Читать книгу The Story of the Zulu Campaign - Edmund Verney Wyatt Edgell - Страница 12

Table of Contents

Plan of campaign—Native levies—Special service officers—The advance—Pearson's column—Glyn's column—Wood's column—Utrecht—First brush with the enemy—Difficulties of transport—Action on Inyezani—Pearson at Ekowe—Glyn's advance—Durnford's failure—Isandhlwana—Description of camp—The battle—Details—Reconnaissance and return of Lord Chelmsford—Rorke's Drift—Causes of Isandhlwana—Remarks.

The plan of the campaign now commenced was to advance into Zululand in four columns, each column complete in itself, having its own artillery, cavalry, and independent leader. Each column was also to keep up communications with the columns on flank, thus creating, as it were, the effect of an advance in one extended line.

By this means it was intended to thoroughly sweep the entire Zulu territory, and at the same time to prevent any large body of the enemy from slipping between the columns, and so getting to the rear and delivering a counter-attack on the colonies.

In addition to the regular European forces, large native levies had been raised, amounting in all to 7400. It is a great error to suppose that these were without arms, dress, or discipline. On the contrary, a great many of them came to us well armed with serviceable-looking rifles, evidently of Birmingham or Sheffield make, while some of the older-fashioned fire-arms had the Tower mark.

Nor were they clothed only with the conventional blanket. On the contrary, their uniform was neat, and, at the same time, workmanlike, and consisted of a corduroy tunic, or rather patrol jacket, and breeches, with long boots of untanned leather, and a broad-leafed sombrero as a head-dress.

Several native corps were rapidly formed, in the following manner:—The commandant and his staff officers were British officers, the captains mostly retired British officers, colonists, or settlers; the non-commissioned officers, white settlers of different nationalities, and the privates usually Kaffirs.

Among the English officers who received commands in this native contingent were Captain Nolan (Pioneers), Major Bengough, Captain Russell (Rocket Battery), Captain Ulich de Burgh (5th West York Militia), Captain Cherry (32nd Foot), and Lieutenant Hon. H. Gough. Colonel Durnford had command of the whole column, which was to be entirely native so far as the rank and file were concerned, and to be composed of all the three arms—artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

There was also a considerable contingent of European Volunteers—more especially of mounted men, whose total reached close on 1000. Conspicuous amongst these were the Volunteer Hussars and Alexandra Mounted Rifles, the Durban Mounted Rifles, Captain Raaf's Diamond Field and Free State Horse, and a contingent of mounted Boers under Piet Uys, who gallantly responded to Colonel Wood's spirited and soldierlike appeal. These Boers were a splendid body of men, most of them crack shots with the rifle, and although somewhat fierce and uncompromising towards their ancient enemies, the Zulus, proved of invaluable service through their knowledge of localities.

The following "special service" officers, sent out from England, had also arrived and entered on their respective duties:—Captain Cherry (32nd Light Infantry), was placed in command of the 3rd battalion Natal Contingent; Captain Gardner (14th Hussars), was sub-director of transports at headquarters, as well as Captain Huntley (10th Regiment), who was posted to the River Mooi; Captains Essex (76th), and Hon. H. Campbell (Coldstream Guards), were also directors of transports. Major Hopton had this duty at Pietermaritzburg. Captain Brunker, of the Cameronians (26th), had the command of a squadron of Light Horse. Captain Barton (7th Regiment), was staff officer to Colonel Durnford; Captains Pelly Clark (103rd Regiment), Spratt (29th), and Lieutenant Lawrence (18th), were all employed on transport duty at Durban, where, as most of the ammunition and stores were landed, their office was no sinecure. Captain Macgregor (29th Regiment), was staff officer to Colonel Pearson, and Captain Hart (31st Regiment) was on the staff of Lord Chelmsford.

Meanwhile Cetywayo's term of grace had expired; the 11th of January had come and gone without any sign from the Zulu monarch. On the following day the war had begun, and the Tugela was successfully crossed. By four o'clock on the 12th the Buffs, four companies of the 99th, the Victoria Mounted Rifles, the native Sappers, the 1st Natal Native Contingent, and the Naval Brigade were well over the Lower Tugela, near Fort Buckingham. The pontoon worked remarkably well, making three trips an hour. Four small boats were also employed. A herd of cattle was brought into the camp by the vedettes, who also reported that a large Zulu force was in position about twenty miles off, and also at Ondini. It has been mentioned that four columns would be formed from out of the three (whose details have been given above), and these four were now advancing into Zululand in a line which partly described a crescent, of which the left extremity rested on Luneberg and the Pongolo, the right upon the Lower Drift of the Tugela, close to the sea, while the inner half of the circle was represented by the boundaries of Natal and the Transvaal.

The centre may be considered as being at Fort Pearson, where there was a strongly entrenched camp on the summit of a rising or bluff overlooking the river Tugela. The column moving from Fort Pearson consisted of 1500 regular infantry, that is to say, eight companies of the Buffs, under Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one company Royal Artillery and two 7-pounder guns, drawn by mules under Lieutenant Lloyd; one Naval Brigade of 276 bluejackets and Marines, under Captain Campbell, from her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three Gatlings; 200 Mounted Infantry, under Captain Barrow, and 200 Mounted Volunteers (Durban Mounted Rifles), under Captain W. Shepstone; the Alexandra Mounted Rifles, Captain Arbuthnot; Victoria Mounted Rifles, Captain Saner; Stanger Mounted Rifles, Captain Addison; the Natal Hussars, Captain Norton. Colonel Pearson, of the Buffs, was in command of the column, and had to co-operate with him a native contingent of 2000 men, under Major Graves, as well as two companies of the 99th posted at Stanger and Durban. The total strength of Colonel Pearson's column may, therefore, be set down at 2200 Europeans and 2000 natives.

The second or right centre column moved from Kranz Kop, a most formidable position, supported by Fort Buckingham. This was the scene of operations in 1861. The heights are commanding and look over a wide field of country. The position is unassailable except from the Natal side, and this was strongly fortified. Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanded this district and attack, and had with him now the 1st Regiment Native Contingent, which then consisted of three fine battalions, with three rocket tubes, under Lieutenant Russell, and 250 mounted natives, making altogether 3300 natives, officered by 200 European officers.

