Читать книгу Crisis in the Eurozone - Costas Lapavitsas - Страница 4
ОглавлениеCONTENTS
Introduction: The End of Europeanism by Stathis Kouvelakis
PART 1 BEGGAR THYSELF AND THY NEIGHBOUR
1 Several dimensions of a public debt crisis
Institutional bias and malfunction in the eurozone
Peripheral countries in the shadow of Germany
The impact of the crisis of 2007–9 and the role of finance
Policy options for peripheral countries
The order of analysis in Part 1
2 Macroeconomic performance: Stagnation in Germany, bubbles in the periphery
Growth, unemployment and inflation
3 Labour remuneration and productivity: A general squeeze, but more effective in Germany
The determinants of German competitive success
Real compensation and the share of labour in output
4 International transactions: Trade and capital flows in the shadow of Germany
Current account: Surplus for Germany, deficits for periphery
Financial account: German FDI and bank lending to the periphery
5 Rising public sector borrowing: Dealing with failed banks and worsening recession
The straitjacket on fiscal policy
Rising public deficits and debt due to the crisis
6 The financial sector: How to create a global crisis and then benefit from it
An institutional framework that favours financial but also productive capital
Banking in the eurozone: The core becomes exposed to the periphery
ECB operations allow banks to restrict their lending
Sovereign debt rises
A hothouse for speculation
7 Political economy of alternative strategies to deal with the crisis
Austerity, or imposing the costs on workers in peripheral countries
Reform of the eurozone: Aiming for a ‘good euro’
Exit from the eurozone: Radical social and economic change
PART 2: THE EUROZONE BETWEEN AUSTERITY AND DEFAULT
8 Introduction
9 A profusion of debt: If you cannot compete, keep borrowing
The magnitude of peripheral debt
The economic roots of external debt
The composition of peripheral debt: Domestic financialisation and external flows
10 Rescuing the banks once again
Banks in the eye of the storm
Funding pressures on European banks
The European support package and its aims
The chances of success of the rescue package
11 Society pays the price: Austerity and further liberalisation
The spread of austerity and its likely impact
The periphery takes the brunt of austerity policy
Mission impossible?
12 The spectre of default in Europe
Default, debt renegotiation and exit
Creditor-led default: Reinforcing the straitjacket of the eurozone
Debtor-led default and the feasibility of exit from the eurozone
APPENDIX 2A THE CRISIS LAST TIME: ARGENTINA AND RUSSIA
The Washington Consensus brings collapse to Buenos Aires
Some lessons from Argentina
Russia’s transition from a planned economy: Collapse and recovery
Default is not such a disaster, after all
Appendix 2B Construction of aggregate debt profiles
Greece
Appendix 2C Decomposition of aggregate demand
PART 3: BREAKING UP? A RADICAL ROUTE OUT OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS
13 Hitting the buffers
A global upheaval
The euro: A novel form of international reserve currency
The euro mediates the global crisis in Europe
14 Monetary disunion: Institutional malfunctioning and power relations
The ECB and the limits of liquidity provision
EFSF and ESM fumbling
15 Failing austerity: Class interests and institutional fixes
Virtuous austerity: Hurting without working
Desperately searching for alternatives
16 Centrifugal finance: Re-strengthened links between banks and nation states
The re-strengthening of national financial relations
Greek banks draw closer to the Greek state
17 The social and political significance of breaking up
The context of rupture
Modalities of default
18 Default and exit: Cutting the Gordian knot
Greece defaults but stays in the EMU
Greece defaults and exits the EMU
In lieu of a conclusion
