Читать книгу Understanding Canadian Law Four-Book Bundle - Daniel J. Baum - Страница 6

Chapter 1

Physical Punishment

of Youth — A Crime?

Over the decades, the law has shielded young offenders from the full force of the criminal justice system. As reflected in statutes and court decisions, the law has long assumed that young people lack the maturity of adults and consequently are not to be held fully responsible for their actions. We can ask, at what age is a young person deemed in need of special protection and at what age does that protection end? Public policy states that, if at all possible, parents are to raise their children. The State intervenes only to support parents or those filling the role of parents, such as grandparents or other legal guardians.

We will begin our examination of young offenders’ case studies with the subject of spanking. Criminal law is associated with punishment. Spanking is a form of corporal punishment. If we substitute the word spanking with hitting or striking, then we begin to see how it might be considered in setting public policy for young offenders. It can be used to define a “risk zone” — a danger zone in the sense that it may well bring the court to examine the lawfulness of what has been challenged.

In years gone by, it was usual for frustrated parents whose children seemed out of control to call upon the constable on the beat for assistance — to help their children conform with basic social behaviour. Modern life is more complex, but teachers and school principals still have wide discretion in shaping and enforcing rules for student conduct, including student and locker searches. Their power, however, is now subject to challenge. They may be questioned in court to prove that they acted reasonably. Students find that they have responsibilities and rights. For even as students, they are recognized as persons within the meaning of the Charter.

With most crimes, the first point of contact is the police. They investigate the incident and determine (perhaps in consultation with the Crown) whether charges will be laid. How do the police make decisions when the alleged wrongdoers are youths? How are youths to be questioned? Does the criminal process become more rigorous when the crime becomes more violent? Does the violent youthful offender lose the right to be treated as a youth in need of protection? This book will address such issues.

The range of penalties for adults violating the criminal law includes probation (often with conditions), prison, and possibly fines. All of these penalties are administered, directly or indirectly, by the State. In centuries past, the lash was part of criminal sentencing. In modern Canada, such corporal punishment is no longer used. Since individuals cannot legally assault others, the State cannot assault those who have violated its laws. Still, the State has allowed parents, teachers, or legal guardians to use force “by way of correction.” How does this square with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Constitution of Canada that, among other rights, affords all persons life, liberty, and security of the person? Among the questions raised in this chapter are:

Does the criminal law of assault protect children as well as adults?

Who may spank a child?

What limits are there to physical force by adults against children?

The Criminal Code of Canada allows parents and teachers to use “reasonable force” to correct a child or pupil. This is an exception to the general criminal law, which prohibits anyone from striking another person without consent. The exception in section 43 of the Criminal Code provides: “Every school teacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.”

The Foundation Case

It was the constitutionality of this provision that was challenged by the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law (the Foundation) on several grounds, all of which centred on the Charter. In light of the following points, the Foundation asked for a declaration that the defence to assault be set aside:

The Foundation claimed that the exception violates section 7 of the Charter, which guarantees individuals against state action that infringes on life, liberty, or security of the person contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. This is done, for example, by a law that is too vague for there to be objective rules. (See the portion of the law quoted above.)

Allowing the exception, said the Foundation, in effect gives state approval to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of section 12 of the Charter.

Children are treated differently from adults. They are not given the same protections under the law, and this is a denial of their right to equal protection within the meaning of section 15(1) of the Charter.

The trial judge and the appellate court rejected the arguments of the Foundation. The matter came before the Supreme Court of Canada on June 6, 2003, and it was decided on January 30, 2004, in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General of Canada (the Foundation case). The Court permitted a number of public and private organizations, such as the Child Welfare League of Canada and the Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies, to intervene in the case.

In a 6-3 vote (actually 7-2, considering the partial dissent of Justice Binnie, which approved the conclusion reached by the majority but not its reasoning), in the opinion given by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, the Court allowed the exception to the Criminal Code. But it listed a number of limitations on the use of the Criminal Code defence. The Court addressed such concerns as:

Should force be denied against children of certain ages?

Should the child’s conduct be a measure of the kind of force that may be imposed?

Should teachers and parents have an equal right to use force?

Three individual dissents to the majority opinion were given by Justices Louise Arbour, Marie Deschamps, and Binnie (the latter, as noted above, dissenting in part).

The Majority Decision on Vagueness

The primary issue considered by the Court majority in the Foundation case was whether section 43 was “vague or overbroad.” Specifically, the Foundation argued that section 43 permitted violation of children’s liberty and security by allowing parents and teachers the right to physically discipline them — so long as that discipline was deemed reasonable under the circumstances. The Foundation contended that discipline deemed reasonable under the circumstances is a vague concept. Thus, neither the accused nor the courts are able to have any firm fix on what is permitted and what is subject to criminal sanctions under section 43.

Chief Justice McLachlin, speaking for the Court majority, stated that a law need not provide certainty for it to be constitutional. It is enough for the law to set “an intelligible standard both for the citizens it governs and the officials who must enforce it.” That standard is achieved if the law provides fair warning to potential wrongdoers that they may be entering an area of risk. The chief justice stated:

A vague law prevents the citizen from realizing when he or she is entering an area of risk for criminal sanction. It similarly makes it difficult for law enforcement officers and judges to determine whether a crime has been committed. Yet, whether a law is vague may also depend on the judicial decisions which have interpreted it. Such decisions can add specific meaning to the statute.

This invokes the further concern of putting too much discretion in the hands of law enforcement officials, and violates the precept that individuals should be governed by the rule of law, not the rule of persons. The doctrine of vagueness is directed generally at the evil of leaving basic policy matters to police officers, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc [at the moment] and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.