Following the line of advance to the left, and occupying about fifty or sixty miles of frontier, we come to column three, the left centre attack, commanded by Colonel Glyn. Take any good map and you will remark how the boundary winds serpentine fashion in its length from Fort Buckingham to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar. Helpmakaar made an excellent base to Rorke's Drift. Being situated on a lofty plateau, it formed an admirable place for a permanent encampment. It also had depôts at Greytown on the one side and Ladismith on the other. Colonel Glyn had with him seven companies of the 1st battalion 24th and eight companies of the 2nd battalion 24th, six 7-pounder guns with Kaffrarian carriages under Colonel Harness, a squadron of mounted infantry under Captain Browne, the Natal Mounted Police (150 men), the Natal Carabineers under Captain Shepstone, the Buffalo Border Guard (Captain Robson), the Newcastle Mounted Rifles (Captain Bradstreet), also the native contingent (2nd Regiment), 2000 strong, under Commandant Lonsdale, officered by 200 whites. From Rorke's Drift, about five miles over the river is Ungusdana, and thence on the traveller comes to the Intalalala river, which is about fifteen miles inland. The country all about the district is rugged and broken, and calculated to afford positions of great defensive strength. Colonel Glyn was, if possible, to bear a little to his left flank after crossing the boundary with a view to communication being opened with Wood's right flank. To effect this connexion, however, there was a sad need of cavalry.

We now come to the extreme left of the advance, whose headquarters were Utrecht, and which was thus composed:—Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B., 90th Light Infantry, commanding No. 4 Column; Staff Orderly Officer, Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Infantry; Principal Staff Officer, Captain Hon. R. G. E. Campbell, Coldstream Guards; general Staff duties, Captain Woodgate, 4th Regiment; transport duties, Captain Vaughan, R.A.; senior commissary officer, Commissary Hughes; commissary of ordnance, Assistant Commissary Philimore; subdistrict paymaster, Paymaster M'Donald; senior medical officer, Surgeon-Major Cuffe. Corps—Royal Artillery, six 7-pounders, Major Tremlett, R.A.; 1st-13th Light Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, 13th; 90th Light Infantry, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Cherry, 90th; Frontier Light Horse, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Buller, C.B., 60th; Wood's Irregulars, 700 men, Commandant Henderson. In addition, a few Boers were coming in, and more were expected.

Utrecht is the most southerly part of the Transvaal, and lies upon the border of both Natal and Zululand. It is separated from the former by the Buffalo river, and, after crossing the Blood river, a few marches bring one to the territories of King Cetywayo. From the lowest, or most southerly portions of Utrecht, just where the Buffalo and Blood rivers form a junction, to the port of Durban, on the coast of Natal, is but 100 miles, and the capital city is about thirty miles from Newcastle, the most northern of Natal towns. The two districts are connected by a tolerably fair road and a drift over the Buffalo river. Utrecht, in a strategical point of view, wedged in as it were between Natal and Zululand, cannot be equalled by any position of a similar nature. The interior of this district extends away to the summit of the Drakenberg range, one of which reaches an altitude of 4000 feet. Most of the Utrecht land lies in what is called the "terrace country," and has the advantage of the most splendid bracing air, added to which are mountain ridge and peak, precipice, wooded gorge, and grass-land, and scenery whose characteristics are of a grander and nobler nature than that of the Cape Colony. The portion of the Drakenberg which runs through Utrecht has its eastern front and glacis looking towards the sea, which is about eighty miles distant, and as each terrace or range slopes down the character of the country changes, presenting many of the features of the upper portions of the Cape Colony, that is to say, broad undulating downs in one part and immense flats covered with bush on the other. All the principal rivers and streams of Utrecht and their tributaries flow eastward to the Indian Ocean. On one boundary there is the Pongola, and on the other the Buffalo, while the Blood river passes through it with a south-eastern flow, and the Pifan does the same, but with an inclination to the north-east. From the wild highlands between these two streams issue the head waters of the Umoolosi, which traverses Zululand and empties itself into St. Lucia Bay.

Wood's column marched from Utrecht on the 7th, so as to be on the borderland in order to operate with the right-hand column on the appointed day. General Lord Chelmsford had given orders that Colonel Wood was to be at a certain point on the 10th, and consequently arrangements were made to carry out these instructions. It was known that Sirayo would probably oppose the crossing of Colonel Glyn at Rorke's Drift, and Colonel Wood had been told, if possible, to get sufficiently near to operate on the enemy's right and rear should such an attempt be made. Leaving a small guard at his camps at Sandspruit, the rest of Wood's force paraded in the lightest possible order at 1.30 p.m. on the 10th, and marched from two that afternoon until six p.m. A halt was then made until 1.30 a.m., when by the light of a glorious moon the advance was pursued. A mounted advanced guard was thrown out, flanking patrols were organized and told off, and the troops moved in the greatest silence, not a word in the ranks being allowed to be spoken. At 3 a.m., a short halt took place, and the chief ordered forward a reconnaissance, consisting of Buller's Light Horse, two 7-pounder guns under Major Tremlett, and twenty-four picked shots from the 13th and 90th Regiments respectively. These men were to be carried in some of the mule waggons, and were accompanied by the 700 irregulars, horse and foot. Colonel Wood accompanied this advanced force, leaving the remaining (main) body in charge of Colonel Gilbert, who was ordered to follow at a fixed time. The advanced body arrived within ten miles of Rorke's Drift at 7.30 a.m., and by eight the camp fires were lit and the men comfortably having their breakfasts on the banks of a small stream; the mounted men having at once off-saddled, the infantry piled arms, and the horses and mules turned out to graze under a strong guard.

About nine o'clock the general, Lord Chelmsford, cantered up to the camp, accompanied by his staff and an escort of 100 mounted infantry and some Natal mounted police. The general seemed delighted at the celerity with which his orders had been carried out, as in eighteen hours Wood's party had covered twenty-seven miles, and the men and horses were as fresh as paint. A long consultation took place with the general, and then the order was issued for the return to the main body; but this was not found necessary, as Colonel Gilbert met them after about ten miles.

