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2 Belief and Believing

Truth can never be told so as to be understood and not be believed.

Does a firm persuasion that a thing is so make it so?

William Blake

1 Two Kinds of BelievingThis is a book about believing, for ‘the believer’, and a believer is one who believes. We use the term ‘belief’ of both secular and religious belief. We all believe, but not all of us in the sense which the word sometimes has, when it is used of the religious believer. All believers have something in common. Our interesting exercise is to think a little about the nature of belief, about what it means to believe and make some classifications. For there are all kinds of beliefs: in people, in ideas, in reports, in products. We believe all kinds of claims to be true and others to be false.We can thus approach this topic from two different points of view, which may turn out to be complementary. First we ask, What does the religious believer have in common with other believers? For we all believe all sorts of things all the time, often changing our minds. Second, what are the unique beliefs of religious believers that make them different from other believers?We notice an important distinction. It is between believing in and believing that. The two meet when we trust someone. We believe that what they say is true and trustworthy because we believe in them. We take them to be trustworthy and honest because we have had experience in our relations with them. This has produced evidence that confirms the faith we place in them. When that has been established, we do not question their trustworthiness and do not always have to be assessing with questions in mind whatever they say or do.This twofold meaning of the verb ‘believe’ and the noun ‘belief’ shows itself in the religious use. Take the two questions: Do you believe in God? Do you believe that God sustains and acts within the natural world? The first asks about relation, about commitment. The second asks about taking a theological position, asks whether you accept a particular teaching. The first is belief as trust. The second is belief in an assertion, accepting a proposition as true.So believing is sometimes explained as equivalent to trust, sometimes as accepting a claim, making an assertion about the world and about relations within it. Take some examples of religious belief:Belief in GodBelief that Jesus was an historical figureBelief in Jesus as Saviour, RedeemerBelief that some historical statements in the Bible are trueBelief that God reveals himself through ScriptureBelief that there will be post-mortem survivalBelief in life after deathIt is worth noting that on occasion ‘I believe in’ is being used as equivalent to ‘I believe that’ as in these last two examples which mean the same thing.In which senses are we to take the confessions, the creeds the Christian makes, the many and varied doctrinal claims? These are often the subject of vigorous disagreement between believers of different persuasions. For these either implicitly or explicitly are prefaced with the expression ‘I believe’. It is noteworthy that such statements prefer the term ‘believe’ to others, for example, ‘I know’, ‘I propose that’. It is significant that believers often prefer to preface their statement with ‘I believe’ rather than leave the two words out and simply say for example, ‘God is the Maker of heaven and earth’. They will often say, ‘I believe that . . . .’ ‘I believe’ here expresses a personal attitude, a commitment to what the belief implies. The expression sometimes expresses a kind of hesitation, as if one did not wish to claim certainty beyond doubt. When we say, ‘I believe that . . . .’ rather than ‘ I claim that. . . .’ we show that we realise that believing is not identical with making a claim to knowledge. For we do not always think that we are we making a claim when we express our belief. Often we do. But we can distinguish levels of certainty when we make a claim. ‘I believe that . . . .’ can express a high level of certainty. It can also preface a tentative claim.We cannot always be assured that what we believe is true. That is what makes believing different from knowing. Belief is not identical with knowledge. Indeed we sometimes prefer to use the term ‘believe’ when we are not sure, even to say ‘ I don’t know but I believe that Johnny will come today’, ‘I can’t be sure but I believe that it was Elizabeth that I saw’. But this is not how believers characteristically use the term when speaking of many of their religious convictions. Belief is thus accompanied by different levels of conviction that ‘believers’ entertain. For example they would not put their belief that God exists (even if they would use that form of expression at all), or their belief that Paul was the ‘author’ of the book of Romans on the same level as their belief in a living God, or in their belief that they are justified by faith (an important Pauline teaching).So we have some interesting philosophical questions to consider. We can make a preliminary list. These questions are of general interest and lead us to answers of the widest application.What is the relation between belief and knowledge?What distinguishes justified from unjustified belief?How in a particular case does one justify one’s belief?Would we sometimes be justified in believing what was false?Do we always need sufficient evidence before we believe?Is it reasonable to believe on authority?Can we choose to believe?Various answers are given to the question, ‘What is belief?’ Let us look at some of these.Belief is a mental occurrence, for example mere acceptance, being under the impression that a proposition is true.Belief is reasoned assent to a proposition.Belief is absence of dissent to a proposition.Belief is a behavioural disposition rather than a mental occurrence.The difference is significant. We are disposed to act in a certain way, as if what we believe were true. That means we have already entertained the proposition. A disposition is not always manifest, made public. It is nevertheless a property we possess and which, given the appropriate circumstances, we would manifest.Belief is entertaining ideas and then preferring one or other propositions that express that idea or those ideas. We give assent to a proposition while having reasonable assurance that it is true. We have some grounds for thinking our belief is reasonable. Our route to assurance is that we have experiences that would be as they are if the proposition were true. If our proposition were true we would expect such experiences. When they happen, our beliefs are confirmed or strengthened. I believe that this recipe is a good one. So I make a casserole and it turns out that everybody likes it really well. So my belief is confirmed. I may have held it tentatively at first. Now it has grounds and is strong.It is important to differentiate the content of the belief from the process of acquiring the belief. So we distinguish two questions: What is belief? How do I acquire belief? In view of the above observations and in view of the fact that not every belief one holds has any relation to their behaviour, that some beliefs are purely theoretical, we shall further ask, When it is related to behaviour how is belief related to behaviour?We acquire beliefs before ever we could ask how we get them. It sometimes comes as a surprise to us when we must answer the question ‘How did you come to believe that?’ For, the fact for all of us is that we acquired our first beliefs before we could frame, let alone answer, that question. We believed before we knew it. We had no choice in the matter. Take (what I think has been) your former belief in Father Christmas. Then ask how you came to believe it. Was it a rational belief? You now know that it was not true. But the case raises a lot of questions.Or draw a comparison. Contrast or compare what you believe about Napoleon or Robin Hood with what you believe about Robinson Crusoe and why. How much, in volume, have you heard of each? Who has told you? In what contexts? Why do your beliefs about these characters differ?

