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In bringing the teachings of this book under the collective heading “Chess Strategy,” it was not in any way my intention to draw anything like an exact parallel between the manœuvres on the chess-board and military operations in actual warfare. In trying to seek such analogies there is great danger of being led astray, and little likelihood of gaining knowledge that might be of use in practical play. Plain common-sense will give us all we need, without our being influenced by those tactical and strategical considerations that have been found useful in war.

The following definition may not be out of place : Strategy sets down the whole of the problems which must be solved in war, in order to attain the ultimate result aimed at ; tactics solve such problems in various ways, and according to the conditions prevailing in the particular case. Sound strategy, when setting the task, must never lose sight of tactical practicability, and only a thorough knowledge of tactical resources makes correct strategy possible.

Now we shall not under any circumstances, as unfortunately even great chess masters have done, seek in outward similarities justification for transferring to chess the teachings of the strategy and tactics of war. It sounds pretty enough to say : Chess is a game of war—the various pieces represent the various kinds of forces : the pawns represent the infantry, the Knights take the place of cavalry, the Rooks do the work of heavy artillery, sweeping broad lines ; the different ways in which the pieces move find a parallel in the topography of the theatre of war, in that the various battle-fields are more or less easy of access. But it is quite unjustifiable to assign to the Knights the functions of scouts, and to say that Rooks should stay in the background, as heavy artillery, and so on. Such pronouncements would not have the slightest practical value. What we take from the science of warfare is merely the definition. In each game the strategy of chess should set us the tasks which must be accomplished (in order to mate the opponent’s King), and tactics point the way in which it is possible to solve such problems. Correct chess strategy will only set such tasks as are tactically possible, and, if we wish to expound the principles of chess strategy, we cannot exclude chess tactics from the field of our observations. If here and there the results of our deliberations bear some analogy to actual warfare, we may certainly give way to a kind of æsthetic satisfaction in that our own occupation has some parallel in real life, but we must never fashion our principles in accordance with such fortuitous circumstances.

Having surveyed the problems we have to solve, we can now plunge into our subject.

In the first chapter, when considering special cases in elementary combinations, we have already noticed the important part played in each skirmish by the balance between the attacking and defending units. Speaking quite generally, common-sense will tell us that, in all operations on the chess-board, the main consideration for the defence will be to maintain that balance, and that there is only justification for an attack when it is possible to concentrate more forces on the strategic point than can be mustered by the defence. However, one very important point must not be neglected, though I did not touch upon it when discussing elementary combinations for fear of complicating matters for beginners : the balance between the contending forces is by no means established by their numerical equality. A paramount factor is the mobility of such forces, and as soon as it is no longer one of the elementary cases of capture and recapture described previously, this factor must be taken into account in order to decide, on a general survey, whether there is a sufficient defence to an impending attack, or whether one’s own intended attack is likely to prevail. That mobility is the first and foremost consideration should be self-evident, since the relative value of the pieces can only make itself felt by their greater or lesser mobility.

Except in certain positions, which are brought about by some particular array of the pieces, the intrinsic value of a Rook is greater than that of a Bishop, because it can command all the squares on the board, whilst a Bishop is tied to its own colour ; Knight and Bishop are considered equivalent, because the Knight’s advantage in being able to act on all the squares of either colour is balanced by the fact that the Bishop can sweep long diagonals. Two Bishops are, generally speaking, of greater value than two Knights, because together they also act on all the squares, and their command of long diagonals is a clear advantage. The whole of this valuation, however, comes to nought when the pieces are hindered in their mobility by the peculiarity of any particular position.

We will consider one instance from end-game play, and one from the openings.

In Diagram 13, White derives no advantage from being the exchange to the good, for the Rook has no file which could be used to break into the Black camp.

Diag. 13.

In Diagram 14, the numerical equality of forces will not save Black, because bad development reduces the mobility of his pieces to such an extent that he has no resources with which he can parry the impending attack.

Diag. 14.

White will assail the Black King’s position on the Queen side, and Black is unable to concentrate his forces quickly enough for the defence of the jeopardised entrenchments. Let us therefore bear in mind that the mobility of the pieces is the deciding factor of their efficiency, and that mobility is the highest criterion by which to judge the merits (or demerits) of their operations.

We will now consider this principle in its application to the three stages of play, namely, the opening, the middle-game, and the ending.