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The companions of Zeno.

88. During the later years of his life Zeno gathered round him a number of men of practical and speculative capacity, not unworthy of comparison with the companions of Socrates. His death dissolved the immediate tie between them. Some took an active part in the work of government; others followed their teacher’s example, and became the founders of independent schools of thought; a few devoted themselves to strengthening and extending Zeno’s system; and many were doubtless engaged in useful employment of which no record has reached us. Zeno’s work had not yet been exposed to the test of time, and another century was to pass before it could be seen that the Stoic school was to be of permanent importance. Towards the schools of the Cynics, the Megarians, and the Academics, from which its principles were so largely derived, the attitude of the hearers of Zeno was that of a friendly interchange of opinions, in which sharp controversy stopped short of enmity; the followers of Aristotle (the Peripatetics) continued to be but slightly distinguished from the Academics. But all these schools appear to have united in opposition to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; the champions of virtue could hold no communings with the advocates of pleasure. Individual teachers who practically reverted to Cynic or Academic teaching still called themselves Stoics: but the only one of Zeno’s hearers who adopted Cyrenaic views was contemptuously branded as ‘the deserter[1].’

Persaeus.

89. The most intimate companion[2] of Zeno was Persaeus of Citium (circ. 300-243 B.C.). He was the fellow-townsman of Zeno, and, as good authorities assert, at first his personal servant (οἰκέτης)[3] and afterwards his fellow-lodger. On the recommendation of Zeno he took service, together with Aratus the poet, with Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia[4]. Here he was often twitted as to the Stoic paradoxes. King Antigonus sent him messengers announcing the loss of his wife, child, and property, and found that he was not entirely indifferent to external circumstances[5]. He adapted himself easily to court life, and is said to have written a treatise on the theory of the banquet, in which he did not rise above the moral standard of his neighbours[6]. Nor did he disdain to hoax Aristo of Chius, who held strongly to the paradox that ‘the wise man never opines’; he first sent him money by one of two twins, and then sent another to demand it back[7]. Another Socratic paradox, that ‘the wise man is sure to be a good general,’ he endeavoured to maintain by his personal example[8]. Antigonus placed him in command of the acropolis at Corinth, which was nevertheless taken by Aratus of Sicyon in 243 B.C. According to one account, Persaeus was wounded in the attack, and afterwards put to death by the conqueror[9]; others relate that he escaped to Cenchreae[10]. As a philosopher he is of little importance; but Cicero mentions that he not only maintained that amongst the gods were men raised to the sky for their services to mankind (which was an accepted Stoic doctrine), but also that objects useful to man had been deified[11].

Aratus.

90. Two other companions of Zeno also took service under Antigonus, apparently at the same time. Of these Philonides of Thebes[12] is otherwise unknown to us. The other was Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, author of the well-known poem The Phaenomena, an astronomical treatise afterwards translated into Latin by Cicero, and largely used by Virgil in his Georgics. The poems of Aratus had a wide influence, and were probably the source from which so many Stoic conceptions reached Virgil. The most interesting part for us is the Introduction, in which he interprets Zeus in Stoic fashion as the deity who dwells in sea and land, in markets and streets: whose family is mankind; and whose providence has set the stars in the heaven to regulate the seasons of the year and to be a guide to the farmer and the sailor[13]. The spirit of this poem is closely akin to that of the hymn of Cleanthes.

Sphaerus.

