Читать книгу Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812 - Edward A. Foord - Страница 5

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The circumstance which most impresses the reader who for the first time, and without knowledge of the conditions, peruses the story of the Franco-Russian campaign of 1812 is that the forces of Russia were, as compared with those of Napoleon, very weak. This weakness in war is familiar enough to all students of Russian history, nor are the reasons far to seek. Since, however, it must appear peculiar to all who regard Russia as a power essentially huge and powerful—the "Colossus of the North"—its causes must be briefly reviewed.

It is true that Russia is a country of vast extent; but her huge territory, to-day very imperfectly developed, was in 1812 largely in an almost primeval condition, while the population was even more sparsely distributed. The country was and is covered in many places by wide expanses of almost impenetrable forest, and by vast tracts of morass. In the western provinces the marshes of Pinsk cover an area of more than 20,000 square miles; and in 1812 they were pierced by only three indifferent roads. The majority of the numerous rivers do not in themselves present grave obstacles to intercommunication or military operations, being in summer shallow and easily fordable, and in winter usually frozen over, but they are often wide, and frequently have soft or sandy beds. The larger of them must be negotiated by means of bridges, and in 1812 bridges were few. Moreover, in Central Russia the soil is generally yielding and sandy, and every small stream has hollowed for itself in the course of ages a gully more or less deep. These gullies, repeatedly recurring, presented considerable obstacles, especially since they were rarely bridged.

The distances to be traversed were and are enormous. Readers of Herodotus will remember how the prospect of the three months' march from Miletus to Susa frightened Kleomenes and the elders of Sparta. To transfer troops from the Caucasus to St. Petersburg in 1812 involved a journey of even greater magnitude—without the aid of the Royal Road of Persia. Even to-day the Russian roads are comparatively few and bad. In 1812 it was infinitely worse. The few high-roads were frequently very badly maintained; cross-roads of use for military purposes were almost non-existent.

Finally, Russia was as undeveloped politically as economically. The bulk of the peasantry were serfs chained to the soil. The accepted method of enrolling them for the national defence was to call upon the nobles, who owned the greater part of the land, for a levy of so many per hundred or thousand souls. Their interests naturally induced them to endeavour to retain the best and most industrious of their serfs, and to furnish for the army the ill-conditioned or idle, as far as possible. In a country in which corruption has always been rampant the recruiting officials were doubtless amenable to the influence of judicious bribery, and the actual result of a military levy was often far less than it should have been. The slowness of communication, the general poverty of the Government, the lack of factories of clothing, arms and ammunition, added to the difficulty of rapidly and efficiently increasing the armed strength. In 1812 Russia was suffering also from an almost complete cessation of commerce, the result of the British blockade of her coasts brought on by the alliance with Napoleon in 1807, and the financial difficulties were in consequence even greater than usual.

The Russian army, since its organisation on European methods by Peter the Great, has usually tended to be a rather crude and imperfect copy of the most modern force of the time. In 1812 French ideas naturally predominated, and their influence was apparent in many respects, especially in the direction of the higher organisations.

Early in 1810, as already noted, General Barclay de Tolly became Minister of War in Russia, and set himself earnestly, with the support of the Emperor, to reorganise the army. Divided counsels near the Tzar, and the adverse influence of the conditions above detailed, rendered the execution of his plans slow and difficult. Nevertheless, a great deal was effected, and whatever opinions may be held as to Barclay's military ability there can be no doubt of his talent for organising.

In 1812 the Russian infantry comprised 6 regiments of Imperial Guards, 14 of Grenadiers, 50 of light infantry (Chasseurs), and 96 of the line. Each regiment consisted of 3 4-company battalions with an establishment of 764 officers and men per battalion in the Guards, and 738 in the line. As a fact, only the Guard regiments were able to complete 3 field battalions. The strengths of the line regiments were so low that Barclay could only complete 2 battalions of each regiment at the expense of the third. One company of the third battalion was also completed by drafts from the other three, and these companies combined in threes or fours to form battalions of "combined grenadiers." There then remained to each regiment a weak battalion of three depleted companies. These were collected at various strategic centres as "Reserve Divisions," and Barclay hoped to complete them with recruits. He designed the formation of thirty-six depôts at suitable points, at which new levies were to be trained into additional battalions and squadrons for the infantry and cavalry regiments. In this respect, however, there was not enough time for his judicious arrangements to have much effect. In practice Russia was able to do little more than maintain her field army at something like war strength. The third battalions, reserves and new levies were chiefly absorbed in feeding the fighting line.

