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CHAPTER 4

The Provisional IRA Emerges

The danger now was that PIRA’s campaign of terror could lead to a backlash and ultimately civil war, first in Northern Ireland but then spilling across the border, engulfing the entire island and population. As it stood, the situation in Northern Ireland was already very dangerous. Different groups of Republicans and Loyalists, all unlawful organisations, raised stark issues for the Republic. The security of the State was threatened by these small unrepresentative self-appointed groups without any mandate from the electorate. They had taken it upon themselves to conduct their campaigns and counter-campaigns of violence, causing death and destruction. They were attempting to dictate to the democratically elected government representatives of Irish society what policy to pursue. By organising themselves into private armies, their use of physical force, intimidation and coercion caused the State to have to actively defend democracy or succumb to their anarchy.

Half a century of discrimination in the North had given rise to the Civil Rights Movement, the response to which was violent counter-demonstration and mob attacks into Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast. Many one-time residents sought security and shelter elsewhere in the North and some across the border in the Republic. Barricaded ‘no go’ areas sprang up, and to begin with the communities were organised by local defence committees. However, the IRA, once long gone, began to re-emerge as the ‘old-timers’ within the organisation were quick to recognise the potential that the crisis offered, especially with the appearance of British troops on the streets. These ‘69-ers’ saw the opportunity to reinvent themselves and initiate a new campaign. It was a moment to be seized upon and they grasped it wholeheartedly.

The Provisional IRA’s strategy was to target the Stormont regime and force the British protecting power to use its own troops in counter-insurgency operations. The measures taken by the British troops would then operate to keep the political temperature of the dissident community at a level favourable to the Provisional IRA.

Catholic Nationalists, already externally under siege, were now to come under the internal influence of the Provisional IRA. Catholic youths were vulnerable to Provisional IRA propaganda, and were ripe for radicalisation. The veteran IRA recruiters gave Catholic youths a ‘cause’ in defence of their own areas. Unfortunately, the uncompromising Unionists and the British army played right into the narrative in a way unimagined by their recruiters. Young men and women were driven into PIRA and sympathy was generated for them and their military across the Catholic communities.

Now community-based with widespread support, PIRA generated a reputation that ensured even those opposed to them would not cross them. The lack of real access to Catholic communities made it difficult for the RUC Special Branch to identify members. Rotation of British army units unskilled in counter-terrorism made the army a very blunt instrument. Those who called for stronger military action, the commitment of more troops, internment without trial, curfews and the like, ought to have borne in mind that they were behaving as the Provisional IRA’s strategy called for them to behave.

These measures brought mounting costs: moral, military, political and psychological; and it was these, not the insurgent operation itself, which was expected in due course to modify the political will of the protecting power – the British. Thus, every measure of military escalation was, in a sense, a success for those who provoked it – PIRA.

The Provisional IRA was highly organised. Overall charge was executed by the seven member Army Council, an army executive which in turn was elected by the General Army Convention (GAC). Made up of delegates from the brigades, the GAC met infrequently and the Army Council was considered by republicans to be the de jour government of Ireland. The Chief-of-Staff (appointed by the Army Council) was supported by General Headquarters (GHQ) staff, comprising of a Director of each department: Intelligence, Operations, Training, Engineering, Finance, Security, Publicity, Research and the all-important Quartermaster.

Territorially, there were two commands: Northern and Southern. The ‘War Zone’, Northern Command, comprised eleven counties (the Six Counties and five border counties) and Quartermastering Support. Southern Command was comprised of the remaining twenty-one counties, and was involved with all the provisioning, supplying and logistical facilitation of operations, both in the War Zone, England and Europe. Training, bomb-making, financing, weapon importation, storage and transportation and anything else in producing the capacity to sustain the ‘cause’.

There were a number of consciously constructed operational phases and evolving game plans which gave the Provisional IRA purpose, direction and momentum over the years of the Troubles:

• Defence (‘Area Defence’)

• Offence (‘One Big Push’)

• The ‘Long War’

• Bombs, Bullets and Ballot Boxes

• Dirty War

• Stalemate, Standstill and ‘One Final Push’

• Peace Process

• Bombing Britain

• The Good Friday agreement

The ‘Quick Victory’ of the early 1970s was not realised and a war of attrition took hold. There were several other critical periods during the conflict and many changes occurred as PIRA were faced with rapidly changing political realities. Sometimes the military establishment were at odds with its political masters, with all sides becoming more sophisticated over time.

If the British security forces were combatting terror, then their Irish counterparts south of the border were mounting a containment operation. The Provisional IRA killed 15 people in 1970, 89 in 1971 and in 1972, the worst year of the Troubles, the so-called ‘Year of Victory’, – they killed 243 people in a concerted and terrifying shooting and bombing campaign.

The televised rioting, the burnt-out Catholic homes, internment and Bloody Sunday all became rallying points around which PIRA built a support network for fundraising and arms supply – particularly in America, but elsewhere also. It was all powerful propaganda, and recruits, arms and money followed.

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The hard fact is that in guerrilla war the enemy holds the initiative for large parts of the time and information is the key to his defeat.

(Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo,

GOC Northern Ireland, 1971–3.)

The British army implemented the political will of the Stormont and Westminster governments in arresting and detaining IRA suspects during ‘Operation Demetrius’ on 9 August 1971, a course of action advised against by Lieutenant General Tuzo. However, a British army Press Officer with 39 Infantry Brigade stated at the Operation’s beginning: ‘Today is the beginning of the end of the IRA … without the head the body will simply thrash around and eventually die ….’ However, many IRA leaders had slipped the net and internment soon became an unmitigated disaster. Violence escalated and ‘for every one we picked up, we have recruited 10 for the IRA’. A new generation of republicans had taken up the struggle.

As well as being ‘at war’ with the British, the IRA was also at war with itself; following the December 1969 split between the ‘Red’ Marxist Official IRA, under Cathal Goulding, and the ‘Green’ militaristic Provisional IRA under Seán Mac Stíofáin. The Provisional IRA was convinced that only physical force would drive the British out of Northern Ireland, a campaign that went into overdrive during 1971 and reached its peak in terms of deaths in 1972, when the Officials (or ‘stickies’ as they were known because that was how they applied the Easter Lily emblems on their lapels at Easter time, the Provisionals preferring to use a pin) called a ceasefire. But not before they had bombed the headquarters of the Parachute regiment at Aldershot, England, killing seven (including five canteen staff members) in reprisal for Bloody Sunday.

By any normal standards, 1972 was a grim year in terms of bombings, shootings and the number of fatalities. In July alone there were 200 explosions, 2,800 shootings and 95 deaths. But for the Provisional IRA, now sixteen months in existence, it gave cause for great self-belief, not least their 7 July secret high-level meeting with William Whitelaw, Secretary for Northern Ireland, in 96 Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, London. With Stormont abolished, direct rule (from London) was instigated and law and order was firmly placed under British Government and military control. A ceasefire called on 26 June, then ten days old and holding, was the backdrop to the talks. The assembled delegation consisted of Gerry Adams, Ivor Bell, Seán Mac Stíofáin, Martin McGuinness, Dáithí Ó Conaill, Seamus Twomey and an observer, the Dublin solicitor Myles Shevlin. The meeting proved inconclusive, the Provisional IRA’s demands were too much for the British, and the ceasefire was over within 72 hours. A confrontation occurred at Belfast’s Lenadoon housing estate when Catholic families were prevented from being rehoused in vacated Protestant houses. The image of a British army Saracen armoured car suddenly ramming a truck piled high with the Catholic families’ furniture was broadcasted widely and internationally.

The Provisional IRA sensed a final victory and they ‘escalated, escalated, escalated’ their campaign up yet another gear. On Friday 21 July, in what became termed ‘Bloody Friday’, they set off 22 explosions in 90 minutes, killing 9 people and injuring 130. This intended ‘spectacular’ bombing operation backfired badly on the Provisional IRA, though, as the British army were unable to deal with the many bombs in so short a time. It was the worst day in Belfast since the German blitz of 1941.

If ‘Victory 1972’ was not achieved and the movement’s appeal was hurt badly by the bombings throughout the year, the Provisional IRA were relentless in maintaining their campaign, confident now of delivering ‘Victory 1974’. The curious blend of open and guerrilla warfare continued as PIRA activists ambushes at crossroads, shot at ‘opportunity targets’, and sniped at soldiers on the streets, across walls and around corners. Local units suddenly appeared, engaged the British army, and then just as quickly melted back into the housing estates.

The Provisional IRA continued to enjoy popular community support and were proving to be a ruthlessly efficient guerrilla force and militarily, the British army were still struggling to come to terms with them. How deeply threatened then was the Irish State by these actions? Was the integrity of the Irish State more vulnerable to the danger than British sovereignty in Northern Ireland? Even with the initial confusion between ‘the doves’ and ‘the hawks’ within the Irish Republic’s ruling party Fianna Fáil resolved, what kind of a security response could be mounted sufficient to match the violent vigour of the Provisional IRA? Curiously, the context south of the border was different, and while the Irish State had every reason to fear what the Irish Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, described as ‘the scourge of society’ (PIRA), there existed a residual memory within the republican movement of what had happened during the 1940s, when de Valera’s Fianna Fáil Government reacted strongly to the IRA threat. Six were executed and three left to die on hunger strike. Subsequently, in 1954, two years before ‘Operation Harvest’ or the IRA ‘Border Campaign’ (1956–62), the IRA introduced General Standing Order Number Eight as part of its operating policy:

Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any militant action against 26 County Forces under any circumstances whatsoever. The importance of this Order in present circumstances, especially in Border areas, cannot be over emphasised …. Volunteers arrested during training or in possession of arms will point out that the arms were for use against the British Forces of Occupation only.

