walker and Mr. Stephenson declined the task, on the ground that they did not wish to become embroiled in professional controversy, but Mr. Wood undertook it; and a similar commission was afterwards given to Mr. Hawkshaw.

In order to put the shareholders fully in possession of all the information in their power, the Directors published a very complete statement by Mr. Brunel on the arrangements adopted by him. It will be seen that in this report, which is given in Appendix I. p. 525, he states his original arguments, and answers the objections brought against his plans; and he contends that the result of experience establishes their success. In regard to the gauge, he says:—

Everything that has occurred in the practical working of the line confirms me in my conviction that we have secured a most valuable power to the Great Western Railway, and that it would be folly to abandon it.

But the two engineers, to whom the consideration of this matter had been referred, differed materially in opinion from Mr. Brunel. The nature of their investigations and reports, and of Mr. Brunel’s replies, is stated in the extracts given below from the report of the Directors in January 1839.

In addition to the question of gauge, another important matter referred to the consideration of Mr. Wood and Mr. Hawkshaw was the construction of the permanent way.[50] On the Great Western a construction had been introduced by Mr. Brunel differing materially from that ordinarily used; and as defects had shown themselves after the opening of the railway, some anxiety was felt in reference to it by many of the shareholders.

The subject of the permanent way adopted on the Great Western Railway does not necessarily belong to the gauge question, and would, perhaps, have been more properly considered in the chapter on Mr. Brunel’s railway works; but, as a matter of fact, the controversy concerning it became so interwoven with that of the broad gauge, that in a historical account it would be difficult to separate them.

It appeared to Mr. Brunel that, with a view of applying the engine power to the greatest advantage, particularly in attaining high speed, more attention ought to be paid to the construction of the permanent way. He says, in a report dated February 1837:—

It appears to be frequently forgotten that although lofty embankments and deep cuttings, bridges, viaducts, and tunnels are all necessary for forming the level surface upon which the rails are to be laid, yet they are but the means for obtaining that end; and the ultimate object for which these great works are constructed, and for which the enormous expenses consequent upon them are incurred, consits merely of four level parallel lines, not above two inches wide, of a hard and smooth surface; and upon the degree of hardness, smoothness, and parallelism (which last has hitherto been very much neglected) of these four lines depend the speed and cost of transport, and in fact the whole result aimed at....

In forming all my plans I have looked to the perfection of the surface on which the carriages are to run, as the great and ultimate desideratum; and in the detail of construction of this last operation, without which all the previous labour is comparatively wasted, I have always contemplated introducing all the perfection of materials and workmanship of which it is capable.

With a view to improvement on this point, Mr. Brunel considered it would be advantageous if two important changes were made. He proposed, in the first place, to abolish the use of stone blocks for the rails to rest on, and to substitute timber; and, secondly, to apply the support uniformly and continuously along the whole length of the rails, instead of only at intervals.

The first of these changes, namely, the substitution of timber for stone, was not wholly new, for transverse wood sleepers were often used in exceptional situations; but it was the general opinion that stone, where it could be applied, formed the best support for the rails,[51] and the exclusive employment of timber was considered a great innovation.

The other principle, that of ‘continuous bearing,’ was similar to that of the old wooden and stone tramways; and, even as applied to iron rails it had been extensively used before, as Mr. Brunel mentions in his report of August 1838 (see Appendix I. p. 535.)

Mr. Brunel designed for this continuous bearing a peculiar shape of rail, which, from the form of its section, acquired the name of the ‘bridge rail.’ The rail was bolted down to the longitudinal timbers, and the timbers of the two rails were connected together at intervals by cross-pieces, called transoms, bolted to them; these served to keep the two rails at a proper distance apart. The longitudinal timbers lay on gravel or other ‘ballast,’ which had been found to form the best foundation, as being firm and solid, easy of adjustment, and allowing free drainage.[52]

Mr. Brunel, however, thought there would be difficulty in giving the longitudinal baulks a sufficiently solid bearing on the gravel below them.