In this day, or rather twenty-four hours, the men had marched thirty-one miles, and were not fated, on camp being pitched, to enjoy the fruits of their labour and toil, for soon after they were settled for the evening a heavy thunderstorm came suddenly over the tents, and in a quarter of an hour they were up to their ankles in a perfect river of water. The tents went down in all directions, and in many cases poles were snapped. The next day, however, a patrol of Buller's horse was paraded soon after daybreak, as scouts had brought in information that a large number of cattle were to be seen in the neighbouring kloof. Soon after leaving camp Buller's men were fired upon, but the Zulus did not stand their ground, and by the afternoon they had brought in nearly 1000 cattle. Captain Barton, who had gone out later in the day with another party, marched twenty miles in the direction of Umkanga's kraal, where in the skirmish which resulted 550 cattle were taken, and seven of the Zulus were killed and wounded. On the following morning a strong reconnaissance was made in the direction of the Bushee Valley. The Zulus were in considerable force, and their general tried to induce the English skirmishers to follow him to ground of his own choosing. Colonel Wood, however, kept his men well in hand, and contented himself by sending forward two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, Colonel Gilbert's fine corps, and menacing the Zulu flank with some score or more horsemen, who, galloping to a favouring eminence, made capital practice at the Zulu main body with their rifles at 700 and 800 yards. The Zulus still continued to creep up in rear, getting what cover they could from the bushes, and a sharp fire was kept up on both sides. As the men in skirmishing order pushed the enemy gradually before them, the mounted force harassed them on either flank, sometimes galloping round to the right and left to obtain vantage-ground and cover, and then dismounting in sections, and acting as infantry, while the main body was kept carefully out of sight in the dense mimosa which was found in the rear. The bush, as they advanced, gradually became more dense, and the path scarcely allowed them to move in fours by a steep descent into a wooded valley. Instinctively it was guessed that here would be the main body of the foe, and this turned out to be the case, for away to the left front, on a tall "copjie" or circular hill, about twenty mounted Zulus were to be seen, evidently the commander and his staff giving orders and directing the operations of the columns in the plain. The firing had now become general, but the soldiers were not allowed to waste their ammunition, and nearly every shot told with fatal effect. Colonel Wood had taken the precaution to strengthen his flanks as he advanced, and as the enemy could not tell how strong he was, the main body being still invisible, they were completely puzzled by the daring of the mounted men, who seemed ubiquitous. The guns were found rather a nuisance; one of the carriages broke down, and the limber had to be left behind, while the gun itself was secured. The head of the first line of skirmishers had now made good their way through the kloof with slight loss, and the Zulus attempted in vain to get round to its rear, but found all hopes of such a manœuvre utterly futile—as the flanking parties were on the qui-vive. It was now Wood's turn to push them, and he used the opportunity. Two more companies were advanced at the double to force the centre of the Zulu line, and in a few moments we had cut it in two. In the meanwhile one of the light field-pieces had obtained a favourable position, and had got the enemy's range exactly, but the execution done was not what could have been obtained with a good honest nine or twelve-pounder. The pursuit was carried on for about a mile, and the Zulus were scattered in all directions, but the commander was too wary to allow his men to go too far, and the recall was sounded, and in a short time brought back the excited fellows, puffing and blowing, to rejoin the main body.

For some days this column continued to advance steadily without meeting any serious opposition. Having moved on from the Blood River, Wood's force encamped at Bemba's Kop till the 20th January. The country over which they had passed since they left Utrecht may be described as a succession of large rolling plains, interspersed in all directions by watercourses (dongas), which radiate from the bases of the table-topped mountains rising at intervals throughout this part of the country. These watercourses are as a rule about twelve to fourteen feet deep, and serve to irrigate the country, which seems prosperous and well-populated. What would be called a road in England does not exist in Zululand. The tracks made by the traders with their waggons answer the purpose. These tracks are, however, tolerably good, and experience proved that artillery could be moved almost anywhere, except in wet weather. Waggons could pass each other at almost any part of the main road from Utrecht to Ulundi, except at that portion leading across the Inhlazatye Mountain, which runs along a narrow ledge, and where it ascends the Intendeka table-land. Wherever the troops moved they came across numerous kraals, each kraal containing from eight to fifteen huts, and each hut ten to fifteen men. From Bemba's Kop they moved on the 20th to Wolpoint, as nearly as possible seven miles west of the White Umbolosi, and thence went on to Tunguin's Neck, where a laager was planned and completed. After a reconnaissance made by Colonel Wood on the 22nd, in which his troops had a slight skirmish with a small body of Zulus, suffering no casualties, and inflicting a slight loss upon them, he halted on the 23rd, and sent out strong patrols in the direction of the Ingwazini River. These men rode over an open plain admirably suited for cavalry operations, but found nothing but some deserted kraals and the dead bodies of some Zulus, who, it was subsequently discovered, were wounded at Isandula the previous day. On their return the party were fortunate enough to discover the whereabouts of a strong body, some 4000 to 5000 Zulu warriors, who, it was imagined, were merely the nucleus of a force intended to surprise Wood's column. They were posted in a well-chosen position at a place called Tintas Hill, and when they moved down in his direction the following day, Wood had concealed a portion of his force so well, that he got them between two fires, and in about half an hour had killed about sixty or seventy of them, his own casualties being only two men wounded. It was during this action that information was brought by Captain Alan Gardner, who gallantly rode without any escort from Helpmakaar to Utrecht, notifying the terrible disaster of the 22nd, and the destruction of No. 3 Column. This news caused Colonel Wood to change his plans, and after a halt of a couple of hours, he turned back towards the Umbolosi, where his little force arrived at seven a.m. on the 25th. On Sunday (26th) he moved on to Ugaba Ka Hawana, where good camping-ground and a defensive position were chosen, and where the minor essentials of wood and water were in plenty.

Colonel Pearson, who commanded No. 1 Column on the extreme right, had also been prosecuting his advance with the greatest vigour, and the results were in every way satisfactory, though already the tremendous difficulties of commissariat and transport had made themselves unpleasantly evident. This force assembled near Fort Stanger, and crossed the Lower Tugela on the 12th, having as nearly as possible 1500 regular troops, consisting of eight companies of the old Buffs, under Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one company Royal Engineers, and two 7-pounder guns. A naval brigade, however, which might be considered as a little army in itself, went with them, and were under Colonel Pearson's command. This force consisted of 270 bluejackets and marines, under Captain Campbell, of her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three of the new-pattern Gatling. Two hundred mounted infantry and 200 colonial mounted riflemen also formed part of the column, while the whole force was supplemented by Major Griffiths and about 2000 men of the Native Contingent. The crossing of the river was at first impeded by the rains, and another delay occurred at the lower drift, where the river was at least 400 yards wide, but all these difficulties were overcome, and after a week's delay a flying column was sent forward on the 18th in the direction of Ekowe, which is a mission-station not quite forty miles inland, and distant nearly seventy from the king's kraal at Ulundi. It was the intention of Colonel Pearson to establish here an entrenched post as a point d'appui to the invading army. On the following day the colonel was followed by the rear division, escorting the heavy baggage, necessary though inconvenient impedimenta, as it contained stores and ammunition. The column of waggons extended for five miles, and it took the officers in charge all their time and the services of three horses each during the day to supervise its progress from inspan till outspan. Again, two days later, came the commissariat, and here imagination fails to describe the difficulties encountered. The subject of transport is one that must be considered in any future operations in Africa. The waggons must be stronger than those employed; the animals should be proof against sickness caused by climate, the tulip plant, and the tsetse fly, and this can be avoided by choosing one's own season for marching. The employment of mules would be much preferable to that of oxen, although in many books the converse is stated, the Dutch being infatuated in regard to the superior qualities of the latter. Mules, for instance, have this advantage over oxen. They can travel twenty-five miles a day with ease, while twelve or fifteen a day with oxen is considered good work; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that a mule costs twice as much as an ox, apart from the cost of feeding. The mule must, of course, be fed on forage carried for him or bought on the road, while the ox will feed on the veldt, except during the three winter months, when his services are not often required. Two kinds of mules can be procured about Pretoria—the Montevidean and the home-bred animal. The latter is generally preferred, although no doubt the former is most tractable. There is an immense trouble in selecting oxen for campaigning, as none but those bred in the sour veldt of Natal or Zululand are of any use for such rough food and hard work; and, as a rule, these will live where others would die. The usual load is 7000 lbs., placed on a waggon weighing 3000 lbs., and drawn by sixteen or eighteen oxen. The cost for oxen averages about 9l. each, but during this war they went up to 18l., and even 25l. Each waggon, with dissel-boom and yokes complete, costs at least 180l. The cost of mules will average 20l. each, and mule waggons 100l., with harness at 5l. for each animal.