A large proportion of the troops were by 1812 armed with a musket of new model, about equal to that with which the French and British infantry were furnished, but many still carried the older and clumsier weapon which had been employed in 1807. The bullet was rather heavier than that of the French infantry musket; but, judging from the fact that the Russians usually appear to have had a higher proportion of killed to wounded than their adversaries, it is probable that the powder was often inferior.

The Russian cavalry included 6 Guard regiments—2 of Cuirassiers, 1 of Dragoons, 1 of Hussars, 1 of Uhlans (Lancers) and 1 of Cossacks—each of 4 field squadrons and 1 depôt squadron. The Cossack regiment included a detachment of Orenburg Cossacks, and apparently had 5 or 6 field squadrons. The line cavalry comprised 8 regiments of Cuirassiers, 36 of Dragoons, each of 4 field squadrons and the depôt; 11 of Hussars and 5 of Uhlans, each with 8 field and 2 depôt squadrons. The establishment of a Guard squadron was 159 officers and men, that of a line squadron 151. The cavalry was well and adequately mounted, much better so than that of Napoleon. The men were less well trained than their opponents, but, belonging to a country in which there is a horse to every five or six human beings, were probably good horse masters. Hay was the usual forage, and, to the surprise of Clausewitz, the horses throve upon it. Accurate details of armament I have been unable to procure, except that the line Cuirassiers were only protected on the breast. Helmets and cuirasses were painted black, not polished—a very sensible and labour-saving device.

The gradual inclusion in Russia of nomadic peoples and of the old border moss-trooping or Cossack (really Kazak=freebooter) settlements enabled the Government to supplement its forces by swarms of irregular horsemen. Besides the Cossacks these were Crimean Tartars, Kalmuks and Bashkirs—the latter still clothed in chain mail and armed with the bow! In June there were perhaps 15,000 of them on the western frontier. Their numbers later increased to 30,000 or more. Their reputation rests largely upon the dread with which they inspired the demoralised Napoleonic army during its retreat. In the field they could not contend with regulars, and even during the retreat could never achieve anything against such of the French infantry as kept its ranks. For guerilla operations and for harassing the retreat they were invaluable.

In artillery Russian armies have usually been very strong. The inefficiency of the mediæval Muscovite levies of horse and foot led early to a remarkable and precocious development of the artillery arm. Peter the Great in his reorganisation paid special attention to it, and his crowning victory at Poltava was very largely due to his excellent artillery. After Peter's reign his policy was continued, and Russia owed many victories to the masses of well-served guns which accompanied her armies.

In 1812 the Russian artillery of the line comprised 44 heavy, 58 light and 22 horse-artillery batteries organised in 27 foot and 10 reserve brigades, besides single horse artillery batteries attached to the cavalry. There were also 29 depôt companies. The numbers of gunners and drivers varied from an average of 240 for the heavy batteries to 160 for light artillery companies. They were each armed with 12 guns and howitzers. Cossacks had their own horse batteries.

The artillery of the Guard comprised 2 heavy and 2 light batteries, each of 16 guns and howitzers, and 2 horse artillery batteries of 8, with establishments in proportion.

The armament consisted of 18-pounder (½-púd) howitzers and 12-pounder guns for the heavy batteries, 9-pounder howitzers and 6-pounder guns for the light artillery, and 6-pounders for the horse batteries. The heavy ammunition waggons customary in other European armies were not employed in Russia, their place being taken by a larger number of light vehicles. The quality of the material appears generally to have been excellent, though Sir R. Wilson and General Kutaïsov recommended various improvements; and the draft horses were very numerous and good. The Russian artillery continually performed feats of transport that speak volumes for its high quality, and the number of pieces abandoned or captured was extraordinarily small.

The technical troops were few in number and lacking both in scientific officers and training. The medical department, though far better than in 1807, when it was practically non-existent, was still terribly inadequate and ill equipped, and trained physicians and surgeons were very few.

There were 32 garrison regiments, 1 Guard garrison battalion, garrison artillery, and pensioners.