A similar difficulty had already been experienced with the heavy stone blocks used on other railways. As a remedy for this, Mr. Stephenson caused each block to be lifted and dropped several times on its place, so as to consolidate the ballast below.

The same thing could not be done with a long wooden baulk, and Mr. Brunel therefore contrived another mode of overcoming the difficulty. Piles were driven into the ground between the rails, and their heads bolted to the cross-transoms, the object being to hold the timber framework firmly down. The gravel was then rammed hard under the longitudinal baulks, to give the consolidation desired. The result, however, of this mode of construction was far from successful, and the state of the road, when run over by the trains, was in many places very defective.[53]

In the course of his enquiry Mr. Wood tried a large number of experiments on the Great Western and other lines. He was of opinion that stone blocks afforded a permanently firmer base, and so caused less resistance to the train, but that there was less noise with continuous timber bearings, and that they gave a smoother and a more perfect road for high rates of speed. He thought, however, that the piles were objectionable, and that the weight of the trains would in the course of time sufficiently consolidate the foundation. Mr. Brunel accepted Mr. Wood’s conclusions and abandoned the piling, adopting at the same time larger timbers and heavier rails.

The experience of the permanent way, as thus altered, fully justified the favourable anticipations Mr. Brunel had formed of the continuous timber bearing.[54]

After the reports of Mr. Wood and Mr. Hawkshaw, with Mr. Brunel’s replies to them, had been circulated among the shareholders, a special general meeting was called in London, to receive and consider these documents. It was convened for December 20, 1838, but was adjourned till January 9, 1839. This meeting was of great importance, not only to the Company, but to Mr. Brunel personally, as on the resolutions to be passed depended whether or not his plans should be proceeded with.

He had, however, the warm support of the Directors, as will appear from the following extracts from their report.

It may be here concisely stated, that Mr. Wood deduces from experiments upon the performance of engines on the Great Western and other lines, that although a higher rate of speed has been attained on the former, it would appear only to have been accomplished by the increased power of the engines, with a much greater consumption of coke when calculated per ton per mile. He ascribes this result principally to the resistance presented by the atmosphere to the motion of railway trains, especially at high rates of speed. His remarks on that subject are qualified, however, by the expression of a doubt as to the value to be assigned to the single set of experiments on each of two inclined planes, which are quoted as the authority for the degree of atmospheric resistance supposed to have been discovered.

The reduction of friction by the employment of wheels of increased diameter, and the benefit of lowering the carriages between the wheels, are affirmed by Mr. Wood as incontrovertible. The increased stability, and consequent increased steadiness of motion to carriages on the wider base, are also admitted by him....

The various propositions of doubtful advantage from the wide gauge, as well as of alleged objection to it, appear to have been thoroughly considered in the report in question. The experiments on the consumption of coke at high velocities were unfavourable, and, in connection with the theory of atmospheric resistance, appear to have influenced the mind of Mr. Wood to consider that a seven-feet gauge was beyond the width which he would deem the best. At the same time, upon a review of all the circumstances, and considering that there are counteracting advantages, incidental to an increased width of gauge, he does not think that the result of his enquiries would justify a change in the dimensions adopted on this line, and he recommends the present width should be retained.

The advice thus given by Mr. Wood, upon mature reflection, being directly at variance with the conclusion at which Mr. Hawkshaw had previously arrived upon an investigation similarly delegated to him, it became the duty of the Directors to consider most attentively the train of reasoning and argument which led the latter to urge such an opposite course. Naturally expecting from that circumstance to find in his report a clear and definite statement of the positive loss or disadvantages accruing from the increased width of gauge, the Directors could not fail to remark with some surprise that he enforces his recommendation, not upon any ascertained injury or failure in the plan, but almost exclusively upon the presumption that all railways, however disconnected or locally situated, should be constructed of one uniform width. While he appears to think that it might be an improvement to have an addition of a few inches, five or six at the most, he still questions the expediency of any variation from the 4 feet 8½ inches gauge. Mr. Hawkshaw, in his report, also considers any additional expense upon the gauge, as well as upon the improvement of gradients, to be undesirable, and assumes it at a scale of augmentation far beyond the real difference of cost. His estimates on that head are impeached in the engineer’s observations, and no doubt exists in the minds of the Directors, that the subject, reduced to a mere question of figures, in its present position, would undeniably show a pecuniary loss to be borne by the Company by any such change of system as he advocates, even if it were on other grounds deemed advisable. The objection that the wide gauge might prevent a junction with other lines seems both to Mr. Wood and the Directors to have but little weight, as applied to the Great Western Railway. Already has the same width been contemplated and provided for in the extension lines through Gloucestershire to Cheltenham and from Bristol to Exeter. Any local branches hereafter to be made would undoubtedly follow the same course, and the proprietors, therefore, may be satisfied that no apprehension need be entertained by them on that head.

