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Introduction

From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the Greek-Turkish confrontation on NATO’s southeast flank was considered a fact of life by government officials, diplomats and officers. Greek-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean continue to this day and dogfights in the Aegean skies are almost a daily occurrence. The two countries have not altered their policies and have continued to deploy their armed forces on both sides of the Aegean Sea, watching each other. While the issue of post 9/11 international security preoccupies most other governments, Athens and Ankara continue to view each other’s intentions with suspicion. Athens, has been especially suspicious of Turkey’s hostile strategic intentions towards Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean. The post-Cold War expansion of Turkish arms procurement programmes, the influence of the military in Turkish politics and the rise of new issues over the Aegean caused by Turkish diplomacy, indicates to the Greeks a revisionist Turkey ready to exploit any opportunity and crisis in order to advance her own interests at the expense of Greece.

The author provides background information on post-1974 Greek foreign policies and domestic politics and focuses his research on the tenures of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and of Prime Minister Costas Simitis in the crisis days of March 1987 and January 1996 respectively. The 1980s was the last decade of the Cold War. However Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, continued to regard each other with hostility. In the 1990s, during the era of the ‘New World Order’, with ethnic conflicts erupting in the Balkans, Greece continued suspecting the motives of Turkish foreign policy and the ever expanding military procurement programmes of Ankara.

The Greek-Turkish confrontation – from the Cyprus insurgency in 1955, to the Turkish invasion of the Cyprus Republic in 1974 and today’s Aegean dogfights1 – has proven to be resistant to international diplomatic initiatives by other NATO member states, arms limitation treaties and the geo-strategic changes in the international environment. Present multinational co-operations against the threat of Islamic terrorism seem to have had no influence on the way the two countries regard each other. In order to understand the course of Greek-Turkish relations from the 1970s to the 1990s, it is necessary to study the patterns and accuracy of Greek threat assessments and attempt to assess their influence over Greek policy making towards Turkey.

The chapters follow a thematic narrative, as it is vital to address a number of interrelated historical, political and bureaucratic factors which were pertinent to Greek intelligence performance from the 1970s to the 1990s. Chapter I examines Greek foreign policy and domestic politics in the 1970s and 1980s with reference to Prime Ministers Constantinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou. There is also an assessment regarding the objectives of legislation for the Greek intelligence service and of the Ministry of Defence decision-making process in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Following this is an outline of the history of the Greek-Turkish disputes since the 1970s and the legal and policy positions of each party. The way in which the legal position of Greece is presented in the Aegean disputes is of great importance because arguments of legality and perceptions of sovereign rights had a direct impact on military threat assessments. The Greeks assumed that the seemingly weak legal position of Turkey in the Aegean led Ankara to seek a resolution of the dispute by means of political manipulation or coercion. Chapter II explores the strategic assessments of the Greek military intelligence on Turkish intentions, arms programmes, deployments, propaganda and covert operations against Greece in the 1980s and 90s.

Finally, Chapter III describes the nature and the intensity of the confrontation in the Aegean by placing emphasis on the Greek-Turkish dogfights that have defined the level of tactical engagements until today. Focusing on the Greek-Turkish crises and the role of intelligence, the two following chapters deal with the major Greek-Turkish confrontations that include substantial military deployments in the Aegean; the crises of March 1987 and January 1996. Following a chronological narrative, this study provides a documented, balanced and rigorous description of the crisis days and the crisis management styles of Greek leadership. The crises chapters narrate the ways in which Greek intelligence interpreted Turkish intentions and how Greek politicians interacted with top officers. Both crises may have led to an armed conflict between the two supposed Cold War allies. It is shown that intelligence played a key role in averting war.

The history of Greek military intelligence assessments of Turkey will be preceeded by a brief- but vital- section on military intelligence and crisis analysis concepts, so as to enable the reader to compare the evolving Greek and Anglo-American understanding of intelligence and crisis management.

Key Concepts in Military Intelligence

What is ‘intelligence’? Many prominent intelligence scholars and practitioners offer definitions. There is now a broad consensus as exemplified by the following definitions: ‘Intelligence is knowledge. Intelligence is both a process and an end product’ argues Sherman Kent, the famous CIA scholar of the late 1940s in his Yale Review article in 1946 and in his book Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, 1949).2 ‘Intelligence is the information – questions, insights, hypotheses, evidence – relevant to policy’ as H. L. Wilensky defines it in Organizational Intelligence (New York, 1967). Robert R. Bowie, former head of US National Foreign Assessment Centre, argues that intelligence is ‘knowledge and analysis designed to assist action’. Policy makers must ‘appraise’ the intelligence available and make relevant decisions. The appraisal encompasses intelligence collection, analysis and the method of presenting the data to the policy makers. Information always has to be relevant to the politicians’ or top military officers’ priorities and requirements for long-term foreign policy, current policy or for international crisis management.3

However amongst Greek academia there is no equivalent debate of the meaning of ‘intelligence’. In Greek, ‘intelligence’ means information (pliroforia); the intelligence service is called ypiresia pliroforion. The word pliroforia has no conceptual link to espionage, analysis, process, or the product of confidential status or security, as the English term ‘intelligence’ may imply. The word pliroforia as a term does not refer at all to the source, public, official or secret. Touching upon the issue of secrecy, Michael Warner, a CIA staff historian, wrote that intelligence by necessity requires confidentiality of sources and methods of collection and of assessments produced; thus ‘intelligence is a secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’.4

Throughout this research, the definitions offered by Kent, Bowie and Warner were the most pertinent to analyse how Greek intelligence works.5 Throughout the interviews, diplomats and politicians who were unfamiliar with literature on intelligence studies, downplayed the importance of ‘analysis’ and of ‘information to assist action’; by ‘intelligence’ they meant just to receive information and not the whole process of estimation. In contrast, military officers and former NIS (Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion, National Intelligence Service) directors had a very good conceptual grasp of military intelligence, but remained hesitant to speak more freely or to explain their arguments and views in greater depth. (This was not surprising as they were unaccustomed to research interviews for academic purposes.) In addition, espionage (kataskopia) is a word with very negative connotations and the attitude of interviewees changed upon hearing this term. Conceptually, pliroforia and kataskopia or analysi (analysis) have no connection. Upon hearing the word kataskopia, some interviewees became more hesitant to speak even when it was made clear that only contemporary assessments and analyses were required and not the cloak-and-dagger details about kataskopia.

Whilst the interviewees were reluctant to discuss collection methods and espionage, the hunt for facts and plans plays a crucial role in the intelligence process. As the US congressional intelligence specialist Angelo Codevilla writes ‘‘evidence of enemy plans sought by intelligence agencies is either ‘static’ or ‘dynamic’. Geography, climate, demography, culture, political and economic institutions and the personalities of key military and civilian officials constitute ‘static’ facts. In contrast, the ‘dynamic’ data encompasses military capabilities and ever-changing political intentions’.’6 However Codevilla ignores the possibility of false or misinterpreted facts and forecasts. One example of false static intelligence analysis was the 1975 CIA estimate of the future of the Cypriot Republic after the Turkish invasion. The paper warned that Greek Cypriots would face severe economic problems as the majority of the agricultural production came from the Turkish occupied areas. The major copper mines and tourist resorts were also located in the occupied zone. CIA analysts argued that the continuation of the occupation would result in mass unemployment, a decrease in the average per capita income and a ‘deep economic crisis’.7 However, since the late 1970s, the economy of the Cypriot Republic has developed rapidly and as a result, became a European Union member state in 2004. Meanwhile, the Turkish occupied area has been suffering from unemployment and underdevelopment and Ankara continues to give ongoing financial support to the Turco-Cypriot regime.

As demonstrated in Chapter II, Greek estimates referred to Turkish arms procurement trends, to perceptions of ‘Turkish grand strategy’ and to the long-term political and legal positions in the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. Regarding the assessment of the military power of an opponent, a number of analytical components and variables are to be applied. Key areas of constant intelligence research concern are the quantity and quality of weaponry, the composition of military units, support and logistics mechanisms and the training, morale and leadership quality of military personnel. The nature of arms procurement programmes is directly affected by current and predicted assessments of the geographical and geopolitical environment.8 In estimating the military threat, analysts proceed to a ‘net assessment’, which includes the comparison of quality and quantity of the opponent’s forces with those of their own country. In parallel, they define military threats (mainly in the form of surprise attacks and full scale invasions) and estimate to what extent new technologies and weaponry could change the balance of military power. Analyses tended and still tend to be focused on military capability. Interestingly, a British government view during the Cold War claimed that political intentions ‘may change rapidly whereas military capabilities can only be altered over a long period’.9 In evaluating the Turkish threat, Greek intelligence also adopted this line of reasoning (see Chapter II).

However the analysis of capabilities does not always reveal the hostile intentions of potential foes. Capabilities can be assessed by quantitative and qualitative analysis, whereas intentions are assessed by a multi-layered analysis of tactical, operational, strategic and political factors and goals. Intelligence officers have to pay constant attention to the interrelation and fluctuation of the intentions and capabilities of the opponent state, examining its current and future aims, not just its past military and political behaviour.10

Estimates of the development of military capabilities contribute directly to assessments of political and strategic intentions. As a result, Greek intelligence was required to clearly define the military and political challenge posed by dynamic Turkish arms procurement programmes. In general, information on enemy military objectives, exercise scenarios and changes in military capability could indicate long-term political intentions despite the interference of ephemeral and circumstantial evidence during strategic intelligence analysis.11 The analysis of the arms procurement strategy of a state perceived as a threat has to directly address the issue that the purchase of expensive weaponry may be the side effect of inter-departmental or inter-service struggles within governments that lack effective central controls on spending or that suffer from poor financial planning, or corruption. The assumption of a centrally controlled long-term strategy against other states requires rigorous testing and cannot be inferred from propaganda sources or the analysis of long-term arms procurement trends only.12 Greek Prime Ministers and secretaries, especially Andreas Papandreou, believed strongly in a centrally directed and long-term Turkish strategy against Greece and thus interpreted any Turkish diplomatic and military decision and action as premeditated and tightly controlled by the Turkish General Staff (TGS).

It is worth citing that Kam, in Surprise Attack, warns that information on foreign military capabilities is always ‘false, inaccurate, obsolete, incomplete’ at the strategic level.13 Even in cases where authentic top-secret information on how the opponent perceives his own capabilities is available, assessments are to be approached with caution. Strategic assumptions could be based upon constantly changing information and an understated or overestimated view of the opponents’ assets and intentions may develop.14

In assessing the opponent’s intentions, it is very difficult to discover strategic, political, operational and tactical ‘rationality’. The analysis process is often influenced by cultural biases and historical memories and this potentially causes the formulation of an over exaggerated threat estimate. Moreover, problems occur because of an inadequate understanding of the opponent’s military doctrine and foreign and defence policy establishments. History is abundant with examples of the misperception of motives and doctrines. This is especially evident in the Turco-Greek case as the burden of history of confrontation has influenced the way in which politicians and military officers have viewed Turkish intentions toward Greece during and after the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In the 1980s, the emergence of a nationalistic/neo-Ottoman rhetoric in Turkey influenced the way Greek politicians and Greek public opinion perceived Ankara’s strategic intentions. However as shown in Chapters II and III, a dispassionate analyst would have hypothesised that Ankara did not have the military, financial and diplomatic capabilities to pursue an aggressive nationalist foreign policy.

In assessing intelligence concepts and methods, it is necessary to refer to factors that may corrupt an estimate. ‘Mirror imaging’ is an analytical obstacle that has not been previously studied by Greek analysts or academics. Mirror imaging refers to the projection of one’s own way of thinking, culture and political history, onto the opponent. Phrases like ‘they must know…’, ‘they probably realise that..’. or ‘it is logical for them to react that way..’. represent honest attempts to create a framework for understanding the mentality of the opponent.15 The assessment of the opponent’s way of thinking is linked and compared to one’s own standards. Interestingly, the Anglo-American concept of mirror imaging is related to a famous ancient Greek saying: ‘You shall not judge by your own affairs those of others’. As demonstrated in Chapters II and III, some Greek politicians and the public opinion might have overestimated the perceived Turkish threat because of the strong influence of the Turkish military in domestic politics. Besides, Greek diplomats and generals strongly believed that a semi-autocratic regime, like that of Turkey in the 1980s and 90s, harboured aggressive intentions toward Greece. They argued that Greece, a true democracy since 1974, had no expansionist intentions toward Ankara and that the invasion of Cyprus, along with the Turkish resolve to continue the occupation of the northern part of the island, proved the existence of a militarily aggressive Turkey. Greek officials strongly believed and still believe, in Immanuel Kant’s argument that ‘democracies do not fight each other’16 and that it is ‘logical’ to expect aggression from a regime where the military has considerable influence in the political process.17 The politicians’ and the public’s collective memory of the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 has largely shaped the understanding of Turkey’s intentions towards Greece in the post 1974 era.18

One area of military intelligence, which has had particular relevance to the Greek-Turkish confrontation, is the well-heard argument that the opponent’s forces are always deployed offensively and not defensively and have been far too numerous to have been undertaking defensive missions. During the Cold War, Western analysts estimated that the Soviet forces could launch surprise offensive land operations at short notice and with no time for a political signal to be received by Western governments. This analysis created the almost unchallenged assumption that Soviet military capabilities and their deployment indicated the Kremlin’s intentions. However the explanation that the Kremlin did not have expansionist intentions was not accepted by these pessimistic analysts. Soviet strategists had in fact made rational contingency plans in response to a Western offensive and in the case of such an event they would initiate an intensive counter-attack. It is understood that there has to be a constant attempt for accurate and critical analysis of the way the opponent views his own capabilities and those of his opponent’s.19 The fact that the opponent state can use its capabilities does not mean that it will employ them during a crisis.20 In the interviews retired Greek generals argued that the composition and the deployment of Turkish forces in East Thrace and Anatolia were offensive in nature, using offensive weaponry, assets such as landing craft and paratrooper regiments and offensive war plans, indicated by exercises featuring air drops and beach landings. They also believed that Ankara had reformulated her military doctrine on US air-land battles in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, these military officers did not elaborate further on the assessments of Turkish operational doctrine and did not mention the possibility of another explanation. For example, the Turkish General Staff planners did not have strategic depth in East Thrace (Turkey) in response to a Greek land offensive and this may explain why Ankara chose to assume an offensive posture. Moreover, historically, the Turkish Army in East Thrace enjoyed high symbolism as it traditionally guarded the borders of Ottoman Istanbul/Constantinople. With regards to the Turkish air-land battle doctrine, one could argue that in the 1980s, this US-NATO concept was the most available and familiar for the pro-Western, Turkish military, equipped with US-made weaponry and sharing training with US and NATO member states military since the early 1950s.

Generally, long-term Greek intelligence assessments, following certain US intelligence analysis patterns, tended to over-exaggerate Turkish intentions, military capabilities and the operational performance of her weaponry.21 Usually, Western and Greek planners reacted against the ambivalence and ambiguity of data by assuming the ‘worst-case scenario’.22 Unshakable assumptions of the hostile intentions of the opponent state may just be poor analysis leading to poor foreign policy. The analytical approach adopted by some top Greek politicians and officers of always assuming the worst and the side effects of misinterpreted intelligence in crisis decision-making have yet to be addressed by Greek scholars. However it is worth noting that this research and the interviews conducted reveal that no Turcophobic mentality existed in the key service echelons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NIS or the MoD in the 1980s and 90s.

Leadership and Intelligence

Politicians are described as ‘human beings and political animals’ and this duality affects their response toward intelligence estimates. Declared policies should enhance political and ideological credibility and secure re-election, even though contrary evidence may be clearly evident.23 Former Deputy Director of South African National Intelligence Service, Shan McCarthy, has studied the influence of self-confidence on a politician’s way of thinking. The politician believes that his personal success (i.e. to be elected President, Prime Minister or to be appointed member of the cabinet) is mainly the result of good personal judgement and superior decision-making skills.24 Politicians constantly acquire their own information from personal contacts with fellow foreign leaders in private discussions. Gradually, they become ‘analysts on their own’ and tend to only trust a small, intimate circle of political advisors who may not have specialised training and experience in intelligence matters. The intelligence bureaucracy is not always well informed about the estimates of their political superiors. This means that senior intelligence officials who do not take into consideration the views and priorities of the politicians they serve, may find their estimates deemed irrelevant by top-level decision-makers. Former head of Israeli military intelligence, Shlomo Gazit, comments on the requirement of ‘chemistry’ between the political leader and his intelligence chief, the importance of a reciprocal relationship, mutual trust and the need for constant communication, directions and feedback.25 However all these useful suggestions derive from his own military experience in the 1970s and 1980s, decades in which Israel was engaged in conflict with the Arabs, Egypt and Syria. Within the historical context of the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between leaders and intelligence chiefs constituted different behavioural and structural arrangements in different cases. The experience of a Greek officer, who may have studied the Turkish armed forces for years but was not called up to fight in Cyprus or in the Aegean, is vastly different to an Israeli officer who found himself either on the desert battlefield in protection of his homeland or in constant dramatic communications with his political leadership during a conflict.

Others argue that leadership intelligence challenges the intelligence cycle and may cause confusion in the echelons of the intelligence and foreign policy establishment.26 The Anglo-American concept of the ‘politicisation of intelligence’ encompasses the attempts of the political and military leadership to influence the mid-level analyst’s estimates and conclusions in favour of their subjective policy positions.27 There are types and degrees of politicisation. As demonstrated in this study, the Greek ‘politicisation of intelligence’ took place in a domestic political context. It did not include the biased analysis of foreign threats or pressure from higher echelons on mid-level intelligence analysts. In these cases, Greek politicians simply ignored the foreign affairs and defence bureaucracy. Throughout the interviews with former diplomats and officers, no individual claimed that he had experienced pressure to change his estimate of Turkish foreign policy towards Greece. Most significantly, there was no evidence of political leaders attempting to pressure an officer into changing his assessment of operational and technical matters.

Professor Ben-Zvi refers to ‘motivated’ and ‘unmotivated’ sources of misperception and how it may influence the decision-maker. In some instances, leaders exhibit insensitivity toward new intelligence. They may disregard intelligence and foreign policy advice which identify current policy weaknesses, or a need to change their policies (and thus potentially lose credibility in the eyes of the electorate.) Decision-makers may also disregard the interests, aspirations and plans of their opponent’s foreign policy. On the other hand, they may overestimate and overstate the perceived threat in order to justify their own policies.28 There is a distinction between motivated and unmotivated perception bias in intelligence perception. Three types of interrelated variables affect the way of thinking and decision-making:

Cognitive variables (i.e. perceived values, biases, overconfidence, lack of empathy). Strategic variables (i.e. long/short-term bureaucratic or personal perceptions of the opponent’s strategy). Domestic political variables.29

The theses of MacArthy and Ben-Zvi are directly relevant to the Greek experience in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the historical evidence and testimonies, the key members of the first socialist administration under Andreas Papandreou were hostile toward the tenured officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MoD and intelligence (considered to be rightists and ex-Junta supporters or sympathizers). Administration officials, strongly motivated by Papandreou’s socialist ideology, chose to rely on their own abilities to analyse intelligence and world affairs when assessing the Turkish threat to Greece. In addition, they were loyal and always adjusted their views in line with the opinions of Papandreou who had an authoritarian style of leadership within both his administration and his party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).30 Finally, it can be argued that the literature of Anglo-American and Israeli authors on the relationship between intelligence and leadership has been influenced by a number of modern conflicts which have experienced the threat of imminent conflict and the fear of strategic surprise. Conversely, later chapters demonstrate that Greek leaders and their staffs in the 1980s and 90s closely studied Turkish foreign and defence policy but they did not anticipate an imminent Greek-Turkish conflict. This meant that they took a more cool and detached attitude towards assessments debates and politicisation.

Intelligence and Crisis Management

The analysis of Greek-Turkish crises constitutes an integral part of this book. Professor Phillip Williams defined an international crisis as ‘a confrontation of two or more states, usually occupying a short time period in which the probability of an outbreak of war between the participants is perceived to increase significantly’.31 Similarly Michael Brecher describes a crisis as a ‘situational change in the external or internal environment that creates, in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of an international actor, a perceived threat from the external environment to the “basic” values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary’.32 In operational terms a crisis has four elements:

Perceived change in the external environment. Threat to basic (or non-basic) interests. High awareness of the eventuality of resorting to the use of force. The realization that the decision-makers have a finite/limited time framework to establish and implement a strategy for response.33

Williams refers to two main approaches in the discipline of crisis management. The first approach claims that crises occur in the international system like some sort of a ‘disease’ that no inter-state relations could avoid. The main task of crisis management is the avoidance of war and the formulation of diplomatic options to resolve the dispute in a mutually acceptable fashion. In contrast, the zero-sum approach regards crisis management as an opportunity for the advancement of national interests. Confrontation, coercion and the communication of any threats are integral parts of good crisis management and the main aim of skilful leadership is to get the opponent to back down.34 The zero-sum approach promotes a ‘zero-sum mentality’. The intentions, capabilities and behaviour of the opponent are always interpreted as hostile. This approach induces an increased sensitivity to threats, both real and imagined and may lead to counter-action and a further escalation of the crisis. In contrast, the understanding that crises are inevitable ‘diseases’ promotes a framework of interpretation or mindset which decreases threat sensitivity. The actions and decisions of the opponent are interpreted as initiatives primarily directed toward avoiding armed conflict and it is assumed that both sides share a mutual interest in the avoidance of war. Both approaches shape the analysis of intelligence during a crisis.

According to the principles of crisis management, one of the most important axioms is the limitation of objectives. The limitation and specification of foreign policy objectives during a crisis encourages restraint, builds mutual trust and as a result, the opponents may opt for restraint in their military and diplomatic responses. In parallel, the intelligence agencies identify the policy opportunities generated by the crisis, whose exploitation may lead to the advancement of the country’s interests. Another accepted principle of crisis management is the improvement of communication between policy makers and intelligence personnel (i.e. analysts and senior collectors). Moreover, crisis response needs to have legitimacy by promoting the legal and political positions of the parties involved to the international community and to world opinion. Force restraint is a crucial component of the strategy of legitimacy and of avoiding escalation.35

The aforementioned principles of crisis management should be considered a selective description of Cold War crisis management and not a rigid theory that covers every international confrontation. They are the products of scholarly and professional research in the West, primarily in American political science. It can be assumed, with a certain degree of safety, that officials in Turkey and Greece, as members of NATO and familiar with the US military training system for senior officers, understood and absorbed these well-known principles, despite the aggressive and nationalistic rhetoric and propaganda employed during a bilateral crisis. Indeed, a retired general admitted to the apparent ability of Turkish officers to adapt their operational military thought to NATO doctrines and practices. However they were also characterised by a blind obedience towards their superiors and exhibited a lack of initiative, especially within the middle ranks.36 Yet, each party may interpret the crisis management principles differently. For example, a Greek General or a Turkish ambassador may honestly have different ideas of what is crisis management and how to ‘save face’ during a crisis negotiation. There exists the danger of mirror imaging in the interpretation and application of these principles and ultimately, the Turks may understand the crisis management principles differently to the Greeks.

Scholarly research in leadership studies has identified two main types of intelligence-policy relations, the mono-centrist and the poly-centrist. A mono-centrist approach involves a lack of consultation between decision-makers and intelligence staffs and, the formulation of an elite group. This closed group is often isolated from the intelligence bureaucracy and employs it to deliver, rather than analyse, any information. Gradually, this elite team is affected by what is termed ‘groupthink’ which serves to constrain creative thinking and rigorous intelligence analysis in a crisis. Groupthink refers to the stereotyped views of enemy leaders and opponents’ policies and of the inherent morality with which the decision-makers feel for themselves. It also incorporates the exertion of direct pressure on other officials to agree with the prevailing policy options and assessments.37

In most cases, intelligence personnel are kept out of this policy making group. The groupthink phenomenon refers to the situation when political, military and intelligence officials follow the same patterns of thought, interpretation and analysis. This can lead to a disregard for parameters and hypotheses that could aid the understanding of the crisis situation as a ‘dynamic intelligence reality’. CIA analyst Frank Watanabe warns that total agreement among decision-makers during the analysis of the opponent’s intentions, especially during a crisis, ‘may be an indicator that something in the estimate is probably wrong’.38 In contrast, the poly-centrist approach seeks to prevent the emergence of groupthink and favours rigorous cross-bureaucratic communication and consultations among various ranks, including direct competition for the most accurate and precise intelligence assessment.39

Chapter II identifies that the patterns of consultation within the Greek administration in the 1980s, were mono-centrist and subject to high degree of groupthink under the influence of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Moreover, the Greek legal framework of the intelligence services in the 1970s and 1980s contributed significantly to the mono-centrist approach. A close study of published memoirs and interviews with key officials willing to speak can reveal the consultation patterns within the top echelons of the Greek government in the 1980s. Regarding the mid 1990s, Chapter V presents the consultations of Prime Minister Costas Simitis with his secretaries and the chief of the National Defence General Staff during the January 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis.

Intelligence Relating to Intentions during a Crisis

During the period preceding a crisis, intelligence agencies watch for indicators that may show a change in the behaviour of their perceived opponent. A change in attitude may indicate to the intelligence community that national security and the interests of the state, as they are perceived and defined, may be jeopardized by the actions or decisions of the opponent state. The focus should remain on identifying the significance of every indicator, or of the accumulation of these indicators and their impact on short-term and medium-term bilateral relations. Professor Kam argues that the enemy produces indicators through his behaviour. Intelligence analysts seek to identify the most useful threat assessment indicators (e.g. demarches of diplomats, troop mobilisation and deployments, new high ranking military appointments and ultra-nationalist remarks by politicians.) The challenging issue that arises is whether the analysts, in this case the Greek intelligence community, are focusing on the correct indicators for the situation at hand.40

Information on the real political and military intentions of the opponent in a rapidly changing situation constitutes the core requirement of intelligence in a crisis. Ben-Zvi makes a distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘immediate’ intentions. Basic intentions have a long-term, strategic essence and are assessed regularly by various sources (i.e. diplomatic, military). There is an anticipation of the opponent’s style of behaviour in international organisations, in military exercises and in diplomatic relations with allies and adversaries. However ‘basic’ intentions may be difficult to define because deception and secrecy as well as flaws in analysis (i.e. mirror imaging, ethnic stereotypes, trend analysis on historical events and the prediction of an opponent’s behaviour in the future), may interfere. In contrast, ‘immediate’ intentions refer to the perception of how the enemy may behave and how he might implement his policies in the tactical environment of a crisis. Analysts formulate short-term military and diplomatic-political expectations about the opponent’s decisions and observe the opponent’s deployment of capabilities and the armed forces operational status. However uncertainty remains a factor to be counted in all assessments.41 As discussed in Chapter V, during the Greek-Turkish crisis in 1996, Ankara challenged the sovereignty of two islets within Greek territorial waters. In Athens, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MoD considered this to be the first time Turkey had undertaken such an initiative since the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. As a result, the realisation that ‘something changed’ in the behaviour of a ‘revisionist’ Turkey considerably influenced the contemporary Greek assessment of the crisis.

In addition, warning is divided into three main categories: political, strategic and tactical. Political warning refers to the history of bilateral tensions that officials assume could lead to a crisis at any moment. A crisis may be the pretext or the cause of resorting to arms. As Professor Richard Betts argues, ‘strategic warning covers issues of developing military assets according to a preconceived attack plan of the opponent state’.42 A warning requires a prompt analysis and a decision that ultimately leads to action. This action creates indicators that are picked up by the opposite side, thus initiating the ‘cycle of warning’ process (i.e. warning-analysis-decision-action). The opponent’s reaction creates another warning which begins the process again. During international crises, this two-party process takes place within days, hours or minutes. The interaction of the cycles of warning directly affects the assessments of both opponents. Intelligence agencies must establish if the opponent has optioned for a ‘decision stairway’. This process shows that the other party is seriously considering ‘all options’ (i.e. resorting to the use of force) and making operational and political contingency plans. Thomas Belden, a CIA analyst, talks of the decision stairway being a military-political-intelligence process that is affected by the other party’s initiatives and decisions.43

As shown through the analysis of the research undertaken, the concept of cycles of warning is directly relevant to the way Greek reactions were shaped during the crises in 1987 and 1996. With regards to Turkish intentions, as examined in Chapter IV, Ankara did not intend to initiate military action against Greece during the crisis of 1987. The deployment of Turkish forces was limited and not positioned offensively. Moreover, during the crisis in January 1996, Ankara only mobilised naval units around the disputed area and decided against involving the Turkish land forces (with the exception of a small commando team), thus indicating an intention to manage the crisis rather than implement plans for war.

Professor Betts argues that intelligence failures in a crisis are due to a total absence of warning, very late warning, or a lack of appreciation for the information provided to the decision-makers. The warning is either ‘factual-technical’ or ‘contingent-political’. The factual-technical warning is based on the intelligence gathered regarding the enemy’s capabilities in a given area (e.g. military movements on mainland Turkey, naval movements in the Aegean international waters and Greek-Turkish air dogfights). The contingent-political warning depends on the analysis of the information gathered and on the hypothetical construction of the opponent’s intentions.44

In his study of the role of intelligence in a crisis, Thomas Belden offers four general principles of what he calls ‘probability statements’. Firstly, one should bear in mind that very precise predictions (of dates and hours) have a low probability. One cannot be sure that at X time, on Z date an offensive/provocative action will take place. Secondly, the greater the number of estimated data/information elements (e.g. movement of ships, troops, politicians’ statements within a short period of time and the influence of international organisations and diplomacy upon the opponents), the lower the probability of a predicted event. Many categories of data increase the number of possible scenarios. Thirdly, the long time span of a prediction negatively affects the probability of an event. Other political-military variables may affect the opponent’s political and military behaviour, plans and intentions, causing the opponent to act differently than expected.45 As shown in Chapter II and III, Belden’s probability estimates helped to evaluate the strategic threat assessment by Greek intelligence.

This study will focus on the analysis of the contingent-political warning and will provide evidence showing that Athens obtained a secret warning on possible Turkish contingency plans in response to a possible Greek initiative on the continental shelf in 1986-1987. In comparison to Betts’s and Ben Zvi’s theses on warning, the Greek warning was not related to a surprise offensive, but involved possible Turkish diplomatic intentions toward Greek sovereign rights and claims in accordance with the international law. Chapter V presents the Greek intelligence analysis of the 1996 crisis and demonstrates that the mobilisation of the Greek military for surveillance purposes around the Imia islets and the landing of Greek civilians on one islet may have caused the landing of Turkish journalists and, in general, the provocative Turkish actions towards Greek sovereign rights over the area.

The ‘Rules of the Game’

States engaged in confrontations over a long period of time learn a great deal about each other’s military behaviour from experience. A number of unwritten ‘rules of the game’ develop over the years. Any deviation from this unofficial body of rules causes second thoughts about each other’s tactical, operational and strategic intentions.46 In the case of Turkey and Greece, the rules of the game refer to the movement of aircraft and warships, the military exercises in the Aegean and the violations of their national airspace and international airspace regulations. Greece and Turkey found themselves facing intelligence analysis challenges linked to each other’s legal and political positions on the issues of airspace and sea boundaries. As examined in Chapter IV on the Greek-Turkish confrontation, quantitative studies, (e.g. how many Turkish violations of regulations in airspace take place annually) and qualitative studies (i.e. types of weaponry and pilots’ attitudes during dogfights) do not always help us to adequately define the Greek and Turkish military interaction and strategic intention of each other.

Moreover, during crises each side perceived the other’s legal and political arguments as invalid and instead viewed them as indications of current and future hostile, revisionist and manipulative intentions. Any proposals for discussions were interpreted as concessions or the legitimisation of the demands of the opposite party. The Greek administration in the 1980s, unwilling even to have political level communication with the Turkish government, interpreted any Turkish decision and diplomatic initiative as a high threat to Greek interests. However the stakes of every international crisis may not be calmly defined during the dramatic hours of high level consultations and in rapid intelligence briefings on the current military situation. The perceived aggressor in a crisis may seem to be challenging the sovereignty or national security of the defending state. When considering national interests, one must assess to what extent they are really threatened.47 It is usually the fear of precedent-setting actions by the opponent that causes crises excalating over exaggerated assessments and reactions.48 Conceptual images of the ‘defender’ and the ‘aggressor’ interfere with the effort for a distanced and dispassionate intelligence analysis. In Greek-Turkish relations, the unshakeable assessment of a long-term, centrally planned Turkish strategy aiming at the ‘thinning out of Greek sovereign rights’ in the Aegean Sea, created a image of a high threat and this subsequently affected the Greek intelligence analysis.49

The suspicion that a centralised strategy initiates a crisis for diplomatic-military advantages to be gained is as old as war itself. The analysis which regards every decision or deployment of the opponent’s military and diplomacy as centrally directed, prevails in crisis assessment and in some instances, may distort accurate assessment of the situation. Chance, randomness, co-incidences and blunders are not considered adequate explanations for events in crisis hours; especially when past personal memories and institutional history may be linked, even arbitrarily, to the current conditions in the minds of decision-makers and commanders.50 During a crisis, there is a constant mental effort to define the causation of events and the behaviour of the players. The quest for the enemy’s ‘secret plan’ is a human reaction to chaos and uncertainty.51 Nonetheless, the analyst, in a quest for the truth, should always ask himself and others: is there a secret plan of the opposite side?

This research shows that Greek intelligence had some secret information on possible, centrally directed Turkish decisions and actions before and during the crises in 1987 and 1996. In the crisis of 1996, Greek intelligence believed that a party of Turkish journalists who landed on Imia islet were in fact state-sponsored agents provocateurs (see Chapter V). However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, high ranking officials at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MoD and NIS echelons, accepted the analyses of an aggressive centralised Turkish strategy without allowing for the possibility of coincidences and innocent tactical mistakes. The belief that Ankara had a highly organised and long-term strategy of expansion against Greece has existed to this day.

The concepts examined in this research, focus mainly on the scenario of a surprise attack against a sovereign state. In later parts of this research, evidence will show that the Greeks were preoccupied with the notion of a ‘staged crisis’, not a full scale Turkish attack. In Greek eyes, Turkey did not intend to invade an Aegean Greek island, but aimed at causing a crisis which could have forced Athens into negotiations over the Aegean disputes. Thus Athens had to constantly anticipate Turkish political intentions rather than just her military deployments, since Ankara could cause an Aegean crisis with provocative actions and decisions and take advantage of a Greek overreaction in order to further escalate the crisis. However whether such a crisis would involve the Turkish armed forces in full mobilisation is the subject of debate in chapters IV and V.