Читать книгу The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945 - David S. Nasca - Страница 11

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Introduction

Amphibious Warfare in Practice through History

Amphibious warfare is a type of offensive operation in which naval vessels are used to land and support the movement of ground forces from ship to shore. It has been used for centuries in the history of warfare and has been conducted for a variety of reasons ranging from raiding and plundering to military and humanitarian operations. In short, the use of amphibious warfare not only allows the projection of hard power from the water, but also sets the stage for follow-on ground forces and subsequent operations beyond the coast and into the interior.

Amphibious warfare has been in use since ancient times. Historical records and archaeological studies show that amphibious warfare was used extensively throughout the world. It was used by the Greeks, especially the Athenians, in the subjugation of various maritime settlements and islands around the Greek peninsula. While the mountainous terrain of Greece’s landscape restricted movement and heavily favored the defender, the waters around the peninsula offered easier access for the movement, support, and deployment of Greek armies. The seas of the Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean, and Mediterranean were the common military avenues of approach that offered the least resistance. Athens became the dominant power not only by its maritime trade and development, but also by carefully utilizing its formidable navy to expand its control throughout the region. During the Persian Wars, the Greek city-states used these geographical features to decisively defeat two Persian invasions and, afterward, to go on to destroy the Persian Empire.¹

Athens and the other maritime Greek city-states achieved this success by their effective naval tactics: the intelligent division of labor to operate their warships, ship-to-ship communications, and continuous training. City-states such as Athens excelled at naval warfare by maximizing speed and communication to coordinate their own ships to sink or disable other enemy ships. In addition, Athens and other Greek maritime states continuously adapted and developed naval technology to improve the speed, durability, and performance of their naval vessels. While Athens enjoyed naval superiority in the oceans of the ancient world, it was severely handicapped when it came to land-based operations.²

During the Peloponnesian War, Athens attempted to overcome this deficiency by using its naval strength to defeat the more powerful ground forces of Sparta and its allies. Athens elected to use amphibious warfare as the means to allow its powerful navy to land its armies at times and locations of its own choosing, hence forcing Sparta and its allies to spread their ground forces to protect vulnerable regions that they could not afford to lose. While Athens used amphibious warfare for demonstrations, raids, and seizing weakly defended coastal settlements and islands, the possibility of coordinating a large-scale amphibious campaign to seize a large, fortified city was extremely difficult and very risky.

Athens and its allies suffered for committing to one such amphibious operation during the Sicilian Expedition during the seventeenth year of the Peloponnesian War. The intent was to conquer Syracuse and utilize its immense wealth and manpower to finally finish the war with Sparta. Unfortunately, the campaign was a complete disaster, and it led to the destruction of the expeditionary force.³ While it failed for several reasons at the strategic and operational level—primarily poor leadership and planning—training and preparations also played a part. Although the Athenian expeditionary force had marines available, their responsibility was limited to policing the crew as well as defending or attacking ships. Meanwhile, the regular line Greek soldier had neither a familiarity with amphibious operations nor the ability to swim. Additionally, the lack of coordination and communication in offloading the expeditionary force, building up its combat power once ashore, and attacking Syracuse were hampered by continuous delays and indecisiveness. These holdups allowed Syracuse’s military to recover from the initial shock of the invasion, build up its defenses and, afterward, sally forth to surround and destroy the Athenians. In addition, the arrival of Sparta and its allies finished off what was left of the expeditionary force and turned the tide of the battle and, ultimately, the war.⁴ As a result, the geopolitical position of Athens as the most powerful city-state in Greece was shattered, the Peloponnesian War was concluded, and Athenian power was lost when it sued for peace with Sparta and its allies.⁵

The failure of the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse served as an important lesson for many centuries to future nations and empires about the importance of avoiding amphibious warfare whenever possible because it was simply too expensive and risky. Ironically, amphibious warfare played a decisive role in future strategies over the centuries, as seen with Rome’s victory over Carthage, the Viking invasions that led to the destruction of the Carolingian Empire, the Norman conquest of England, and the capture of Quebec during the French and Indian War. Yet, a review of numerous historical narratives reveals amphibious warfare in a more negative light, as seen in the Roman Civil Wars from 49 BC to 30 BC, the failure of the Mongols to seize Japan, repeated Ottoman attempts to conquer Rhodes, and British military embarrassments during the American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. In each case, while the ships, weapons, armor, and fighting techniques differed, the conduct of amphibious warfare remained the same.

Essentially, amphibious warfare was thought to be a straightforward affair in which men were loaded onto boats, shipped to the desired location, and unceremoniously dumped off at the nearest port or beach to find and fight the enemy. This mindset posed several obvious problems, one of them being the assumption that the port or beach was either friendly or neutral to the expeditionary force’s intentions. The other difficulties were situationally dependent and determined by a variety of factors, such as weather, hydrography, and terrain. In addition, planners had to consider intelligence about the enemy’s strength and location on land and sea, the infrastructure and capabilities of the port, and issues with supply and labor. All these factors could potentially impact the coordination, movement, and support of the expeditionary force when it had to disembark and fight.

This practice continued with various countries and civilizations over the centuries and relied strictly on avoiding coastal forts and defenses as well as staying away from nearby armies that could potentially move against the landing force. In such cases, the expeditionary force could find itself potentially in a long, protracted siege if the enemy army decided to dig in and fortify a key settlement, as seen from the Ottoman defeat during the Siege of Malta in 1565. Even worse, the entire expeditionary force could be completely destroyed before it even landed and assembled for battle, as seen in 1588 with the destruction of the Spanish Armada and its expeditionary force in the North Sea during an attempted invasion of England. While both the Ottoman and Spanish Empires survived centuries after these catastrophic defeats, these operations had political, economic, and military consequences both at home and abroad. Not only was the material loss self-evident militarily and economically, but it also had significant consequences. For both the Ottoman and Spanish Empires, belief in their invincibility as the perceived top world powers of their time was severely compromised and, therefore, so was their support in their respective homelands and within the international system. After these disasters, both empires went through a slow, gradual decline over the centuries as unrest and revolution threatened to destroy their imperial institutions, while other powerful, opportunistic state actors sought to carve territorial acquisitions for themselves.

For many centuries, amphibious warfare in military history was looked at as an ad hoc affair and was consistently observed as such by its repeated failures, defeats, and disasters. Campaigns with successful amphibious attacks were argued to be special cases in which luck, surprise, or overwhelming military force played a major part. The lack of planning and preparation, combined with poor intelligence and unanticipated factors in landing troops from the sea, created the impression that amphibious warfare against a hostile enemy coast simply could not be done on a large scale. Instead, amphibious warfare tended to revert to either coastal raids, as seen in many of the European colonial skirmishes and wars prior to the nineteenth century, or by utilizing a friendly port from an allied nation in order to land unmolested and assemble the manpower and supplies necessary for an upcoming campaign or battle.

Part of the argument was that ships were made simply for destroying or capturing other ships. In the event that ships were used in support of ground operations, as in the case of an opposed amphibious landing, naval commanders had to improvise, using weapons and equipment it had on hand to support the landing force. Boats meant for transporting only a small landing party had to be converted to serve as transports to offload large numbers of men and supplies either at the port or at the beach. Usually, such a process was a very laborious, disorganized affair, resulting in not having enough time to land the whole ground force on the coast or sometimes failing to completely unload all the necessary food, supplies, weapons, and equipment for the expeditionary force’s campaign. In addition, such amphibious operations were even more frustrating by the need for unity of command and the potential chance for friction between leadership personalities. At a minimum, this friction often resulted in arguments. At worst, the expeditionary force was quickly kicked ashore and simply left behind by the navy!

The Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolutions attempted to address these shortfalls by setting the foundations for sorely needed organizational training and reform within the military. These changes ultimately led to the professionalization of the soldier and sailor through the creation of recruit training centers and war academies, thus creating a learning environment for military personnel. In turn, these institutions helped set conditions for the technical specialization of the military and the importance of using scientific logic and technology to carefully study the realities of combat in a variety of geographic locations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The United States and Amphibious Warfare

While amphibious warfare was developed and used for centuries, the United States was one of the few nations in world history to use amphibious warfare to position itself for geopolitical supremacy in the international system. Being protected by two of the world’s largest oceans, the American republic was not only sheltered from invasion from more powerful state actors, but was able to use the safety of the North American continent to build and expand its political, economic, and military base. However, the United States’ use of amphibious warfare would not start to become a factor in its rise to superpower status until nearly the end of the nineteenth century. The rise in science and industry contributed to amphibious warfare’s use and success for the United States, because it enabled the development and mass production of technologies that could minimize the difficulties of amphibious warfare. Due to these developments, when the United States became strong and secure enough, it soon used technology to expand beyond North America to begin systematically using amphibious warfare to influence and fight other countries to promote its national interests and democratic ideology.

The United States’ ability to use amphibious warfare to dominate the world started with the Second Industrial Revolution, which brought unprecedented advances in science and technology to industrialized nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It resulted in the development of inventions in agriculture, industry, and commerce as well as transformed the face of human society, including warfare. As a new industrialized power, the United States dramatically expanded throughout the world from 1898 to 1945. This expansion was driven primarily by the United States’ desire for security both at home and abroad.

Kenneth J. Hagan recognizes that the rise in technology and industrialization also resulted in the modernization of most of the major powers’ militaries, especially their navies. The growing naval strength of the European Powers, especially Great Britain, in terms of better guns and armor for its warships made the U.S. Navy nervous. With the American Civil War long over, the U.S. Navy was lagging behind more and more in technological development and modernization. Fearing that the American continent and its overseas interests could potentially be threatened by more advanced and more powerful naval forces from the other world powers, the U.S. Navy pushed for a comprehensive modernization program and an expansion of the American fleet. In addition, American naval leadership also pushed for better salaries, training, living conditions, arsenals, naval bases, and other support facilities to keep the U.S. Navy afloat and combat ready.⁶

During this period, amphibious warfare went through a dramatic technological transformation that defined America’s current geopolitical strategy. Armed with the new technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution, the United States was now able to use its large industrial and technological base to project large, powerful military forces into almost every part of the world. In being able to land on hostile shores and defeat its enemies, the United States’ geopolitical strategy evolved from a western hemispheric focus in the nineteenth century to a global outlook by the conclusion of World War II that continues today. In understanding the importance of amphibious warfare, also known as “expeditionary operations,” Jon T. Hoffman argues, “Expeditionary warfare remains an elusive and somewhat malleable concept, but throughout history it has been a vital component of national power.”⁷

This book focuses on amphibious warfare and the manner in which it shaped American geopolitical strategy from the Spanish-American War in 1898 to the final defeat of the Axis Powers during World War II in 1945. During this period, America used its industrial and technological superiority to develop modern amphibious capabilities in order to move its massive military strength against its enemies. New technologies, such as aviation and nuclear weapons, were introduced during this time period and later influenced U.S. geopolitical strategy in the second half of the twentieth century. However, the use of aviation and nuclear weapons had drawbacks and limitations that became apparent during World War II. Land- and carrier-based aviation was not powerful enough to force enemy states to surrender, while nuclear weapons were not only too destructive, they were soon found to cause longterm health and environmental problems. However, the modernization of amphibious warfare positioned the United States to become the most powerful nation in the world and, ultimately, established the foundations of an international system shaped under American leadership. Russell Weigley points out that once American military power became great enough to make the destruction of the United States’ enemies an object worth contemplating, American strategy soon focused on the problem of how to secure victory.⁸

While amphibious warfare has been in use since ancient times, the rise of the Second Industrial Revolution radically transformed this type of warfare in unforeseen ways. The introduction of bolt-action rifles, machine guns, indirect artillery, battleships, steamboats, aircraft, aircraft carriers, combustible engines, and wireless communications enhanced the speed, support, and destructive power of military forces. During this period of industrial development, the United States began its transformation into a world superpower based on its growing economic, political, and military base in North America. Through its growing economic and technological capabilities, the United States became part of a growing interconnected international system that brought it into conflict with many competing states. Henry Kissinger points out that the United States played contradictory roles in the world in terms of being involved with and indifferent to other countries’ affairs as well as being so globally ideological and isolationist at the same time. The fact of the matter is that the United States became an empire of influence through a combination of hard and soft power.⁹

During the expansion of the United States’ influence in the international system, the American political and military leadership began to appreciate the potential threats that other powerful competitor nations posed to American security interests and values. William H. McNeill discusses the growing relationship between the military and industry dating back to the European powers of the eighteenth century. McNeill uses the example of the symbiotic relationship that built the strength and power of the British Empire’s military during the nineteenth century when five-year plans were utilized to develop and shape British power projection capabilities through the Royal Navy. The British government’s efforts in industrial mobilization were the result of political and military leaders working together to develop strategic planning with industrial management. This union not only led to the design of military technologies to meet geopolitical requirements, but also led other nations to adopt this policy of developing industrial and technological efforts in building up their respective military forces.¹⁰

Many of the world’s political and military leaders during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries believed that war was a rational course of action because of the ease and quickness with which conflicts could now be waged overseas to conquer various peoples through the leaders’ respective country’s monopoly on technological violence. The use of technology on amphibious warfare essentially allowed powerful, industrialized nations to project military power at almost any point of the globe. It was now possible to land large military forces, supported by the Second Industrial Revolution’s technological inventions and mass production capabilities, to fight wars overseas and impose their nation’s will on another nation through the deployment of a permanent ground force. Max Boot points out in his historical study of various different weapons technologies that the nations capable of taking advantage of technological changes and incorporating them into their militaries have been history’s winners, while those that have fallen behind in harnessing innovation have been consigned to irrelevance or oblivion.¹¹

Among the major powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States recognized the potential capabilities of technology on amphibious warfare and called for a reorganization of its naval and ground forces, especially in regard to the traditional use of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. William F. Fullam led the effort by arguing for reforms that would incorporate the presence of ground troops onto naval warships. By expanding the capabilities of the U.S. Navy beyond just projecting power on the oceans, Fullam was convinced that reorganizing infantry battalions to serve on ships and troop transports would enhance the power of its naval forces. No longer would the U.S. Navy be restricted to the water, but it could now project more military power on the coasts and islands in terms of seizing fortifications and harbors as well as being able to set up coastal guns to support warships in fleet maneuvers against an enemy fleet.¹²

Through the use of technology and the reorganization of its ground and naval forces, the United States was now able to transform its political and industrial strength into hard power to protect and exert its influence across the international system. America’s easy victory in the Spanish-American War through the application of technology on amphibious war brought worldwide recognition that the United States was finally a world power. Afterward, growing American involvement in the Western Hemisphere went from maintaining order and stability to becoming involved in complex diplomatic situations overseas where amphibious warfare was used to protect American interests and citizens overseas as seen during the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippines, and the Tangier Crisis. The growth in American involvement beyond its borders was influenced in part by the world becoming dominated by the great European empires. European empires Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, as well as Japan quickly utilized modern technologies to establish extensive imperial empires, which were seen as potential threats to the security of the United States and its interests.¹³

Soon the United States was caught up in two world wars in which amphibious warfare was more important than ever in securing America’s global position as a world superpower. In both world wars, the United States required the total mobilization of its industrial base as well as the movement of massive numbers of troops overseas against hostile states. By the end of World War II, the United States had military forces deployed around the world and took to maintaining a long-term presence overseas, especially in Germany and Japan. The forward deployment of these forces was based on geopolitical considerations in the post-World War world, and the need to deal with the growing threat of the Soviet Union. This rivalry became more pronounced when the Soviet Union sought to grow its own power projection capabilities through airpower, nuclear weapons, and the development of its own amphibious capabilities. In Dominik G. Nargele’s study of the Soviet Union’s military during the Cold War, he assesses that the Soviet Navy had the largest number of warships in the world with an amphibious lift that included about one hundred amphibious ships with naval infantry specifically trained to conduct amphibious warfare. The Soviet Union looked at having an amphibious warfare capability to protect its core interests in Eurasia by being able to seize choke points and coastal regions from the United States such as the Straits of Denmark, the coast of Norway, and the entrances to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan.¹⁴

While military technology transformed the conduct of war, its application to amphibious warfare changed the balance of power in the international system. No longer was military power monopolized by Europe, but instead resided with America. Bevin Alexander’s study of the United States in the aftermath of World War II reveals that the American republic had emerged as the supreme political, economic, and military power in the world. It not only had 12.5 million people in uniform, but also had 1,200 warships, 2,000 heavy bombers, and a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This power enabled the United States to establish the foundations of a new international system that was shaped by American political, social, and economic values. By creating a new world order in the aftermath of World War II, the United States became the indispensable power on earth.¹⁵

The importance of amphibious warfare and its impact on American geopolitical strategy from 1898 to 1945 is a problem today because some political and military leaders no longer view amphibious warfare as either vital to national defense or effective for diplomacy. However, amphibious warfare remains a viable option for the United States and other competing powers in today’s geopolitical environment. In his assessment of America’s geopolitical strategy dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, Henry Kissinger believes that if the United States disclaims its strategic interests, it would only mean more aggressive powers would overrun the world.¹⁶ Therefore, America’s continued use of amphibious capabilities, as well as other power projection abilities, would not only shield the Western Hemisphere from outside powers, but also serve as tools for maintaining international peace. Despite the results promised by new technological innovations in air, sea, or cyber warfare, amphibious warfare should not be disregarded as irrelevant. Henry Kissinger points out, “No other society [than the United States] has asserted itself that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual—a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu’s raison d’état [reason of the state]. America has maintained that the prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such but the method of change, especially the use of force.”¹⁷ In fact, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States will still need to be able to conduct amphibious operations against hostile state and non-state actors because of America’s loss of overseas bases and a national economy that is closely tied with the rest of the world.

It is important to study the influence of amphibious warfare and what it did for America’s geopolitical position because it will provide insight into the reasons amphibious warfare was important back then and why it remains so today. While projecting air, naval, and cyber power against a hostile state might exploit potential critical vulnerabilities to make it change its actions and stance on certain policies, the ability for a nation to land military forces and occupy ground continues to make any country nervous and, therefore, willing to give diplomacy a chance. Colin Gray observes in his understanding of technology that it is simply a waste of time to quarrel over whether or not there is a revolution in military affairs. Instead, Gray recommends that the military should simply accept the appearance of technology, and he considers its usage through a different context geared toward achieving strategic superiority.¹⁸ In addition, while airpower, nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, or special operators might be argued to be the only viable, realistic options in the twenty-first century, the fact is that each has its own drawbacks and limitations. Airpower alone could not force the enemy to surrender, as seen during World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Yugoslav Wars. In addition, nuclear weapons are simply too destructive because of the moral, environmental, and humanitarian implications attached to their use, as seen with the Mutual Assured Destruction Doctrine during the Cold War. Finally, cyber warfare is still in the experimental phase with its force projection potential still being explored; special operations are geared toward internal foreign defense and high-value targeting, but are not heavy enough to retain possession of a country, as seen during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With the twenty-first century well under way and the Cold War over, the United States is slowly reverting to the geopolitical position it occupied at the beginning of the twentieth century: having to operate increasingly from North America and its own overseas territories. The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy spelled out this reality because while it still advocates for a strong, modern military, it specifically emphasizes the need to work within the world’s international and regional institutions, as well as cooperate with America’s allies and partners. In addition, the national security strategy goes on to state that protecting American interests, resolving conflicts, and promoting global security requires the use of soft power that employs diplomatic, educational, cultural, and economic actions in a comprehensive, peaceful manner.¹⁹

While President Obama called for the increased use of soft power with most state and non-state actors, he also wanted the American military to be a tool of last resort and advocated maintaining a strong military at home that is “ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters.”²⁰ Therefore, relying on long-term garrisons and facilities in overseas stations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East is a dangerous, unrealistic course of action. Having withdrawn from two inconclusive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while dealing with significant economic and social issues at home, the United States must reconsider its geopolitical strategy and options. With the Middle East in chaos and with potential hostile state competitors such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea rising up to challenge American leadership, the United States simply cannot rely on options that neither provide enough punch nor send a powerful strategic message, as in the case of air strikes, cyber warfare, or use of special operators. Revisiting history to study how the United States used amphibious warfare in conjunction with technology from its geostrategic base in North America can help the United States prepare for today’s future challenges.