91. Still another hearer of Zeno took a prominent part in political life. Sphaerus from the Bosphorus (circ. 250 B.C.) was attracted to Cleomenes III, king of Sparta, who under his influence reintroduced the laws of Lycurgus in his city, and particularly those which referred to the education of the youth and the taking of meals in common[14]. With these he combined the plan of a monarchy after the Stoic model, in which the sovereign was to side with the poor against the rich[15]. But in 221 B.C. Cleomenes suffered a crushing defeat, and was compelled to take refuge with Ptolemy III (Euergetes), king of Egypt. Sphaerus found his way to the same court. The death of Ptolemy III left Cleomenes in the position of a disregarded suppliant[16]; but Sphaerus appears to have found a congenial home in Alexandria, now the centre of Hellenistic learning, and doubtless introduced the Stoic philosophy in the circle that gathered round the Museum[17]. He gained a special reputation by the excellence of his definitions[18]. From an anecdote related of him we must infer that whilst adhering to Zeno’s doctrine that the wise man will not opine, he accepted reasonable assurance (τὸ εὔλογον) as a sufficient guide in daily life[19]. He appears to have laid special stress upon the unity of virtue, maintaining that the separate virtues are but appearances of virtue or knowledge in different spheres of action[20].

Herillus.

92. Herillus of Carthage (circ. 250 B.C.) is frequently referred to by Cicero as teaching doctrines hardly distinguishable from those of the Academy, in that he made knowledge the highest good[21], and taught that separate from it, yet with claims of their own, there existed inferior ends of action (ὑποτελίδες)[22]. It does not, however, appear clearly that he differed much from Zeno. Sphaerus, as we have seen, had defined the virtues as being ‘knowledge displayed in different spheres of action,’ and the aim of Herillus, ‘to live according to the standard of life accompanied by knowledge[23],’ points in the direction of practical rather than of speculative wisdom. His ‘subordinate aims’ appear also to correspond with Zeno’s ‘things of high degree’ (προηγμένα), and are defined as being the first states to which an animal is attracted upon birth, as food, life, strength (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν)[24]; they serve only for ‘ends’ (τέλη) for men who have not yet attained to wisdom[25]. This doctrine corresponds closely to the Stoic doctrine as developed somewhat later[26].

Aristo.

93. Aristo of Chios (circ. 250 B.C.) departed more decidedly from Zeno’s teaching, falling back generally on Cynic views. He was no favourite of Zeno, who called him a chatterbox[27]: and in later life he was accused of becoming a flatterer of Persaeus when the latter was in power[28], and of luxury in his personal habits[29]. But his success as a teacher was great, and he formed a body of followers who called themselves Aristonians.

He appears to have supported Zeno vigorously as to the doctrine of ‘comprehension’; and if on this subject he was worsted for the moment by Persaeus[30], he retaliated on some Academic by asking: ‘do you see who is sitting next you?’ The Academic replied ‘I do not.’ ‘Are you blind, then,’ said Aristo; ‘where are your eyes[31]?’ Still he considered any systematic study of dialectics to be a mere waste of time; like spiders’ webs, which seem to display much skill, but are of no use[32]. With regard to physics he was openly agnostic[33]; of the nature of the gods he thought we could know nothing, not even whether the deity were animate or no[34]. Ethics alone remained; but this part of philosophy he reduced by omitting all practical precepts, as introducing the element of uncertainty[35]. In ethics proper he rejects the theory of ‘things of high degree’ (προηγμένα), observing that this term does not harmonize with the treatment of advantages as ‘indifferent,’ but comes dangerously near to calling them ‘good[36].’ Virtue, or rather knowledge, is, as he maintains, the only good; and all that lies between good and evil is alike indifferent[37]. The highest good may therefore be defined as a state of indifference (ἀδιαφορία) towards all such things[38].

Aristo was however once more in agreement with Stoic doctrine when he maintained the unity of virtue. ‘The soul,’ he said, ‘has one power only, that of reasoning; one virtue only, the knowledge of good and evil. When we need to choose the good and avoid the evil, we call this knowledge Soberness; when we need to do good and not evil, we call it Wisdom; Courage, when it is bold and cautious at the right moments; and when it gives every man his due, Justice[39].’ But in deciding his action the wise man will be bound by no theories: he can do whatever comes into his head, provided only he keep himself free from distress, fear and greed[40].

