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CHAPTER FIVE

The Treaty

Sinn Féin secured a clear mandate from three provinces of Ireland at the 1918 and 1921 general elections. In Ulster, it did not achieve such a mandate and battled with the Irish Parliamentary Party/United Irish League for hegemony within the nationalist community, with both of them significantly below the level of political support for Ulster unionism in the province. With the electoral destruction of the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1918, Sinn Féin became the effective voice of Irish nationalism. At this juncture, the partition of Ireland was being enforced, yet Sinn Féin had no coherent policy on the issue. Other than the counter-productive Belfast Boycott, the party was devoid of any clear strategy to end partition or deal with it. With the birth of the northern jurisdiction and the truce of July 1921, it had to finally confront the issue head-on.

In the preceding years, Sinn Féin leaders tended to over emphasise the blame attributed to Britain for causing partition and to downplay the real hostility of Ulster unionists to being governed by a Dublin parliament. There seemed a genuine, albeit wholly naïve belief that if Britain withdrew from Ireland, Ulster unionists would be open to a united Ireland. De Valera felt that the troubles in Ulster were ‘due to British guile and nothing else’.1 Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith claimed the division of Ireland was ‘unnatural’, maintaining that if the Ulster unionists did not have the backing of the British government, ‘we could settle the Ulster question’.2 Likewise, another Sinn Féin leader, Michael Collins, maintained that ‘the tendency of sentiment in the North East, when not interfered with … was national, and in favour of freedom and unity’.3 Whilst not holding a monopoly on threatening rhetoric, some of the comments made by Sinn Féin representatives were not conducive to creating a favourable impression amongst the unionist community. De Valera often described Ulster unionists as a ‘foreign garrison’ and ‘not Irish people’. If they rejected Sinn Féin solutions, ‘they would have to go under’, and if they stood ‘in our way to freedom we will clear you out of it’.4 Griffith stated that Ulster unionists ‘must make up their minds either to throw in their lot with the Irish nation or stand out as the English garrison. If they did the latter the Irish nation must deal with them.’5 Cahir Healy, writing as Sinn Féin MP for Fermanagh and Tyrone in 1925, attacked the party’s policy towards the north in the years since 1916:

The truth is that none of the Irish leaders understood the northern situation or the northern mind. Griffith, the sanest and best informed of them all, nursed a delusion for years – that the (solution) of the problem lay in London. Not even de Valera’s non-recognition of it nor the rather jumpy efforts which, with Collins, passed for statecraft, could possibly bring us one day nearer peace.6

De Valera modified his views, becoming open to accommodating unionists in a federal Ireland externally associated within the British Commonwealth.7 He moved from a stance of ‘Ulster must be coerced if she stood in the way’ to one of ruling out the use of force against Ulster by 1921.8

This more conciliatory approach was evident in his willingness to meet Craig in May 1921. Alfred Cope from Dublin Castle ‘arranged a “theatrically clandestine” but essentially pointless meeting on 5 May between de Valera and James Craig’.9 Craig courageously agreed to ‘be conducted by a number of IRA men to meet de Valera. The party changed cars before arriving at a house on Howth Road protected by a number of guards disguised as workmen.’10 Craig wanted an agreement on the border; de Valera wanted an agreement on Irish unity. Both were as unrealistic as the other. Craig claimed that de Valera spent the time ‘harping on the grievances of … the last 700 years … After half an hour he had reached the era of Brian Boru. After another half hour he had advanced to the period of some king a century or two later. By this time I was getting tired.’11 Although no agreement was reached, they both expressed an openness to meet again, but this never happened. The meeting also showed that Craig was open to negotiating with Sinn Féin. The meeting was supported by his party, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, Ulster farmers and ‘the trading community is also pleased as there looks to be a hope that by some understanding the boycott can be lifted’.12

Just days after King George V’s speech at the state opening of the northern parliament, Lloyd George invited de Valera, ‘the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland’, and Craig, ‘Premier of Northern Ireland’, to negotiations, without preconditions – another step towards a truce. Equally, it could be construed as recognition of partition by de Valera if he accepted.13 De Valera turned down the invitation, as it denied ‘Ireland’s essential unity’ and instead sought a conference in Dublin with ‘certain representatives of the political minority in this country’, including Craig, the Earl of Midleton (William St John Fremantle Brodrick), Sir Maurice E. Dockrell, Sir Robert H. Woods and Andrew Jameson. He also believed if he went to a conference in London with Craig, ‘they would be like two bad boys and would start fighting themselves at once and the Government would exploit their differences’.14 In his letter to invitees, de Valera stated:

The reply which I, as spokesman for the Irish Nation, shall make to Mr. Lloyd George will affect the lives and fortunes of the political minority in this island, no less than those of the majority.

