Читать книгу Briefly: Mills' On Liberty - David Mills Daniel - Страница 8

What is On Liberty?

The question that Mill addresses in On Liberty affects people to a much greater extent today than in 1859, when it was published. How much power is society entitled to exercise over the individual? Mill recognized that these questions had assumed greater, not less, significance, as, during the nineteenth century, reform movements and revolutions led to the establishment of more democratic governments. In a non-democratic state, such as the monarchies that had governed most European countries in the eighteenth century, it was clear that rulers and ruled had different interests. Those who opposed such governments sought to replace them with elected ones, chosen by and responsible to the majority of the people, which would look after their interests and thus eliminate conflict between rulers and ruled. Mill, however, thought it naive to think that the arrival of democracy would solve all problems. On the contrary, the rise of elected governments meant that the issue of individual freedom tended to be overlooked.

A democratic government represents the majority, but what about individuals and minorities who have not chosen that particular government, whom it does not represent, and to whom it might be hostile, or those minorities or individuals whose opinions are at odds with the majority in society? It is necessary to safeguard their rights against the tyranny of the majority. And (Mill argues) such tyranny does not necessarily take the form of political oppression by government itself. It may be social tyranny, involving the use of public opinion to coerce nonconformists into acceptance of majority views and modes of behaviour.

So, where should the boundary between individual freedom and society’s legitimate interference with individual conduct be drawn? Mill proposes what he calls ‘one very simple principle’ to regulate society’s control over the individual: that the only purpose for which society may exercise power over one of its members, against his will, is where his conduct may harm others or their interests. In matters affecting only himself or his interests, the individual (children and those incapable of managing their affairs being excepted) must have absolute independence.

Of course, this principle of individual liberty is less simple to apply than to state. Opinions will vary as to whether or not certain actions harm others, or, even if this is agreed, whether or not they should be banned or tolerated. But Mill’s point is that, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, and the behaviour in question is clearly harming others or their interests, individual freedom should always be preferred to social control. As Mill explains, a range of historical, religious, cultural and social factors determine the values of a particular society, from religious beliefs, through the interests of a particular social class, to a society’s ‘likings and dislikings’. However much importance it places on its values, society, or the majority in it, should not impose them on dissentient individuals and minorities, and thus restrict their freedom, unless their actions involve harm to others.

For example, until after the middle of the twentieth century, society in Britain disapproved of homosexuality, and homosexual relationships were against the law, even though what took place between two consenting adults could not harm others or their interests. Today, in Britain, fox-hunting is banned, even though it is hard to see how those who pursue this minority sport can cause harm to others. Of course, it is true that many people had or have strong moral or religious objections to both. But would either the former ban on homosexual relationships, or the current ban on fox-hunting, pass the test of Mill’s very simple principle? Were, or are, the restrictions on personal liberty they involve justified by the standard he proposes?

Mill maintains that all matters relating to conscience and the expression and publication of opinion, including press freedom, fall within the ‘region of human liberty’, and no restrictions should be placed on them. This is consistent with his principle of individual liberty, but he argues that, quite apart from the matter of individual freedom, there are practical reasons why censorship harms society, including those in it who disagree with certain opinions, and want to suppress them. Most human opinions and conduct are rational because they can be corrected through discussion. Indeed, truth is usually arrived at through a combining and reconciling of opposite points of view. For this to be possible, people need to be able hear a wide range of different points of view on a subject and, even when an opinion has become the majority one, it should continue to be scrutinized and debated. A suppressed opinion on a particular matter may be the true one, or it may contain an important (but neglected) part of the truth, which the generally accepted opinion lacks. Mill uses the example of Christian morality. Some claim that it provides a complete system of morality, but (in his view) it needs to be supplemented by Greek and Roman morality, with their greater emphasis on the ideas of duty and public obligation. Further, even if the majority opinion is true, unless it is challenged it will be held as a mere dogma, not a belief that has ‘living power’. He considers that this had happened to Christianity. It was no longer a dynamic, growing religion because its beliefs and values were generally accepted, so its followers no longer had to defend them against challenge and criticism.

In a democratic society, few would challenge Mill’s argument for freedom of expression. But can it always be the paramount consideration, or are there occasions when, even in a democratic society, it needs to be curbed, because the views being expressed may lead to incitement of hatred against individuals or groups, or even be directed at destruction of the democratic society itself? As Mill acknowledges, it is one thing to denounce corn-dealers as starvers of the poor in the press, but another to do so to an excited mob, in front of a corn-dealer’s house.

Mill has little patience with the view that the proponents of controversial or minority opinions should express them with restraint, to minimize offence, and even less with any suggestion that there should be legislation to regulate the matter. People with strong views often express them with a passion that opponents find objectionable, but this is in the nature of public debate. What he does deplore is any attempt, particularly by the supporters of the majority view, to represent their opponents as bad or immoral, simply because of their views, which can deter them from making their case. Mill’s insistence on mutual fairness and tolerance in public debate seems particularly relevant today, when, in the political world, ‘spin’, misrepresentation of opponents’ views and assaults on their integrity have become commonplace.

But individual freedom is not just about people’s views and how they are expressed; it is also about how they lead their lives. Although Mill accepts that actions, where the potential for harm to others is greater, cannot be as free as opinions, he felt that nineteenth-century European society, which was increasingly dominated by mass public opinion, as reflected in mass circulation newspapers, discouraged individuality and originality, thus impoverishing human life. Afraid to be different, people were too ready to let society decide how they should live, rather than choosing for themselves. The consequence was that many people were unable to achieve their full potential, and lead fulfilled and happy lives, because they felt compelled to conform to the approved standard of conduct, while society was denied the benefit of the new ideas that unconventional lifestyle choices might generate, as these only occur in conditions of freedom and individuality.

Mill maintains that, with democratic governments increasingly pandering to the demands of the masses that elected them, the general trend in society was towards acceptance of the ‘despotism of custom’, making progress difficult. He makes a plea for the cultivation of individuality. Society needs eccentrics, who will flout mass opinion, and live unconventional lives, and whose value lies less in their being right than in their refusal to bend the knee to custom, which sets an example to others.

It could be argued that Mill adopts too extreme a position here. While individuals often lead the way in political and social reform, his view that all wise and noble things come from individuals, and that no democratic government can rise above the level of the mediocre seems exaggerated and elitist. It was proved wrong by, for example, the important reforms introduced by William Gladstone’s 1868–74 Liberal government which, following the 1867 Reform Act, was elected on a much more democratic franchise than its predecessors. But Mill is also pointing out a danger that democratic governments face. They are elected by the people, and must represent their interests, but this does not mean they should allow their voters to do their thinking for them. They must provide leadership, not follow the dictates of public opinion. Mill also makes the perceptive point that the rule of custom, although it impedes progress, does not necessarily rule out change, provided the change applies to, or is accepted by, everyone. So a proposed reform may be resisted, but once it is introduced, it immediately becomes the new orthodoxy, which everyone must accept. Any continuing opponents of the reform will be regarded as being as eccentric as its proponents were previously.

In Chapter IV of On Liberty, Mill explores the question of where the boundary between what he calls ‘self-regarding’ actions (those that affect only the individual) and actions that affect others (with which society is entitled to interfere) should be drawn. Society is entitled to punish those who harm others, whether by law or public opinion, but, although it may encourage people to cultivate self-regarding virtues, point out their mistakes to them, and, if they do not change their ways, shun them, it is not entitled to interfere with conduct, however foolish, that affects only the individual himself. The evil of compelling an individual to act against his wishes, even for his own good, is greater than the mistakes (and their consequences), which follow from his choosing for himself.

However, in practice, is there such a thing as a purely self-regarding action? Smoking seems to be one. If an individual chooses to smoke, despite the risks involved, he is the one who will have to face the consequences. But do the consequences affect only the smoker? At home or in a public place, his smoking will make conditions unpleasant for other people. If he becomes ill, it will cause distress to family and friends. Treating the illnesses that result from smoking imposes costs on the health service; and so on.

Mill uses the example of drinking. In itself, drinking alcohol is a self-regarding action, but it ceases to be one if a heavy drinker is unable, because of it, to look after a family or meet financial obligations. Then society is entitled at least to express its disapproval. But he warns against society interfering with purely personal conduct, just to impose the majority view of what is good on a minority, as he thought was the case in some parts of the United States, where the sale of alcohol was banned. However the example of alcohol just illustrates the practical difficulties of distinguishing between purely self-regarding actions and those that affect others. Mill is severe on the temperance movements, in Britain as well as the United States, as examples of organizations wanting to impose their view of what is good on others. But when people drink alcohol outside their own homes, it is not a purely personal act. It does have a public dimension, because it can and does affect others. Banning it would be an extreme measure, but few people would want alcohol consumption to be free of regulation by society: not so that the majority can impose their view of what is good on the minority, but to protect the rest of society from inconvenience and harm.

Again, if we applied Mill’s argument, would we have to regard the taking (as opposed to the selling) of drugs as a self-regarding action, with which society should not interfere? After all, our present anti-drug laws control individual conduct for the individual’s own good, as well as to prevent harm to others. Mill himself acknowledges that it is legitimate for governments to restrict the sale of alcohol to prevent breaches of the peace, while the sellers’ interest in promoting consumption for purposes of profit justifies regulation of its sale. He also accepts that, while taxation of alcohol simply to reduce consumption is illegitimate interference with individual liberty, taxation of what is a non-essential item for revenue-raising purposes is not.

If society, in the interests of individual freedom, must tolerate actions of which it disapproves, does it have to tolerate the activities of those who, perhaps for personal profit, encourage others to commit such actions? Mill concedes that, while society must tolerate fornication and gambling, it is more difficult to decide whether it must also tolerate pimps and casino owners.

Mill considers that, in nineteenth-century British society, there were instances of liberty being allowed where it should be denied and vice-versa. Husbands were permitted despotic and unacceptable powers over their wives, as were parents over their children. Yet, the state did not, as he thought it should (and began to through the Elementary Education Acts from 1870 onwards), compel parents to ensure that their children received an education. In fact, Mill was opposed to the state providing education, except as one type of educational provision among many, fearing that it would become a means of moulding children to be exactly the same, and thus of preventing the development of individuality. However, he held that the state should provide public examinations, to assess children’s progress and check if parents were carrying out their responsibilities. Interestingly and perhaps surprisingly, Mill thought it would be legitimate for the state to pass laws preventing couples from marrying, unless they could prove the means of supporting children, in order to prevent children being brought up in conditions of extreme poverty and wretchedness.

To what extent is it acceptable for the state to help its citizens, rather than leaving them to fend for themselves? Overall, Mill is opposed to too much assistance, because it would lead to what we might call ‘big government’. Generally, people do things better, and become more responsible and self-reliant citizens, if left to themselves, while any increase in government activity simply adds to its power, including its power over individuals, which is undesirable. He was afraid that if the state began to take over the role of free institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, universities, local councils and voluntary organizations, neither a free press nor a democratic constitution could ensure the country remained a free one. As central government accumulated power and administrative functions, the state bureaucracy (civil service) would expand, so that in the end, the most able people would be state employees, while the rest would become dependent upon it, and thus its docile instruments, incapable of individual initiative. Mill urges that, as far as possible, administrative functions should be given to local authorities, with central government’s role confined to supervision and the dissemination of information. It is interesting to speculate on what Mill would think of the massive expansion of government activity that has taken place since his day.

Perhaps, every politician, political activist and political campaigner should keep On Liberty to hand. It does not provide a simple means of determining the extent to which the state or society is entitled to restrict individual liberty. But Mill’s principle of individual liberty affirms that ensuring individual liberty must be a priority, and that the state or society should only restrict it if there are compelling reasons for doing so. Mill also makes the important points that: in itself, democracy is no guarantee of individual liberty and democratic governments can be too ready to pander to their electorates; for opinions and decisions to be soundly based, all points of view on a subject need to be freely expressed and listened to with respect; the majority opinion may be wrong, and minority or individual opinion right; and the over-expansion of state power and functions can restrict individual liberty and inhibit development of responsible and self-reliant citizens.