The popularity of these views was repressed by the activity of Chrysippus; in Cicero’s time they were, in cultivated society, extinct[41]. But from the numerous references to Aristo in literature it is clear that his teaching was by no means forgotten; and when there took place the revival of the Cynic tone which we see illustrated in the writings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius, Aristo is again treated with high respect[42].

Eratosthenes.

94. An eminent pupil of Aristo was Eratosthenes of Cyrene, the grammarian, whom he won over from the Cyrenaic school. Eratosthenes undoubtedly represented the spirit of his teacher and of the Cynic school towards which he inclined, when he vehemently repudiated the prejudice which then divided mankind into Hellenes and barbarians[43]. He was invited by Ptolemy III (Euergetes) to be chief librarian of the Museum at Alexandria, and tutor to the crown-prince, and has left us an epigram in honour of this great patron of learning and philosophy[44]. Amongst other followers of Aristo we hear specially of Apollophanes of Antiochia[45].

Dionysius.

95. Alone amongst the hearers of Zeno Dionysius of Heraclea abandoned his principles, and went over from the camp of virtue to that of pleasure. A painful disease of the eyes had made him abandon the doctrine that ‘pain is no evil[46].’ His secession was used by Antiochus as an argument against the doctrine of comprehension or certain knowledge[47]. That his life after he became a Cyrenaic was openly scandalous[48] we need not too readily believe: such accusations may easily be mere deductions from his supposed philosophic principles. Dionysius appears to have been a particular friend and admirer of the poet Aratus[49].

Of the less important hearers of Zeno we have the names of, amongst others, Athenodorus of Soli[50], Callippus of Corinth[50], Posidonius of Alexandria[50], and Zeno of Sidon[50]. The last, if he existed, must be kept distinct from other Zenos, such as Zeno of Tarsus the pupil of Chrysippus, and Zeno of Sidon the Epicurean philosopher.

Cleanthes.

96. We come last amongst Zeno’s hearers to Cleanthes of Assos in Asia Minor (331-232 B.C.), who succeeded Zeno as head of the school when already advanced in years, and presided over it for a whole generation. In personal character he was a worthy successor of Socrates, Diogenes, and Zeno. He was trained in hardship and willing endurance[51]; and if he did not quickly understand, yet all he learnt was deeply impressed upon him[52]. He studied Zeno’s life even more attentively than his doctrines; lived with him, watched his hours of retirement, inquired whether his actions corresponded to his teaching[53]. Himself a man of the people, he ardently desired to spread his convictions amongst the many, and chose verse as the best means to express clearly his meaning and win access to men’s ears[54]. He remained constant to Zeno’s teaching[55], but he inspired it with a fresh enthusiasm and developed it in more consistent detail. He is before all things the theologian of Stoicism. The belief in the deity, which in the fragments of Zeno’s teaching appears merely formal and argumentative, becomes in the verse of Cleanthes ardent and dominating. God is the creator and the director of the world; his Logos gives it order and harmony. In God’s designs it is the privilege and duty of man to cooperate; but since he is possessed of free will, it is also within his power to make a futile opposition. In this way the good and the bad stand in definite contrast. Finally, right knowledge and right action are only possible by association with the deity through praise and prayer.

His poetry.

97. It is our good fortune to possess several complete poems of Cleanthes, which are of more value to us towards appreciating his standpoint than a hundred detached sentences would be. The hymn to Zeus[56] is the most important, and its likeness to the opening of Aratus’ Phaenomena[57] will not escape notice.

Hymn to Zeus.