A detailed statement of the Russian forces is given in Appendix C, but of course all of these were not available. Immediately disposable to meet the invasion there were:—

First Line

About

First Army of the West 126,000

Second " " 40,000

Third " " 45,000

———— 211,000

Second Line

About

27th Infantry Division 7,500

Reserve Troops and Riga Garrison 37,500

———45,000

————

Total 256,000

To reinforce the fighting line there were brought up during the campaign—

About

From Finland 14,000

" the Turkish frontier 44,000

" the Crimea 5,000

Militia, Recruits, Cossacks, etc. 90,000

———153,000

————

Total actually employed 409,000

————

The last item can only be a very rough estimate. It is, however, certain that the large figures given in some authorities bear no proportion to the numbers of reinforcements which actually reached the front. It is of course obvious that the entire armed strength of Russia cannot be reckoned as opposed to Napoleon. The Asiatic, Caucasian and Crimea troops could at best only furnish small detachments.

The First and Second Armies had received at the hands of Barclay a fairly complete army-corps organisation, each corps containing two infantry divisions, a brigade or division of cavalry, and two brigades of artillery, with a battery of horse artillery attached to the cavalry. The Third Army and the Army of the Danube were still organised in the main on the old system of mixed divisions.

The characteristics of the Russian soldier have never varied. He was and is endowed with remarkable endurance and courage, but is comparatively unintelligent. In 1812 illiteracy was practically universal.

The conditions of service were bad. The period was twenty-five years, and brutal methods were often necessary to compel the recruits to leave the homes which they would probably never see again. Life in the ranks was hard, and only the fact that it was probably no harder than the existence of the average peasant could have rendered it endurable. The men were well clothed, for obvious reasons; but they were in general ill-fed, ill-lodged, ill-cared-for, and practically unpaid. The methods of maintaining discipline were brutal, and if in theory military service meant emancipation from serfdom, in practice the men were treated as slaves. It is all to their honour that they made and make such good soldiers.

The great characteristic of Russian troops is their extraordinary solidity and imperturbability under the most terrible punishment. A Russian army hardly ever dissolves under the influence of defeat; it must literally be battered to pieces. A good example of this was afforded at Zorndorf in 1758, when Frederick the Great gained a Cadmean success over a largely raw, badly trained and equipped, and ill-led Russian army not greatly superior in number to his own. He nearly destroyed both wings of the Russian host, but the centre stood firm, rallied the survivors, fought doggedly until nightfall, and lumbered defiantly away with some show of equality. The campaign of 1812 was to afford further proof of these characteristics.

There is a tendency to regard the Russian soldiers as generally large men, but there is abundant evidence that this was not the case. An English observer, writing about 1854, describes them as usually undersized, but they were doubtless hardy enough. The Guards were picked men. The cavalry, artillery, light infantry and grenadiers absorbed the best of the remaining recruits; the ordinary line regiments, with very inadequate means, had to assimilate and train the poorest of the available material.

The officers, as a class, were not capable of adequately training the fine material at their disposal. There were honourable exceptions, but at his best the Russian regimental officer was hardly the equal of his opponent of corresponding rank, though often, perhaps, a better linguist and a finer social figure. The Guards, as a whole, obtained the best officers, and after them the pick went to the cavalry and artillery, while the line infantry regiments were often very badly off. The ordinary battalion and company leaders frequently lacked all but the most elementary military instruction. Appointment and promotion were too often due to Court favour, female influence or corruption. The officers were, as a class, indolent. Too often they were not at the head of their men; their private carriages or sledges swelled the trains to enormous proportions, while the fighting line was weakened by the numbers of men detailed for their service. Gambling and drunkenness were very prevalent, and personal cowardice by no means uncommon, as Duke Eugen of Württemberg and Löwenstern testify. It is fair to add that defects such as these existed more or less in all armies of the period, but the Russian army has always been badly or inadequately officered.

In the higher ranks the conditions were not more satisfactory. There was a superabundance of general officers, but their quality often left much to be desired, and appointments were frequently due to other causes than military efficiency. This was, it is true, not especially the case in 1812. Alexander, presumably with the assistance of Barclay de Tolly, seems to have made a very fair choice of corps commanders, and several of the divisional leaders later acquired a well-deserved renown.

The foreign officers were a most important element. Germany furnished the largest contingent, but there were many French émigrés, as the Duc de Richelieu, Langeron, and St. Priest, and at least one Italian, the Marquis Paulucci. It may fairly be said of them that their general intellectual and scientific level was higher than that of the native officers. The latter were naturally bitterly jealous; and the foreigners rarely receive justice at the hands of popular Russian writers. It is humiliating to find even Tolstoï stooping to perpetuate these jealousies and employing the term "German" in an obviously contemptuous sense. Many of these foreigners did excellent work for Russia in 1812—though it is true that Phull, perhaps the most prominent of them, was an unpractical dreamer.