2 FaithThe claims of the religious person are prefaced with the words ‘I believe’ or some equivalent to this. The primary claim is, ‘I believe in God’. These statements are, as we say, ‘confessions of faith’. What does it mean to say, ‘I believe’? This way of speaking is not, of course unique to the believer. Does he then believe in a special way? Since the words ‘believe’, ‘belief’, are used in different senses, a job of sorting out needs to be done to clarify what the religious use of the term is actually claiming. Such a procedure will prove illuminating.Let us start with four sentences whose meaning we quite well understand:I believe that it’s half past two.I believe in penicillin.I believe in Chelsea.I believe in you.

Note now that while there are two nouns ‘belief’ and ‘faith’, there is only one single verb corresponding to each of these. This is the verb ‘to believe’. So while we talk of believing, we do not speak of ‘faithing’. Because of this, the word ‘to believe’ may mean ‘to have belief’, or it may mean ‘to have faith’. We must make up our minds in any particular case. We must be careful to distinguish the uses of the word, so that its various meanings do not get confused. For if they do, then the meaning of faith i. e. the appropriate meaning in the particular context is bound to be obscured. If we have alternatives in mind, we may better decide in any given context which is the appropriate meaning of the term. We shall then not simply transfer one meaning to each case, or one inadequate meaning to the particular context. For example, ‘believing’ might mean ‘accepting as true on inadequate evidence’. Whether that is an adequate meaning will depend upon the usage to which it is put. If the context demands that usage, then the meaning it has is a proper one. But this does not mean that ‘believe’ will have this meaning in other contexts.

Going then to our examples: In the first instance, ‘I believe’ means ‘I am of the opinion that’, ‘I am more or less certain that what I am saying is correct’. What is being affirmed is the correctness (more or less) of a fact. You could easily give other examples: I believe you can get to New York from London in five hours; I believe that Mary is Jane’s cousin; I believe that Sara Jones is a pen-name for Susan Jenkins, etc.