Ad hoc discretionary decision making must be distinguished from appropriate judicial interpretation. Judicial decisions may properly add precision to a statute. Legislators can never foresee all the situations that may arise and, if they did, could not practically set them all out. It is thus in the nature of our legal system that areas of uncertainty exist and that judges clarify and augment the law on a case-by-case basis.

It follows that section 43 of the Criminal Code will satisfy the constitutional requirement for precision if it delineates a risk zone for criminal sanction. This achieves the essential task of providing general guidance for citizens and law enforcement officers.

This case illustrates that the courts may not be able to spell out with any precision the law in any particular case. What the Supreme Court can do, and what it has done, is indicate a danger area — an area of “risk.” Those who approach it run the risk of crossing the line and having their actions deemed unconstitutional. Often the role of lawyers is to caution their clients that they run the risk of having their actions deemed unconstitutional and, with that declaration, being saddled by the Court with liability for the wrong done.

Creating a Risk Zone

To determine whether section 43 creates a risk zone, the Court majority considered the words of the provision in the context of their ordinary meaning, as well as court decisions interpreting those words.

The chief justice said that section 43 is precise as to who may access the provision: parents, teachers, and those standing in for parents in the sense of carrying all of their duties. In defence of section 43, the chief justice said that it requires that the force is used by way of correction. Further, that force must be reasonable under the circumstances. At this point, the chief justice turned to specific cases to provide further interpretation.

Correction and Education

The chief justice said of correction:

First, the person applying the force must have intended it to be for educative or corrective purposes.… Accordingly, section 43 cannot [allow] outbursts of violence against a child motivated by anger or animated by frustration. It admits into its sphere of immunity only sober, reasoned uses of force that address the actual behaviour of the child and are designed to restrain, control, or express some symbolic disapproval of his or her behaviour. The purpose of the force must always be the education or discipline of the child.…

Second, the child must be capable of benefiting from the correction. This requires the capacity to learn and the possibility of successful correction. Force against children under two cannot be corrective, since on the evidence they are incapable of understanding why they are hit.… A child may also be incapable of learning from the application of force because of disability or some other contextual factor. In these cases, force will not be “corrective” and will not fall within the sphere of immunity provided by section 43.

Reasonable under the Circumstances

Reasonableness, said the chief justice, is a concept long used in law in a number of different areas. It takes its meaning from particular facts and, in that regard, individuals have grown accustomed to measuring their conduct accordingly. The chief justice explained:

The law has long used reasonableness to delineate areas of risk, without incurring the dangers of vagueness. The law of negligence, that has blossomed in recent decades to govern private actions in nearly all spheres of human activity, is founded upon the presumption that individuals are capable of governing their conduct in accordance with the standard of what is reasonable.

But reasonableness as a guide to conduct is not confined to the law of negligence. The criminal law also relies on it. The Criminal Code [citing specific sections] expects that police officers will know what constitutes reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has been committed, such that an arrest can be made (section 495); that an individual will know what constitutes reasonable steps to obtain consent to sexual contact (section 273.2(b)); and that surgeons, in order to be exempted from criminal liability, will judge whether performing an operation is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case (section 45). These are merely a few examples; the criminal law is thick with the notion of reasonableness.

Again, while reasonableness is a standard that has been used to provide guidance, to signal approaching a zone of risk the Court emphasized that the factual and statutory context are important determiners as to meaning. The chief justice stated:

Reality is that the term “reasonable” gives varying degrees of guidance, depending upon the statutory and factual context. It does not insulate a law against a charge of vagueness. Nor, however, does it automatically mean that a law is void for vagueness. In each case, the question is whether the term, considered in light of principles of statutory interpretation and decided cases, delineates an area of risk and avoids the danger of arbitrary ad hoc law enforcement.

In the case of section 43, the chief justice said there were implicit limitations on the law that help shape its meaning, and she named the following:

1 Section 43 provides an exemption for the simple, non-consensual use of force. What it doesn’t permit is force that causes harm or raises a reasonable prospect of harm. This means that section 43 can be used only in the mildest forms of assault. The chief justice wrote:Section 43 does not exempt from criminal sanction conduct that causes harm or raises a reasonable prospect of harm. It can be invoked only in cases of non-consensual application of force that results neither in harm nor in the prospect of bodily harm. This limits its operation to the mildest forms of assault. People must know that if their conduct raises an apprehension of bodily harm they cannot rely on section 43. Similarly, police officers and judges must know that the defence cannot be raised in such circumstances.
2 The line between mild discipline that does not cause harm and injuring a child in the name of discipline, the Court suggested, has been drawn in international treaties to which Canada is a party. As such, the Court cited cases requiring it to interpret Canadian statutes in a way that conforms with international treaties. The Court summarized those obligations as they relate to children: “Canada’s international commitments confirm that physical correction that either harms or degrades a child is unreasonable.”The chief justice referred to specific treaties:Canada is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 5 of the Convention requires state parties to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or … other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.Article 19(1) requires the state party to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.Finally, Art. 37(a) requires [those nations agreeing to the Convention] to ensure that “no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” … This language is also found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights … to which Canada is a party. Article 7 of the Covenant states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes it clear that its provisions apply to “all members of the human family.” From these international obligations, it follows that what is “reasonable under the circumstances” will seek to avoid harm to the child and will never include cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
3 Yet, the Court noted and emphasized that neither the Convention on the Rights of the Child nor the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly require state parties to ban all corporal punishment of children.
4 A somewhat subtle approach has been taken in the interpretation of international treaties as applied to the corporal punishment of children by parents and teachers. Here the treaties have been read against section 7 of the Charter. In the process of monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has said that physical punishment of children in schools involves section 7’s prohibition of degrading treatment or punishment. The committee, Chief Justice McLachlin noted, has not expressed a similar opinion regarding parental use of mild corporal punishment.
5 Further, objective consideration of what is “reasonable under the circumstances” in the case of child discipline, the chief justice said, comes from expert evidence that gives rise to “social consensus.” Such an approach involves finding the meaning of “reasonable under the circumstances” without any subjective interpretation by judges or police. The chief justice wrote:

It is implicit in this technique that current social consensus on what is reasonable may be considered. It is wrong for caregivers or judges to apply their own subjective notions of what is reasonable. Section 43 demands an objective appraisal based on current learning and consensus. Substantial consensus, particularly when supported by expert evidence, can provide guidance and reduce the danger of arbitrary, subjective decision making.

