Читать книгу The Russian Totalitarianism. Freedom here and now - Dmitrii Shusharin - Страница 13

The antique word “thaw” has entered the current political vocabulary and did not repel anyone by its archaic origin. Yes, indeed, a new thaw, just like that, you know, somehow, we expect to get some new little liberties, in hope of fame and bliss to come… Anatolyevich’s days were a wonderful beginning. Such sentiments surfaced with Medvedev’s ascent to the presidency.

It was just not clear what was to be unfrozen and for what purpose. Under Khrushchev, everything was clear. With a second thaw, when the frozen was melted again, and it naturally turned out to be unsuitable for consumption, no one really suffered from misunderstanding. And in 2008 – what? Why the situation in 2008 had to be described in terms of a completely different era, even epochs, because the word “thaw” in its political significance is more than fifty years old, and “Gorbachevism” is not even twenty-five? And why no one wanted to recall perestroika with glasnost? Those words are much younger.

I can clearly see why. “Thaw” did not compel anyone to anything, it was not officially proclaimed, Khrushchev did not use that word. This phenomenon was something incomprehensible, a historical something that was, but it was not. It didn’t look like a historical event, which had a creator, an actor and passive objects of its impact, but rather a natural occurrence. The wind was blowing, now it’s calm… it’s been warm, and now it’s freezing. The Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away. Thaw, a remarkably convenient word. But Gorbachev articulated “perestroika”, “glasnost” and “new thinking” all by himself. As for the word “thaw” … Well, Ilya Ehrenburg coined it. Reading his novel with this title makes you wonder how could that happen. But the word caught on. It turned out to be rather vague, so it caught on.

Although, of course, there is a similarity between the thaw and perestroika, yes, indeed, there is. In some important circumstances, but not in the results. The circumstances are as follows:

• expansion of publicly discussed topics and socio-political lexicon;

• changing the status of the first person of the state (party);

• Significant changes in the external positioning of the country.

Expansion of publicly discussed topics and socio-political lexicon. That is true to both Khrushchev and Gorbachev times. But what there was to be expanded under Medvedev? There was no unified, clichéd, openly or unofficially sanctioned language for describing reality.

Changing the status of the first person of the state (party). Dmitry Medvedev had only one way to gain real power: decisive political and economic liberalization and democratization. But there were no grounds for speculating about Dmitry Medvedev’s dissatisfaction with anything. That he wanted more and sought to get rid of the influential surrounding. That he was interested in the fate of the Russian statehood and the presidency institution.

And the last, significant changes in the external positioning of the country. Here, by the way, it’s not so simple with the thaw. Khrushchev’s doctrine of peaceful coexistence was in fact a form of expansion, especially in the third world. But expansion can also be interpreted as a way out of isolation. Let’s just say that unlike Stalin’s extra watchful attitude and Brezhnev’s detente, designed to consolidate borders in Europe and a certain level of armaments, the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods in foreign policy were marked by increased dynamism.

However, unlike the “thaw” and perestroika, the successes of diplomacy were and continue to be evaluated not by the ability to turn enemies into friends, but, on the contrary, by the ability to acquire enemies. Especially in the post-Soviet space. What kind of a “thaw” happened under Medvedev, whose presidency was marked by the Golden-Horde style raid on Georgia, with subsequent occupation of part of its territory and recognition of the separatist formations as states.

There were no observable prerequisites either for the “thaw” or for perestroika. Neither external nor internal. The external circumstances of both phenomena make both of these terms out of date and inapplicable to Medvedev’s rule.

The impact of the 1956 anti-Stalin report was due to its congruence with the mood that already existed in society after the war. Or rather – with the realization that the actor and mover of history is not only the leader, not only the power. A change of perception has occurred not only in culture, but also in the mass consciousness, bringing to a focus man as the subject of history. This shift in thinking made the thaw possible to occur so sudden and explains the bright flash in culture, literature, art, which marked that era.

In this respect, the Khrushchev thaw is the direct opposite to the technological fetishism of Medvedev’s few years of presidency, which were the years of deliberate depersonalization of social activity, that is, a thaw in reverse. And there is a simple explanation to it.

Gradually it became clear that the “medvedians” are those who are going to milk the modernization budgets, take superior position in innovative agencies, and control foreign contacts in the field of high-tech and possible foreign investments in this sphere. Pretty soon it became apparent that they are not interested in any political modernization, and even see it harmful for them. As described by Vladislav Surkov in February 2010, the separate development of innovative industries50 meant further atomization of society, isolation of those engaged in these industries, creating a super elite as opposed to what was formed in previous years on the basis of the raw material economy and the military-industrial complex. This particular elites from the very beginning were taking root abroad, and not only and not so much within the country.