In the case of b and c the term ‘I believe in’ expresses the confidence appropriate to what is believed in. ‘I believe in penicillin’ means that you would recommend its use, you would use it yourself, because you anticipate it would produce benefit when used. ‘I believe in Chelsea’, a football team, means that you think that they are likely to have success rather than failure. In both of these cases the confidence expressed is tested by future performance. If penicillin produced such dreadful side effects that outweighed its future usefulness you would not talk this way about it. If Chelsea never won a game for the whole of the season you would soon lose that confidence. ‘I believe in’ in the sense ‘l have confidence in’ is a statement which you can alter if you find that things don’t turn out so as to support your confidence. You have to wait and see!

We may not be aware of the total range of our confidence. We assume beliefs, which we only make explicit when there is some demand upon us or when they are called into question, or when perhaps, for methodological purposes, we feel that examination is called for to make them explicit. The physical scientist has a confidence of this kind. He assumes, that is to say he believes in, the reliability of nature, accepting the principle of uniformity as the foundation for all his work. Such an assumption is irrational in the sense that he is never able to give decisive and finally convincing reasons that this is so. But his whole activity is based upon this belief being a worthy one. That belief is a non-scientific assumption which, when made, he finds makes his scientific work possible. He too has faith. That his methods ‘work’ is sufficient to sustain that faith.

In the case of d, we have an example of an expression of personal trust. ‘I believe in you’, spoken by a father to his son, by a voter to his representative, by a friend to his friend, means ‘I trust you’. The term is now being used on a personal level. Of course, it might turn out that such trust is wrongly placed. If you have confidence in a friend and speak to him about private matters and find that the secret is kept, your confidence is maintained. But can you be absolutely sure? What if the next time you share a confidence you find that someone later knows about it? Or what if one day you find a knife in your back? But people do trust one another. They do act as if there is not going to be this let-down. They are willing to venture on the assumption that the future will bear out their trust. But they also know that there are quite specific ways in which such trust could be shown to be misplaced. But they do not expect that it will. In this fourth sense, then, ‘I believe’ means I have trust of a personal kind.