The road, after crossing the river Tugela, crosses no less than four streams, and before reaching Ekowe passes through a broken bushy country. On the 22nd, the day on which Isandula was attacked, Colonel Pearson had a sharp engagement with the enemy at a place called by the natives Inyezane, about four or five miles beyond his camping-ground of the 21st. Major Barrow had been sent forward along a fertile valley which led to the Inyezane, when Colonel Pearson received a despatch from him, saying that he had selected a tolerably good place for camping, which he had carefully guarded by vedettes. On receiving this information the colonel at once rode on to the spot, and although he did not quite approve of the ground, as being too full of bush for an outspan, he decided to allow the waggons to be outspanned for two hours on account of there being no water near at hand. This was done to rest and feed the oxen, and to allow the men to have their morning meal. About eight o'clock, just as the waggons had begun to park, and while the officers were busy in directing the posting of pickets, scouts, and sentries, the advanced company of the Native Contingent, which had been scouting in front under Captain Hart, discovered the Zulus in force rapidly advancing over the slopes and attempting to gain the bushes on both flanks. They came on in skirmishing and extended order in the finest style, rushing from bush to bush in a steady but stealthy manner until within 100 or 150 yards of the outposts. Captain Hart's men, being in the open, had to bear the brunt of a heavy fire, and not without casualties, as they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and four privates almost at once. These poor fellows, it is feared, were sacrificed, inasmuch as they did not understand the order to retire and seek cover, and concluded that it was their duty to remain in the open. The Naval Brigade was now ordered into action, and most ably they acquitted themselves. Two 7-pounders and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade rockets were smartly brought into action on a knoll at the base of the pass, but commanding the valley from which the flank attack was made. Meanwhile two companies of the Buffs and A and B companies of the Naval Brigade opened a heavy and well-directed fire upon the enemy, and effectually held him in check. This coign of vantage was occupied by Colonel Pearson, whence he directed the movements of his troops during the fight. All this time the waggons continued to park, and while the fire was kept up by Commander Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd, with his guns, and Lieutenant Martin with the Buffs, two other companies of the same regiment which had been employed in guarding waggons were moved down, ready to clear the bush as soon as it was well shelled and swept with rockets and musketry. Colonel Pearson selected Captain Macgregor to undertake this duty, with the assistance of Captains Harrison and Wyld, who, getting their men into skirmishing order, and bringing their shoulders gradually forward as steadily as if manœuvring at a field-day, sent the Zulu braves flying discomfited before them, and exposed them once more in the open to the hail of shot and shell which swept the plain. Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, now took advantage of this favourable moment, when the enemy was demoralized, to send forward Captain Wynne and Major Barrow with the infantry. These, with skirmishers and flankers on the left, and supported by two half-companies of the Buffs and 99th, now moved forward at a steady pace.

The Zulus, however, were not beaten, though evidently puzzled, and Campbell, who was in charge of the Naval Brigade, saw that they were making a flank movement on the left. This officer at once obtained permission from Colonel Pearson to take a portion of his men and drive out a body of Zulus who had obtained possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll. Captain Hart, with part of his Native Contingent, gallantly supported this movement. They managed to obtain possession of the high ground to the left of the Ekowe road, and effectually checked the enemy in their movement on the British left.

But the gallant sailor Campbell was not satisfied with this partial success, and sent for further permission to follow up his coup by driving on the foe to a more respectable distance. Colonel Parnell, of the Buffs, who up to this time had been acting as a sort of reserve with Captain Foster's company at the foot knoll, where Colonel Pearson remained throughout the action, had now an opportunity of mingling in the fray. Smartly deploying his men, he advanced at the double, and forming up on the right of the bluejackets, swept the heights beyond the kraal which a few moments before were crowned with savage warriors. This decided the action, as the Zulus, thoroughly distracted, fled in all directions, the guns making capital practice wherever a group collected. The last round from the rocket-tubes seemed to carry destruction and confusion amongst them, and was fired a little before ten a.m.

Colonel Pearson and Colonel Parnell both had their horses shot under them, and several officers remarked that the fire of the Zulus was principally directed at the English leaders. The regiments opposed to Pearson were composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and Ingulubi, and as near as could be judged, and from the information subsequently received, numbered about 5000 men. Of these at the very least 300 were slain, while the number of wounded, as a rule carried away into the bush, could not have been less than double that. Pearson's loss was eight killed and sixteen wounded, and of these were six officers and non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent. The following day two companies of the Buffs, two companies Native Contingent, and a few mounted men were sent off to the help of Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who with three companies of his regiment was bringing up a convoy, much wanted, of seventy waggons of stores and ammunition, while on Saturday, the 18th, Major Coates started with fifty extra waggons to bring up more supplies. On the day after the Inyezane engagement Pearson arrived at Ekowe. The position was a strong one, and he immediately set to work to make it still more formidable. Water was close to the fort, and well under its fire.

At this juncture news of the Isandhlwana disaster reached Colonel Pearson. After consultation with his officers, he decided to remain where he was, feeling confident that even without further supplies or reinforcements he could hold his position for at least a couple of months. All his waggons came in safety to the fort except five, which broke down and had to be abandoned. The mounted men and Native Contingent were sent back to save food, and there thus remained 1200 British troops, having 320 rounds per man.