Supreme of gods, by titles manifold

Invoked, o thou who over all dost hold

Eternal dominance, Nature’s author, Zeus,

Guiding a universe by Law controlled; 2

Hail! for ’tis meet that men should call on thee

Whose seed we are; and ours the destiny

Alone of all that lives and moves on earth,

A mirror of thy deity[58] to be. 5

Therefore I hymn thee and thy power I praise;

For at thy word, on their appointed ways

The orbs of heaven in circuit round the earth

Move, and submissive each thy rule obeys, 8

Who holdest in thy hands invincible

So dread a minister to work thy will—

The eternal bolt of fire, two-edged, whose blast

Thro’ all the powers of nature strikes a chill[59]— 11

Whereby thou guid’st the universal force,

Reason, through all things interfused, whose course

Commingles with the great and lesser[60] lights—

Thyself of all the sovran and the source: 14

For nought is done on earth apart from thee,

Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea;

Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men

Whose own hearts lead them to perversity. 17

But skill to make the crookèd straight is thine,

To turn disorder to a fair design;

Ungracious things are gracious in thy sight,

For ill and good thy power doth so combine 20

That out of all appears in unity

Eternal Reason, which the wicked flee

And disregard, who long for happiness,

Yet God’s great Law can neither hear nor see; 24

Ill-fated folk! for would they but obey

With understanding heart, from day to day

Their life were full of blessing, but they turn

Each to his sin, by folly led astray. 26

Glory would some thro’ bitter strife attain

And some are eager after lawless gain;

Some lust for sensual delights, but each

Finds that too soon his pleasure turns to pain. 31

But, Zeus all-bountiful! the thunder-flame

And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim:

From ignorance deliver us, that leads

The sons of men to sorrow and to shame. 33

Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul

And grant that Wisdom may our life control,

Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world

Upon the path of justice to its goal. 35

So winning honour thee shall we requite

With honour, lauding still thy works of might;

Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this—

The universal Law to praise aright. 39

Translated by W. H. Porter.

98. Another short poem of Cleanthes identifies Zeus with fate, and points the same moral as to human duty:

Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,

What way soe’er ye have appointed me!

I follow unafraid: yea, though the will

Turn recreant, I needs must follow still[61].

In other poems characteristic Stoic doctrines are set forth with clearness and emphasis:

‘Look not at common opinion, and be not eager to be wise of a sudden; fear not the chatter of the many, in which there is no judgment and no modesty; for the crowd does not possess shrewd just and fair judgment, but amongst the few you may perchance find this[62].’

‘Do you ask me of what kind the good is? Listen then. It is orderly, just, innocent, pious, self-controlled, useful, fair, necessary, severe, upright, always of advantage; fearless, painless, profitable, without smart; helpful, pleasing, sure, friendly, honourable, consistent; noble, not puffed up, painstaking, comforting, full of energy, biding its time, blameless, unchanging[63].’

‘He who abstains from some disgraceful action yet all the while has desire for it, will some day do it, when he gets opportunity[64].’

In the last of the passages we are introduced to an ethical paradox of the highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the will and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action[65].

Originality of Cleanthes.

99. To the ancients Cleanthes was the faithful disciple of Zeno. Persaeus, Aratus, and others had turned aside from the direct pursuit of philosophy, and their contact with science and politics might easily sully the purity of their philosophic creed. Herillus had adopted Academic doctrine, Aristo had fallen back into Cynism, Dionysius had actually seceded to the party of pleasure. It might seem that the far-reaching sweep of Zeno’s intellect had no real hold on his companions. But Cleanthes at least stood firm by the old landmarks. We must not suppose from this that he was a man of no originality[66]; his language and his style at least are his own. Nor on the other hand can we go all the way with some recent writers, who attribute to him exclusively large parts of the Stoic system[67]. Our authorities commonly refer either to Zeno alone, or to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus jointly, as vouching for accepted Stoic doctrine; and we are hardly entitled to lay great stress on the comparatively few fragments of which the authorship is assigned exclusively to Cleanthes, as evidence for the independence of his teaching; especially as we can in many instances see that our authorities delight in attributing a difference of meaning to the Stoic masters, when in reality there is nothing more to be found than a difference of phrasing[68]. It is however clear that Stoicism did not assume its complete form in the hands of its first propagator; and to a limited extent we can see the directions in which his teaching was amplified by his successors.

