Читать книгу The Works of Daniel Webster, Volume 1 - Daniel Webster - Страница 9

Critical State of Foreign Affairs on the Accession of General Harrison.—Mr. Webster appointed to the State Department.—Death of General Harrison.—Embarrassed Relations with England.—Formation of Sir Robert Peel’s Ministry, and Appointment of Lord Ashburton as Special Minister to the United States.—Course pursued by Mr. Webster in the Negotiations.—The Northeastern Boundary.—Peculiar Difficulties in its Settlement happily overcome.—Other Subjects of Negotiation.—Extradition of Fugitives from Justice.—Suppression of the Slave-Trade on the Coast of Africa.—History of that Question.—Affair of the Caroline.—Impressment.—Other Subjects connected with the Foreign Relations of the Government.—Intercourse with China.—Independence of the Sandwich Islands.—Correspondence with Mexico.—Sound Duties and the Zoll-Verein.—Importance of Mr. Webster’s Services as Secretary of State.

The condition of affairs in the United States, on the accession of President Harrison to office, in the spring of 1841, was difficult and critical, especially as far as the foreign relations of the country were concerned. Ancient and modern controversies existed with England, which seemed to defy adjustment. The great question of the northeastern boundary had been the subject of negotiation almost ever since the peace of 1783. Every effort to settle it had but increased the difficulties with which it was beset, by exhausting the expedients of diplomacy. The Oregon question was rapidly assuming a formidable aspect, as emigrants began to move into the country in dispute. Not less serious was the state of affairs on the southwestern frontier, where, although a collision with Mexico might not in itself be an event to be viewed with great anxiety, it was probable, as things then stood, that it would have brought a war with Great Britain in its train.

To the uneasiness necessarily growing out of these boundary questions, no little bitterness was added by more recent occurrences. The interruption of our vessels on the coast of Africa was a frequently recurring source of irritation. Great cause of complaint was sometimes given by boarding officers, acting on frivolous pretences or in a vexatious manner. At other times cxx the public feeling in the United States was excited by the exaggerations and misstatements of unworthy American citizens, who abused the flag of the country to cover a detestable traffic, which is made a capital felony by its laws. The affair of the “Caroline,” followed by the arrest of McLeod, created a degree of discontent on both sides, which discussion had done nothing to remove, but much to exasperate. A crisis had arisen, which the Minister of the United States in London24 deemed so serious, as to make it his duty to communicate with the commander of the American squadron in the Mediterranean.25

Such was the state of things when General Harrison acceded to the Presidency, after perhaps the most strenuously contested election ever known, and by a larger popular vote than had ever before been given in the United States. As soon as the result was known, the President elect addressed a letter to Mr. Webster, offering him any place he might choose in his Cabinet, and asking his advice as to the other members of which it should be composed. The wants and wishes of the country in reference to currency and finance having brought about the political revolution which placed General Harrison in the chair, he was rather desirous that the Department of the Treasury should be assumed by Mr. Webster, who had studied those subjects profoundly, and whose opinions were in full concurrence with his own. Averse to the daily drudgery of the Treasury, Mr. Webster gave his preference to the Department of State, without concealing from himself that it might be the post of greater care and responsibility. In this anticipation he was not disappointed. Although the whole of the danger did not at once appear, it was evident from the outset that the moment was extremely critical. Still, however, the circumstances under which General Harrison was elected were such as to give to his administration a moral power and a freedom of action, as to pre-existing controversies, favorable to their settlement on honorable terms.

But the death of the new President, when just entering upon the discharge of his duties, changed the state of affairs in this respect. The great national party which had called him to the helm was struck with astonishment. No rallying-point presented cxxi itself. A position of things existed, not overlooked, indeed, by the sagacious men who framed the Constitution, but which, from its very nature, can never enter practically into the calculations of the enthusiastic multitudes by which, in times of difficulty and excitement, a favorite candidate is borne to the chair. How much of the control which it would otherwise have possessed over public opinion could be retained by an administration thus unexpectedly deprived of its head, was a question which time alone could settle. Happily, as far as our foreign relations were concerned, a character had been assumed by the administration, from the very formation of General Harrison’s Cabinet, which was steadily maintained, till the adjustment of the most difficult points in controversy was effected by the treaty of Washington. President Harrison, as is well known, lived but one month after his inauguration, but all the members of his Cabinet remained in office under Mr. Tyler, who succeeded to the Presidency. With him, of course, rested the general authority of regulating and directing the negotiations with foreign powers, in which the government might be engaged. But the active management of these negotiations was in the hands of the Secretary of State, and it is believed that no difference of views in regard to important matters arose between him and Mr. Tyler. For the result of the principal negotiation, Mr. Tyler manifested great anxiety; and Mr. Webster has not failed, in public or private, to bear witness to the intelligent and earnest attention which was bestowed by him on the proceedings, through all their stages, and to express his sense of the confidence reposed in himself by the head of the administration, from the beginning to the end of the transactions.