The first failure in the carrying out of Lord Chelmsford's plans occurred to No. 4 Column, and proved the initial step to the crowning disaster of Isandhlwana. The right centre column, which should have operated simultaneously with Colonel Wood's force, was unfortunately composed almost entirely of natives, and these fellows did not succeed in getting over at the point directed in orders. As this column could not be brought over the river, a portion of it was left behind to keep open communications and guard the frontier, while the remainder, under Colonel Durnford, was moved up to Rorke's Drift to reinforce Colonel Glyn's command. The following day (12th) Colonel Glyn had his first brush with the enemy. Lord Chelmsford had joined this column, and after crossing the Tugela ordered out a reconnaissance by the Bashee Valley and along the road leading to Izpizi. Glyn took with him three companies of the 1st battalion 24th and one battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, while the mounted men, crossing the valley, went rapidly along the road leading over the Ngudu mountains, where high cliffs close in the gorge for more than three miles. Cattle and armed Zulus were seen on the heights, and some of the 24th and the natives were ordered to bear round to the right flank and cut them off. The skirmish which followed lasted about twenty minutes, and was a very smart affair. It resulted in the taking of the fastnesses and the precipitate flight of the Zulus, who suffered a loss of ten killed, three wounded, and nine prisoners taken, together with a quantity of cattle, horses, and sheep. Colonel Glyn's loss was two privates Natal Contingent killed, one officer of the same, Lieutenant Purvis, severely wounded; Corporal Mayer, Natal Native Contingent, severe wound in thigh. Four companies of the 2nd battalion 24th, and four companies of the 2nd battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, under Colonel Degacher, were now ordered by the General to advance up the Bashee and attack Usirayo's kraal, a place called Loxie, about two or three miles farther on. This place, situated in a wild and mountainous gorge or krantz, interspersed with caves, guarded by huge boulders, was completely explored by these men. In the meantime Russell and his mounted men had ascended to the summit of the Ngudu mountain, where they were fired upon at a distance of 90 or 100 yards. Sixteen of the Zulus were killed, and a very heavy thunderstorm came on during the fight. No signs could be observed of any Zulu force in reserve, and this was explained by the subsequent news that Usirayo had made a precipitate flight in the direction of the king's kraal. On the following day communications were opened between Wood's column and that of Colonel Glyn. The General's movements from the first appear to have been hampered by baggage and transport arrangements, and a similar reason delayed Colonel Pearson. Lord Chelmsford was present with this column when it moved from Rorke's Drift, and saw the site which was chosen by Colonel Glyn at Insalwana, ten miles on the road to the Indeni forest. He then left Colonel Glyn in charge of the camp, and on the same day moved, with a portion of the force, ten miles further on, to reconnoitre the country in front. Returning to camp that evening, without having had time to fully explore, the General, the following morning, sent out two separate reconnoitring columns, under the command respectively of Major Dartnell, who took with him the Mounted Police and Natal Volunteers, of which he is commandant, and Commandant Lonsdale with two battalions of his Native Contingent. Dartnell went along the same road as that explored by the General the previous day, while Lonsdale moved along the southern slope of the Inhlazatye range, towards a hill called Malaka's Kop. If possible a junction between these two bodies was to be effected; and, as soon as information could be obtained as to the situation of the enemy and the strategical features of the locality, both were to return to the headquarter camp. By some extraordinary oversight, neither of these reconnoitring columns seems to have been supplied with rations, while it was usual on such expeditions for the men to take preserved meat and three days' biscuit in their haversacks, supposing that mule transport cannot be had. On the afternoon of the Tuesday Major Dartnell sent an officer to the headquarter camp, to inform the General that he could not advance beyond the Insangu river, a small stream near Inkankla Mountain, as the Zulus were posted there in force. Dartnell, therefore, sent an orderly to call up Lonsdale with his Native Contingent, and sent to Lord Chelmsford to request a reinforcement of regulars to enable him to attack the enemy. His lordship did not consider it advisable to comply with this demand, as the daylight was almost gone, and the distance was long. A supply of biscuit was, however, sent out to the exploring party, who bivouacked at the foot of the Inhlazatye. During the night, however, Major Dartnell appears to have become aware of his critical position, and at half-past two on the morning of the 22nd (Wednesday), Colonel Glyn received a letter from him, saying that the Zulus had been strongly reinforced, and were now in his front in great strength. Instead of recalling the column, or at once pushing forward troops to its assistance, a delay took place, and a staff officer was despatched to ask Dartnell what he wished done. After some further lapse of time the General ordered Colonel Glyn to march to Major Dartnell's assistance with the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, the mounted infantry, and four of Harness's guns. As this detachment would considerably weaken the camp, the General at the same time sent off two expresses to Colonel Durnford, who had been left at Rorke's Drift, telling him to move up at once to Isandula with his 500 native troops, 250 of whom were mounted. The General then decided to accompany Colonel Glyn's force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1–24th, was left in charge of the camp, with orders to defend it, pending the arrival of Durnford's natives. The actual fighting strength of Pulleine's force consisted of 2 officers, 78 men, and 2 guns R.A.; 1–24th Regiment, 15 officers, 334 men; 2–24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men; mounted Europeans, 5 officers, 204 men; Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men; Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men; while Durnford, when he arrived very soon after, brought with him 18 officers and 450 men, thus making an aggregate of 772 Europeans and 850 natives, or in all 1622 combatants. On his arrival at the camp, Colonel Durnford, being the senior officer, of course immediately assumed the command.

To the right understanding of what follows it is necessary to give a somewhat detailed account of the situation. The leading feature of the plain on the southern slopes of which the English camp was placed is the Isandhlwana, or Lion Hill. To the west it rises abruptly, forming the head of the crouching animal it resembles in shape; after forming the back it descends sharply to the east. At both ends are necks or ridges connecting the hill with the smaller undulations of which the more level part of the country consists. The road from Rorke's Drift passes over the western ridge, while on the north facing the camp was a deep ravine and watercourse. To the immediate right was a small copse; beyond this the ground was much broken, irregular krantzes and hills all covered with huge boulders continuing as far as the Buffalo river. To the left of the camp, at the distance of rather more than a mile, ran a long ridge towards the south, connecting it with the great Isandhlwana hill, having on its summit a plateau which, towards the east, opened on to an open and extensive valley. On the extreme left of the camp, looking towards the ridge, were pitched the tents of the Natal Native Contingent; between these and the next two battalions intervened a space of rather less than 300 yards; occupying the centre were the British regular Infantry, just above whom came the headquarters camp of Lord Chelmsford, and in close proximity the headquarters of the column. On the right were the guns and mounted corps lining the edge of the road. Soon after it came over the neck at the back of the camp the ground rose considerably, until the bottom of the precipitous Isandhlwana was reached: the camp therefore literally had its back to a wall.