In theory, PIRA were careful not to bring themselves into open conflict with the southern authorities, not out of concern for members of the southern security forces, rather to prevent any ‘anti-IRA’ sentiment from surging across the Republic and a reintroduction of the harsh measures used to deal with them. As it was, the Irish Government was already strengthening its arsenal of measures to deal with the IRA: using new legislation; the building up of the Defence Forces and the Gardaí; and the reintroduction of the Special Criminal Court (SCC) amongst them. However, the Provisional IRA was also building up its arsenal of measures, weapons most prominent amongst them.

On the outbreak of the Troubles, their previously dumped collection of guns and ammunition was unearthed from hides, taken from outbuildings or under grain in farmyard sheds and unwrapped from plastic bags, barrels and boxes. They were basic weapons but in good condition and capable of delivering the lethal effect they were designed and manufactured for: Lee-Enfield .303 (Mark 4) and US Garand .30 calibre semi-automatic rifles, Springfield carbines, Thompson and Sten sub-machine guns, shotguns, .22 rifles, .45 Webley revolvers and explosives stolen from quarries. The simplest bomb was sticks of gelignite taped together with a detonator and a length of fuse, but there was also a lot of information on explosives available in libraries, and IRA training manuals were updated and made available. Subsequently, homemade explosives were produced from readily available materials, much of it fertiliser-based. From very early on, the first consignment of modern ArmaLite rifles were delivered to the IRA and in September 1972 a huge shipment of RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers was successfully and secretively landed at Shannon Airport. Originally the plan was to land the shipment at Farranfore Airport in Co. Kerry but the runway was too short for the aircraft. These rocket launchers were used in a series of attacks along the border the following month.

With the Provisional IRA campaign going into overdrive in Northern Ireland, there was a constant need for weapons, and what could not be brought in could possibly be built. There were those in PIRA who were to prove highly proficient in producing prototypes and then perfecting them. At a more basic level, training camps were organised and established well away from the ‘war zone’: in Kerry, Mayo and other out-of-the-way locations. A five-day training camp model was developed where weapon and explosives familiarisation was conducted, as well as training participants in the characteristics and capabilities of the weapons available. Weapons would be disassembled, their working parts exposed and explained and then the weapon reassembled. This ‘stripping and assembling’ of a weapon demystified it and for many fed the fascination with guns that was an attraction in the first place. Safety precautions, cleaning, care and maintenance were next and then firing practise with live rounds. Any bad habits were corrected through instruction and the individual trainees for the most part reached a standard to be allowed to operate on the streets and in rural parts of Northern Ireland.

Security was an issue and keeping the exact location of the training camp hidden was always uppermost. Active measures were taken to avoid suspicion and discovery. Those attending camps departed from their homes by different routes and were collected at a central rendezvous from which they were transported in vans, minibuses with blacked-out windows and in the rear of cattle trucks. Products used at the camps – including food and drink – were made generic and any reference to locality on milk cartons, shopping bags etc. was removed. No local newspapers were permitted. If discovered, there were selected escape routes and rendezvous spots where the participants were to gather after the getaway was made. Sometimes specialised camps for explosive making or advanced weapons training were also held. Hundreds of trainees passed through the training camps and areas; all were prepared and most put what they had learned into action to perpetrate and continue the violence. Often, force was not only used for the furthering of the ‘Brits out’ aim, but also for its own sake. The constant continuum of thousands of small-scale attacks, shootings and bombings were of value to the Provisional IRA in keeping the low-intensity struggle contested, thereby maintaining morale amongst the active members by keeping them tirelessly committed. This also kept their focus and nurtured their ability – keeping it fit for purpose – and was an overt statement of prevailing strength to the community from which it drew its support.

Financing the campaign and the organisation was always a difficulty; by its own estimates the Provisional IRA cost £2 million a year to keep itself functioning. The funds required came from an assorted mix of sources; a levy on Belfast’s black taxis, gaming machines, drinking clubs, extortion, defrauding the tax and social welfare, smuggling operations along the border involving petrol, cattle, cigarettes and diesel, as well as funds raised abroad – particularly in the USA – and of course bank and wage robberies in the Republic. There was a lot of criminality associated with PIRA and the professionalisation of the Provisional IRA’s handling of its finances was to develop over the years regarding the administration and control of its earnings.

The production of money was one aspect of Provisional IRA activity; the production of fertiliser-based explosives was another. Ammonium nitrate was extracted from a process using Net Nitrate fertiliser mixed with gallons of water. When this was heated and the resultant residue mixed with diesel oil, this became the primary ingredient for PIRA bombs. This process produced a nauseating stench with sickening fumes, and together with the heat such facilities, often semi-derelict buildings in remote areas, were unpleasant places to work. The explosive material extract was collected regularly and transported to bomb factories to become the primary component in car bombs.

The Provisional IRA had the means, method and mentality to continue its armed struggle, taking the fight to the British on every occasion they could, convinced that victory was in their grasp. The military thinking of the Provisional IRA was to change over the years; the leadership became Northern-based, its structure was dramatically reorganised and its support base was broadened by blending the armed struggle with electoral politics. There were to be cessations, ceasefires, truces, campaign resumptions and decisive escalation of violence; more lives were lost in Northern Ireland, and the Irish State was required to go to great lengths to combat the real and sinister threat posed by the organisation.