Conclusions Reached: Reasonable Under the Circumstances

The Court reached conclusions — based on interpretation and past decisions, as well as international treaties and “social consensus” — that were quite specific as to “reasonable under the circumstances” as set out in section 43. The chief justice stated these conclusions and they constitute the rules that now apply in the interpretation of section 43:

Based on the evidence currently before the Court, there are significant areas of agreement among the experts on both sides of the issue.…

Corporal punishment of children under two years is harmful to them, and has no corrective value given the cognitive limitations of children under two years of age.

Corporal punishment of teenagers is harmful, because it can induce aggressive or antisocial behaviour.

Corporal punishment using objects, such as rulers or belts, is physically and emotionally harmful. Corporal punishment which involves slaps or blows to the head is harmful. These types of punishment, we may conclude, will not be reasonable.

Contemporary social consensus is that, while teachers may sometimes use corrective force to remove children from classrooms or secure compliance with instructions, the use of corporal punishment by teachers is not acceptable. Many school boards forbid the use of corporal punishment, and some provinces and territories have legislatively prohibited its use by teachers…. This consensus is consistent with Canada’s international obligations, given the findings of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations noted above. Section 43 will protect a teacher who uses reasonable, corrective force to restrain or remove a child in appropriate circumstances. Substantial societal consensus, supported by expert evidence and Canada’s treaty obligations, indicates that corporal punishment by teachers is unreasonable.

A Word about Precedent

The chief justice acknowledged a critique by Justice Arbour (see “The Opinion of Justice Arbour” that follows). There have been a number of varied, even conflicting, decisions coming from trial and appellate Canadian courts as to the meaning of “reasonable under the circumstances” under section 43. Still, the chief justice said that the new guidelines should help to establish some more specific and objective principles that should lead to uniformity. (Justice Arbour did not dispute the conclusions reached by the majority. Rather, she insisted that those conclusions should have been developed under section 7 of the Charter and, more appropriately, through Parliamentary enactment of a new law.) The chief justice stated:

It must be conceded at the outset that judicial decisions on section 43 in the past have sometimes been unclear and inconsistent, sending a muddled message as to what is and is not permitted. In many cases discussed by Arbour J., judges failed to acknowledge the [evolving] nature of the standard of reasonableness, and gave undue authority to outdated conceptions of reasonable correction.

On occasion, judges erroneously applied their own subjective views on what constitutes reasonable discipline — views as varied as different judges’ backgrounds. In addition, charges of assaultive discipline were seldom viewed as sufficiently serious to merit in-depth research and expert evidence or the appeals which might have permitted a unified national standard to emerge. However, the fact that a particular legislative term is open to varying interpretations by the courts is not fatal.… This case, and those that build on it, may permit a more uniform approach to “reasonable under the circumstances” than has prevailed in the past. Again, the issue is not whether section 43 has provided enough guidance in the past, but whether it expresses a standard that can be given a core meaning in tune with contemporary consensus.…

Precedent itself is not always crystal clear, the chief justice seemed to say. But, at least “precedent” should set a guiding principle as to how the law should be construed.

Trumping the Best Interests

of the Child Principle

The law has overridden the principle of the best interests of the child. In the Foundation case, Chief Justice McLachlin, speaking for the Court, stated that the best interests of the child may be an important legal principle, but it can be overridden by other societal needs. The chief justice wrote:

The legal principle of the “best interests of the child” may be subordinated to other concerns in appropriate contexts. For example, a person convicted of a crime may be sentenced to prison even where it may not be in his or her child’s best interests. Society does not always deem it essential that the “best interests of the child” trump all other concerns in the administration of justice. The “best interests of the child,” while an important legal principle and a factor for consideration in many contexts, is not vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice, and hence is not a principle of fundamental justice.

YOU BE THE JUDGE

A Matter of Correction?

The Facts

Under section 43 of the Criminal Code, Janet Wye, age twenty-five, was charged with assaulting her six-year-old son, Jason. Ms. Wye had taken Jason and her three-year-old daughter, Lucy, to the neighbourhood supermarket. Time and again that day, Ms. Wye had quietly and firmly told Jason not to tease his sister. And, time and again, Jason, who understood what he had been told, had proceeded to tease Lucy by pulling her hair and laughing at the result, namely, Lucy in tears with his mother visibly upset.

At the supermarket, Jason’s teasing became more forceful. He not only pulled his sister’s hair, but he yanked some of it out by the roots. Lucy screamed. Jason laughed, and he continued laughing — even when his mother screamed at him. Purposefully, Jason started teasing Lucy. He yanked as hard as he could at some of her long hair.

At that point, his visibly angry mother energetically shook Jason. She said to him, “How would you like it if someone pulled your hair?” She then reached down, took a small clump of Jason’s hair, and pulled it out by the roots. Some blood flowed from the wound. Jason immediately stopped his teasing. Shocked, he looked at his mother and started to cry.