At six a.m. on the 22nd, a company of the Natal Natives was ordered to scout towards the left, the enemy having appeared in that direction. Whilst these were away Durnford arrived, about nine o'clock, with a rocket battery under Colonel Russell, R.A., 250 mounted natives, and 250 native foot. News was now brought in that the Zulus in very large numbers were driving the pickets before them. A later messenger—a native without uniform, supposed by some to be a Zulu purposely sent with false intelligence—brought the news that the Zulus had divided into three columns, one of which it was supposed was about to attack Colonel Durnford's baggage, still on the road from Rorke's Drift, the other to harass Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn's party in their rear, whilst the third was to hover round and watch the camp. Finally came the news "Zulus retiring in all directions." Colonel Durnford thereupon asked Colonel Pulleine to lend him a couple of the 24th companies, but he declined, saying his orders were to guard the camp, and he could not, under the circumstances, let them go without a positive command. Durnford then determined to go on with his own force, which he divided into three, one part being sent up the hill to the left (east), one to the left front, and the third to the rear, in the direction of Rorke's Drift, to act as an escort for the baggage not yet arrived. The rocket battery was of the party that proceeded to the front under Colonel Durnford in person, to a distance of four or five miles from the camp, but being unable to keep pace with the mounted force was soon left behind.

The body of troops despatched to the left became engaged with the enemy almost immediately, and firing was soon heard all along the crest of the hill. In about an hour Durnford's mounted men re-appeared over the hills, hotly pursued by swarms of Zulus; at the same time the horsemen to the front were also driven back. These, after retiring steadily in skirmishing order for about two miles, came upon the remains of the rocket battery, which had been cut off and broken up, whilst a hand to hand engagement was going on with those who remained. It appears that Russell, whilst advancing with his battery, perceived a body of the enemy on his left, he fired three rockets with some effect; then the Zulus fired a volley, upon which the Native Contingent of infantry retreated, the mules were frightened, and disorder ensued. Taking advantage of this, the enemy charged down the hill, a mêlée ensued, and Russell was killed. As the mounted men retired towards them, the Zulus retreated to their cover, and they, after making a final stand in a spruit about a mile and a half in front of the camp, were eventually driven in.

As the cavalry on the left was being pushed rapidly back, Captain Mostyn was ordered to advance with two companies of 1–24th on the eastern neck of the Isandhlwana, where at a distance of about a mile and a half the Zulus were advancing in large numbers along the north of the Isandhlwana, to outflank the camp on the right, and with this wing of the foe they at once became engaged.

Meanwhile the Zulu left rapidly, and the centre steadily, though more slowly, pushed forward, despite the artillery fire poured into them. Orders were now given for three companies of the 1–24th to occupy ground near the Native Contingent camp, facing the hill over which the Zulu force was streaming. These three companies were supported to their right front by the Natal Native Contingent.

Immediately to the right of the Native Contingent tents came the guns, at a distance of about four hundred yards from the left, and rather more from the right, which was composed of two companies, 24th Regiment and the Mounted Corps, and which occupied the extreme right of the camp and rested on the road. The infantry, in extended order, were by this time engaged along the whole line, and were firing rapidly and steadily. Though the enemy fell in hundreds they kept advancing in apparently undiminished numbers. As rank after rank of the foremost were swept down others pressed on, till at length the companies of the 1–24th above mentioned had been driven back to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. A number of the native infantry now began a hasty retreat to the camp; their officers endeavoured to restrain them, but without effect. Captain Essex pointed this out to Colonel Durnford, who ordered him to take men to that portion of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check. But before this could be executed the natives rushed back in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of the first battalion of the 24th on the left and rear, and the enemy dashing forward at once poured in through this part of the line. In a moment all was disorder, and but few had time to fix bayonets before the Zulus were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect. Then followed a scene of utter confusion; horse and foot, black and white, English and Zulu, friend and foe, in a struggling, fighting crowd, pushed gradually through the camp towards the road, where the Zulu right already barred the way. Every man endeavoured to escape towards the Buffalo river, but this was almost an impossibility even for mounted men. The ground was rugged, broken with water-washes, boulder-strewn: ground over which an active native Zulu could progress even faster than a horse. In front ran the river, swift, deep, and fordless, sharp rocks, and deep water alternating. Not half of those who escaped from the camp succeeded in crossing this obstacle: many were drowned, many assegaied, some few shot, and so the pursuit continued right into Natal. The guns moved from right to left across the camp, and endeavoured to get on the Rorke's Drift road. This being occupied by the enemy, they turned off to the left, and coming to grief in a donga had to be abandoned. Major Smith, though wounded, managed to reach the Buffalo, but was there shot.

Lieuts. Melvill and Coghill, seeing all was lost, made an attempt to escape on horseback with the colours of the 24th. Coghill succeeded in getting safely across the Buffalo, but Melvill was struck by a shot just as he was reaching the far bank of the river. Coghill, with heroic devotion, turned back to assist his less fortunate comrade—alas! only to share his fate. Their bodies were subsequently discovered in close proximity, and around them a group of dead Zulus. The colours which they had so desperately defended were also found in the bed of the river, saved from the degradation of capture and contamination by the hands of savages.

In this sad affair there perished twenty-six Imperial officers and 600 non-commissioned officers and men. The loss of the Colonial forces was not less terrible, twenty-four officers being included in the list.

The following is a detailed list of the victims of that sad day:—1–24th, Col. Pulleine, Major White; Captains Degacher, Wardell, Mostyn, Younghusband; Lieuts. Hodson, Cavaye, Atkinson, Daly, Anstey, Porteous, Melvill, Quarter-Master Pullen, and five entire companies: 2–24th, Lieuts. Pope, Austin, Dyer, Griffiths, Quarter-Master Bloomfield, and ninety men. Royal Engineers, Colonel Durnford, Lieut. McDowell, Captain G. Shepstone (political assistant to Col. Durnford), Lieut. Coghill, A.D.C. (to Sir Bartle Frere), Surgeon-Major Shepherd. The Mounted Police Carabineers and Volunteers lost forty-three out of seventy-one, including Captain Bradstreet, Lieut. F. J. D. Scott, and Quarter-Master Hitchcock. The Mounted Infantry lost thirty out of thirty-four. The N Battery 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, under Major Stuart Smith, was destroyed (Lieut. Curling escaped), as also the Rocket Battery under Major Russell, R.A. 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C., lost in officers, Captains Robert Krohn and James Lonsdale, Lieuts. Avery, Holcraft, and Jameson; Surgeon F. Bull, Quarter-Master John McCormick. 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C., lost Captains Erskine, Barry, and Murray; Lieuts. Pritchard, Young, Gibson, Standish Vereker, and Rivers, Quarter-Master A. Chambers. The loss of material is put down at 102 waggons, 1400 oxen, 2 guns, 400 shot and shell, 1200 rifles, 250,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 60,000l. worth of commissariat supplies, a rocket trough, and a number of tents.

