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NEUTRALITY or marching after proclaiming war or peace has been explained.

Sthána (keeping quiet), ásana (withdrawal from hostility), and upekshana (negligence) are synonymous with the word ‘ásana,’ ‘neutrality.’ As to the difference between three aspects of neutrality:---Keeping quiet, maintaining a particular kind of policy is sthána; withdrawal from hostile actions for the sake of one’s own interests is ásana; and taking no steps (against an enemy) is upekshana.

When two kings, who, though bent on making conquests, are desirous of peace, are unable to proceed, one against the other, they may keep quiet after proclaiming war or after making peace.

When a king finds it possible to put down by means of his own army, or with the help of a friend, or of wild tribes, another king of equal or superior power, then having set up proper defences against both internal and external enemies, he may keep quiet after proclaiming war.

When a king is convinced that his own subjects are brave, united, prosperous, and able not only to carry on their own works without interference, but also to harass his enemy's works, then he may keep quiet after proclaiming war.

When a king finds that as his enemy's subjects are ill-treated, impoverished and greedy and are ever being oppressed by the inroads of the army, thieves, and wild tribes, they can be made through intrigue to join his side; or that his own agriculture and commerce are flourishing while those of his enemy are waning; or that as the subjects of his enemy are suffering from famine, they will immigrate into his own territory; or that, though his own returns of agriculture and commerce are falling and those of his enemy increasing, his own subjects will never desert him in favour of his enemy; or that by proclaiming war, he can carry off, by force, the grains, cattle and gold of his enemy; or that he can prevent the import of his enemy's merchandise, which was destructive of his own commerce; or that valuable merchandise would come to his own territory, leaving that of his enemy; or that war being proclaimed, his enemy would be unable to put down traitors, enemies, and wild tribes and other rebels, and would be involved in war with them; or that his own friend would in a very short time accumulate wealth without much loss and would not fail to follow him in his march, since no friend would neglect the opportunity of acquiring a fertile land and a prosperous friend like himself,--then in view of inflicting injuries on his enemy and of exhibiting his own power, he may keep quiet after proclaiming war.

But my teacher says that turning against such a king, his enemy may swallow him.

‘Not so,’ says Kautilya, ‘impoverishment of the enemy who is free from troubles is all that is aimed at (when a king keeps quiet after proclaiming war). As soon as such a king acquires sufficient strength, he will undertake to destroy the enemy. To such a king, the enemy’s enemy will send help to secure his own personal safety.’ Hence, whoever is provided with necessary strength may keep quiet after proclaiming war.

When the policy of keeping quiet after proclaiming war is found productive of unfavourable results, then one shall keep quiet after making peace.

Whoever has grown in strength in consequence of keeping quiet after proclaiming war should proceed to attack his enemy.

When a king finds that his enemy has fallen into troubles; that the troubles of his enemy’s subjects can by no means be remedied; that as his enemy’s subjects are oppressed, ill-treated, disaffected, impoverished, become effiminate and disunited among themselves, they can be prevailed upon to desert their master; that his enemy’s country has fallen a victim to the inroads of such calamities, as fire, floods, pestilence epidemics (maraka), and famine and is therefore losing the flower of its youth and its defensive power,--then he should march after proclaiming war.

When a king is so fortunate as to have a powerful friend in front and a powerful ally (ákranda) in the rear, both with brave and loyal subjects, while the reverse is the case with he enemies both in front and in the rear, and when he finds it possible for his friend to hold his frontal enemy in check, and for his rear-ally to keep his rear-enemy (párshnigráha) at bay, then he may march after proclaiming war against his frontal enemy.

When a king finds it possible to achieve the results of victory single-handed in a very short time, then he may march (against his frontal enemy) after proclaiming war against his rear-enemies; otherwise he should march after making peace (with his rear-enemies).

When a king finds himself unable to confront his enemy single-handed and when it is necessary that he should march, then he should make the expedition in combination with kings of inferior, equal, or superior powers.

When the object aimed at is of a definite nature, then the share of spoils should be fixed; but when it is of a manifold or complex nature, then with no fixity in the share of the spoils. When no such combination is possible, he may request a king either to supply him with the army for a fixed share, or to accompany him for an equal share of the spoils.

When profit is certain, then they should march with fixed shares of profit; but when it is uncertain, with no fixity of shares.

 Share of profit proportional to the strength of the army is of the first kind; that which is equal to the effort made is the best; shares may be allotted in proportion to the profit earned or to the capital invested.

[Thus ends Chapter IV, "Neutrality after Proclaiming War or after Concluding a Treaty of Peace; Marching after Proclaiming War or after Making Peace; and the March of Combined Powers,” in Book VII, “The end of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and second chapter from the beginning.]