1 Belief, Testimony and Knowledge‘I’ll do the impossible. What you believe in, I’ll believe in.’John Steinbeck, East of Eden‘I can’t believe that !’ said Alice.‘Can’t you? The Queen said in a pitying tone. ‘Try again: draw a long breath and shut your eyes.’Alice laughed. ‘There’s no use trying,’ she said: ‘one can’t believe impossible things.’I daresay you haven’t had much practice,’ said the Queen. ‘When I was your age I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.’The Christian religion demands and offers belief. Some people find it impossible to believe, to accept the demand to have faith. For others it is because it is impossible that they confess to the occurrence of a miracle to bring about such belief. It is not only the sceptic who talks that way when he explains that he cannot believe. The believer sometimes says the same, in a reverse, positive way: ‘It required a miracle to bring about my faith.’ Take the words of the non-believer classically expressed by David Hume, On Miracles:The Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principle of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.We can discuss the issues on different levels, by asking the following questions:What does it mean to believe?What can you believe and what can you not believe?Can you choose to accept a particular belief?Can you choose between beliefs?Basic and fundamental questions for the Christian believer are what it means to believe in God, to believe that what the sacred writings present to us is true.1 That second question is one which the non-believer can also ask. Both believer and non-believer will ask, ‘Are we to take as both authentic and as true the claims that the various writings of scripture make?’ Both will also ask, ‘Why does the believer take these writings to be authoritative in a way the non-believer does not?’ ‘Is it possible to establish common ground over the difference of approaches?’We have distinguished two meanings. The term ‘believe’ sometimes means ‘to have faith’. It also means ‘to have a belief.’ The distinction can be illustrated by considering two sentences.I believe in God.I believe that Jesus spoke of the Kingdom of God and of the Son of Man.The term ‘believer’ has two meanings: a person who has faith. It also means one who assents to particular beliefs, who accepts purported claims to be true. Those who share faith (belief in one sense i.e. ‘belief in’) do not always share beliefs (i.e. ‘belief that’). For example, both may share belief in having faith in a loving God, and yet disagree about what they believe (assent to) about the problem of evil and suffering, or about scripture and its interpretation.Christians, like other theistic believers, have writings they consider to be not only authentic but also authoritative. For the Christian believer is interested in both the present and in the past. The writings, called ‘Scripture’ make frequent reference to events that happened, to people and peoples who lived in the past, to places which now no longer exist. So historical questions are often of importance. It is relevant to ask why, if so.These documents are sources and provide testimony. They witness to persons, events, beliefs. Sometimes the writing is the only witness to the events it purports to report and interpret. Such testimony is thus available for the kind of scrutiny the historian directs to historical sources.The believer and the unbeliever share something in common. They both make claims about historical events based on evidence available generally, in particular from written documents. What each claims about a particular report will depend on the background beliefs they hold. They may both agree that Mark was the source of a miracle story, but then disagree about whether the miracle actually took place. The dispute may be on a theoretical level. One believes in the universality of natural law. The other believes God has ways of intervening into the system of nature. Those are the more fundamental beliefs. One believes that allowance must be made for the truth of reports in a sacred book that would not be made in other cases. The other believes that reports in a sacred book are to be evaluated according to principles of historical evaluation that are universal.The unique testimony of Christians also has a present aspect in that the believer is now making a claim not simply about the past but also about the present. He or she is testifying (1) to something that has happened to them, something that is claimed to validate belief, and (2) claiming that, fulfilling the same conditions upon hearing testimony, it can also happen to the hearer.How is this testimony validated? Some such testimony is validated by a two stage process. The hearer believes the proposition. What the testator claims to have experienced, or claims other people have experienced, the hearer also experiences.What then results, it is believed, is that the testator’s claim is justified. That is a common experience. The sufferer says that when she took Pillpal her pain ceased. You believe her and take Pillpal and your pain ceases. The effect confirms your belief in her testimony. It was true testimony.Reference to other peoples’ experience is not direct testimony as is testimony to one’s own experience. But it may well be evidence, and in a secondary sense it is thus also testimony. ‘John has become sober and honest after coming to believe’ is a different kind of evidence from ‘I have become sober and honest after coming to believe’.One dictionary defines belief as ‘mental assent to or acceptance on the ground of authority or evidence; the mental condition involved in this assent of a proposition, statement, or fact as true’ (Shorter Oxford Dictionary).When would we, indeed when do we, accept what someone says as true? When do we give assent to their claim on the basis of their testimony? Put the question in terms of the definition above and it becomes: ‘When does someone’s testimony have such authority that we believe, i.e. give our assent to, what they say?’ Or alternatively, ‘Why do we hesitate or entertain doubt or suspicion about it?’The question we are asking is ‘When is belief justified?’ We might also consider whether there are circumstances where I could justifiably believe something that was not true. We could not ‘remember’ something that is false. If we thought we had remembered something false, it would not be remembrance but delusion or deception. But in contrast to remembering could we believe something false? So we need to ask, ‘How is evidence, independent of the person’s testimony, related to my giving or withholding assent to their report?’ Maria testifies that she saw Phyllis at the concert yesterday evening. I met Phyllis this morning and, full of enthusiasm she described the performance she heard yesterday. So I am confirmed in believing Maria’s testimony.Now for a few examples. Apply the questions suggested above to the following examples:The witness says that she saw the car swerve and hit the lamp post.The witness says that he saw a man walk through a closed door.The witness says she saw a ghost in the library.The witness said that he saw water flowing upwards.The reporter claimed that the Frenchman ate three hundred and twenty four snails.David Hume considered that when the Indian prince or the inhabitant of Sumatra refused to believe that water froze, that belief was a reasonable one. So he thought that it is reasonable sometimes to believe something that is false. There is no reason to disagree with that. We are now ready to discuss what makes for reasonable belief, what justifies belief.To express a belief you do not always have to preface the remark with the words ‘I believe that’. Normally when you make a statement you intend your hearer to understand that it is to be taken to be a true statement. When you say, ‘Mary is coming tomorrow’, it is clear to anyone who takes spoken sentences as we normally take them that you believe it. A false statement or a lie is under normal circumstances, i.e. unless we have grounds for doubt, taken to be true. When we believe a false statement we take it to be true. That is why people lie.A proposition is a statement, i.e. a sentence that expresses either a truth or a falsehood. It is a claim and it is either true or false, but not both! It is a sentence that makes an assertion. The following two sentences make claims. ‘Today is the twenty-ninth day in February.’ ‘Leila’s maternal grandfather is six years younger than she is.’ Note that the first is true now, the ‘now’ being as I write in the second month, but it will not be true tomorrow but only again four years from now. The second will not be true tomorrow either, but for a different reason. It is a logical impossibility. Define the terms correctly and there is a contradiction. The passage of time has nothing to do with its truth or falsity. We do not look for evidence for its falsity because we cannot. When we understand the meaning of the terms we know that the claim is false. Sentences that make claims are called propositions. They can be either true or false. We may or we may not believe them. As we have just seen, they make claims in their different ways.In contrast, ‘Get up!’, ‘What a beautiful morning!’, ‘Let us move forward.’ are complete sentences but they do not make claims. They are not propositions. They are not statements. One is a command. One is an exclamation. One is an exhortation. None of these can be true. Nor can they be false. Such a sentence that may be true or false is a proposition. We respond appropriately to each of these different kinds of sentences in different ways. But we cannot believe these three kinds. Take an exclamation for example. Jane says, ‘What a lovely day!’ and wants you to take this as an exclamation rather than as a claim. Jenny says, pointing to the facts, ‘It’s pouring with rain and the river is overflowing. So it’s not appropriate to say, What a beautiful morning.’ ‘Oh! But it is!’ says Jane, ‘I have just heard that I have passed my exam!’ Reacting thus appropriately is not the same as believing, asserting, claiming. An exclamation expresses an attitude. It does not make a claim. But the attitude may or may not be appropriate. What makes the attitude expressed in an exclamation appropriate will, of course, be some state of affairs about which a proposition may truly be made. Hence Jenny points to some dismal facts which seem to make Jane’s happy exclamation inappropriate, only to be countered with Jane’s stating a different fact which makes her expression of delight appropriate for her.Sometimes sentences that have the form of propositions and so appear to make a claim may function differently. They may express an attitude. For example, ‘That dog is a terror’ (which has the form of a statement) may mean effectively that I am expressing an aversion to the beast! Something like ‘Ugh!’ Or I am sounding a warning: ‘Keep well clear of him!’ When Jane says, ‘I’ve passed! I’ve passed!’(which has the form of a statement) she is expressing her exultation and means effectively, ‘Wow! Whoopee!’ as well as giving you the information that the examiners have passed her. It has the form of a statement but in effect it is not only a statement, but also an exclamation. It is to be taken rather as an expression of delight than a statement of fact. It does have these two functions of course. But one is predominant! Some religious sentences are like that. It is a matter of recognising both the function and the status of the particular sentence. Take and consider for example ‘God loves us as a father loves his child’. It may be intended as an exclamation of contentment, or as a claim, sometimes both!Some things we believe are justified and others are not. I may or not be justified in my belief about a perception, an event, or an abstract proposition.To answer how you would justifiably affirm or deny a claim, you must ask the general question about the grounds on which one makes claims. There are two basic answers to this question: First, ‘It stands to reason!’ where ‘reason’ means logical consistency. The statement has to be true given the meaning of the terms and the relation asserted between them: e.g. 2+2 = 4. The statement is logically necessary.The second sort of ground is that there is sufficient evidence to verify the claim. The evidence may be direct. It is given to me by some experience I am having or have had. I have seen, heard etc. Or, the evidence comes to me from reliable witnesses. Mary told me she saw, heard etc.Having asked the general question and given your answer you then can go to the specific case and apply it there. Try the examples that follow:The sound I am now hearing is a car exhaust. (To hear is to perceive.)The flower I am looking at is yellow. (To see is to perceive.)What I smell is lavender. (To smell is to perceive.)People never have illusions.There are pink elephants.The earth is flat.Not all claims are concrete. Some are abstract. You may or may not be justified in your belief about an abstract claim. First of all, of course, you have to understand it. You may then believe it. You may then not believe it. Your belief depends upon your understanding. If you do not understand Pythagoras’ theorem, you cannot believe its conclusion. You may pretend to assert it. But without comprehension you neither believe nor can you make a genuine assertion. Your stating it may give the appearance of an understanding you do not have.Consider the following:20 litres is larger than 10 gallons.The end justifies the means.Knowing involves believing.A necessary condition for believing is understanding.The interior angles of a triangle amount to two right angles.A large dog is a better house dog than a small dog.Boojams are inflabulated.An interesting issue arises. When one affirms a belief one does not understand the conformity that results may be artificial and/or hypocritical. You may appear to agree with the majority when you have not reached an understanding of what it is you appear to assert. So you give the impression that you believe. Such artificial agreement is often welcomed by the authority or the company! At least you are off the hook.Sometimes a belief is justified and sometimes it is not. Even if what I believe is true, I may not be justified in believing it. On the other hand, I might be justified in believing something false. So we need to address the question of how a belief is justified. From what we have said, it is clear that a justified belief is not the same as a true belief, not the same as knowledge. So, now we shall ask, What is knowledge? Is it a special kind of belief?Note that in logic we define an argument as a process of reasoning. Statements follow one another and are connected in such a way that we draw a conclusion and say that we are justified in doing so. If the argument is a sound one, the conclusion will follow from the preceding sentences, which are called premises. In such a case if those premises are true the conclusion will be true. Look at the following argument.You can justifiably believe a false statement.Knowledge involves believing a true statement.Knowledge involves justifiably believing a true statementTherefore, you cannot know a false statement.Nor can you know a true statement unless you can justifiably believe it.Does it also follow from:You cannot know a true statement if your belief is not justified:thatJustifiably believing a true statement constitutes knowledge?If testimony is to be credited and provide justified belief, (1) the attester must be honest. This is the sincerity dimension, and (2) she must also have sufficient knowledge or experience to form a true belief. This is the competence dimension. For example, If Pamela testifies on the basis of a lucky guess that Samantha was in Nottingham yesterday, she cannot transmit justification or knowledge to Peter, the person to whom she speaks. What she testifies to is true, but it is a fluke that she believes that it is true. It is even more of an accident that the one to whom she testifies believes the true statement.So their belief is not justified and an unjustified belief is not knowledge. I may believe that what she says is true. Her belief was not justified. But what about Peter’s. Is his belief justified? If you say that it is, will you also have to add that he does not know what he believes? I can believe what I do not know. I can believe what I am not justified in believing. Also it is quite possible that I might justifiably believe something that is false. Think of circumstances in which this might be the case. The one above is an example.Questions to think about:Are there other reasons why my belief might not be justified?Since a justified belief may be a false belief, what more must there be for a justified belief to constitute knowledge?On what basis would you consider a belief to be justified by someone’s testimony? This might be either someone’s verbal account, a report in a newspaper, or what a textbook says.But you may be justified through my testimony even if I who testify am not justified in my belief. Whether you are justified in your belief will depend on (1) The way I attest to Samantha being in Nottingham yesterday, and (2) your background information about me and about the circumstances. Can you work out this example? Then make up one of your own of (1) justified belief, (2) unjustified belief based on testimony.Statement of principles: A belief based on testimony is justified provided the believer has adequate grounds for taking the attester to be credible regarding the proposition in question. Belief constitutes knowledge only provided the one testifying knows the proposition and provided the one hearing, the one who comes to believe, has no reason to doubt either the proposition or the attester’s credibility about it.So if I have reason to think the attester is trustworthy and has no motive for deceiving me and has a good ground for believing what she says and perhaps also is in a position of authority, or has access to special knowledge, then my belief is reasonable and so is justified.Questions: Was it reasonable for many thousands of people for long periods of time to believe that the earth is flat, i.e. were they justified in so believing a falsehood? So is one justified in believing something at one time but not at another time?Think of examples of justified but false belief.