Four special-service officers, viz. Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars and Essex 75th Regiment, and Lieuts. Smith, Dorien, 95th, and Cochrane, 32nd, together with Lieut. Curling, R.A., succeeded in escaping, and rode away to Helpmakaar, where a laager was immediately formed. The same night, as no other messenger could be found, and it was feared Wood's column might be cut off in rear, Captain Gardner started to give him timely warning. Riding all night, he reached Utrecht about four o'clock next day, thence despatching a messenger to Colonel Wood, he himself returned to Helpmakaar.

The following account is of great interest as having been given by a Zulu deserter:—

"The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps about 3000 strong, the Nokenke 2000, the Nkobamakosi, including the Uve, 5000 strong, the Umcityu 4000 strong, the Nodwengu 2000 strong, the Umbonambi 3000, and the Udkloko 1000—a total of 20,000 men in all—after an address from the king left the Nodwengu military kraal on January 17th, and proceeded on their march towards Rorke's Drift. On the 20th they halted for the night close by the Isipezi hill, and on the 21st, keeping to the eastward, they occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed that of Isandhlwana, distant about four miles nearly due west. The order of encampment was—on the right, the Nodwengu, Nokenke and Umcityu; in the centre, the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi; on the left, the Ulundi and Udkloko corps. On the morning of the 22nd there was no intention of making an attack on account of some superstition as to the state of the moon, and they were sitting down resting when firing was heard by the Zulus on the right. This was at first supposed by them to be an attack on the centre, but a move being made in that direction this proved not to be the case; and it was soon found out that this was the whites engaged with Matyana's people some ten miles off to the left front. Just after the Zulus had resumed their position, and again sat down, a herd of cattle came past their line driven down by some of their scouts from the right. Just when these were opposite the Umcityu regiment a body of mounted men on the hill to the west were seen galloping and evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, seeing the Umcityu, they dismounted, fired a volley, and retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged. This example was followed by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on the right, as well as by the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi in the centre, whilst the Undi and Udkloko formed a circle—as is customary with the Zulus when a force is about to engage—and remained in their position. With these were the two chief officers Mavamingwana and Tyugwayo, who after a short pause led away these centre troops in a north-westerly direction, and keeping to the north of the Isandhlwana performed a turning movement, unseen by the English through the nature of the ground. Thus the original Zulu left became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left. The two regiments forming the latter—the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi—made a turning movement along the front of the camp to the English right, but became engaged before they could complete it. The Uve battalion of the Nkobamakosi had to retire till reinforced; and the Umbonambi suffered heavily from the artillery fire. Meanwhile the Zulu centre, consisting of the Umcityu (left centre) and Nokenke and Nodwengu (higher up on the right) under the hill, were making a direct attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely from both artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone; while the Nodwengu suffered least. When the camp was carried the regiments became all mixed up together; some pursued the fugitives to the Buffalo; the remainder plundered the camp: but the Undi and Udkloko made the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, in order to plunder the post there."

It is now time to turn attention to the remainder of the troops that had left the camp before this sad event occurred.

The force under Colonel Glyn, accompanied by Lord Chelmsford, moved off at early dawn, and had reached Major Dartnell by 6.15 a.m. The General at once took command, and ordered out scouting parties of mounted men to gain intelligence of the positions and strength of the enemy, who soon after showed in some force on the opposing heights parallel to the Inhlazatye Mountains. A general advance of the troops was made, and the enemy retired slowly, but without firing. The guns and 24th Regiment meanwhile moved up the valley, their left being protected by the Mounted Infantry, while the Mounted Police and Volunteers guarded the right flank. The main body of the enemy drew back in regular order and took up a position with great skill on the spurs of the Isipisi Mountain, distant about six miles, but Captain Shepstone, with his Natal Carabineers, managed to cut off about 300 of the stragglers and destroyed fifty of them. At nine a.m. a messenger, whose horse was panting and covered with foam, arrived before Colonel Glyn with a brief despatch from Colonel Pulleine, notifying that musketry firing was heard on the left front of the camp. Lord Chelmsford at once sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Milne, to an eminence from whence the camp and valley of Insalwana could be seen, and it seems that a delay of an hour took place while this officer was vainly scanning the horizon. The actual scene of conflict where Colonel Durnford was engaged with the Zulu army was five miles away, and hidden by some hills intervening between Lord Chelmsford's position and the British camp. The General, therefore, seems to have felt no apprehensions in regard to the safety of the camp, and continued his operations against the supposed main body of the Zulus.

About two o'clock Lord Chelmsford was on the banks of the Amange stream, selecting a fit spot for a camp, he having already in the morning sent Captain Gardner back to Colonel Pulleine with an order to that officer to forward the camping materials of the party out on reconnaissance. While thus engaged a native on horseback galloped down from the opposite ridge saying that an attack was being made on the camp, and that he had seen heavy firing and heard the big guns. Lord Chelmsford immediately hastened to the crest of the hill, whence through a glass the camp could be plainly seen. All, however, seemed quiet: the sun was shining on the white tents; no signs of firing were seen, and the bodies of men moving about in the camp were put down to be English soldiers and friendly natives. Knowing how careful were his dispositions and how positive his orders for the defence of the camp, one and all of Lord Chelmsford's escort came to the conclusion that an attack had been made and repulsed. It was then decided that the headquarters camp should move to the spot selected on the Amange stream, whilst the General himself, who was anxious to know the details of the attack, should proceed back to camp. The Carabineers and the Mounted Infantry accompanied him: the 1st battalion 24th Regiment, the four guns, the Mounted Police and 2nd battalion of 3rd Regiment Native Contingent were left to form the new camp. During the first seven miles of the journey nothing occurred to excite the General's suspicion. Certainly some of the tents had disappeared, but then this was in accordance with the orders given in the morning. When about four miles from the camp he fell in with the Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered to return many hours previously, but which seeing the camp attacked by forces superior to its own had wisely halted. In about half-an-hour they were met by a solitary horseman coming at a foot pace from the direction of the camp. Commandant Lonsdale, for it was he, rode up to the General and uttered the astounding words "The camp is in possession of the enemy." It appears that Lonsdale, who had been ill, being very tired was quietly returning from Glyn's column to the camp. He had crossed the small water-wash to the south of the camp and was jogging slowly along in a sort of lethargy, from which he was roused by the discharge of a rifle close to him. Looking up, he saw a native, who had evidently just fired, and him he imagined to be one of his own contingent indulging in reckless firing; so he pursued his way. Sitting in and around the tents were groups of red-coats, so he still kept on till within a bare ten yards of the tents. He then saw a great black Zulu come out of one with a blood-besmeared assegai in his hand. Gazing more carefully, he saw that black men, and black men only, were the wearers of the red-coats. The truth flashed on him: turning his pony sharp round he galloped off before the enemy knew what he was about. Not less than 150 shots were fired at him as he did so, but, providentially, he escaped to warn the General, who, without such warning, his staff and troops with him, would have walked unsuspiciously into the trap, and the whole force would probably have perished to a man.