The store manager called the police. Ms. Wye was arrested and charged with assaulting Jason in violation of the Criminal Code. A Children’s Aid worker took charge of the children.

The Issue

Was the force Ms. Wye used against Jason intended to “correct” his behaviour and, as such, was it a defence against the assault charged?

Points to Consider

Section 43 of the Criminal Code prohibits intentional use of force against another without that person’s consent.

The force that Ms. Wye used against Jason was not minor. It was not what the law would term de minimis.

Section 43 does indeed provide a defence against assault of a child by a parent or schoolteacher if it is intended for correction and/or educational purpose.

A section 43 defence by a parent must demonstrate that the assault was reasonable under the circumstances.

The child assaulted (Jason) must be capable of benefiting from the discipline, that is, the assault.

Discussion

Ms. Wye’s defence would likely be rejected for two reasons: (1) the force she used was not imposed to educate or correct Jason’s behaviour, (2) under the circumstances, the Court would conclude that it was not “reasonable.”

To Correct and Educate

On the facts, Ms. Wye physically disciplined her child while she was angry. The chief justice, speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada in the Foundation case, stated that it is not possible for a person in a state of anger to administer physical discipline which, if it is used at all, must be for educative or corrective purposes. She wrote:

The person applying the force must have intended it to be for educative or corrective purposes.… Accordingly, section 43 cannot exculpate [allow] outbursts of violence against a child motivated by anger or animated by frustration. It admits into its sphere of immunity only sober, reasoned uses of force that address the actual behaviour of the child and are designed to restrain, control or express some symbolic disapproval of his or her behaviour. The purpose of the force must always be the education or discipline of the child….

Reasonable Under the Circumstances

An important element for a section 43 defence, the Court ruled, is that the physical discipline must be reasonable under the circumstances. The Foundation questioned whether this test has any objectivity, and whether what is “reasonable” is open to the trial judge’s interpretation. So it was that the Foundation cited The Queen v. K.(M.) (1992), 74 Canadian Criminal Cases, 3d series 108. There, Justice O’Sullivan of the Manitoba Court of Appeal wrote, “The discipline administered to the boy in question in these proceedings [a kick in the rear] was mild indeed compared to the discipline I received in my home.”

Reasonableness, said Chief Justice McLachlin in the Foundation case, is a broad standard. But it does have meaning. Trial judges are not free to do whatever they want. There are limits placed on its application. The chief justice wrote:

The reality is that the term reasonable gives varying degrees of guidance, depending upon the statutory and factual context. [In itself, the term] does not insulate a law against a charge of vagueness. Nor, however, does it automatically mean that a law is void for vagueness. In each case, the question is whether the term, considered in light of principles of statutory interpretation and decided cases, delineates an area of risk and avoids the danger of arbitrary ad hoc [individual] law enforcement.

Is section 43’s reliance on reasonableness, considered in this way, unconstitutionally vague? Does it indicate what conduct risks criminal sanction and provide a principled basis for enforcement? While the words on their face are broad, a number of implicit limitations add precision.

The first limitation arises from the behaviour for which section 43 provides an exemption, simple non-consensual application of force. Section 43 does not exempt from criminal sanction conduct that causes harm or raises a reasonable prospect of harm. It can be invoked only in cases of non-consensual application of force that results neither in harm nor in the prospect of bodily harm. This limits its operation to the mildest forms of assault. People must know that if their conduct raises an apprehension of bodily harm they cannot rely on section 43. Similarly, police officers and judges must know that the defence cannot be raised in such circumstances.

Applied to Ms. Wye, her section 43 defence would likely fail. She struck in anger, and this probably foreclosed an intent to be corrective. Yet more to the point, she caused bodily harm to Jason. She yanked out his hair and caused him to bleed.

A Case of Serious Misbehaviour

Penny Franklin, age twelve, understood the difference between right and wrong. However, she was the leader of a gang of seven girls who called themselves the Holy Terrors. The object of the gang was to intimidate neighbourhood girls who were the same age or younger.

Penny’s parents believed in the philosophy of “spare the rod and spoil the child.” Learning of their daughter’s involvement with the gang, they cautioned her in the strongest possible terms to stop, and they spoke with school authorities — all to no avail.

One day, Mr. and Mrs. Franklin became aware of a particularly vicious attack by the Holy Terrors on eleven-year-old Zoë. No one struck Zoë, but for more than an hour she was swarmed by the Holy Terrors and intimidated. To Penny’s parents, particularly in view of the warning they had given their daughter, this was extremely serious misbehaviour. They felt strongly that it was their duty as parents to take corrective action. Mrs. Franklin took responsibility for meting out discipline. She strapped her daughter, giving her ten strong lashes on her bottom. The punishment left bruises on the girl.

Penny’s serious misbehaviour, however, is not a factor in determining whether her mother’s use of the strap was justified. Corporal punishment, said Chief Justice McLachlin for the Court majority in the Foundation case, should be used only to correct, never to punish. She wrote, “It is improper to … focus on the gravity of a child’s wrongdoing, which invites a punitive rather than corrective focus.… The focus under section 43 is on the correction of the child, not on the gravity of the precipitating event. Obviously, force employed in the absence of any behaviour requiring correction by definition cannot be corrective.” Further, discipline cannot be inflicted if it is likely to cause harm to the child.

CHALLENGE QUESTION

Setting Standards

Q: Will the “rules” set by the Supreme Court in the Foundation case remain fixed? For example, if it is wrong to spank a teenager today, might it become acceptable at another time?

The Court ruled that objective standards should always apply. Further, central to such objective standards is that corporal discipline should always be directed toward correction and/or education.

Trial judges must decide what is reasonable under the circumstances and at the same time recognize that circumstances may change over time. The Court suggested that an approach might be to look to expert evidence, though it did not expressly state that it might come from child psychologists or social workers. Chief Justice McLachlin stated:

Determining what is reasonable under the circumstances in the case of child discipline is also assisted by social consensus and expert evidence on what constitutes reasonable corrective discipline. The criminal law often uses the concept of reasonableness to accommodate evolving mores and avoid successive “fine-tuning” amendments. It is implicit in this technique that current social consensus on what is reasonable may be considered.

It is wrong for caregivers or judges to apply their own subjective notions of what is reasonable. Section 43 demands an objective appraisal based on current learning and consensus. Substantial consensus, particularly when supported by expert evidence, can provide guidance and reduce the danger of arbitrary, subjective decision making.

Justice Binnie’s Partial Dissent

in the Foundation Case

Justice Binnie agreed with the Court’s result as applied to parents and those standing in for parents. He had this to say about the proper role of the appellate courts in “calibrating” the application of rules to changing societal values:

Providing a defence to a criminal prosecution in the circumstances stated in section 43 is rationally connected to the objective of limiting the intrusion of the Criminal Code into family life.

As to minimal impairment, the wording of section 43 not only permits calibration of the immunity to different circumstances and children of different ages, but it allows for adjustment over time. In this respect, the Crown’s expert, Nicholas Bala, stated:

In the past, the use of belts, straps, rulers, sticks and other similar objects to deliver a punishment was commonly accepted, both by society and the courts, as reasonable in the chastisement of children. Today, most courts hold that, in most circumstances, the use of these objects is excessive. As well, previously, courts have considered punishment causing temporary pain lasting a few days, but without permanent injury, to be reasonable. Today’s courts scrutinize the level of pain, bruises, red marks and other signs of temporary harm carefully. In most cases, when they find that a child has suffered some injury, the teacher, parent or person taking the place of a parent is convicted of assault.

In the past, as Arbour J. demonstrates in her reasons, the elasticity of section 43 has led to acquittals in some quite shocking circumstances. However, in my view, it is the function of the appellate courts to rein in overly elastic interpretations that undermine the limited purpose of section 43, which is what the interpretive guidance offered by the chief justice is designed to do, provided the courts stop short of judicial amendment [of the statutory law].

The Media’s Response

The Globe and Mail commented on the Court’s decision in the Foundation case:

In upholding the legality of mild spankings yesterday, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the protection of children also requires protection of their families from the State. But that was the status quo — and some judges have in the past made questionable decisions that left children unprotected from abuse. (A Manitoba appeal court judge once allowed a kick in the rear, saying that he had suffered worse as a child.) So the court wisely drew a line between the mild spanking and the abusive one.

It is not easy to define the boundary between reasonable force to correct a child’s behaviour and abusive force that harms a child. The 7-2 judgment will not, alas, provide perfect protection for all children. Many instances of corporal punishment will remain at the borderline of what is legal, and of what most Canadians would consider tolerable. Most people have seen assaultive behaviour — a twist to the wrist or the cartilage of an ear, a slap to the back of the neck, a series of hard blows to a small child’s back — engaged in by other people in public, or perhaps by themselves at home after a sleepless night. It will remain for the lower courts to define the boundary more precisely, using the Supreme Court’s guidelines. [Here follows a summary of the Court’s guidelines.]

No one should read the [Court’s] judgment as a kind of official sanction for hitting children. Rather, the ruling recognizes what Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin called the “blunt hand of the criminal law” should not be brought down on families, except as a last resort, lest it harm the children in doing so.

A couple of generations ago, it was not uncommon for parents to use belts, straps or sticks on their children. A generation ago, it was permissible to strike children hard enough to leave them in pain for a few days; that is no longer permitted. Yesterday’s ruling, by narrowing the definition of reasonable force, marks a small but important step in society’s advance (“Spanking Is Permitted, but Mind the New Rules” 2004).

Another Point of View

Globe and Mail columnist Margaret Wente also commented on the Court’s decision regarding spanking:

Anti-spankers pretend that little children are rational beings, like the rest of us, and that disciplinary measures should be designed to make them “think.” Actually, little children are more like puppies, most of which are innately loving and aim to please, but need to internalize the norms of civilized conduct. Brute force is a last resort, but sometimes a smack with a rolled-up newspaper wouldn’t hurt. In fact, the principles of training dogs and training children are more or less the same, and it strikes me that if parents were required to attend dog-training courses, we’d all be a whole lot better off. There’s nothing worse than being around a dog that’s got its owner cowed, unless it’s being around an eight-year-old who likes to scream, “You’re not the boss of me!”

In a culture that has elevated violence against children to the greatest of all human evils (and redefined violence to include just about everything), the harm that spanking does has been ridiculously exaggerated. [Some of] the happiest and most grounded kids I’ve ever met belong to families that believe in physical discipline. I know equally splendid kids whose parents never laid a finger on them. It’s not the spanks or lack of them that matter. It’s the clear expectations, the consistency, the ability to set boundaries, the time their parents spend with them, and the steady love. The best parents I know are the ones who spend great amounts of time attending — really attending — to their children. They put in the mileage, and there’s no substitute for it (Wente 2004).

CHALLENGE QUESTION

Are Children Equal

Before and Under the Law?

Q: Does section 43 of the Criminal Code offend section 15 of the Charter?

Here is the context for this question:

The Charter is part of the Constitution of Canada, and as such it is the supreme law of the land. No statute can stand if it offends the Charter.

Section 15(1) of the Charter provides for equality rights with these words: “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.”

A violation of section 15 of the Charter can be excused if it meets the terms of section 1 of the Charter, which provides: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”

The Foundation argued that section 43 decriminalizes the offence of assault against children. As such, a message is sent that a child is less worthy of recognition or value as a human being, or as a member of Canadian society.

Chief Justice McLachlin, for the Court, rejected the argument. There is a difference between the Charter requirement of equal treatment and identical treatment. That Parliament chose section 43 reflects its desire to protect the need of children for safety and security “in an age-appropriate manner.” She wrote:

The difficulty with this argument [that of the Foundation], as we shall see, is that it equates equal treatment with identical treatment, a proposition which our jurisprudence has consistently rejected. In fact, declining to bring the blunt hand of the criminal law down on minor disciplinary contacts … reflects the resultant impact this would have on the interests of the child and on family and school relationships. Parliament’s choice not to criminalize this conduct does not devalue or discriminate against children, but responds to the reality of their lives by addressing their need for safety and security in an age-appropriate manner….

Children need to be protected from abusive treatment. They are vulnerable members of Canadian society and Parliament and the Executive act admirably when they shield children from psychological and physical harm. In so acting, the government responds to the critical need of all children for a safe environment. Yet this is not the only need of children. Children also depend on parents and teachers for guidance and discipline, to protect them from harm and to promote their healthy development within society. A stable and secure family and school setting is essential to this growth process.

Section 43 is Parliament’s attempt to accommodate both of these needs. It provides parents and teachers with the ability to carry out the reasonable education of the child without the threat of sanction by the criminal law.

The criminal law will decisively condemn and punish force that harms children, is part of a pattern of abuse, or is simply the angry or frustrated imposition of violence against children; in this way, by decriminalizing only minimal force of transient or trivial impact, section 43 is sensitive to children’s need for a safe environment. But section 43 also ensures the criminal law will not be used where the force is part of a genuine effort to educate the child, poses no reasonable risk of harm that is more than transitory and trifling, and is reasonable under the circumstances. Introducing the criminal law into children’s families and educational environments in such circumstances would harm children more than help them. So Parliament has decided not to do so, preferring the approach of educating parents against physical discipline.

This decision, far from ignoring the reality of children’s lives, is grounded in their lived experience. The criminal law is the most powerful tool at Parliament’s disposal. Yet it is a blunt instrument whose power can also be destructive of family and educational relationships.…

I am satisfied that a reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, apprised of the harms of criminalization that section 43 avoids, the presence of other governmental initiatives to reduce the use of corporal punishment, and the fact that abusive and harmful conduct is still prohibited by the criminal law, would not conclude that the child’s dignity has been offended in the manner contemplated by section 15(1).

Children often feel a sense of disempowerment and vulnerability; this reality must be considered when assessing the impact of section 43 on a child’s sense of dignity. Yet, as emphasized, the force permitted is limited and must be set against the reality of a child’s mother or father being charged and pulled into the criminal justice system, with its attendant rupture of the family setting, or a teacher being detained pending bail, with the inevitable harm to the child’s crucial educative setting. Section 43 is not arbitrarily demeaning. It does not discriminate. Rather, it is firmly grounded in the actual needs and circumstances of children. I conclude that section 43 does not offend section 15(1) of the Charter.

On the point denying the application of section 15 of the Charter, Chief Justice McLachlin spoke for a majority of six. Justices Binnie and Deschamps dissented; they would have allowed children the protection of section 15. Justice Binnie would have permitted the conclusion reached by the Court majority, but only after the Crown demonstrated justification for the restraint. Justice Deschamps would have afforded children protection and she would have rejected the government’s claim of justification. Justice Arbour saw no need to deal with section 15. Her reason: section 43 offended section 7 of the Charter. We will briefly set out the reasoning of Justices Binnie and Deschamps.

Justice Binnie’s Partial Dissent on Section 43

Quoting the majority opinion, Justice Binnie said: “It may be that introducing the criminal law into children’s families and educational environments [in the context of section 43] would harm children more than help them.” But, he stated, this is a reason that goes toward justifying the action of government within the meaning of section 15 of the Charter. It does not speak to whether children are protected within the meaning of section 15.

Justice Binnie then addressed himself to whether corrective force by parents might be justified. He concluded, “To deny children the ability to have their parents, or persons standing in their parents’ place, to be successfully prosecuted for reasonable corrective force under the Criminal Code does not leave them without effective recourse. It just helps to keep the family out of the criminal courts. In my view, section 43 in relation to parents and persons standing in their place is justified on this basis.”

However, Justice Binnie could not find the same justification as applied to teachers. He wrote:

The question is whether the undoubted need to keep order in schools justifies the section 43 exemption of teachers from the assault provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Law Reform Commission of Canada recommended the repeal of the section 43 defence for school teachers, stating that the ultimate sanction should be the removal of a child from school, not corporal punishment: Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 38, Assault (1984), at p. 44. A number of countries have abolished or modified similar legislative immunities for teachers: see, e.g., section 47 of the British Education (No. 2) Act 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 61; section 59 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 (N.Z.), 1961/43; and s. 139A of the New Zealand Education Act 1989 (N.Z.), 1989/80.

While I accept that order in the schools is a legitimate objective, I do not think that giving non-family members an immunity for the criminal assault of children “by way of correction” is a reasonable or proportionate legislative response to that problem. The attempt to save the constitutionality of section 43 by rewriting it to distinguish between parents and teachers and carving out school order from the more general subject matter of “correction” is, in my view, a job for Parliament. In short, section 43 does not minimally impair the child’s equality right, and is not a proportionate response to the problem of order in the schools.

The Dissent of Justice Deschamps

Justice Deschamps said that section 43 should be interpreted according to the intent of the Parliament at the time of the law’s enactment. As such, the constraints that the majority imposed on section 43 go too far. The Court majority, Justice Deschamps said, has inserted its views as to what the law should be rather than the clear intent of the Parliament. In this regard, she cited and approved the reasoning of Justice Arbour, which is set out (below) in “The Opinion of Justice Arbour.”

Justice Deschamps then proceeded to discuss the application of section 15 of the Charter to children, who, she said, have long been recognized as a vulnerable group in need of protection. She wrote:

Children as a group face pre-existing disadvantage in our society. They have been recognized as a vulnerable group time and again by legislatures and courts. Historically, their vulnerability was entrenched by the traditional legal treatment of children as the property or chattel of their parents or guardians. Fortunately, this attitude has changed in modern times with a recognition that children, as individuals, have rights, including the right to have their security and safety protected by their parents, families and society at large. This recognition is illustrated by several decisions of this Court (see, e.g., B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, (1995) 1 Supreme Court of Canada Reports 315; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., (2000) 2 Supreme Court of Canada Reports 519); … by government policy and laws (for example, specific criminal law protections, family law reforms, and child protection services), and by international legal authorities.…

However, by permitting incursions on children’s bodies by their parents or teachers, section 43 appears to be a throwback to old notions of children as property. Section 43 reinforces and compounds children’s vulnerability and disadvantage by withdrawing the protection of the criminal law. Moreover, because the accused is the very person most often charged with the control and trusteeship of the child, being deprived of the legal protection to which everyone else is presumptively entitled exacerbates the already vulnerable position of children. The entitlement to protection is derived by virtue of our status as persons and the status of children as persons deserves equal recognition.…

[Section] 43 as it currently stands permits a broader range of assaults to be justified by its terms. There is a general consensus among experts that the only benefit of mild to moderate uses of force, such as spanking, is short-term compliance. Anything more serious is not only not conducive to furthering the education of children, but also potentially harmful to their development and health.… It cannot be seriously argued that children need corporal punishment to grow and learn. Indeed, their capacities and circumstances would generally point in the opposite direction — that they can learn through reason and example while feeling secure in their physical safety and bodily integrity.

By condoning assaults on children by their parents or teachers, section 43 perpetuates the notion of children as property rather than human beings and sends the message that their bodily integrity and physical security is to be sacrificed to the will of their parents, however misguided.… Section 43 creates a category of “second-class citizens” that must suffer a “consequent attenuation of [their] right to dignity and physical security.” Far from corresponding to the actual needs and circumstances of children, section 43 compounds the pre-existing disadvantage of children as a vulnerable and often-powerless group whose access to legal redress is already restricted.

The Charter infringement in this case is discriminatory at a very direct and basic level. It clearly impairs the equal rights of children to bodily integrity and security in a much more intrusive way than necessary to achieve a valid legislative objective. The provincial and policy mechanisms available do not change this effect.

The Opinion of Justice Arbour

Justice Arbour came to a conclusion, in her words, “not very different from that reached by the chief justice.” The majority reached their conclusions as to the limitations of corrective force in section 43 because they reflected what the statute, itself, requires. Justice Arbour reached her conclusions as to these limitations because they reflect what the Charter, as part of the supreme law of the land, requires. For that reason, because section 43 offends the Charter, Justice Arbour would have set aside the statute. To do so, she said, does not leave either parents or teachers defenceless in appropriate cases. She pointed to two common law defences, which are described below in “You Be the Judge: A Case of Necessity?” and “Still Another Common Law Defence: De Minimis?”

Further, and this is central to Justice Arbour’s argument, it should be Parliament that brings its laws into conformity with the Charter. It is not the Court’s role to reshape the law to meet the requirements of the Charter.

Section 43 of the Criminal Code

Section 43 has long been part of the criminal law. As such, Justice Arbour said, it stood for values allowing “reasonable” force on children. She stated:

That section 43 is rooted in an era where deploying “reasonable” violence was an accepted technique in the maintenance of hierarchies in the family and in society is of little doubt. Children remain the only group of citizens who are deprived of the protection of the criminal law in relation to the use of force.…

Whether such policy ought to be acceptable today with respect to children is the subject of ongoing debate in society about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the use of corporal punishment by way of correction. We have not been asked to take a side in that debate. However, the issue is also the subject of the constitutional challenge brought before us by the Foundation. This legal challenge is what we must address.

Section 7 of the Charter

To Justice Arbour, it is section 7 of the Charter that must be examined to determine the constitutionality of section 43. Section 7 provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

The first part of the test under section 7 is whether section 43 affects the “security of the person” when the person is a child. Justice Arbour said there is no doubt on this point. The criminal law is an important means by which the State protects the liberty and security of its citizens. The operation of section 43 withdraws that security, which applies to parents and teachers, from children.

This brought Justice Arbour to the second part of the analysis of section 7: Has the security of children been denied by section 43 in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice? In this regard, she accepted the argument of the Foundation that “reasonable under the circumstances” is a standard too vague to allow for clear guidelines; judges could do as they pleased. And, in the view of Justice Arbour, that is precisely what many courts have done. There were no objective case guides (precedents).

It may be, Justice Arbour said, that “reasonableness” in other contexts does permit objective standards. For example, there is something to measure the standard of reasonableness against if the question relates to self-defence. In the face of a defined threat, what was necessary to defend oneself? But, the same may not be said of “reasonableness” applied to the physical discipline of children. Justice Arbour wrote:

This is not so in the case of corporal punishment of children, where there is no built-in [relationship] between physical punishment and bad behaviour that can be used to assess proportionality. Indeed, the chief justice concludes … that the gravity of the child’s conduct is not a “relevant contextual consideration” as it invites a punitive, rather than a corrective focus.

Corporal punishment is a controversial social issue. Conceptions of what is “reasonable” in terms of the discipline of children, whether physical or otherwise, vary widely, and often [involve] cultural and religious beliefs as well as political and ethical ones. Such conceptions are intertwined with how other controversial issues are understood, including the relationship between the State and the family and the relationship between the rights of the parent and the rights of the child.

Whether a person considers an instance of child corporal punishment “reasonable” may depend in large part on his or her own parenting style and experiences. While it may work well in other contexts, in this one the term “reasonable force” has proven not to be a workable standard. Lack of clarity is particularly problematic here because the rights of children are engaged….

Justice Arbour stated that because reasonable under the circumstances is vague, neither parents nor teachers understand the zone of risk, the area in which they might be charged under the criminal law: “A standardless sweep does not become acceptable simply because it results from the whims of judges and justices of the peace rather than the whims of law enforcement officials. Cloaking whims in judicial robes [is] not sufficient to satisfy the principles of fundamental justice.”

Justice Arbour further ruled, that because section 43 is “standardless” — that is, too vague — it cannot meet that portion of section 1 of the Charter, that might otherwise allow a violation of section 7 to stand.

International Treaties and Canada: Protection of the Child

Section 43, Justice Arbour said, had to be measured against the requirements of the Charter, and especially section 7 of that document. After all, the Charter, as the highest law in Canada, sets standards that must be met by statutes such as the Criminal Code.

A source for understanding the rights of children, as they relate to principles of fundamental justice within the meaning of section 7, are Canada’s international obligations found in treaties. There, said Justice Arbour, Canada not only has obligated itself to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, but Canada is also committed to take part in the Committee on the Rights of the Child, set up under the agreement. That committee, whose comments are not binding, said of section 43 in a summary given by Justice Arbour:

It is notable that the Committee has not recommended clarifying these laws [section 43] so much as abolishing them entirely.… The Committee’s Concluding Observations on Canada’s First Report are illustrative:

Penal legislation allowing corporal punishment of children by parents, in schools and in institutions where children may be placed [should be considered for review]. In this regard … physical punishment of children in families [should] be prohibited. In connection with the child’s right to physical integrity … and in the light of the best interests of the child, … the possibility of introducing new legislation and follow-up mechanisms to prevent violence within the family [should be considered], and … educational campaigns [should] be launched with a view to changing attitudes in society on the use of physical punishment in the family and fostering the acceptance of its legal prohibition. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report adopted by the Committee at its 233rd meeting on 9 June 1995, Ninth Session, CRC/C/43, at para. 93.

In its most recent Concluding Observations, the Committee expressed “deep concern” that Canada had taken “no action to remove section 43 of the Criminal Code” and recommended the adoption of legislation to remove the existing authorization of the use of “reasonable force” in disciplining children and explicitly prohibit all forms of violence against children, however light, within the family, in schools and in other institutions where children may be placed. (Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, paras. 32–33)

YOU BE THE JUDGE

A Case of Necessity?

The Facts

Simon Just has been an elementary school teacher for fifteen years. He is recognized by school administrators and students as fair-minded but strict. Rules of conduct, he has frequently said, are meant to be followed. “If they are not taught here and accepted, the likelihood is that they will not be accepted later on in a child’s education.”

Simon Just is an athletic person with a black belt in karate.

One day, he heard screaming in the school hall. Two ten-year-old boys were in the midst of a fight. Both had drawn knives and they were slashing at each other. Both were bleeding.

Just rushed over. He knew both boys. He had been their teacher for three years, and he considered them “hot heads.” They had little capacity to manage their frustrations. With two swift karate chops, Just not only disabled both boys, but knocked them out. Both were rushed to the hospital. They suffered from concussions and dislocated shoulders.

The police laid charges of assault against Just, who admitted that shouting at the boys during the fight might have ended the confrontation. But he felt that this was a chance that he simply could not take. In his view, the boys had been dangerous, capable of seriously wounding him and each other with their knives.

The Issue

Did the fight present an emergency situation that justified Just’s assault?

Points to Consider

Section 43 of the Criminal Code provides: “Every schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if force does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.”

In the context of section 43, teachers may reasonably apply force to remove a child from a classroom or secure compliance with instructions, but force cannot be used merely as corporal punishment.

Section 8(3) of the Criminal Code allows for the common law defence of necessity. This defence recognizes that there are emergency situations where the law does not hold people accountable if they act in self-defence or to save others.

In effect, the defence of necessity is an excuse, not a justification for violating the law.

Discussion

If the reasoning of Justice Arbour in her Foundation case dissent was accepted, Simon Just might have a valid defence within the meaning of section 8(3) of the Criminal Code. He acted to protect children from seriously wounding or possibly killing each other. They were slashing at each other with knives. Both were bleeding. They were known in the school as “hot heads.” Indeed, the fight took place in the school where Just was a teacher. He saw the fight and acted instantly.

Was there a reasonable alternative to the assault, to the use of karate which caused injury? If such an alternative existed, then, under the defence of necessity, he was obligated to use it. Just seemed aware that the law did not approve of the use of force. His alternative was to yell at the boys to stop fighting. However, Just felt that he could not take the chance that the boys would not stop fighting on his command. He believed he had to act quickly to end the fight.

Once Just put before the trial court sufficient evidence to raise the issue of necessity, then the burden was on the Crown to show that the defence was invalid beyond a reasonable doubt.