2 A Summary of Some IssuesOur question is: How does testimony produce belief?Distinguish inferential and non-inferential beliefs. Ask, Are all beliefs which are derived from testimony inferential, as in the following case?Premises: The witness seems reliable.Evidence: The statement the witness makes fits in with what I know about the case.Conclusion: Therefore, it is reasonable that I believe that statement.Perception is necessary for the formation of beliefs grounded in testimony. I must hear the testimony. A basic belief is one not based on other beliefs. The beliefs evoked by testimony need not be based on premises at all, i.e. they can be non-inferential.The epistemological question is: ‘How does testimony yield justified belief and knowledge?’ Certain conditions must be fulfilled if testimony is to provide knowledge to its hearer. If I who am testifying do not know that p [p stands for ‘any statement’], you who hear my testimony can’t come to know that p on the basis of my attesting to it. If I do not know but only pretend that I do, you cannot know what I testify to. For example, if I do not know, but only surmise, that I am getting a good return on my investment, and testify to you that I am, you, the hearer, cannot know. You may believe but the belief may turn out to be false. Whether you are justified in believing me depends on other considerations.However, even if I am not justified in believing it, my testifying to it can provide you with justification for believing it, by providing the main materials for your becoming justified in believing it. The way I attest to the proposition, together with your background justification regarding me and the circumstances, may give you justification, independent of whether I have such justification.If testimony is to be credited and provide justified belief, (1) the attester must be honest, and so fulfil the sincerity dimension, and also (2) must have sufficient knowledge or experience to form a true belief, the competence dimension. For example, say that Pete testifies on the basis of a lucky guess that Bob made a deal with Mary yesterday.What he believes is true, what he testifies to is true, but it is a lucky accident that his testimony is true. But he does not know that it is. Suppose I believe his testimony. I may or may not be justified in my belief. Whether I am must be determined by considerations about my previous contacts with Pete, and my present grounds for taking his testimony to be true, e.g. my experience of his previous reliability as a giver of testimony. There is irony in such an example. His belief is a true belief, but for him it is not justified since it is a fluke that he got it right. So since his testimony is true, and will turn out to be known as true, he may, because of that, be taken as a reliable witness, not only in this case, but in other instances. The question is whether my belief is justified as the grounds for his reliability in other cases than this one.You may be justified through my testimony even if I, in testifying, am not justified in my belief. Whether you are justified in your belief in my testimony will depend on first, the way I attest to say, Samantha being in London yesterday, and second, your background information about me and third, independent of your considerations about me, your awareness of the circumstances to which I am testifyingStatement of principles: A belief based on testimony is justified provided the believer has justification for taking the attester to be credible regarding the proposition in question.