The advantage of following Mr. Wood’s advice, in not making any alteration in the width of way, has been since most forcibly shown by more recent experiments, which have entirely changed the results upon which the chief objections to the gauge were founded. The performance of the engines, shown by Mr. Wood’s experiments in September, gave such a disproportionate result in their power upon the attainment of high velocities, as to render it all but impossible that the effect could be entirely produced by the action of the atmosphere on the trains. All doubts were shortly removed by its being ascertained that a different cause (a mere mechanical defect in the engine itself) had been in operation. If Mr. Wood had witnessed these recent performances of the engines, he must unquestionably have changed his opinions as to the means and practicability of carrying full average loads at a high speed, without the great increased expense of fuel. The Directors have satisfied themselves of this very important fact, by personally attending an experiment (accompanied by several gentlemen, among whom was a very eminent practical mechanic), on which occasion the ‘North Star’ took a train of carriages, calculated for 166 passengers, and loaded to 43 tons, to and from Maidenhead, at a mean average speed of thirty-eight miles per hour, the maximum being forty-five miles per hour, consuming only 0·95, or less than 1 lb. of coke per net ton per mile, instead of 2·76, say 2¾ lbs., as previously shown. This was accomplished by a mere altered proportion in the blast pipe of the engine, in the manner explained by Mr. Brunel, being a simple adaptation of size in one of the parts, which admits a more free escape of steam from the cylinder, after it has exerted its force on the piston, still preserving sufficient draft in the fire.[55]

It must be almost needless to point out to those who have perused the reports, how importantly this change bears upon the subject in almost every relation of the enquiry. It negatives the assumption that the velocity can only be attained by a ruinous loss of power. It establishes beyond doubt that the consumption of fuel as now ascertained, in proportion to the load, is only one-third of that which from the former experiments had been the basis of Mr. Wood’s arguments. An analysis in the report of the performance of the Great Western engines, with heavy loads varying from 80 tons to 166 tons, shows in every respect a peculiarly satisfactory result at a small cost of fuel, and warrants the expectation of very great benefit to the Company from the economical transport of goods on the line. That the expenses of locomotive repairs, especially on that heavy class of repair which arise from lateral strains on the wheels and framing of the engines, have been materially less than on other lines is ascertained by very detailed accounts, accurately made and submitted to the Board by the superintendent of that department. The experience of some months has now enabled the Directors to witness the progressive improvement in the practical working of the railway. A higher rate of speed has been generally maintained than on other lines, and at the same time, with that increased speed, great steadiness of motion has been found in the carriages, with consequent comfort to the passengers. If speed, security, and comfort, were three great desiderata in the original institution of railway travelling, the Directors feel sure that the public will appreciate and profit by any improvements in those qualities, the Company deriving ample remuneration in the shape of increased traffic. A saving of time upon a long journey, with increased comfort, will necessarily attract to one line in preference to another many travellers from beyond the ordinary distance of local connection, and will thus secure a valuable collateral trade which would not otherwise belong to it. It has also a decided tendency to avert competition, which may with much reason be regarded as the chief peril to which railway property is subjected.