The General at once sent back to hurry up Colonel Glyn and his force, while Colonel Russell was sent on to reconnoitre the camp, which was found to be as Commandant Lonsdale had reported. On Colonel Glyn's arrival the whole force was disposed in fighting order, and moved rapidly across the plain, but could not arrive in the vicinity of the camp until after dark. All was found a wreck—corpses, broken tents, dead horses, oxen, and other débris were strewed around; and the men, most of whom were without ammunition, and had not tasted food for forty-eight hours, were ordered to bivouac amidst the crowd of blood-stained relics which marked the day's slaughter. Our soldiers had covered more than thirty miles on the previous day without food or ammunition, and if resolutely attacked by the entire force of Zulus might have shared the fate of their comrades. The next morning, therefore, before daylight a sad retreat was effected to Rorke's Drift, where the first glad tidings were heard of the glorious defence which had been made by Chard and Bromhead, with their handful of men.

It came about thus. Lieutenant Chard, with one sergeant and six men, had been left in charge of the ponts over the Tugela at this point. Close by was a commissariat depôt in charge of Lieutenant Bromhead and a company of the 24th Regiment. About three o'clock on January 22nd news of the disaster at Isandhlwana reached this officer, together with a note, saying that the enemy were advancing in force against his post, which was to be held at all costs. Chard immediately withdrew his small party, and in concert with Bromhead arranged for the loopholing and barricading the store-building and hospital, and for connecting the defences of the two by building walls of mealie-bags. At 3.30 an officer of Durnford's Horse with about 100 men came in, and was asked to send them out as vedettes; these, when pressed, to fall back and assist in the defence of the buildings. At 4.30 this officer returned with the news that the enemy was close at hand, that his men would not obey orders, but had galloped off to Helpmakaar. About the same time Captain Stephenson and his detachment of natives also withdrew. It was at once perceived that the line of defence was now too extended for the small force left, and an inner entrenchment of biscuit-boxes was made, and this had been completed to a wall two boxes high, when suddenly 600 of the enemy turned the hill to the south. They advanced at a run against the southern wall, and notwithstanding a tremendous fire reached to within fifty yards of it. Being here encountered by a cross-fire from the store they were stopped. Taking advantage, however, of some shelter afforded by the cookhouse and ovens, they kept up heavy musketry volleys thence, whilst the main body moved on to the left round the hospital, whence they made a rush upon the north-west wall and breastwork of mealie-bags. Meanwhile the mass of the advancing foe lined a ledge of rocks and filled the caves overlooking the English position at a distance of 100 yards to the south, whence they too kept up a constant fire. Another party to the left occupied a garden in a hollow in the road, and also the bush beyond, which time had not permitted to be cut down. The enemy could thus advance close to the English works, and were soon in possession of one whole side of the wall, whilst on the other in a line extending from the hospital all along the wall to the bush they made a series of determined onsets. But each attack was met and splendidly repulsed with the bayonet, Corporal Schiess (N.N.C.) especially distinguishing himself. The fire from the ledge of rock and caves at length became so galling, that it was necessary to retire behind the inner line of biscuit-boxes.

All this time the enemy had been trying to force the hospital, and at length they did set fire to the roof. The garrison defended the place room by room, bringing out all the sick who could be moved before they retired. Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 24th Regiment, were the last to leave, holding the doorway against the Zulus with their bayonets, their ammunition being quite expended. Five sick men, owing to the smoke and want of interior communication, had unfortunately to be left to their fates. Two heaps of mealie-bags were now converted into a sort of redoubt, and a second line of fire was thus obtained all round. Darkness now came on, and after several more furious attacks had been repulsed the defenders had ultimately to retire to the middle, and then to the inner wall of the kraal, east of the position they had at first held. The attacks continued all night, the soldiers firing with the utmost coolness, and never wasting a shot. At four a.m., January 23rd, firing ceased, and by daybreak the enemy were disappearing over the hill to the south-west. The ground was then patrolled, the arms of the dead Zulus collected, and the position strengthened as far as possible. About seven a.m. a large body of the enemy was again seen on the hill to the south-west, and a friendly Kaffir, who had come in shortly before, was sent to Helpmakaar to ask for assistance. However, about eight a.m. the British 3rd column began to appear, whereupon the enemy, who had been again advancing, fell back as the troops advanced, and Rorke's Drift Post had been saved.

The number of English engaged in this action was eight officers and 131 non-commissioned officers and men; of these fifteen were killed and twelve wounded, two subsequently dying of their hurts. The attacking Zulu force consisted of two regiments—the Undi and Udkloko—in all a total of something less than 4000. Of these 370 lay dead around the post on the morning that Lord Chelmsford so opportunely arrived.

Surgeon Reynolds, Acting Commissary Officer Dalton, and Assistant Commissary Dunne were throughout conspicuous for their gallantry and coolness. Lieutenants Chard, R.E., and Bromhead, 24th Regiment, subsequently received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for their heroic conduct, and were advanced to the rank of majors.

So much has been said and written as to the cause of, and so many people have been held responsible for the Isandhlwana disaster that the subject cannot here be passed over in silence.

The living no less than the dead have a claim to a full share of justice and truth; but remembering that the mouths of one party—"les morts qui ne reviennent pas"—are closed, we should be extremely careful in drawing any conclusion from acts which, could the testimony of the fallen be obtained, it would not only explain and excuse, but amply justify.

The court of inquiry held at Helpmakaar found itself unable to form from the available evidence any positive judgment; but the facts disclosed point irresistibly to a negative conclusion. Had the troops acted on the defensive, the camp would not have been lost.

Still there may have been cogent—nay irresistible reasons which caused Colonel Durnford to push forward his forces. Were Colonel Pulleine alive, he might give equally good reasons for acceding to Durnford's urgent request and sending out the reinforcements.

The British regular infantry advanced successfully, retired slowly and in unbroken order; they were still firing rapidly, coolly, and with great effect. Things though desperate were by no means hopeless. Suddenly the native levies, "though their officers tried to restrain them, rushed back in the utmost disorder," thus exposing the flank and rear of the regulars. "Few of the men had time to fix bayonets before the enemy were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect." Here is the answer to "How did it happen?" The natives on one side—the Zulu—were regarded too lightly; on the other, fighting for the English with too great confidence. "Why," it will be asked, "were not the waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign, that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him, after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced.