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[1] Despatch from Sir John French to Earl Kitchener of September 17th, 1914. For the text of this see Appendix.

[2] The contemplated fine has been alleged to be 4,000 millions sterling, coupled with the formal cession of all North Eastern France. This statement was circulated by Reuter's correspondent at Paris on what was asserted to be high diplomatic authority. Such a sum sounds incredible, though as a pretext it might possibly have been put forward.

[3] Simon: The Emperor William and his Reign.

[4] This phrase is that of General F. von Bernhardi.

[5] After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Prince Gortschakov mooted the idea of an alliance between Russia and France. In 1879 Bismarck, in view of such a development, concluded the alliance between Germany and Austria. Italy joined this alliance in 1883, but on a purely defensive footing. The account given of the Triple Alliance by Prince Bernhard von Bülow, ex-Imperial Chancellor, is that it was designed to safeguard the Continental interests of the three Powers, leaving each free to pursue its extra-Continental interests. From 1815 to 1878 the three absolutist Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, had aimed at dominating the politics of the Continent by their entente. For many years, however, German influence in Russia has been giving way before French influence. This is one of the most important facts of modern European history. The Triple Alliance was undoubtedly designed to counteract its effect. Germany, with ambitions in Asia Minor, backed up Austria, with ambitions in the Balkans. Both sets of ambitions were opposed to the interests of Russia. Russia's desertion of the absolutist entente for the existing entente with the liberal Powers of the West has been due nevertheless as much to the growth of constitutionalism as to diplomacy. The entente with Great Britain and France is popular. On the other hand, the entente with Germany and Austria was unpopular. The view here taken that one of the real aims of the Triple Alliance was the furtherance of Prussia's designs against France is the view consistent with the course of Prussian policy. For Prince von Bülow's explanations, see his Imperial Germany.

[6] F. von Bernhardi: The Next War: see Introduction.

[7] Of the remaining corps, five were posted along the frontier of East Prussia to watch the Russians. The rest were held chiefly at Mainz, Coblentz, and Breslau as an initial reserve.

The now definitely ascertained facts regarding the military strength of Germany appear to be these:—

25 corps and one division of the active army mustering	1,530,000 men
21 corps of Landwehr mustering	1,260,000 men
	————
Total	2,790,000 men

In addition, there were raised 12 corps of Ersatz Reserve, and there were also the Landsturm and the Volunteers, whose numerical strength is uncertain. These troops, however, were not embodied until later in the campaign.

[8] The leading army, that of General von Kluck, consisted of 6 corps; and the second army, that of General von Bülow, of 4 corps. The others were formed each of 3 corps, making an original total of 28 corps.

Following the disaster at Liége, however, the army of General von Emmich was divided up, and the view here taken, which appears to be most consistent with the known facts, is that it was, after being re-formed, employed to reinforce the armies of Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. That would make the strength of the German force, which marched through northern Belgium, 780,000 men.

[9] A German army corps is made up, with first reserves, embodied on mobilisation, to 60,000 men. Twenty-eight army corps, therefore, represent a total of 1,680,000 of all arms.