Читать книгу The Art of Strategy: Napoleon's Maxims of War + Clausewitz's On War - Carl von Clausewitz - Страница 45

MAXIM XL.

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Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a victorious enemy.

NOTE.

The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses.

The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.

But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity; or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces.