Читать книгу New South African Review 4 - Devan Pillay - Страница 27

A key factor in sustaining trade unions, particularly during apartheid, has been their organisational tradition of shop-floor democracy and worker control. The emphasis on worker control over their leadership and their organisations was critical to the survival and growth of these unions, and continues to be important in explaining how unions sustain themselves. The 1996 LRA does not interfere in the internal operations of unions and, in fact, promotes accountability within trade unions in the legal requirements with which unions have to comply and the way in which these requirements are enforced.

Recently, however, this organisational tradition has shown signs of stress in which ‘the arrival of political democracy in 1994 has been associated with a decline in the intensity and vitality of local union democracy’ (Hirschohn 2011: 2). Reporting on the fourth iteration of a survey of members of Cosatu affiliates, Hirschsohn and the researchers associated with the Taking Democracy Seriously project present findings that suggest a weakening of the key role played by shop stewards in the workplace and in relation to the members they represent. Two findings, in particular, are striking. The first is the sharp decline between the first survey in 1994 and the fourth survey in 2008 in the number of respondents who agreed that shop stewards can only act on a mandate from members. This fell from 72 per cent in 1994 to 46 per cent in 2008. Despite a problem of comparability between the first and the following three surveys due to methodological changes, the fact that less than half of the respondents in 2008 felt that shop stewards may act without a mandate points to a decline in accountability between shop-floor leaders and union members. A similar finding emerged from the Cosatu Workers Survey where less than 40 per cent of the respondents felt they were able to exercise a lot of influence over their shop-steward representatives (Naledi 2012: 23).

A second striking finding is the decline in policy knowledge levels among shop stewards. When shop stewards were asked, for example, whether they had ever been in a meeting where there was a report-back on Nedlac, the number dropped from 59 per cent in 1998 to 21 per cent in 2008. As Hirschsohn (op. cit.: 20) concludes: ‘Although individual members are far removed from policy negotiations at Nedlac, the limited participation of their representatives in meetings where policy issues are discussed raises substantive questions about the extent to which effective mandating processes are in place.’ Not surprisingly, Hirschsohn concludes that although the formal structure of democracy remains in place in the country’s largest trade unions, the model of shop-floor democracy and worker control on which the unions were built has been substantially weakened.

This understanding of unions’ internal organisational problems has been echoed by a number of commentators over the past few years (see, inter alia, Buhlungu 2010). It was, however, the dramatic industrial conflict during 2012, particularly the conflict in the mining sector, that pushed these issues into the open and no doubt influenced the self-critical agenda of Cosatu’s 11th Congress in late 2012 and its collective bargaining conference in March 2013.

In his address to the collective bargaining conference, Zwelinzima Vavi (2013:7), the general secretary of Cosatu, outlined key organisational problems:

On the issue of the social distance of leaders, we have to acknowledge that even at the level of full time shop stewards, and even more so at the level of elected leadership, we have allowed a situation where a physical and material distance often exists. How often do we hear of full time shop stewards having absolutely no connection to their original constituency? Sometimes these are elected office bearers, who have not been re-elected by their constituency, and yet get protected by a fudging of their union constitution. Then there is often a material distance. Sometimes in an effort to find a solution to the challenge of a full time shop steward being taken out of the normal pay and progression structure of a company, we have agreed to conditions which provide undue privilege. This privilege becomes the source of envy as well as derision (disdain and scorn). Where it becomes the source of envy it produces leadership battles based not on principle but on material competition. Whether the response of workers is envy or derision, the ultimate product is the same – the creation of conditions ripe for splits and splinter unions.

The fact that the NUM became the victim of widespread member dissatisfaction in the platinum mining sector is perhaps instructive of the range of challenges that have been facing many Cosatu affiliates. In the case of unions such as the NUM, its sheer size and scale has presented it with the challenge of maintaining a balance between worker control and shop-floor democracy on the one hand, and maintaining an effective union administration and level of service to its members on the other. In the face of a high outflow of experienced unionists to the public service, political office and other pursuits, maintaining an effective organisational machinery would clearly be difficult – as it has been in many other institutional and organisational settings in the country.

The first significant change in union organisation highlighted by the 2012 conflicts has therefore been a gradual but systematic weakening of the organisational power vested in the tradition of shop-floor democracy and worker control. This is not to suggest that organisational weakness spans the entire union movement – but the fact that some of the largest and most influential trade unions have suffered setbacks highlights the significance of the problem and the potential for greater instability in union developments in the future.

A second key feature of 2012 that relates to problems of union organisation was the upsurge in independent and often uncoordinated worker action in the mining and agricultural sectors. In the mining sector, the relationship between the action by workers and trade unions was complex. On the one hand, workers engaged in industrial action after communication between the NUM, management and workers broke down (Alexander et al. 2012: 119). On the other hand, worker committees were established on some mines, and although they seemed to be independent it is possible that rival unions such as Amcu played a role in the formation and operation of certain committees. On the mines, independent worker action could therefore be viewed in the context of disillusionment with management, dissatisfaction with the established majority union, and a response to the emergence of a militant, rival union trying to gain a foothold among workers. Dissatisfaction with levels of pay, particularly among rock drill operators, was also a driving factor in the mining unrest from its inception at Anglo American Platinum in January 2012.

The upsurge of worker action in the Western Cape agricultural sector in September 2012, starting in De Doorns and spreading to Ceres, Robertson, Prince Alfred and Somerset West, saw worker action, independently of any union formation in the area, demanding a minimum wage of R150 per day. Within a short space of time, a number of trade unions established a presence among workers in areas such as De Doorns and engaged with government and employers in the talks that followed and that were aimed at reviewing the minimum wage contained in the sectoral determination. As was the case in the platinum mines, the underlying cause of worker action was dissatisfaction with existing levels of pay. Poor working and living conditions were frequently cited as aggravating factors fuelling the strikes and protest action among these workers. As Hartford (2012: 7-8) states: ‘There is no doubt that the gross poverty and inequality in South Africa (amongst the worst in the world in respect of Gini coefficient measures) provides the social and economic context to heightened expectations of wage increases.’

The industrial action of 2012 in agriculture, in particular, was perhaps the first widespread expression of how socioeconomic pressures on workers, on income levels and on general living conditions have led directly to instability in industrial relations.

A third feature of 2012 was the persistence of violent action during industrial disputes. The tragic shooting of mineworkers on 16 August 2012 at Marikana served as a grim reminder of the repressive capability of the state, irrespective of political regime. The violence of Marikana was accompanied by violence during the farmworker protest and the strike during August 2012 in the road freight sector. In both, violence was accompanied by the burning of vineyards and trucks. In many ways, the violence that characterised industrial conflict during 2012 served also as a reminder of the persistence of violence in South Africa’s industrial relations system. Strikes, and violence during strikes, has been a recurring theme from the early part of the twentieth century to the present.

The implications of recurring strike violence by unionised and non-unionised workers are twofold. On the one hand, violent action serves as a reminder of the limits to institutionalisation of industrial relations; irrespective of the legitimacy of industrial relations, the exercise of class power remains a possibility. On the other hand, the use of violence reminds one of the ways in which workers will exercise power – with violence an extreme form, but one frequently resorted to in South Africa. As Von Holdt (2008: 17) argues:

It is clear from this that industrial conflict is only partially institutionalised in postapartheid South Africa. On the one hand, trade unions and employers make regular, indeed daily, use of the institutions and procedures for resolving conflict between individual employees and employers, as well as for collective dispute resolution and collective-bargaining. On the other hand, procedures may be disputed or regarded as unfair, and collective action not infrequently involves violence and intimidation, including violence by the police. Explaining the partial quality of institutionalisation needs to take account both of the industrial relations factors as well as the factors located in the broader society.

What are the likely implications of these features of the 2012 industrial conflict for the future of trade unionism? The weakening of internal union organisation and the ability of trade unions to rely on organisational power is likely to have three consequences. First, the chances of fragmentation through the formation of new, breakaway unions is increased. Fragmentation may lead to a short- term decline in overall union membership as some workers give up their union affiliation. Over time, workers may well join other unions or re-join the union to which they originally belonged, and the overall effect on aggregate union membership may be minimal. A second consequence of the weakening of union organisation is that it lays a basis for greater instability in workplace labour relations and may lead to a weakening of collective bargaining. The risk of instability is clearly heightened where unions compete for recognition and organisational rights, or where new unions adopt a militant stance in pursuit of organisational rights, which has been seen in the platinum mining and transport sectors. A third consequence is that trade unions turn to the state to support them in retaining their workplace influence – either through legislative change or through intervention with management. Such a strategy is not only contrary to the rationale underlying the current legal dispensation but is also likely to be the most damaging to the long-term prospects of strong, democratic trade union organisation.