The Directors, upon a deliberate reconsideration of all the circumstances affecting the permanent welfare of the undertaking, divesting the question of all personal partialities or obstinate adherence to a system, unanimously acquiesce in the abandonment of the piles, in the substitution of a greater scantling of timber, and of a heavier rail, retaining the width of gauge with the continuous timber bearings, as the most conducive to the general interests of the Company.

The views of the Directors were approved of by the majority of the shareholders (the numbers being 7,792 for, and 6,145 against); and the construction of the line was proceeded with according to Mr. Brunel’s plans.

By June 30, 1841, the whole length of the Great Western Railway was opened from London to Bristol. Some of the Directors’ reports mention the fact that the speed uniformly maintained by the engines much exceeded the ordinary rate of railway travelling, and allude to the ‘general testimony borne to the smoothness and comfort of the line and carriages.’

As has been before mentioned, extensions and branches on the same gauge, to all of which Mr. Brunel was engineer, were projected and ultimately carried out, in accordance with the original scheme of the undertaking, to Exeter, Plymouth, and Cornwall, and to Gloucester, Hereford, and South Wales, as well as to Oxford, Windsor, and other towns in the immediate neighbourhood of the line.

About 1844, the attention of the Company began to be directed to projects involving extensions of a much more serious character, and which were destined to have a powerful influence on the position of the gauge question. During the railway mania, the Great Western Company found it impossible to stand aloof from the contests which were going on around them, and thought it necessary, in order to protect their own interests, to extend their lines beyond the district to which they had originally intended to confine themselves.

At the general meeting in August, an extension from Oxford to Rugby was determined on, as ‘of the greatest importance to the Great Western line.’ About the same time a broad-gauge line was promoted from Oxford to Worcester, and thence by Kidderminster and Dudley to Wolverhampton, in order to open an immediate communication with the Staffordshire and Worcestershire districts. There were also rival projects on the narrow gauge, promoted by the London and Birmingham Company; and the competing plans were referred, as was the custom at that time, for the examination of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade.

In regard to the communication from north to south, through Oxford, the question was, where the break of gauge should be.[56] The Board of Trade saw nothing in the relative merits of the gauges to determine this question, and from commercial considerations, they recommended that the change of gauge should be made at Oxford. On this and other grounds they considered that the narrow gauge schemes to the north of Oxford were preferable to those of the Great Western Railway.

The rival schemes then went before Parliament, and after a protracted enquiry, obstinately fought between the parties, the decision was given in favour of the Great Western lines, contrary to the recommendation of the Board of Trade. It was, however, stated by the chairman of the Commons Committee that the decision had been founded on the local and general merits of the respective lines, without any reference to the comparative merits of the two gauges. On this account some peculiar provisions were made in the Acts; for though the lines were sanctioned on the broad gauge, the proprietors were bound also to lay down narrow gauge rails upon them, if required to do so by the Board of Trade. At the same time the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr. Cobden, passed a Resolution praying her Majesty to refer the gauge question to a Royal Commission.

A Commission was issued in July; the Commissioners being three in number—Sir J. M. Frederic Smith, R.E.; Mr. G. B. Airy, Astronomer Royal; and Professor Barlow, of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. They took a large amount of evidence, both oral and documentary, and made some examinations of the working of the two gauges. Their report was presented to Parliament early in the session of 1846.

Of forty-eight witnesses, thirty-five were advocates of the narrow gauge; and against these were arrayed but four champions of the broad gauge, all officers of the Great Western Railway:—Mr. Charles Alexander Saunders, the secretary; Mr. Seymour Clarke, the traffic superintendent; Mr. (now Sir Daniel) Gooch, the locomotive superintendent; and Mr. Brunel.

The report was of considerable length, and in it the Commissioners addressed themselves to three heads of enquiry, viz.:—

1. Whether the break of gauge was an inconvenience of so much importance as to demand the interference of the legislature.

2. What means could be adopted for obviating or mitigating such inconvenience.

3. Considerations on the general policy of establishing a uniformity of gauge throughout the country.

The general conclusions arrived at on these points were thus summed up by the Commissioners:—