Mikhail Bogdanovich, Baron Barclay de Tolly, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the First Army of the West at the outbreak of hostilities, was himself in some sense a foreigner, and seems to have been regarded as one, much to his misfortune, by the ultra-Russian officers. He was a Livonian by birth, and ultimately of Scottish extraction, being descended from a member of the family of Barclay of Towie, who had settled in Livonia in the seventeenth century. In 1812 General Barclay de Tolly was fifty-one years of age. His rise in the army had at first been very slow, owing to his unassuming character and to lack of influence; but his skill and courage as a divisional leader in 1807 and 1809, especially displayed in his march across the frozen Baltic in the latter year, had brought him to the front rank in the Russian councils. His reorganisation of the Russian army in 1810–12 will probably constitute his best title to fame. The published Russian documents bear emphatic witness to his industry, energy, and scientific spirit. His deficiencies in high command are to be attributed partly to inexperience in handling large masses of troops—an inexperience which he shared with all but a very few contemporary leaders. He was overburdened with work, being War Minister as well as general, and was constantly harassed by the insubordination, sometimes verging upon mutiny, of his assistants. His personal character stands very high. Patriotism and devotion to duty were to him a religion; and he was one of the few men in Russia who rose above narrowly patriotic views. His scorn of personal profit and ease do him the highest honour, since they were shared by few indeed of the men about him. Alexander's trust in him never seems really to have faltered. The dreamy, romantic, crowned knight-errant and the simple, devoted soldier of his country had indeed much in common. Russia has had few sons to compare with Barclay de Tolly; and it is not to her credit that his worth has been so little appreciated.

FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE BARCLAY DE TOLLY

General, War Minister, and Commander of the First Army of the West in 1812

General Prince Peter Ivanovich Bagration, commander of the Second Army of the West, was a man of different stamp. He was descended from the Armenian royal line of the Bagratidae; and to his exalted rank his rapid rise in the service was largely due. Though only born in 1765, he was a major-general in 1795. At the same time Bagration's abilities were considerable enough to have ensured his rise under any circumstances. Suvórov had a high opinion of him; and the great leader's judgment cannot be lightly set aside. Bagration was essentially a fighter: his tactics were usually influenced by his combative instincts; and his excitable temperament rendered him reckless of his person. His impatient temper rendered him an intractable colleague for the calm and methodical Barclay; and the latter's courtesy and deference to the senior who had come under his orders did not always relieve their strained relations. On the whole, it would seem that Bagration possessed better strategic insight than his comrade; but his tactical ideas were not always happy. Having regard to his impetuosity, it was, perhaps, fortunate for Russia that he was not, as his admirers wished, placed in supreme command. But in pressing the French retreat his fiery energy would have been invaluable; and from this point of view his death was a national disaster. It is but due to his memory to say that he really appears to have been a man of too high and noble a character to condescend to wilful insubordination or intrigue; his intractability was the outcome of temporary ill-temper, as were his occasional unjust remarks concerning Barclay. Towards the end of their association relations between the two chiefs improved; and, on one occasion at least Bagration openly testified to his regard for Barclay.

General Count Alexander Petrovich Tormazov, the commander of the Third Army of the West, does not appear to have been a man of any exceptional ability. His early successes were due to numerical superiority; but he then unduly dispersed his forces, and was in his turn overwhelmed. At Gorodeczna he would probably have been destroyed but for the methodical slowness of his opponents.

General Prince Mikhail Hilarionovich Golénischev-Kutuzov, who in August became Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian armies in the field, was a veteran of sixty-seven years, of which fifty-two had been spent in arms. He was certainly a man of ability, both political and military; and his practical experience of war was great, though largely acquired in service against Polish guerrillas and Turkish irregulars. Though he had been nominal Commander-in-Chief at Austerlitz, his reputation had scarcely suffered; for it was well known that he had exercised practically no authority, which had been usurped by the young Tzar and his confidants. That he could take advantage of his opponents' blunders had been demonstrated at Dürrenstein in 1805, and on the Danube in 1811. But in 1812 Kutuzov was too old for the emergency; and wounds and infirmity had diminished his bodily activity. Even in the Turkish war this had been noticeable. As an ultra-Russian he was able to command more loyal support than Barclay. His conduct of the battle of Borodino was at least energetic, and his subsequent strategy sound; but during the French retreat his lack of enterprise was evident. His last campaign made him Field-Marshal and Prince of Smolensk, but can hardly be said to have enhanced his reputation.

FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE GOLÉNISCHEV-KUTUZOV

Commander-in-chief of the Russian Armies in 1812

General Baron Levin Bennigsen, the stout antagonist of Napoleon in 1806–1807, was for a time Kutuzov's principal assistant; but the two did not work well together, and eventually Bennigsen was retired. Bennigsen, a Hanoverian soldier of fortune, was as old as Kutuzov, but much more energetic. He appears to have been a selfish and jealous, but able, man, and in the following year once more did Russia good service. Barclay, according to Löwenstern, said of him, that despite his ability, he was a "veritable pest" to the army, owing to his egoism and envy; and this view is certainly borne out by a perusal of Bennigsen's unreliable and self-laudatory memoirs.

General Matvei Ivanovich Platov, Ataman of the Cossacks of the Don, is probably better known to British readers than any of his colleagues. He was a burly, genial officer, uniting to considerable military talents the daring and good-humour which were even more important in the eyes of his wild followers. He was an ideal leader of irregulars; his ceaseless activity and energy will presently be more apparent.

Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Danube, is a somewhat remarkable figure in Russian history. He perhaps owed some of his characteristics to his frequent association with Englishmen. He seems to have been somewhat impetuous and excitable; and certainly possessed a very independent temper, not hesitating to speak his mind to his despotic master. A seaman and diplomatist, placed in command of a land army at a great crisis, it would not have been strange had he failed badly, but this was far from being the case. Once clear of the Turkish embroglio he brought his army to the front with all speed; and though, as a general, too slow, he carried out his operations with a steady pertinacity, refusing to be diverted by contradictory orders. For Napoleon's escape at the Berezina he was only very partially responsible; but the entire blame was laid upon him by the hasty injustice of his countrymen, and his career ended in voluntary exile many years later. It is not pleasant to find his name still rancorously assailed. The Tzar Alexander II was of a different opinion; one of the first ships of the Russian ironclad navy was named Chichagov.

Of the advisers who surrounded and influenced—not always for his good—the Tzar, the most prominent was the Prussian Phull. He had occupied an important position on the Prussian staff in the fatal year 1806, a fact which should surely have warned Alexander against his counsels. Certainly none but the Tzar had any confidence in him, and his utter lack of real military capacity was shown in the famous project of the camp at Drissa.

Of the staff-officers the most notable were Major-General Alexei Petrovich Yermólov and Colonel Baron Charles Toll. The former was an extraordinary personality, who seems to have retained more barbarian characteristics than any European military leader of modern times. He was a man of great courage, considerable ability, and remarkable will-power; but of a savage and unstable disposition. He could be guilty of gross cruelty to prisoners of war, and later, as Viceroy of the Caucasus, relied, as he admitted with cynical frankness, upon a policy of indiscriminate massacre. Yet he was a kind and considerate commander, beloved by his troops, and not ungenerous in his treatment of subordinates. This treacherous side of his character would induce him to intrigue against a rival, with whom he would then suddenly become reconciled on some impulse of generosity. He intrigued against Barclay, but wept bitterly when that ill-used chief left the army. It may have been hypocrisy, as Löwenstern says; but it really has more resemblance to one of those impulses which civilised men can hardly understand, but which are characteristic of barbaric natures, such as Yermólov's. Yermólov's policy of massacre failed to pacify Caucasia, and his successor Paskievich declared it to have been a gross blunder. Nevertheless, Yermólov has continued to this day to be the subject of somewhat indiscriminate eulogy. It is perhaps better to take the opinion of men who knew him. Barclay's was terse and to the point: "An able man, but false and intriguing." Alexander's was pithy: "His heart is as black as his boot." Clausewitz, who was little associated with him, admitted his ability.

Toll was a scientific soldier of considerable attainments, and played a distinguished part during the years 1812–1815.

Of the officers who, during the campaign, commanded detachments or army corps several were men of real distinction.