The use of industrial protest action to deal with socioeconomic pressures experienced by workers can have many consequences. The obvious effects are instability in workplaces, with associated risks of deterioration in existing relations between management and workers and in such collective bargaining arrangements as may exist. It may be tempting to view spontaneous industrial action as an opportunity for trade union organisation, but such opportunities are complicated by a lack of familiarity with trade unionism on the part of workers, who are often in vulnerable positions, as are farmworkers, and for whom trade union subscriptions are not always affordable. The fact that workers who engage in industrial protest may be seasonal or contract workers, as was the case in the farmworker protests, also makes union membership an unlikely prospect. As has been pointed out in relation to obstacles to effective collective bargaining for non-standard workers, ‘a fragmented workforce implies that there are different segments of workers in the same workplace with diverse interests and different contractual status, which can trigger and intensify conflicts among workers themselves instead of labour-management conflict, thereby hindering solidarity among workers’ (Ebisui 2012: 5).

Finally, the consequence (apart from legal consequences) of violence during strikes and industrial action is likely to be a growing problem of trade union legitimacy. Declining legitimacy and growing distrust in unionism can only lead to declining affiliation and membership of trade unions.

In light of these developments in industrial relations and trade unionism, some have argued for a review of labour legislation to craft a different dispensation that is better able to deal with the challenges that have arisen over the past few years.

What then are the strategic and policy implications of the industrial conflict of 2012? The first implication is that the problems in labour relations cannot be resolved simply by further amendments to labour legislation. Some would argue that the legislative framework is not suited to current dynamics, especially when it comes to assisting low-paid, vulnerable workers and nor does it assist in regulating competition for resources between the employed and unemployed, as labour legislation supports collective bargaining structures that create barriers to entry into the labour market and excludes minority unions and outsiders. Such arguments tend to over-emphasise the role of law in resolving conflicts relating to socioeconomic conditions. As outlined above, the LRA clearly supports collective bargaining arrangements, in particular between strong bargaining partners. But the LRA does not compel parties to enter into specific arrangements, including arrangements relating to majority unions and the rights that they may enjoy. The LRA also does not prescribe what agency shop agreements employers and unions should enter, and nor does it set down hard and fast criteria for thresholds of representivity and access to organisational rights and collective bargaining arrangements. A distinction should be drawn between the statutory framework and the labour relations frameworks and practices that are adopted by employers and trade unions in workplaces and in bargaining structures, including bargaining and statutory councils. As Van Niekerk argues (2012: 5): ‘It is not necessary in these circumstances to rewrite the LRA, nor is it necessary to reconvene another Wiehahn-like commission to consider alternative legislative models. What is required is for both unions and employers to revisit their agreements to determine whether they are grounded in historical circumstances that are no longer part of workplace reality, and to make the necessary changes.’

Placing the responsibility for change on business and organised labour, and not the state, does however run the risk of stalemate, as the parties resort to a power play that will inevitably inhibit innovation and change. If unions are to continue to grow in the face of the labour market and socioeconomic challenges that face workers it will be necessary to re-build democracy within trade union structures and also to restore legitimacy in trade unionism, particularly in the eyes of those who remain as prospective union members. Revisiting employer and trade union agreements in workplaces will also be necessary to craft a more inclusive trade union regime in the workplace so as to avoid conflict and encourage more inter-union cooperation.

As key elements of the LRA’s vision for trade unionism and collective bargaining have not been realised over the past twenty years, the prospects for change in the future are not encouraging. In the light of increased labour market fragmentation, a weakening of organisational power of some of the largest trade unions and an increased politicisation of trade unionism, union growth in the future is likely to be limited, uneven across sectors and occupational groups, and constrained by the responsiveness of union organisation to changing labour market conditions.