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Aristotle’s Protrepticus

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O philosophy, thou guide of life,

o thou explorer of virtue and

expeller of vice! Without thee what

could have become not only of me

but of the life of man altogether?

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.2.5

Among Aristotle’s early writings, the most important is his Protrepticus, the original of which has been lost in its entirety, but its essential content and narrative has been reconstructed. It is a “hortatory essay” (logos protrepticos), an exhortation intended to urge those who would take up the study of philosophy—to do so. The most famous passage, as it appears in the reconstructed text of Anton-Hermann Chroust, is: “The term ‘to philosophize’ (or, ‘to pursue philosophy’) implies two distinct things: first, whether or not we ought to seek [after philosophic truth] at all; and second, our dedication to philosophic speculation [philosophon theoria]” (par. 6).2

With this assertion as his theme, Aristotle pursues its meaning. He says that “there is a science of truth as well as a science of the excellence of the soul. . . . philosophic wisdom (phronesis) is the greatest of all goods, and, at the same time, the most useful of all things” (pars. 35–36). Aristotle concludes: “Since human life is capable of sharing in this faculty [of reasoning and of acquiring wisdom], however wretched and difficult it may be, it is yet so wisely ordained that man appears to be a god when compared with all other creatures. . . . This being so, we ought either to pursue philosophy or bid farewell to life and depart from this world, because all other things seem to be but utter nonsense and folly” (pars. 105–106). Philosophic wisdom takes two forms, as contemplative speculation (theoria) and as guiding conduct to achieve well-being (phronesis).

Chroust’s reconstruction is as above, but, as Chroust says, there is a tradition, stemming from Cicero, Quintilian, Lactantius, and Boethius, that the passage is more like this: “You say that one should (or must) philosophize; then you should (or must) philosophize. You say that one should not (or must not) philosophize, then (in order to prove your contention) you must philosophize. In any event, you must philosophize.” On the passage, put in this way, Quintilian comments: “Sometimes two propositions are put forward in such a way that the choice of either leads to the same conclusion: for example, “We must philosophize (even though we must not philosophize) [‘philosophandum est, etiam si non est philosophandum’]” (Inst. orat. 5.10.70).

The coming together of these two propositions is what Aristotle would call an aporia, an impass that thought brings on itself by arriving at two equally valid but opposed claims. Such an impass generates wonder (thauma), owing to which philosophy first began and by which it continues to be (Meta. 982b). It is a wonder to philosophy that it itself is. The attempt to preclude philosophy from the activity of thought requires an act of philosophizing. Philosophy is the only form of knowing that is justified by its own attempted act of denial. In this way philosophy imbeds itself in the human condition.

If we pass from Aristotle’s Protrepticus to Boethius’s masterpiece, the Consolation of Philosophy, the dialogue Boethius creates between himself and Lady Philosophy (Philosophia), we gain a further picture of how philosophy speaks to the human condition. Boethius’s work is a prosimetrum, prose interspersed with verse. It became one of the several books to gain universal appeal throughout the Middle Ages. In late Latin, consolatio meant “aid” or “support” rather than “consolation” or “comfort.” Boethius, in prison, facing his death, is visited by Lady Philosophy, who immediately drives away the Muses of poetry whom, Boethius says, had been helping him find the words for his grief. Their instruction in poetry is not enough. Only attention to philosophy will take us to a knowledge of virtue and true justice, as it resides in the human soul. Boethius must come to understand that politics is always the enemy of philosophy, that is, politics that takes the actions of the state as the key to human nature and conduct.

Boethius says: “But you, Lady, dwelling in me, drove from my soul’s depths all desire for mortal things, and to have made any room for sacrilege under your very eyes would have been wicked indeed, for daily you instilled into my ears and my mind the Pythagorean saying, “Follow God’” (1.4.140). Epou deo is one of the ancient precepts, like those on the temple of Apollo at Delphi. Philosophy has freed Boethius to be self-determinate and free. It allows him to comprehend the Socratic conception of philosophy as practice of death. The pursuit of philosophy transcends the need to trust in fortune (fortuna) because fortune is always wont to change into misfortune (2.1.60). Good fortune is not the Good, for the Good is unchanging; it is ultimate, and knows no opposite.

Philosophy further teaches that happiness cannot be obtained by political power. If we consider well what political power is, we will see that: “whenever the power that makes kings happy ends, there their lack of power creeps in and makes them miserable; in this way, then, kings must have a larger share of misery than happiness. Knowing by experience the dangers of his own position, one tyrant [Dionysius I of Syracuse (see Cicero, Tusc. 5.21.61–62)], likened his fears as king to the terror of the sword hanging over Damocles’ head” (3.5.12–17). Happiness can be found only through the power of the divine. Boethius says to Lady Philosophy, “you spoke of that same form of the good being the substance of God and of happiness, and you taught me that unity itself was the same thing as the good, which was sought after by the whole natural world” (3.12.88–94).

There is an element of the Stoic in Boethius as there is in every philosopher. As such, neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean position is acceptable. The true philosopher has the sense of self-sufficiency that Aristotle attributes to contemplation. A dedication to reason and to the power of thought to think itself makes the philosopher unreachable by the ordinary means whereby the non-philosopher is affected—wealth, honor, power, glory, pleasure (De Con. 3.2.46–48). Pleasure is acceptable to the philosopher, but not as the highest good.

The true philosopher engaged in contemplation (theoria) can enjoy ataraxia, peace of mind. When fear is removed, as in the peace of the garden of Epicurus, the philosopher can flourish, not as a public figure but as a human engaged in the distinctively human activity of friendship, of friendly conversation. But the Neo-Platonic philosopher, whether Socratic or Christian, unlike the Epicurean, does not take pleasure to be the highest good. Nor does the true philosopher conquer the fear of death by the study of natural philosophy in order to remove fear of the gods. Death is a natural condition of life, but those who have listened to Socrates in the Phaedo overcome the fear of death because of the immortality of the soul—a view Boethius accepts philosophically and in his commitment to Christianity.

If the propensity to philosophize cannot be overcome by an act of philosophizing, this propensity must be taken to its limit. In so doing there is a sense of self-sufficiency and peace of mind that is inherent in the love of wisdom. In this way Lady Philosophy, as the absolute Muse, guides us by means of memory, as she does Boethius, through what was, what is, and what is to come.

Philosophical Ideas

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