General Mikhail Andreïevich Miloradovich—"the Russian Murat"—was in charge of the advance-guard which pressed the French retreat. The Russian documents show that he was hardly so much the mere swordsman as Tolstoï would make him. Both in 1812 and 1813 Miloradovich distinguished himself greatly, showing himself to be as admirable in rear-guard command as he was in the leading of the pursuit.

Lieutenant-General Count Peter Wittgenstein, the German commander of the 1st Army Corps, gained considerable renown by his independent operations against Napoleon's left wing. In high command he always failed; but as a corps commander he was equal to most of the French marshals, and, though frequently rash and inconsiderate, was never lacking in stubbornness and energy.

General Dmitri Sergeievich Dokhturov, commanding the 6th Corps, had served with distinction as a divisional leader in 1805, 1806 and 1807; and reaped fresh laurels in 1812. His conduct before and during the battle of Maloyaroslavetz reflected the highest credit upon him, and may be said in effect to have sealed the fate of the retreating Napoleonic host.

Lieutenant-General Nikolai Nikolaievich Raievski, the commander of the 7th Corps, gained a reputation little inferior to that earned by Dokhturov. During the critical days of August 14–16, when Napoleon was executing his famous flank march on Smolensk, Raievski's ready acceptance of responsibility and fine resolution ensured the defence of the city, and gave Barclay and Bagration time to concentrate. His action undoubtedly saved the Russians from severe defeat, if not, indeed, from crushing and irretrievable disaster.

Lieutenant-General von der Osten-Sacken, commanding the reserves of the Third Army, was detailed by Admiral Chichagov to guard his rear against Schwarzenberg in November, while he himself marched to hold the crossings of the Berezina. He executed his task with unfailing courage and energy, though opposed to greatly superior numbers. Though an elderly man, his fighting energy was great. In the two following years he added to his reputation as a dauntless and hard-fighting commander.

None of the other Russian corps commanders was accorded the opportunity of rendering such eminent service as these three; but none, whatever his other defects, showed himself deficient at need in that stubbornness which was probably the most necessary of all qualities when opposed to Napoleon.

Nor can any serious fault be found with the majority of the divisional commanders. Conspicuous among them were Konovnitzin, Neverovski, and the young Prince Eugen of Württemberg, who next year gained a great reputation as chief of the 2nd Corps. Among those who later rose to the highest rank may be mentioned Voronzov, a brave, capable, and altogether estimable man, the hero of the terrific struggle on the plateau of Craonne in 1814, and thirty years later Viceroy of the Caucasus. Also, in command of one of Raievski's divisions was a difficult-tempered, vain, and jealous young major-general, who in after years was to achieve a European renown—Paskievich, presently to be Field-Marshal Paskievich of Erivan and Prince of Warsaw. Another prominent figure was that of the youthful Major-General Count Kutaïsov, who commanded the artillery of Barclay's army. Though only twenty-eight years of age, he does not appear to have been unfitted for his post; all who came in contact with him bear witness to his tireless energy. Certainly the Russian losses in artillery were very slight, and to Kutaïsov must part at least of the credit be given. He ended his brief and brilliant career on the field of Borodino while leading a successful counter-attack.

Of the Russian army as a whole it is to be said that there were too many generals entitled by their rank to high command, and whom it was deemed necessary to placate by giving them commands. At Borodino, besides the general officers on the staffs of Barclay and Bagration, Bennigsen was present as Chief-of-Staff of all the Russian armies; Konovnitzin was "general of service," and there were others. Miloradovich commanded two army corps under Barclay, and General Gorchakov was also on the field in a somewhat undefined capacity—all these in addition to the Commander-in-Chief and the leaders of the two armies. Most of them were useless on the field, for Barclay, Bagration, and Kutuzov naturally sent orders direct to the corps and divisional commanders. In 1813 matters were even worse. In order to employ as many as possible of the ambitious general officers a practice was adopted of combining corps in pairs. In this fashion a force of about 35,000 men was burdened with more than thirty generals and three distinct staffs! In 1812 the confusion at head-quarters, owing to the presence of unattached generals or relatives of the Tzar, was often great, and that disaster did not ensue was more than once due to something like sheer good fortune. Alexander also committed what might have been a fatal error in not giving one general precedence over another when acting together. Barclay and Bagration often found it hard to agree; and though Chichagov and Tormazov, and, apparently, Wittgenstein and Steingell, succeeded in working together, it was fortunate that trouble did not arise.