But the former elite did not allow anything like this, the innovative captains did not get to sail free. Such a forecast was made already then, and it has fully come true51. More precisely, this is about capitals, not the captains. Putin did not let go. His priorities have been defined long before, no doubt about it. Indeed, the model of a separate development of innovative industries, in essence, was anti-modernization. This is just a scheme for rent-seeking behavior accessing budgetary and prospective private investments, including foreign ones. All the activities of the state were aimed at blocking the private initiative.

Both the thaw and perestroika were accompanied by true soul-searching and a reassessment of values. During the years of Medvedev’s rule, nothing close to it was detected. Meanwhile, it has become increasingly clear what needs to be done to change the vector of the country’s evolution. I took the trouble to formulate it this way:52

• reforming the political system: repealing laws on the referendum, on political parties, on appointing governors, on abolishing elections in districts;

• revision of criminal cases related to state asset-grabbing and political persecution of businessmen, public figures, scientists, laying the groundwork for the return of political emigrants to Russia;

• independent investigation of terrorist acts, beginning with house bombings in 1999, political murders and mysterious deaths;

• the beginning of a broad public discussion on the economic development of the country, the rejection of governmental management of the economy in favor of its effectiveness;

• end of the clan system, cronyism and nepotism in personnel policy;

• the restoration of the civilized party system, the termination of the merger of the state and the party of power, if necessary, its dissolution;

• dissolution of youth organizations sponsored by the government;

• development of a new concept of Russia’s foreign policy and its active and effective implementation;

• administrative, military and judicial reforms, creation of new Armed Forces, new national security, defense and law enforcement agencies;

• restoration of territorial integrity and a single legal space, actual, not formal approval of the constitutional order in the North Caucasus, real integration of the region into Russia.

By the fall of 2008, a new item was added to the list: the repeal of Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognition, the revision of all policies in the post-Soviet space, and the rejection of imperial thinking.

From the very beginning it was clear that such reforms would not be implemented by the political elite. The discussion of these issues had no chance either. Since all these demands – in total or separately – could be put forward if the authorities willingly decided to initiate something like thaw. That is, it would open a free discussion about the further development of the country. Would agree to an independent and transparent examination of its activities.

It turned out to be something opposite and awkward – something like a waht. The present semblance of the opposition are the gleanings of this waht, the backwards thaw. In those odd four years the progressive public did not hide their readiness to serve the authorities, counting on benevolent and generous rewards. The game of change that was played revealed the most important problems not for the authorities, but for those who would like to improve and perfect the system. The essential problems of values, mentality and language.

The language of power was intended to conceal the lack of freedom of expression and choice of topics, vocabulary, assessment of events and persons. It is not language that generates reality, no matter how spin masters try to convince us of this. And not reality is language. The free man is the master of both reality and language. But the choice in favor of cooperation with the authorities has deprived and keeps on depriving man of freedom, control over reality, and the possibility of choosing the language.

When trying to play in a game of thaw it turned out that cooperation with the authorities means giving up civil loyalty. Hopes for a “historic chance”, for the creation of some “loyal majority” on which the president will rely, was the repetition of Gleb Pavlovsky’s “Putin majority”, especially since the idea was articulated by the man of his circle, Alexander Morozov:

“Most of the Medvedev’s” we”, the well-intentioned renovators, are people who never seriously belonged to any opposition: they are non-oligarchic active people – entrepreneurs, lawyers, journalists, doctors, managers, etc. – who made it after 1998 default. At times they were not getting along with their local authority, at times were friends with them, but essentially they have been “loyal.” This is a part of the “loyal majority.”

Note that the “political nation” is really impossible without a loyal majority. And the longer D. Shusharin fantasizes about the investigation of the 1999 bombings as the topic of the agenda, the more eloquent you, Marina, will discuss the issue of how to pull off lustration after the miraculous victory of Solidarity over the forces of evil, the further and further we will be keeping us away from the historical chance.”53

The usual triviality, so characteristic of Pavlovsky and his entourage. “We”, “from below”, “agenda” – empty pathetic clichés. Although not quite ordinary. Against the backdrop of all this baloney about Medvedev’s thaw they betray themselves talking not about a deal or compromise (no one was even thinking to negotiate with them), but about the price of the power status, the fee for the right to kowtow. You are not allowed to discuss the past, the most recent past and the sources of legitimization of power. Just like at the turn of the sixties and seventies: if you want to get your ration, forget about the GULAG. The scale may be dissimilar, but the moral price is the same. There is no difference between the oblivion of slain millions or at least one killed. It’s called the same.

Loyalists set themselves an unprecedented task: to build a society under the rule of the tandemocrats in which the distinction between good and evil is irrelevant, instead the priority is loyalty or disloyalty to power. Where there is no such social regulator as morality, not correlated with state expediency. There is no right either. And they called this return to barbarism modernization. Authoritarian, true, but still modernization.

The target audience of these statements was obvious, and it did not go away. This is the part of society that is tired of Putin’s deadlock, but is not capable of active actions. These people believe in anything and will deceive themselves to the end, preferring their own dreams to reading the news line. They would never evaluate the known facts, wouldn’t notice the obvious, but they will be firmly convinced of the existence of something secret and bright.

And these are not so-called ordinary people. These are intellectuals who are seriously regard this babble worthy of respect:

“I urge everyone to be realistic. “Everything at once” is the principle of the revolution, and Medvedev is not a revolutionary at all, and it would be wrong to pressure him for revolutionary solutions. In any case for now. We must start in a bit by bit mode. From safe, out of harm’s way steps (to shield Medvedev from danger of losing power). The release of Bakhmina, a slight weakening of the repressive reaction to the opposition’s actions, the invitation of the opposition-minded people to the Human Rights Council, the resignation of the main Moscow policeman, the removal of Zyazikov – all this are, albeit small but positive signs of Medvedev’s moving not towards strengthening authoritarianism, but in the opposite direction.

This does not mean that all problems will be solved in one day, they are not diminishing, but the task of the active part of society and the opposition is to pressure Medvedev, to formulate challenges that he will have to react to. Having embarked on this path of small incremental changes, sooner or later Medvedev will face systemic issues that require a radical overhaul of the current regime. And we must persistently urge Medvedev to follow this path and not turn off of it, so that he eventually he would reach the maximum goals.”54

This meaningless nonsense is not even worth discussing – analyzing incantations doesn’t make sense. In the same line with this is the belief in the magical power of the Internet, where the best people will go, so that there, in an absolutely miraculous way, new technologies would give rise to fundamentally new social relations.

For all that, the study of society was not encouraged. Since May 2005, at the time of IV Russian Philosophical Congress, attempts have been continuously made to adapt philosophy to the practical needs of propaganda. The agitprop machine was in need of a national philosophy, without which the state can be downgraded to a second-rate status.55 The importance of the issue was emphasized in the theme of the congress – “Philosophy and the future of civilization.”

The key issue was the power and the justification of its legitimacy. Reviewing all the searching and chasing around of the first Putin’s decade, you have to admit: they were directly opposite to what was observed in perestroika. Then the most important quest was the search for historical legitimacy – in the past. The new political regime was looking for securing its legitimacy in the future: Putin’s plans of saving Russia, Strategy 2020 and other pipe dreams.

This is a significant, but not the sole difference. The perestroika discussions were really public. Although they were encouraged and moderated from above, they stirred up a genuinely live response. What was initiated in the new times cannot be called discussion. Those were PR campaigns conducted by powerful propaganda machine aimed at virtually zero audience.

That is, despite the demonstration of goodwill towards the philosophical community, it was left high and dry, and not engaged for servicing power. Indeed, it would be strange if the political regime, which doesn’t allow public assessment of its decisions, not using the help of applied scientific disciplines, would seek close cooperation with the philosophers, of all people. They were not needed even as an audience listening the exhortations of the authorities, as it used to be in Soviet times. For the authorities just a few people proved to be sufficient enough.

In principle, there is nothing a priori bad in the governmental patronage of philosophy, as well as other scientific disciplines and different kinds of arts. But the fact of the matter is that in the present situation, philosophy in Russia, like other humanitarian disciplines, somehow exists by their own, beside the authorities. The authorities can call the tune, but they never pay the piper. They don’t bother to seduce or intimidate the performers.

Philosophy was appealing by its fundamental objectlessness. Sociologists, economists, independent historians and political scientists are by nature disloyal to the authorities, for loyalty implies the willingness to verbalize what the authorities themselves assign to be made public, and not their own observations of reality. This process went in parallel with the nurturing of the young people’s pro-Kremlin movements, which were an authoritative institution of a new type of totalitarian society – all game and no ideology. Any “ism” is a superfluous element, too much weight. A piece of philosophy can be both Kantian and Orthodox, nationalistic and cosmopolitan.

Meanwhile, the real social prerequisites for change existed. And there was demand for them, too.

Economic growth is a double-edged sword. It does somewhat soften social tensions, but it also contributes to the growth of self-esteem and social claims of a fair number of independent and active people. And they will not be happy with any kind of thaw.

There was a possibility of emergence of a situational opposition, formed of professionals, competent people, deprived, firstly, of social growth prospects; denied, secondly, of participation in a dialogue about problems of the country as a whole and their group role in particular; and thirdly, having no substantial public rostrum. Moreover, the blame for the latter was not so much on the power, but rather on the democratic opposition.

In the Medvedev’s faux thaw, the absence of coherent political programs among the opposition, its reluctance to notice that the center of public activity has moved to the regions became evident. The concentration of attention to what is happening in Moscow – until the announcement of Luzhkov’s resignation, seen as the opposition’s achievement – robbed the democratic movement of the nationwide program and exacerbated the atomization of Russian society.

Nobody was listening to those who spoke about the futility of adaptation to power discourse, the need for a human alternative to power, which could not be substituted with participation in elections, with coalitions created to fit the next election campaign. Nobody noticed the subservient nature of the democratic movements towards the authorities, the fact that the democrats never addressed the needs of society, did not try to initiate discussions on socially significant topics, confining themselves to only responding to the speeches of the ruling elite.

The contradiction between the public democratic demand and the political supply became more and more noticeable. Previously, everyone proceeded from the premise that parties, movements, organizations, positioning themselves as democratic, are something qualitatively different from the party of power. But in today’s Russia political declarations mean nothing – all political platforms here are tailored on the basis of political practice.

It became clear that the opposition was qualitatively, that is, in the first place, stylistically akin to the authorities. Gradually the leadership in the parties have been falling into the hands of people without any political past and experience, political strategists and spin doctors with no knowledge, beliefs, principles, or strategic goals. Therefore, they were unable to lead political organizations for a long time, and this was not part of their plans. They were only able to carry out their pre-sale preparation.

Judging by some private evidence, when forming coalitions, the main criterion was not so much political influence as the sponsor potential of the participants, which resembled the creation of joint-stock companies, rather than political associations.56 But this is all, so to speak, the expenditure part. As far as the political (inseparable from economic) dividends in today’s Russia concerned, this is a separate issue. Whatever the theorists say, democratic opposition organizations are unable to lobby anyone’s interests. This market is monopolized by the party of power. Another matter is their complicity in the formation of the facade democracy and the simulation of political life.

The authorities demonstrated tenacity, ingenuity, cunning and other qualities, as necessary means of ensuring their own irremovability, calm and comfort. At the same time, the opposition hardly ever bothered them.

In late 2009 Valeria Novodvorskaya brought up the issue of the Sovok (USSR) restoration57. But the experiences of all previous restorations show that there has never been a complete restoration of previous models: inevitable is the interaction of the restored with what emerged in the course of its destruction. There is a historical synthesis. In this case, this synthesis led to the emergence of a new model of totalitarianism. That was a move towards further alienation of Russia and the Russians from humanity.

This, in fact, is the essence of totalitarianism. In an open society, the nation is the mediator between man and humanity; in totalitarian societies it becomes an instrument of alienation of individuals from the human race. Perfect totalitarianism implies a complete dehumanization, but, like an ideal gas, it does not exist in reality.

Totalitarianism proved to be very flexible in adaptation to the latest information technology. It has easily created the illusion of change, forming a new social base – from the semi-moronic members of the power-hungry youths to highbrow intellectuals, who were attracted, as it often happened in the past, by the opportunity of cooperation with the authorities in governing the country.

To tell the truth, there was no cooperation, it was not even intended, but to many such a prospect seemed possible.

The main feature of the so-called protest movement in the brief period of Medvedev’s illusions was that it was headed not by intellectuals and high-culture figures, but by representatives of a mass culture that fit perfectly into the new system. With the termination of the games around Medvedev, they didn’t feel not even a slightest threat to their status – they would not have been touched. They were frustrated by the fact that they were never invited to get their share in the power. I do not reprove their success at all. They were honest businessmen, but the market conditions required them not so much to praise the authorities as not to have a loose tongue.

And then everything went only downward: via Bolotnaya Sqare to Navalny, Roizman, and the lucky ones got their pass to Putin’s Valdai talkfest and on TV screen. Medvedev’s waht was the final stage in the formation of a totalitarian society, which was still masquerading as civil society. Now nobody remembers that in the very beginning of Putin’s rule, in November 2001, the presidential administration chose five thousand people to represent civil society at the Civil Forum58. The fact that the very principle of selection contradicted the nature of civil society did not bother anyone. In the future, all these gatherings turned exclusively into a means of budget disbursement. Actually, the very first forum was already a budgetary entry. It has initiated the formation of a totalitarian society, which was getting increasingly autonomous. About Putin, The Russian intelligentsia believes that Putin was imposed by Yeltsin. But Navalny as a leader was definitely chosen by intelligentsia, which gradually, step by step, adopted itself to his way. Yes, it’s OK to harass the migrants, if it serves the purpose, and about the Crimea, well, it’s discomforting to consider its return, and the Ukrainians should understand that they must not push too far. As for Georgia, you know, we should make no bones of this. Not to mention the populism and social voyeurism, and the contamination of Russian intelligentsia with ideas of vulgar socialism the way it is interpreted in Bulgakov’s novel from the mouth of Sharikov (the stray dog turned human).