If the position of things was difficult here, it was not less so on the other side of the Atlantic; indeed, many of the causes of embarrassment were common to the two countries. There, as here, the correspondence, whether conducted at Washington or London, had of late years done nothing toward an amicable settlement of the great questions at issue. It had degenerated into an exercise of diplomatic logic, with the effect, in England as well as in America, of strengthening each party in the belief of its own rights, and of working up the public mind to a reluctant feeling that the time was at hand when those rights cxxii must be maintained by force. That the British and American governments, during a considerable part of the administrations of General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren, should, with the fate of the reference to the King of the Netherlands before their eyes, have exerted themselves with melancholy ingenuity in arranging the impossible details of another convention of exploration and arbitration, shows of itself that neither party had any real hope of actually settling the controversy, but that both were willing to unite in a decent pretext for procrastination.

The report of Mr. Featherstonhaugh, erroneously believed, in England, to rest upon the results of actual exploration, had been sanctioned by the ministry, and seemed to extinguish the last hope that England would agree to any terms of settlement which the United States would deem reasonable. The danger of collision on the frontier became daily more imminent, and troops to the amount of seventeen regiments had been poured into the British Provinces. The arrest of McLeod, as we have already observed, had brought matters to a point at which the public sensibility of England would not have allowed a minister to blink the question. Lord Palmerston is known to have written to Mr. Fox, that the arrest of McLeod, under the authority of the State of New York, was universally regarded in England as a direct affront to the British government, and that such was the excitement caused by it, that, if McLeod should be condemned and executed, it would not be in the power either of ministers or opposition, or of the leading men of both parties, to prevent immediate war.

While this was the state of affairs with reference to the immediate relations of the two countries, Lord Palmerston was urging France into a coöperation with the four other leading powers of Europe in the adoption of a policy, by the negotiation of the quintuple treaty, which would have left the United States in a position of dangerous insulation on the subject of the great maritime question of the day.

At this juncture, a change of administration occurred in England, subsequent but by a few months to that which had taken place in the government of the United States. Lord Melbourne’s government gave way to that of Sir Robert Peel in the summer of 1841; it remained to be seen with what influence on the relations of the two countries. Some circumstances cxxiii occurred to put at risk the tendency toward an accommodation, which might naturally be hoped for from a change of administration nearly simultaneous on both sides of the water. A note of a very uncompromising character, on the subject of the search of American vessels on the coast of Africa, had been addressed to Mr. Stevenson by Lord Palmerston on the 27th of August, 1841, a day only before the expiration of Lord Melbourne’s ministry. To this note Mr. Stevenson replied in the same strain. The answer of Lord Aberdeen, who had succeeded Lord Palmerston as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, bears date the 10th of October, 1841, and an elaborate rejoinder was returned by Mr. Stevenson on the very day of his departure from London. Lord Aberdeen’s reply to this note was of necessity addressed to Mr. Everett, who had succeeded Mr. Stevenson. It was dated on the 20th of December, the day on which the quintuple treaty was signed at London by the representatives of the five powers, and it contained an announcement of that fact.

Happily, however, affairs were already taking a turn auspicious of better results. From his first entrance on office as Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, long familiar with the perplexed history of the negotiation relative to the boundary, had perceived the necessity of taking a “new departure.” The negotiation had broken down under its own weight. It was like one of those lawsuits which, to the opprobrium of tribunals, descend from age to age; a disease of the body politic not merely chronic, but hereditary. Early in the summer of 1841, Mr. Webster had intimated to Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington, that the American government was prepared to consider, and, if practicable, adopt, a conventional line, as the only mode of cutting the Gordian knot of the controversy. This overture was, of course, conveyed to London. Though not leading to any result on the part of the ministry just going out of office, it was embraced by their successors in the same wise and conciliatory spirit in which it had been made. On the 26th of December, 1841, a note was addressed by Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett, inviting him to an interview on the following day, when he communicated the purpose of the British government to send a special mission to the United States, Lord Ashburton being the person selected as minister, and furnished with full powers to settle every question in controversy.

This step on the part of the British government was as bold as it was wise. It met the difficulty in the face. It justly assumed the existence of a corresponding spirit of conciliation on the part of the United States, and of a desire to bring matters to a practical result. It was bold, because it was the last expedient for an amicable adjustment, and because its failure must necessarily lead to very serious and immediate consequences.

In his choice of a minister, Lord Aberdeen was not less fortunate than he had been wise in proposing the measure. Lord Ashburton was above the reach of the motives which influence politicians of an ordinary stamp, and unencumbered by the habits of routine which belong to men regularly trained in a career. He possessed a weight of character at home which made him independent of the vulgar resorts of popularity. He was animated by a kindly feeling, and bound by kindly associations to this country. There was certainly no public man in England who united in an equal degree the confidence of his own government and country with those claims to the good-will of the opposite party, which were scarcely less essential to success. The relations of personal friendship contracted by Mr. Webster with Lord Ashburton in 1839 have already been alluded to, as influencing the selection. They decided Lord Ashburton in accepting the appointment. The writer was informed by Lord Ashburton himself, that he should have despaired of bringing matters to a settlement advantageous to both countries, but for his reliance on the upright and honorable character of the American Secretary.

With the appointment of Lord Ashburton, the discussion of the main questions in controversy between the two countries, as far as it had been carried on in London, was transferred to Washington. But as an earnest of the conciliatory spirit which bore sway in the British counsels, Lord Aberdeen had announced to Mr. Everett, in the interval which elapsed between Lord Ashburton’s appointment and his arrival at his place of destination, that the Queen’s government admitted the wrong done by the detention of the “Tigris” and “Seamew” in the African waters, and was prepared to indemnify their owners for the losses sustained.

Notwithstanding the favorable circumstances under which cxxv the mission of Lord Ashburton was instituted, the great difficulties to be overcome soon disclosed themselves. The points in dispute in reference to the boundary had for years been the subject of discussion, more or less, throughout the country, but especially in Massachusetts and Maine (the States having an immediate territorial interest in its decision), and, above all, in the last-named State. Parties differing on all other great questions emulated each other in the zeal with which they asserted the American side of this dispute. So strong and unanimous was the feeling, that, when the award of the King of the Netherlands arrived, the firm purpose of General Jackson to accept it was subdued. The writer of these pages was informed by the late Mr. Forsyth, while Secretary of State, that, when the award reached this country, General Jackson regarded it as definitive, and was disposed, without consulting the Senate, to issue his proclamation announcing it as such; and that he was driven from this course by the representations of his friends in Maine, that it would change the politics of the State. He was accustomed to add, in reference to the inconveniences caused by the rejection of the award, and the still more serious evils to be anticipated, that “it was somewhat singular that the only occasion of importance in his life in which he had allowed himself to be overruled by his friends, was one of all others in which he ought to have adhered to his own opinions.”

From the diplomatic papers contained in the sixth volume of the present edition of Mr. Webster’s works it appears that the first step taken by Mr. Webster, after receiving the directions of the President in reference to the negotiation, was to invite the coöperation of Massachusetts and Maine, the territory in dispute being the property of the two States, and under the jurisdiction of the latter. The extent of the treaty-making power of the United States, in a matter of such delicacy as the cession of territory claimed by a State to be within its limits, belongs to the more difficult class of constitutional doctrines. We have just seen both the theory and practice of General Jackson on this point. The administration of Mr. Tyler took for granted that the full consent of Massachusetts and Maine was necessary to any adjustment of this great dispute on the principle of mutual cession and equivalents, or any other principle than that of the ascertainment of the true, original line of boundary by cxxvi agreement, mutual commission, or arbitration. Communications were accordingly addressed to the governors of the two States. Massachusetts had anticipated the necessity of the measure, and made provision for the appointment of commissioners. The legislature of Maine was promptly convened for the same purpose by the late Governor Fairfield. Four parties were thus in presence at Washington for the management of the negotiation: the United States and Great Britain, Massachusetts and Maine. Recollecting that the question to be settled was one which had defied all the arts of diplomacy for half a century, it seemed to a distant, and especially a European observer, as if the last experiment, exceeding every former step in its necessary complication, was destined to a failure proportionably signal and ignominious. The course pursued by the American Secretary, in making the result of the negotiation relative to the boundary contingent upon the approval of the State commissioners, was regarded in Europe as decidedly ominous of its failure.

It undoubtedly required a high degree of political courage thus to put the absolute control of the subject, to a certain extent, out of the hands of the national government; but it was a courage fully warranted by the event. It is now evident that this mode of procedure was the only one which could have been adopted with any hope of success. Though complicated in appearance, it was in reality the simplest mode in which the coöperation of the States could have been secured. The commissions were, upon the whole, happily constituted; they were framed in each State without reference to party views. By their presence in Washington, it was in the power of the Secretary of State to avail himself, at every difficult conjuncture, of their counsel. Limited in number, they yet represented the public opinion of the two States, as fully as it could have been done by the entire body of their legislatures; while it is quite evident that any attempt to refer to large deliberative bodies at home the discussion of the separate points which arose in the negotiation, would have been physically impossible and politically absurd. The commissioners were, on the part of Maine, Messrs. Edward Kavanagh, Edward Kent, William P. Preble, and John Otis; and on the part of Massachusetts, Messrs. Abbott Lawrence, John Mills, and Charles Allen.

While we name with honor the gentlemen forming the commissions, a tribute of respect is also due to the patriotism of the States immediately concerned, and especially of Maine. To devolve on any individuals, however high in the public regard, a power of transferring, without ratification or appeal, a portion of the territory of the State, for such consideration as those individuals might judge to be adequate, was a measure to be expected only in a case of clear necessity and high confidence. Mr. Webster is known to have regarded this with the utmost concern and anxiety, as the turning-point of the whole attempt. His letter to Governor Fairfield states the case with equal strength and fairness, and puts the course there recommended in striking contrast with that of proceeding to agree to another arbitration, as had been offered by the preceding administration, and assented to by England. The fate of the negotiation might be considered as involved in the success of this appeal to the chief magistrate of Maine, and through him to his constituents. It is said that, when Mr. Webster heard that the legislature of Maine had adopted the resolutions for the commission, he went to President Tyler and said, with evident satisfaction and some animation, “The crisis is past!”

A considerable portion, though not the whole, of the official correspondence between the Secretary of State and the other parties to the negotiation is contained in the sixth volume of this collection. The documents published exhibit full proof of the ability with which the argument was conducted. They probably furnish but an inadequate specimen of the judgment, tact, and moral power required to conduct such a negotiation to a successful result. National, State, and individual susceptibilities were to be respected and soothed; adverse interests, real or imaginary, to be consulted; the ordeal of the Senate to be passed through, after every other difficulty had been overcome; and all this in an atmosphere as little favorable to such an operation as can well be imagined. What neither Mr. Monroe in the “era of good feelings,” nor the ability and experience of Messrs. Adams, Clay, and Gallatin, nor General Jackson’s overwhelming popularity, had been able to bring about, was effected under the administration of Mr. Tyler, though that administration seemed already crumbling for want of harmony between some of the members and the head, and between that cxxviii head and the party which had brought him into power. No higher tribute can be paid to the ability and temper which were brought to the work.

It was, however, in truth, an adjustment equally honorable and advantageous to all parties. There is not an individual of common sense or common conscience in Maine or Massachusetts, in the United States or Great Britain, who would now wish it disturbed. It took from Maine a tract of land northwest of the St. John, which the people of Maine believed to belong to them under the treaty of 1783. But it is not enough that we think ourselves right; the other party thinks the same; and when there is no common tribunal which both acknowledge, there must be compromise. The tract of land in question, for any purpose of cultivation or settlement, was without value; and had it been otherwise, it would not have been worth the cost of a naval armament or one military expedition, to say nothing of the abomination of shedding blood on such an issue. But the disputed title to the worthless tract of morass, heath, and rock, covered with snow or fog throughout a great part of the year, was not ceded gratuitously. We obtained the navigation of the St. John, the natural outlet of the whole country, without which the territory watered by it would have been of comparatively little value; we obtained a good natural boundary as far as the course of the river was followed; and we established the line which we claimed at the head of the Connecticut, on Lake Champlain, and on the upper lakes; territorial objects of considerable interest. Great Britain had equal reason to be satisfied with the result. For her the territory northwest of the St. John, worthless to us, had a geographical and political value; it gave her a convenient connection between her provinces, which was all she desired. Both sides gained the only object which really was of importance to either, a settlement by creditable means of a wearisome national controversy; an honorable escape from the scourge and curse of war.

Both governments appear to have been fortunate in the constitution of the joint commission to survey, run, and mark the long line of boundary. Mr. Albert Smith, of Maine, was appointed commissioner on the part of the United States, with Major James D. Graham, of the United States Topographical cxxix Engineers as head of a scientific corps, and Mr. Edward Webster26 as his secretary. On the part of Great Britain, Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. B. Estcourt, of her Majesty’s service, was appointed commissioner, with Captain W. H. Robinson, of the Royal Engineers, as principal astronomer, and J. Scott, Esq., as secretary. Other professional gentlemen were also employed on both sides. Great harmony characterized all the proceedings and results of the commission. The lines were accurately run, and that part of them not designated by rivers was marked all the way by substantial cast-iron monuments, with suitable inscriptions, at every mile, and at most of the principal angles; and wherever the lines extended through forests, the trees were cut down and cleared to the width of thirty feet. All the islands in the St. John were also designated with iron monuments, with inscriptions indicating the government to which they belonged; and upon that and all other streams forming portions of the boundary, monuments were erected at the junction of every branch with the main river.

But it is time to advert to the other great and difficult questions included in this adjustment. The extradition of fugitives from justice is regarded by Grotius and other respectable authorities as the duty of states, by the law of nations. Other authorities reject this doctrine;27 and if it be the law of nations, it requires for its execution so much administrative machinery as to be of no practical value without treaty stipulations. The treaty of 1794 with Great Britain (Jay’s treaty) made provision for a mutual extradition of fugitives, in cases of murder and forgery; and the case of Jonathan Robbins, memorable for the argument of Chief Justice Marshall in defence of his surrender, gave a political notoriety to that feature of the treaty not favorable to its renewal in subsequent negotiations. This treaty stipulation expired by its own limitation in 1806.

Besides the convenience of such an understanding on the part of the two great commercial countries, from which language, personal appearance, and manners render mutual escape so easy, the condition of the frontier of the United States and cxxx Canada was such as to make this provision all but necessary for the preservation of the peace of the two countries. An extensive secret organization existed in the border States, the object of which was, under the delusive name of “sympathy,” to foment and aid rebellion in the British Provinces. Although an agreement for mutual extradition of necessity left untouched a great deal of political agitation unfriendly to border peace, murder and arson were, of course, within its provisions. It appears from the testimony of the parties best informed on the subject, that the happiest consequences flowed from this article of the treaty of Washington. No more was heard of border forays, “Hunters’ Lodges,” “Associations for the Liberty of Canada,” or violences offered or retaliated across the line. The mild, but certain influence of law imposed a restraint, which even costly and formidable military means had not been found entirely adequate to produce.

The stipulations for extradition in the treaty of Washington appear to have served as a model for those since entered into between the most considerable European powers. A convention for the same purpose was concluded between England and France on the 13th of February, 1843, and other similar compacts have still more recently been negotiated. Between the United States and Great Britain the operation of this part of the treaty has, in all ordinary cases, been entirely satisfactory. Persons charged with the crimes to which its provisions extend have been mutually surrendered; and the cause of public justice, and in many cases important private interests, have been materially served on both sides of the water.

Not inferior in importance and delicacy to the other subjects provided for by the treaty was that which concerned the measures for the suppression of “the slave-trade” on the coast of Africa. In order to understand the difficulties with which Mr. Webster had to contend on this subject, a brief history of the question must be given. The law of nations, as understood and expounded by the most respectable authorities and tribunals, European and American, recognizes the right of search of neutral vessels in time of war, by the public ships of the belligerents. It recognizes no right of search in time of peace. It makes no distinction between a right of visitation and a right of search. To compel a trading-vessel, against the will of her cxxxi commander, to come to and be boarded, for any purpose whatsoever, is an exercise of the right of search which the law of nations concedes to belligerents for certain purposes. To do this in time of peace, under whatever name it may be excused or justified, is to perform an act of mere power, for which the law of nations affords no warrant. The moral quality of the action, and the estimate formed of it, will of course depend upon circumstances, motives, and manner. If an armed ship board a vessel under reasonable suspicion that she is a pirate, and when there is no other convenient mode of ascertaining that point, there would be no cause of blame, although the suspicion turned out to be groundless.

The British government, for the praiseworthy purpose of putting a stop to the traffic in slaves, has at different times entered into conventions with several of the states of Europe authorizing a mutual right of search of the trading-vessels of each contracting party by the armed cruisers of the other party. These treaties give no right to search the vessels of nations not parties to them. But if an armed ship of either party should search a vessel of a third power under a reasonable suspicion that she belonged to the other contracting party, and was pursuing the slave-trade in contravention of the treaty, this act of power, performed by mistake, and with requisite moderation and circumspection in the manner, would not be just ground of offence. It would, however, authorize a reasonable expectation of indemnification on behalf of the private individuals who might suffer by the detention, as in other cases of injury inflicted on innocent persons by public functionaries acting with good intentions, but at their peril.

The government of the United States, both in its executive and legislative branches, has at almost all times manifested an extreme repugnance to enter into conventions for a mutual right of search. It has not yielded to any other power in its aversion to the slave-trade, which it was the first government to denounce as piracy. The reluctance in question grew principally out of the injuries inflicted upon the American commerce, and still more out of the personal outrages in the impressment of American seamen, which took place during the wars of Napoleon, and incidentally to the belligerent right of search and the enforcement of the Orders in Council and the Berlin cxxxii and Milan Decrees. Besides a wholesale confiscation of American property, hundreds of American seamen were impressed into the ships of war of Great Britain. So deeply had the public sensibility been wounded on both points, that any extension of the right of search by the consent of the United States was for a long time nearly hopeless.

But this feeling, strong and general as it was, yielded at last to the detestation of the slave-trade. Toward the close of the second administration of Mr. Monroe the executive had been induced, acting under the sanction of resolutions of the two houses of Congress, to agree to a convention with Great Britain for a mutual right of search of vessels suspected of being engaged in the traffic. This convention was negotiated in London by Mr. Rush on the part of the United States, Mr. Canning being the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In defining the limits within which this right should be exercised, the coasts of America were included. The Senate were of opinion that such a provision might be regarded as an admission that the slave-trade was carried on between the coasts of Africa and the United States, contrary to the known fact, and to the reproach either of the will or power of the United States to enforce their laws, by which it was declared to be piracy. It also placed the whole coast of the Union under the surveillance of the cruisers of a foreign power. The Senate, accordingly, ratified the treaty, with an amendment exempting the coasts of the United States from the operation of the article. They also introduced other amendments of less importance.

On the return of the treaty to London thus amended, Mr. Canning gave way to a feeling of dissatisfaction at the course pursued by the Senate, not so much on account of any decided objection to the amendment in itself considered, as to the claim of the Senate to introduce any change into a treaty negotiated according to instructions. Under the influence of this feeling, Mr. Canning refused to ratify the treaty as amended, and no further attempt was at that time made to renew the negotiation.

It will probably be admitted on all hands, at the present day, that Mr. Canning’s scruple was without foundation. The cxxxiii treaty had been negotiated by this accomplished statesman, under the full knowledge that the Constitution of the United States reserves this power to the Senate. That it should be exercised was, therefore, no more matter of complaint, than that the treaty should be referred at all to the ratification of the Senate. The course pursued by Mr. Canning was greatly to be regretted, as it postponed the amicable adjustment of this matter for eighteen years, not without risk of serious misunderstanding in the interval.

Attempts were made on the part of England, during the ministry of Lord Melbourne, to renew the negotiation with the United States, but without success. Conventions between France and England, for a mutual right of search within certain limits, were concluded in 1831 and 1833, under the ministry of the Duc de Broglie, without awakening the public sensibility in the former country. As these treaties multiplied, the activity of the English cruisers increased. After the treaty with Portugal, in 1838, the vessels of that country, which, with those of Spain, were most largely engaged in the traffic, began to assume the flag of the United States as a protection; and in many cases, also, although the property of vessels and cargo had, by collusive transfers on the African coast, become Spanish or Portuguese, the vessels had been built and fitted out in the United States, and too often, it may be feared, with American capital. Vessels of this description were provided with two sets of papers, to be used as occasion might require.

Had nothing further been done by British cruisers than to board and search these vessels, whether before or after a transfer of this kind, no complaint would probably have been made by the government of the United States. But, as many American vessels were engaged in lawful commerce on the coast of Africa, it frequently happened that they were boarded by British cruisers, not always under the command of discreet officers. Some voyages were broken up, officers and men occasionally ill-treated, and vessels sent to the United States or Sierra Leone for adjudication.

In 1840 an agreement was made between the officers in command of the British and American squadrons respectively, sanctioning a reciprocal right of search on the coast of Africa. It will be found among the papers pertaining to this subject, in the cxxxiv sixth volume of this collection. It was a well-meant, but unauthorized step, and was promptly disavowed by the administration of Mr. Van Buren. Its operation, while it lasted, was but to increase the existing difficulty. Reports of the interruptions experienced by our commerce in the African waters began greatly to multiply; and there was a strong interest on the part of those surreptitiously engaged in the traffic to give them currency. A deep feeling began to be manifested in the country; and the correspondence between the American Minister in London and Lord Palmerston, in the last days of the Melbourne ministry, was such as to show that the controversy had reached a critical point. Such was the state of the question when Mr. Webster entered the Department of State.

The controversy was transmitted, as we have seen, to the new administrations on both sides of the water, but soon assumed a somewhat modified character. The quintuple treaty, as it was called, was concluded at London, on the 20th of December, 1841, by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and information of that fact, as we have seen above, was given by Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett the same day. A strong desire was intimated that the United States would join this association of the great powers, but no formal invitation for that purpose was addressed to them. But the recent occurrences on the coast of Africa, and the tone of the correspondence above alluded to, had increased the standing repugnance of the United States to the recognition of a right of search in time of peace.

In the mean time, the same complaints, sometimes just, sometimes exaggerated, sometimes groundless, had reached France from the coast of Africa, and a strong feeling against the right of search was produced in that country. The incidents connected with the adjustment of the Syrian question, in 1840, had greatly irritated the French ministry and people, and the present was deemed a favorable moment for retaliation. On the assembling of the Chambers, an amendment was moved by M. Lefebvre to the address in reply to the king’s speech in the following terms: “We have also the confidence, that, in granting its concurrence to the suppression of a criminal traffic, your government will know how to preserve from every attack the interest of our commerce and the independence of our flag.” cxxxv This amendment was adopted by the unanimous vote of the Chambers.

This was well understood to be a blow aimed at the quintuple treaty. It was the most formidable parliamentary check ever encountered by M. Guizot’s administration. It excited profound sensation throughout Europe. It compelled the French ministry to make the painful sacrifice of a convention negotiated agreeably to instructions, and not differing in principle from those of 1831 and 1833, which were consequently liable to be involved in its fate. The ratification of the quintuple treaty was felt to be out of the question. Although it soon appeared that the king was determined to sustain M. Guizot, it was by no means apparent in what manner his administration was to be rescued from the present embarrassment.

The public feeling in France was considerably heightened by various documents which appeared at this juncture, in connection with the controversy between the United States and Great Britain. The President’s message and its accompanying papers reached Europe about the period of the opening of the session. A very sew days after the adoption of M. Lefebvre’s amendment, a pamphlet, written by General Cass, was published in Paris, and, being soon after translated into French and widely circulated, contributed to strengthen the current of public feeling. A more elaborate essay was, in the course of the season, published by Mr. Wheaton, the Minister of the United States at Berlin, in which the theory of a right of search in time of peace was vigorously assailed.

The preceding sketch of the history of the question will show the difficulty of the position in reference to this most important interest, at the time Lord Ashburton’s mission was instituted. With what practical good sense and high statesmanship the controversy was terminated is well known to the country. It is unnecessary here to retrace the steps of the correspondence, to comment on the eighth article of the treaty of Washington, or to analyze the parliamentary and diplomatic discussions to which in the following year it gave rise. It is enough to say, that, under circumstances of some embarrassment to the Department of State, a course of procedure was happily devised by Mr. Webster, and incorporated into the treaty, which, leaving untouched the metaphysics of the question, furnished a satisfactory cxxxvi practical solution of the difficulty. Circumstances having made a restatement expedient of the principles maintained by the United States on this most important subject, a letter was addressed by Mr. Webster to Mr. Everett, on the 28th of March, 1843, to be read to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which the law of nations applicable to the subject was expounded by the American Secretary with a clearness and power which will render any further discussion of the subject, under its present aspects, entirely superfluous. Nor will it be thought out of place to acknowledge the fairness, good temper, and ability with which the doctrine and practice of the English government were sustained by the Earl of Aberdeen.

The wisdom with which the eighth article of the treaty was drawn up was soon seen in its consequences. Its effect was decisive. It put a stop to all discontent at home in reference to the interruption of our lawful commerce on the coast of Africa. Abroad, it raised the jealousy already existing in France on this subject to the point of uncontrollable repugnance. The ratification of the quintuple treaty had long been abandoned. It was soon evident that the conventions of 1831 and 1833 must be given up. In the course of the year 1844, the Duc de Broglie, the honorable and accomplished minister by whom they had been negotiated, accepted a special mission to London, for the purpose of coming to some satisfactory arrangement by way of substitute, and a convention was soon concluded with the British government on precisely the same principles with those of the treaty of Washington.

It may be hoped that the important suggestion of Mr. Webster will be borne in mind, in any future discussions of this and other maritime questions, that the policy of the United States is not that of a feeble naval power interested in exaggerating the doctrine of neutral inviolability. A respect for every independent flag is a common interest of all civilized states, powerful or weak; but the rank of the United States among naval powers, and their position as the great maritime power on the western coasts of the Atlantic and the eastern coasts of the Pacific, may lead them to doubt the expediency of pressing too far the views they have hitherto held, and moderate their anxiety to construe with extreme strictness the rights which the law of nations concedes to public vessels.

The three subjects on which we have dwelt, namely, the northeastern boundary, the extradition of fugitives, and the suppression of the slave-trade, were the only ones which required to be provided for by treaty stipulation. Other subjects, scarcely less important and fully as difficult were happily disposed of in the correspondence of the plenipotentiaries. These were the affair of the “Caroline,” that of the “Creole,” and the question of impressment. Our limits do not permit us to dwell at length on these topics; but we shall be pardoned for one or two reflections.

So urgent is the pressure on the public mind of the successive events which demand attention each as it presents itself, that the formidable difficulties growing out of the destruction of the “Caroline” and the arrest of McLeod are already fading from recollection. They formed, in reality, a crisis of a most serious and delicate character. A glance at the correspondence of the two governments at Washington and London sufficiently shows this to be the case. The violation of the territory of the United States in the destruction of the “Caroline,” however unwarrantable the conduct of the “sympathizers” which provoked it, became, from the moment the British government assumed the responsibility of the act, an incident of the gravest character. On the other hand, the inability of the government of the United States to extricate McLeod from the risks of a capital trial in a State court, although the government of England demanded his liberation on the ground that he was acting under the legal orders of his superior, presented a difficulty in the working of our system equally novel and important. Other cases had arisen in which important constitutional principles had failed to take effect, for want of the requisite legislative provisions. It is believed that this was the first time in which a difficulty of this kind had presented itself in our foreign relations. A more threatening one can scarcely be imagined. In addition to the embarrassment occasioned by the refusal of the executive and judiciary of New York to yield to the representations of the general government, the violent interference of the mob presented new difficulties of the most deplorable character. If McLeod had been executed, it is not too much to say, that war would at once have ensued. His acquittal averted this impending danger. The conciliatory cxxxviii spirit cannot be too warmly commended with which, on the one hand, the proper reparation was made by Lord Ashburton for the violation of the American territory, and, on the other hand, Congress, by the passage of an appropriate law, provided an effectual legislative remedy for any future similar case. They show with what simplicity and ease the greatest evils may be averted, and the most desirable ends achieved, by statesmen and governments animated by a sincere desire to promote the welfare of those who have placed power in their hands, not for selfish, party purposes, but for the public good.

There is, perhaps, no one of the papers written by Mr. Webster as Secretary of State, in which so much force of statement and power of argument are displayed as in the letter on “impressment.” To incorporate a stipulation on this subject into a treaty was, regarding the antecedents of the question, impracticable. But the reply of Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster’s announcement of the American principle must be considered as acquiescence on the part of his government. It may be doubted whether this odious and essentially illegal practice will ever again be systematically resorted to, even in England.28 Considering the advance made by public sentiment an all questions connected with personal liberty, “a hot-press on the Thames” would hardly stand the ordeal of an investigation in Parliament at the present day. It is certain that the right of impressing seamen from American vessels could never be practically asserted in a future war with any other effect than that of adding the United States to the parties in the contest. No refinements in the doctrine of natural allegiance, although cxxxix their theoretical soundness might equal their subtilty, would be of the least avail here. To force seamen from the deck of a peaceful neutral vessel, pursuing a lawful commerce, and compel them to serve for an indefinite and hopeless period on board a foreign man-of-war, is an act of power and violence to which no nation will submit that is able to resist it. In the case of the United States and Great Britain, that community of language and resemblance in general appearance which may have been considered as palliating the most deplorable results of the exercise of this power, in reality constitute the strongest reason for its abandonment. The unquestionable danger that, with the best intentions, the boarding officer may mistake an American for an Englishman; the certainty that a reckless lieutenant, unmindful of consequences, but bent upon recruiting his ship on a remote foreign station, will pretend to believe that he is seizing the subjects of his own government, whatever may be the evidence to the contrary, are reasons of themselves for denying on the threshold the existence of a right exposed to such inevitable and intolerable abuse.

These and other views of the subject are presented in Mr. Webster’s letter to Lord Ashburton of the 8th of August, 1842, with a strength of reasoning and force of illustration not often equalled in a state paper. That letter was spoken of, in the hearing of the writer of this memoir, by one whose name, if it could be mentioned with propriety, would give the highest authority to the remark, as a composition not surpassed by any thing in the language. The principles laid down in it may be considered as incorporated into the public law of the United States, and will have their influence beyond our own territorial limits and beyond our own time.

Some disappointment was probably felt, when the treaty of Washington was published, that a settlement of the Oregon question was not included among its provisions. It need not be said that a subject of such magnitude did not escape the attention of the negotiators. It was, however, speedily inferred by Mr. Webster, from the purport of his informal conferences with Lord Ashburton on this point, that an arrangement of this question was not then practicable, and that to attempt it would be to put the entire negotiation to great risk of failure. On the other hand, it was not less certain that, by closing up cxl the other matters in controversy, the best preparation was made for bringing the Oregon dispute to an amicable issue, whenever circumstances should favor that undertaking. Considerable firmness was no doubt required to act upon this policy, and to forego the attempt, at least, to settle a question rapidly growing into the most formidable magnitude. It is unnecessary to say how completely the course adopted has been justified by the event.

We have in the preceding remarks confined ourselves to the topics connected with the treaty of Washington. But other subjects of great importance connected with the foreign affairs of the country engaged the attention of Mr. Webster as Secretary of State.

The first of these pertained to our controversies with Mexico, and was treated in a letter to M. de Bocanegra, the Mexican Secretary of State and Foreign Relations. The great and unexpected changes which have taken place in that quarter since the date of this correspondence will not impair the interest with which it will be read. It throws important light on the earlier stages of our controversy with that ill-advised and infatuated government. Among the papers in this part of the volume are those which relate to the Santa Fé prisoners and Captain Jones’s attack on Monterey.

Under the head of “Relations with Spain” will be found a correspondence of great interest between the Chevalier d’Argaïz, the representative of that government, and Mr. Webster, on the subject of the “Amistad.” The pertinacity with which this matter was pursued by Spain, after its adjudication by the Supreme Court of the United States, furnishes an instructive commentary upon the sincerity of that government in its measures for the abolition of the slave-trade. The entire merits of this important and extraordinary case are condensed in Mr. Webster’s letters of the 1st of September, 1841, and 21st of June, 1842.

Of still greater interest are the institution of the mission to China, and the steps which led to the establishment of the independence of the Sandwich Islands. The sixth volume of this collection contains the instructions given to Mr. Cushing as commissioner to China, and the correspondence between Mr. cxli Webster and Messrs. Richards and Haalilio on behalf of the Sandwich Islands. At any period less crowded with important events the opening of diplomatic relations with China, and the conclusion of a treaty of commerce with that power, would have been deemed occurrences of unusual importance. It certainly reflects great credit on the administration, that it acted with such promptitude and efficiency in seizing this opportunity of multiplying avenues of commercial intercourse. Nor is less praise due to the energy and skill of the negotiator,29 to whom this novel and important undertaking was confided, and who was able to embark from China, on his return homeward, in six months after his arrival, having in the mean time satisfactorily concluded the treaty.

The application of the representatives of the Sandwich Islands to the government of the United States, and the countenance extended to them at Washington, exercised a most salutary and seasonable influence over the destiny of those islands. The British government was promptly made aware of the course pursued by the United States, and was no doubt led, in a considerable degree, by this circumstance, to promise the Hawaiian delegates, on the part of England, to respect the independent neutrality of their government. In the mean time, the British admiral on that station had taken provisional possession of them on behalf of his government, in anticipation of a similar movement which was expected on the part of France. If intelligence of this occurrence had been received in London before the promise above alluded to was given by Lord Aberdeen to Messrs. Richards and Haalilio, it is not impossible that Great Britain might have felt herself warranted in retaining the protectorate of the Hawaiian Islands as an offset for the occupation of Tahiti by the French. As it was, the temporary arrangement of the British admiral was disavowed, and the government restored to the native chief.

Among the papers contained in the sixth volume will be found a correspondence between Mr. Webster and the Portuguese Minister, on the subject of duties on Portuguese wines, and a report of great importance on the Sound duties and the Zoll-Verein, topics to which the recent changes in the Germanic system will henceforward impart a greatly increased importance.

This brief enumeration will of itself sufficiently show the extensive range of the subjects to which the attention of Mr. Webster was called, during the two years for which he filled the Department of State.

The published correspondence probably forms but a small portion of the official labors of the Department of State for the period during which it was filled by Mr. Webster. They constitute, nevertheless, the most important part of the documentary record of a period of official service, brief, indeed, but as beneficial to the country as any of which the memory is preserved in her annals. The administration of General Harrison found the United States, in the spring of 1841, on the verge of a war, not with a feeble Spanish province, scarcely capable of a respectable resistance, but with the most powerful government on earth. The conduct of our foreign relations was intrusted to Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, and in the two years during which he filled that office controversies of fifty years’ standing were terminated, new causes of quarrel that sprung up like hydra’s heads were settled, and peace was preserved upon honorable terms. The British government, fresh from the conquest of China, perhaps never felt itself stronger than in the year 1842, and a full share of credit is due to the spirit of conciliation which swayed its counsels. Much is due to the wise and amiable minister who was despatched from England on the holy errand of peace; much to the patriotism of the Senate of the United States, who confirmed the treaty of Washington by a larger majority than ever before sustained a measure of this kind which divided public opinion; but the first meed of praise is unquestionably due to the American negotiator. Let the just measure of that praise be estimated, by reflecting what would have been our condition during the last few years, if, instead of, or in addition to, the war with Mexico, we had been involved in a war with Great Britain.