Читать книгу Social Movements - Donatella della Porta - Страница 24

The state does not influence the formation of collective actors only through the definition of territorial boundaries to political action. It is well known that the role of the state in the economy has increased progressively in the course of the twentieth century, peaking in the 1970s, and then, even if unequally in crossnational comparison, declining with social expenditures at the turn of the century (Crouch 1999). However considered, since the 1950s, even in many developing countries, the state moved for a while from being a guarantor of the market to managing economic activities through public enterprise; moreover, the welfare state has contained social inequalities (for a global discussion, see Rose 1984). This has led some observers to hold that the principal social cleavage was no longer based on the control of the means of production, but relates, rather, to the procurement of the means of survival either in the private market or through public intervention (Crompton 1993, pp. 103–104). Certainly, criteria for allocation of public resources, often those concerned with the satisfaction of basic needs such as housing or transport, have represented a significant area for collective action, in particular, for social groups from an urban context (Castells 1983; Pickvance 1985, 1986).

Processes of a political nature, rather than based on market dynamics, affect the existence of certain social groups. After the Second World War, the phenomenon has become more marked, with the development of the welfare state, as well as of neocorporatist patterns of interest representation (see Chapter 8). In recent decades, social movements have criticized the model of the interventionist state, as well as that of the state as mediator between the forces of production. Various factors have converged toward a further widening of the potential for conflict. First, as the active role of the state in the distribution of resources has become increasingly evident, the opportunities for mobilization to protect ever more heterogeneous social groups and interests have also grown. Second, while the expansion of social rights has certainly brought greater opportunities for those from the lowest social classes, it has also entailed considerable fiscal redistribution. This has been considered, in the medium term, as particularly heavy for the middle classes, as well as insufficient to cover the growing costs of the welfare state, particularly in the context of an aging population. The result has been a universal welfare crisis that is at the same time fiscal and political. The explicitly political nature of the criteria for the allocation of social resources has, in fact, stimulated mobilization among the middle classes, not only in the form of antitax movements, but also from a perspective that is globally critical of the welfare state (Brissette 1988; Lo 1982, 1990).

More recently, however, the global justice movement has mobilized mainly in defense of the welfare state. In differing ways in various countries, trade‐union organizations have joined in protest, accusing neoliberal globalization of subordinating citizens’ rights to the free market, thus increasing the inequalities both between the North and South and within their own countries. The forerunners of the Seattle protests can be found, at least in part, in the world of work. As mentioned, in various ways, depending on the prevailing patterns of interest representation in various countries, the 1990s saw a transformation of labor action. While, in general terms, the union federations in European countries accepted privatization, deregulation, and the “flexibilization” of labor, opposition grew in other sectors both inside and outside unions.

Apart from public transport, opposition to neoliberal economic policies extended particularly to education and health. In these areas, in countries with pluralist patterns of industrial relations (with various representative organizations competing with each other), new unions highly critical of the various forms of privatization arose and expanded (Sommier 2003; della Porta 2006). In the so‐called neocorporative countries, with occupational representation confined to a single union, public‐sector unionists took the most radical positions (for instance, first workers’ union OETV and then Ver.di in Germany). It was no coincidence that these unions were the most involved in the protest campaigns against neoliberal globalization (della Porta 2006, 2005a).

As for anti‐austerity protests, changing political conditions are related to some specific forms of capitalism. If capitalism is, according to Marxism, one of a set of modes of production, defined on the basis of the relations between the owners of the conditions of production and the producers, then the specific forms exploitation takes during the evolution of capitalism must be expected to have an effect on producers’ mobilization (Barker 2013).

In cities, social movements have developed around claims on “collective consumption” (housing shortages, inadequate health care and education, access to water supply, sewerage systems, and electricity), but also urban planning (relocation of uses and demolition of cityscape). Critical mass, reclaim the streets, or right to the city have been important actors in city politics, addressing economic reorganization and urban redevelopment in the post‐industrial global city (Salet 2007; Pruijt 2007, p. 5116; see also Chapter 3) and its hegemonic model of urban development with large‐scale physical renovation projects. Going beyond the Western world, “the emergence of this model of urban development has been an international process. The privatization and commodification of urban resources, the processes of residential gentrification, the dispossession and displacement of low‐income people, and the growing impact of tourism in central urban areas are increasingly prominent in cities across the world” (Andretta, Piazza and Subirats 2015, p. 203). In recent years, the global crisis “is intensifying the breaking points around which urban social movements have been rallying, suddenly validating their claims and arguments about the lack of sustainability and the destructiveness of the neoliberal growth model” (Mayer 2009, pp. 370–371).

To summarize: the growth of the role of the state has multiplied the number of social actors whose existence and opportunities seem to be linked at least partially to political decision‐making mechanisms. At the same time, the processes of globalization that we have just described, have undermined the capacity of consolidated political actors to effectively mediate between the various interests. Changes in the criteria for defining actors and for determining the stakes to play for, have promoted the multiplication of collective identities and of mobilized interests and, therefore, also their segmentation.