Physics of Cleanthes.

100. Cleanthes took a special interest in the physical speculations of Heraclitus, on whose writings he composed four books[69], and in particular in the bearing of his speculations upon the nature of the deity. The belief in the dualism of God and matter, of the Word and the world, is attributed to Cleanthes as distinctly as to Zeno[70]; but on the other hand the conception of an overruling unity is much more pronounced in the later writer[71]. Hence from the first Cleanthes endeavours to give a wider meaning to the primary fire of Heraclitus, the creative fire of Zeno. For this fire he proposed the new term ‘flame’ (φλόξ)[72]; at other times he identified it with the sky[73], with the sun[74], and with the principle of heat[75]; and finally adopted the term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, spiritus), which has ever since held its place in the discussion of natural theology. This term appears to have been at first intended to combine the conceptions of the creative fire and of the Logos[76], but it gradually came to have distinctive associations of its own. Like fire, ‘spirit’ is to the Stoics a substance, stuff, or body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and elasticity; it is conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating it as the deity; immanent in the human body and penetrating it as the soul[77]. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its ‘tension’ (τόνος, intentio), by means of which its creative power pushes forward from the centre to the circumference: as for instance in the human body walking is effected by ‘spirit exercising tension towards the feet[78].’ The theory of ‘tension’ has an immediate application to ethics. When the soul has sufficient tension to perform its proper work, it operates according to the virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness; but when the tension is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by the emotions[79].

Theology of Cleanthes.

101. To Cleanthes also it fell to explain more fully the government both of the universe and of the individual. Zeno indeed is said to have used the term ἡγεμονικόν (principale, principatus)[80], which we may translate by ‘ruling power,’ or shortly (following the Latin) by ‘principate[81],’ for the highest power of the human soul; Cleanthes sought a similar principle in the universe also, and is said to have found it in the sun[82]. By thus using the term in a double sense he implies the analogy which is expressed by the correlative terms ‘macrocosm’ and ‘microcosm,’ and which leads up to the definition of God as the ‘soul of the universe[83].’ Cleanthes further speaks of the universe itself as god[84]; but before describing him as a pantheist it is well to consider that this is only one form out of many in which he expresses his creed. He was also the first to give the four proofs of the existence of the deity upon which all discussions of the ‘evidences of Natural Religion’ have been based down to the present day, and which we shall further discuss in a later chapter[85].

The pious zeal of Cleanthes was not without a touch of bigotry, destined to have serious consequences in the final developments of Stoicism, and to reappear in the history of the middle ages with distressing intensity; he was bitterly opposed to the novel heliocentric theory of the universe as an impiety[86].

Weakness of Stoicism.

102. Thus even though we can no longer discriminate sharply between the teaching of Zeno and that of Cleanthes, we have every reason to suppose that the latter was possessed of originality of thought and vigour and copiousness of expression. We cannot easily believe that a man of such powers failed to attract hearers or to retain a hold upon them. But in his extreme old age it seems that the majority were drawn aside either to the ingenious arguments of Arcesilaus the Academic, or to the more independent teaching of Aristo of Chios. The continued existence of Stoicism seemed threatened; its critics were not to be contented with rhetoric or poetry, but insistently demanded proofs. In this crisis it was saved and established by a younger man, Chrysippus of Soli (280-206 B.C.), who was far inferior in original power, but equally zealous and more in harmony with the tastes and demands of the younger generation.

Chrysippus.

103. Chrysippus was a fellow-townsman of Aratus of Soli, and his appearance is doubtless a sign of the active interest in philosophy which for some centuries marks the neighbourhood of the important town of Tarsus. Born in 280 B.C. he found in his early manhood three prominent teachers at Athens, Arcesilaus, Aristo, and Cleanthes. Of these Aristo seems to have been the most popular, and surprise was expressed that Chrysippus did not join his school. ‘Had I followed the many,’ he replied, ‘I should not have become a philosopher[87].’ His convictions drew him to Cleanthes, but he felt much impatience with his methods. This state of mind he must have expressed freely, for in after life he reproached himself that he had not behaved more kindly towards his teacher in his old age[88]. Confident in his own powers, he desired to relieve Cleanthes of the burden of replying to the many attacks made upon his doctrines, especially as to dialectics[89]. It is well known that he asked his master to supply him with his dogmas only, saying that he himself would find the proofs[90]. Chrysippus probably outlived his opponents, and during the time when he was head of the school (232-206 B.C.) only found himself opposed by men of mediocre talents. He devoted his whole energies to strengthening and systematizing Stoic doctrine. He not only gave its proofs, but used every art of the dialectician to recommend it to his hearers[91]. From his facile pen there poured an endless stream of writings, not remarkable either for originality or for style, but of the highest importance as fixing definitely the standard of Stoic orthodoxy. He gathered numerous hearers round him, and before his death it could truly be said that he had saved the Stoa[92].

Dialectic of Chrysippus.

104. In his method of exposition Chrysippus made great use of the syllogism, thus reverting to the practice of Zeno as opposed to the more poetical style of Cleanthes. As to the value of this syllogistic reasoning very contrary opinions were expressed in antiquity. By his contemporaries he was greatly admired, so that it was said that ‘if the gods had needed a dialectic, they would have taken that of Chrysippus[93].’ On the other hand members of his own school complained that he often stated his opponents’ case more forcibly than his own[94]. The Romans mix their praise with censure, and find that he sometimes entangles himself in the threads of his own argument[95]; and we ourselves cannot fail to notice that when his major and minor premisses are compared, the meaning of the common term has usually shifted[96]. But if Chrysippus did not provide a final solution to great problems, he at least adapted the Stoic system to the taste of his age, alike by his use of syllogisms and by the attention he paid to the solution of fallacies[97].

Opposition of the Academy.

105. Whilst the works of Chrysippus cover the whole range of the Stoic philosophy, their special colour is largely due to the interests of his own time. The stress laid by Zeno on the certainty of knowledge had produced a reaction in the Academic school. Arcesilaus, who had succeeded Polemo as its leader, leaving on one side the positive teaching of Plato’s later years, reverted to the sceptical attitude which had been one characteristic of Socrates, and which is so prominent in most of the Platonic dialogues[98]. He attacked with the utmost vigour Zeno’s doctrine of ‘comprehension’; and further argued that certain knowledge is unnecessary for practical life, of which probability, that is, such action as can find reasonable justification, is the sufficient guide[99]. Chrysippus defended with the utmost energy the dogma of the certainty of knowledge, based upon the perspicuity of true mind pictures[100]; but the teaching of Arcesilaus obtained a hold upon him, and (as we shall see) was ultimately allowed by him a place within the Stoic system.

Spread of Epicureanism.

106. Chrysippus meanwhile had a more dangerous enemy to meet than the Academy. During the weakness which befel the Stoic school in the middle of the third century B.C., the rival school of Epicurus had won an enormous popularity. Yet its ethical standard, which it had inherited from the Cyrenaics, offended not only the followers of Zeno but all sober-minded philosophers. For Epicurus had set up Pleasure as the queen of life, and had converted the virtues into her handmaidens[101]; and so far was he from taking interest in model states, that he advised his hearers to hold aloof altogether from public life. Worst of all, his followers only smiled at the reproofs that were showered upon them. They formed among themselves a cheerful, affectionate, and united society; their simple pleasures created no public scandal, though their entertainments were often enlivened by tales of the moral lapses of their self-righteous rivals. The bracing morality of Cynism seemed to be quite gone out of fashion, and even the Aristonians had ceased to exist.