Before sending the reply, therefore, I would like to confer with you and to learn from you at first hand the views of a certain section of our people of whom you are representative.15

All accepted de Valera’s invitation, except Craig, who replied to his ‘namesake in Dublin Senate’ that he had ‘already accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to London Conference’.16 For ‘sheer impertinence it could hardly be beaten’ claimed Craig’s wife.17

Craig was not involved in the talks between de Valera and Lloyd George following the truce in July. He informed Cope: ‘I’m going to sit on Ulster like a rock, we are content with what we have got – let the Prime Minister and Sinn Fein settle this and if possible leave us out.’18 He wanted to make Northern Ireland ‘a new impregnable Pale’.19 Craig believed that ‘no coercion of Ulster’ was among Lloyd George’s non-negotiable commitments. On 18 July, however, Lloyd George put forward ‘five suggestions to Craig and his ministers as to how they might accommodate de Valera’s requirement of Irish unity with local autonomy for the north devolved from Dublin’.20 Craig and his colleagues emphatically rejected them and Lloyd George backed down. Two days later, Lloyd George made his proposal to de Valera of offering Southern Ireland a dominion settlement. De Valera rejected the proposals, instead demanding ‘that Ulster should become a part of the Irish Dominion. Failing this, he demanded, as his only alternative, complete independence for Southern Ireland.’21 Lloyd George suggested that Craig meet with de Valera again, as another meeting was the only way to make ‘him realise that Ulster is a fact which he must recognise, not a figment bolstered up by the British Government as a counter to Sinn Fein. He does not understand this. Till he understands it, I fear that a settlement will always be unattainable.’22 Craig replied that he would only meet de Valera if he ‘accepted the principle of Ulster’s independent rights, and that he gave a written statement to that effect’.23 This stance was repeated when de Valera invited him to attend a conference in Castlebellingham in County Louth in late July.24

De Valera remained adamant that ‘we cannot admit the right of the British government to mutilate our country, either in its own interest, or at the call of any section of our population’.25 Importantly, he also stated, ‘we do not contemplate the use of force. If your Government stands aside, we can effect a complete reconciliation. We agree with you “that no common action can be secured by force”.’26 He followed up by stating in the Dáil on 22 August that they ‘had not the power, and some of them had not the inclination, to use force with Ulster. He did not think that policy would be successful’.27 At the same meeting, he also declared:

as far as dual nationality was concerned, they never recognised it, but that fact would not prevent the British government from establishing it. For his part, if the Republic were recognised, he would be in favour of giving each county power to vote itself out of the Republic if it so wished. Otherwise they would be compelled to use force.28

The one ‘certain result’ of the county option would have been the gain of counties Tyrone and Fermanagh to the south at the expense of the north, something the Earl of Midleton ‘believed that the Sinn Féin leadership was especially covetous of’ and that there would be ‘no more trouble’ if they were transferred.29 During the impasse between de Valera’s talks with Lloyd George in July and the negotiations in October, Sinn Féin established a committee to ‘collect, compile and arrange … statements of fact and argument bearing on the position of Ulster’. It had the remit to address the ‘challenge which Ulster posed to the Sinn Féin cabinet’ and ‘devise a policy tolerable both to their own supporters and to the British government and which could also be imposed on the Ulster unionists’.30 The suggestion made by some northern Sinn Féin members to set up an advisory body of experts on the north to support the negotiation team in London was not taken up, however.31

Much has been written about the Anglo-Irish negotiations from October to December 1921. That the Sinn Féin plenipotentiaries had a number of disadvantages in comparison to the British delegation was clear. Chief amongst these was the vast experience of the British parliamentarians over the Sinn Féin negotiators. The Sinn Féin negotiation team consisted of Griffith, Collins, Robert Barton, Éamonn Duggan and George Gavan Duffy. The British team consisting of people like Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead was accustomed to stringent debate and opposition in Westminster, unlike the Irish delegates, who were part of what was essentially a talking shop – the Dáil. Lloyd George claimed the Irish delegates ‘are simple; they have none of the skill of the old nationalists; these men are not accustomed to finessing’.32 Most of the British parliamentarians had no respect for the Irish, with Bonar Law declaring ‘the Irish were an inferior race’.33

During the negotiations, the two primary issues discussed were Ulster and the crown. Were the talks to fail, ‘the British were determined that the break should come on the issue of sovereignty, while the Irish were intent that it should be Ulster’.34 The Irish were successful in reopening the Ulster question and rekindling matters that the unionists thought were settled. Lloyd George admitted they had a weaker case on Ulster, stating ‘while British soldiers might die for the throne and empire, I do not know who will die for Tyrone and Fermanagh’.35 The Irish delegation began with the position that ‘the unimpaired unity of Ireland is a condition precedent to the conclusion of a Treaty of Association between Ireland and the nations of the British Commonwealth’.36 On 17 October, the Sinn Féin proposals on Ulster contained concessions that weakened their hand from the outset; their proposals were in line with de Valera’s utterances in the preceding weeks. According to John McColgan:

The Unionists were offered the option of joining with the South or of maintaining local autonomy (over an area to be determined by plebiscite) subject to overriding authority from Dublin. Thus, instead of demanding complete Irish unity at the start, Sinn Féin opened negotiations giving away ground on Ulster. This approach probably prejudiced their chances of forcing the break on Ulster.37

It has also been argued that by this move, ‘Sinn Fein had … implicitly accepted partition by arguing that the state of Northern Ireland should be subservient to Dublin rather than London.’38 During the negotiations, Lloyd George had to expend as much energy in soothing unionist (both Ulster and Conservative) fears as he did in negotiating with Sinn Féin. Although Craig and Bonar Law were not ‘the elephants in the room’, they were ‘the elephants outside the door’.39 Lloyd George told Griffith, ‘we could not coerce Ulster. There was the same strain in the argument of de Valera as I have [heard] here this morning, that Ulster would come in if we let her alone … It is a mistake to assume that the population of Ulster for the time being is opposed to partition. It is not.’40 Nevertheless, once the Irish delegation stated that their allegiance to crown and empire was contingent on Ireland’s ‘essential unity’, Lloyd George and others within the British government appeared open to changing Northern Ireland’s status if Sinn Féin would accept allegiance to the crown.41 Austen Chamberlain, one of the British delegates, explained to his wife that ‘the six counties was a compromise, and, like all compromises, is illogical and indefensible’.42 After the negotiations had concluded, correspondence was published between Lloyd George and Craig, where the former said in November that ‘two dominions in Ireland was impractical and indefensible’.43 He ‘decried the idea of a partition that would involve “cutting the natural circuits of commercial activity”, and said that “when such frontiers are established they harden into permanence”’.44 Lloyd George unsuccessfully tried to squeeze Craig into accepting an all-Ireland parliament. Craig did not budge; instead, he ‘proposed that Northern Ireland should become a dominion “based on ‘equality of status’ with the South”, a proposal that came “as a shock to those accustomed to receive their passionate assurances of union”’ and demonstrated that unionists were somewhat flexible in their relationship with the union.45

Craig had become increasingly wary of Lloyd George since the latter’s five suggestions in July of local autonomy for the north within a Dublin parliament. He was aware of Lloyd George’s cunning and duplicity and also of Northern Ireland’s vulnerability. Ulster unionists noticed a cooling of their relationship with senior figures within the Conservative Party. John Andrews, northern labour minister, condemned the attempted ‘disgraceful betrayal of Ulster’ by members of the British government.46 Lloyd George’s overtures in July prompted the northern cabinet to agree

that everything in the situation pointed to the desirability of Northern Ireland consolidating its position as quickly as possible, and it was decided to carry on with the establishment of the new Parliament rapidly. The Prime Minister undertook to write to the Chief Secretary in regard to the early appointment of the Civil Service Committee, which had been suspended pending the establishment of some form of Government in Southern Ireland.47

Under the Government of Ireland Act, a civil service committee was set up to allocate civil service staff to the northern and southern jurisdictions. The committee could only function once both governments were established and had nominated their representatives to the committee.48 With no southern government in operation, Craig protested that the north was being ‘left in mid-air’ and suggested setting up a government in Southern Ireland ruled by the Lord Lieutenant or as a crown colony, or, alternatively, scrapping the idea of a civil service committee altogether.49 As the year progressed, he pressed harder for the transfer of services to Northern Ireland. Craig had appeared open to cooperating with Sinn Féin earlier in 1921, particularly through the Council of Ireland. He talked of a future of competition and rivalry between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland and of using the Council of Ireland to address all-Ireland problems. At a lunch in Belfast in February 1921, he spoke of his ‘hope not only for a brilliant prospect for Ulster, but a brilliant future for Ireland’.50 That same month, Craig stated, ‘The rights of the minority must be sacred to the majority … it will only be by broad views, tolerant ideas and a real desire for liberty of conscience that we can make an ideal of the Parliament and the executive.’51 One of the first actions of the Northern government was to select its twenty members to sit on the Council of Ireland, led by Craig (see Chapter Four). In declining to meet de Valera at a conference, he pointed out that they could instead meet at the council once it convened.52 Craig also appeared receptive to an all-Ireland council of finance, suggested by Arthur Griffith during the treaty negotiations.53 This openness changed, however, once he spoke to Churchill and Birkenhead. The return of Bonar Law, ‘an Orangeman and a fanatic’, back to the political scene after an absence due to ill-health also added to Craig’s resolve.54 Griffith noticed that by mid-November, Craig had ‘become more intractable as a result of the people he had met here in London’.55

Craig refused to concede any ground to Lloyd George and instead won a major concession from him. On 5 November, Lloyd George agreed to transfer services to Northern Ireland without the existence of a government in the south. The Lord Lieutenant was empowered to appoint, on a temporary basis, Southern Ireland’s representatives of the civil service committee, and services were scheduled to be transferred to the north between 22 November 1921 and 1 February 1922.56 That Lloyd George, the wily negotiator, would grant rather than receive concessions from Craig suggests that his commitment to an all-Ireland solution was not wholly sincere. The Irish delegation were aware that the northern jurisdiction was not fully functioning when the negotiations began in October; services being withheld by the British demonstrated that partition could be negotiable, but they appeared unaware of how to use this to their advantage. The significance of services being transferred to the north seemed lost on almost all of those in Dublin too.57 The main opposition in Dublin came from the civil service itself. From 9 November, the Dublin Castle departments were commanded to assign officers for temporary transfer to the north. Whilst Craig sat on his rock of Ulster, ‘the civil service sat on the rock of the Civil Service Committee … confident that whatever would emerge from the London negotiations would be at least as good as existing terms and might be even better’.58 To prevent the enforced transfer of staff to Belfast, the civil service representative body, the Irish Civil Service Association, took a case to the High Court, further stalling the transfer of staff.59 This did not greatly perturb Craig or Clark, who had been filling the northern civil service with Ulstermen they considered loyal.60 In fact, it suited them not to have too many staff transferred from Dublin, particularly those staff members who did not want to be there. Craig was satisfied that finance and, most importantly, law and order, had successfully been transferred, with agricultural services to be transferred by 1 January and education services by 1 February 1922.61 The transfer of powers of law and order gave the Northern government control over the RIC in the six counties and allowed it to remobilise the Specials.62 Clark’s role in Dublin Castle was discontinued, and he became Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance and head of the civil service in Northern Ireland.63 The judiciary was transferred to Northern Ireland on 1 October, with a formal opening of the new courts taking place three weeks later.64

With the possibility of reaching a settlement by pressurising Craig now ended, Lloyd George looked to squeeze the Sinn Féin delegation instead. His secretary, Tom Jones, dangled the idea of a boundary commission in front of Griffith and Collins. Collins was against the proposal, as ‘it sacrificed unity entirely’. When he enquired why the British would not concede to local plebiscites, cabinet member Austen Chamberlain could only reply meekly, claiming that ‘you could not put a more difficult question to us in the light of the history of recent years’.65 Griffith, however, ‘was not alarmed’.66 He believed the Ulster cabinet would not accept such an offer. Initially, the openness in relation to accepting a boundary commission was a tactical move ‘to deprive “Ulster” of support in England by showing it was utterly unreasonable in insisting to coerce areas that wished to get out’.67 Griffith did believe there would be benefits to it, writing to de Valera that the Boundary Commission ‘would give us most of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and part of Armagh, Down, etc.’.68 Griffith naively interpreted his assurances regarding a boundary commission as a ploy to help Lloyd George secure Irish unity. Instead, his assurances resulted in an animated Lloyd George using them against him as the negotiations reached their conclusion, leading to Griffith and the rest of the Irish delegation signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty on the morning of 6 December 1921.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty’s main provision relating to Ulster was Article 12. It stipulated that if Northern Ireland opted not to join the Irish Free State, as was its right under the treaty, a boundary commission would determine the border ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions’.69 Although Northern Ireland was nominally included in the Irish Free State, ‘in reality the inclusion of a clause allowing the north-east to opt out of Dublin jurisdiction, something they were to do at the first opportunity in December 1922, was merely window-dressing to disguise the established fact of partition’.70 Central to the problem with the Boundary Commission was its ambiguity. No ‘timetable was mentioned or method outlined to ascertain these wishes; how exactly economic and geographic conditions would relate to popular opinion, and which would prove most important’.71 No plebiscite was asked for, the clause was open to a number of different interpretations and no time was specified for the convening of the commission. The ambiguity suited Lloyd George perfectly. On one hand, he could give the impression to Sinn Féin that large tracts of Northern Ireland would be transferred to the south. On the other hand, he could give the impression to Craig that it would rationalise the cumbersome border, with perhaps the inclusion of Protestant strongholds to the north. The duplicity of Lloyd George in 1916 in his dealings with Carson and Redmond was clearly forgotten. The Sinn Féin delegation blundered greatly in acceding to such a vague and indefinable clause. Frank Pakenham contended that the blame on the Irish part ‘must rest either on the legal intelligences of 1921 which failed to see evil lurking in Clause 12, or on those of 1925 which permitted the decision of Mr. Justice Feetham [see Chapter Six]’.72

Ulster unionists were vehemently opposed to the Boundary Commission, despite Craig being one of the first to suggest such a concept during the embryonic stages of the Government of Ireland Bill (see Chapter Two). Firstly, they were not party to the treaty and yet were now obliged to adhere to its clauses. It reignited the sense of uncertainty and once again put Northern Ireland’s future in doubt, or at least significant parts of it. Craig told Lloyd George that he would refuse to cooperate with the commission, as there was ‘no precedent in the history of the British empire for taking away territory from an established government without its sanction’.73 At a northern cabinet meeting the following month, the unionist government reflected on Craig’s refusal and weighed up their options on participating, or not, in the Boundary Commission. Although non-participation would make the government ‘very popular’ in Northern Ireland for a time, having no input meant that ‘Ulster would lose a larger area than if she had a representative on the Commission’, and resistance would be ineffective ‘unless we were prepared to take up arms against British troops’. Such a move would see them ‘probably lose the support of the Unionist Party in Great Britain’.74 If they did take part, Bonar Law assured them that either Lord James Clyde or Lord Dunedin, Andrew Murray, both politicians and judges within the Conservative Party, would act as the northern commissioner. Edward Carson also consented to act as Northern Ireland’s commissioner, stating that ‘a little modification of the boundary might be advantageous’. Craig ‘thought the best course would be not to show our hand at the present time but to consider the matter very carefully during the few months that might elapse before the Boundary Commission would be established’.75 A significant amount of time elapsed by the time the commission finally met in 1924.

Nationalist leaders in the six and twenty-six counties were overly optimistic, as it would transpire, regarding the outcomes that would be achieved from the Boundary Commission, believing many areas in Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Irish Free State, including ‘Derry and its western hinterland, most of Tyrone and all of Fermanagh, south Armagh and south Down’.76 Denis Gwynn wrote that the ‘suggestion of a Boundary Commission seemed naturally to imply that the Ulster Unionists would not be allowed to retain the full Six-County area if they did refuse to enter the Free State’.77 To many nationalists, the treaty ‘was a temporary settlement, regarded by many as extorted by threat of immediate war’.78 The optimism over the Boundary Commission in many ways explains the small fraction of time devoted to partition (just nine out of the total 338 pages of the treaty debates) during the acrimonious Dáil debates on the treaty.79 Both the pro- and anti-treaty sides supported the Boundary Commission as a means to end or at least limit partition. Both sides ‘were complacent about the vague terms of reference for the Boundary Commission and the lack of provision for plebiscites even in border areas’.80 Sovereignty was the primary cause of the split that followed the treaty. Even de Valera’s alternative proposal to the treaty, Document No. 2, originally included the same clauses on the north as the original treaty.81 Many nationalists along the border believed their transfer to the Irish Free State was imminent. They were lulled into a false sense of security, believing they could continue to ignore the northern jurisdiction and its institutions. Their hopes would soon prove illusory.

Up until 1922, partition was an administrative inconvenience that had little impact on the lives of people. The border ‘had not yet become a frontier between two mutually antagonistic states’.82 From 1922, with a new government established in the south, the effects of partition became more apparent. Both Irish governments were ‘forced to devote much attention to relations with each other and to the question of the boundary between their two states’.83