Belief constitutes knowledge (1) provided the proposition is true, (2) provided the one testifying knows the proposition and (3) provided the one hearing and coming to believe, has good reason to believe or has no reason to doubt either the proposition or the attester’s credibility about it.2

1 Validating TestimonyChristians, like other believers, have writings they consider to be not only authentic but also authoritative. The Christian believer is interested both in the present and in the past. The writings, called ‘scripture’ have frequent references to events that happened, to people and peoples who lived in the past, what they did, what they said, what happened to them, the writings that survived them. Historical questions are often of primary importance. But their importance is to be distinguished from other kinds of importance.We rely for our knowledge of the past on the testimony of those who lived and left evidence of their living. Such sources provide testimony to persons, events, beliefs. Sometimes the evidence is in the form of writing about the events it purports to report and interpret. Such testimony is thus available for the kind of careful scrutiny the historian directs to historical sources. Such scrutiny reveals the importance of that past to the present. How is this testimony validated?The testimony of Christians has a present aspect in that the believer is now making claims about what is present. Christians testify (1) to something that has happened in the past, something that they claim is essential for their belief, (2) and claim that, fulfilling the same conditions, can also happen in the present to the hearer. Some such testimony is effective and is validated through a two stage process: The hearer believes the proposition about the experience of others. What the testator claims to have experienced, or claims other people as well have experienced, the hearer also experiences. What results, it is believed, is that the testator’s claim is justified.Reference to other peoples’ experience is indirect testimony. I can testify that since he became a believer Sam has become a better person. Statement of what has happened to the speaker is direct testimony. But it may well be evidence, and in the secondary sense of testimony it is thus also testimony. ‘John has become sober and honest after coming to believe’ is a different kind of evidence from ‘I have become sober and honest after coming to believe.’ If there were no other way of knowing either about Sam or about me, such testimony, the conditions being right. would be sufficient to provide justification for my belief.

2 Different Kinds Of Beliefs: The Book Of ActsThe book of Acts in the New Testament provides us with examples of many kinds of beliefs. We may not be aware as we read scriptural writings that understanding them demands several kinds of belief. Some of these are more easily achieved than others and some are not achievable at all by some readers. A typical Christian ‘believer’ will hold the following beliefs and so could preface each of the following propositions with the statement ‘I believe. . . .’ Those marked with an asterisk are amenable to historical assessment. As such they can be verified or falsified empiricially. The others are not amenable to such assessment. That is to say they are beyond historical confirmation.Luke wrote the book of Acts.*Acts was not the first writing Luke composed.*Luke used various sources in writing the book.*Luke’s account is in detail literally true and so trustworthy as a report of actual events. For example, Luke gives a trustworthy account of the day of Pentecost in chapter 2.Peter healed the lame man who came to the Temple by being carried, and left leaping about in his joy.Luke records amazement of the crowds at the healing of the man lame from birth.*The healing was a miracle.The crowds were amazed.Luke knew by report about the conversion of Saul on the way to Damascus.*Luke’s report of this conversion is authentic.*Saul was converted on the way to Damascus.*Luke was a companion of Paul and accompanied him on some journeys.*Paul lived two years in his own house in Rome.*Luke could have written about the last months and the death of Paul, but (as far as we know) he did not.*What is most interesting about these beliefs is that they are not all of the same kind. So, since our task is to analyse what it means to believe, we will distinguish the kinds of belief we have instanced in this list.These beliefs fall into different classes:Belief about historical fact e.g.: about the bookBelief about what the book says took placeBelief about the trustworthiness of the evidence of testimonyBelief in miracle i.e. that the unusual event reported took placeBelief in the possibility of an event which either did not happen or of which we are ignorant.Some of these overlap. For someone who believes that the supernatural can and does intervene in the natural course of events there will be a different assessment of reports about extraordinary events from the one who does not so believe. One will be sceptical about purported testimony to such events. The other will simply accept that testimony. An interesting case is that of the believer who readily accepts reports of miracles within his own religion but is sceptical about those from another religion, even if they are similar. This raises the question about the demands of consistency in the process of evaluation of reports and testimony.The non-believer and the believer would agree about several of the beliefs listed. The ‘non-believer’ would have reservations about several. The beliefs both might agree about are the ones starred on the above list. We may go further and ask whether there could be disagreement about any of the above between believers calling themselves Christian. The one principle all would agree about is that a physical event not considered possible today, for good reasons that can readily be given, could not have happened at any previous time. So people of a different religion have difficulty with reports of miracles claimed within a religious context different from their own. Sometimes this causes them to question the possibility of miracles claimed within their own religious context. If a physical miracle cannot happen now and we can give good reasons for that claim, then it cannot have happened at any time. We know that a lame man is not instantly healed by the mere words of another, that atrophied limbs are not at once made operative, we do not say restored, because, in the case we took as an example, the man was lame from birth. So the believer either does not give the matter thought and takes the account as literally true or, after reflecting on the passage, finds an explanation he can accept but others cannot.

3 Consciousness and BeliefHow many of your beliefs are you conscious of at this moment? Why none at all! Of course, now that the question has been asked you can start recalling one after another till you have an exhaustive list. You can then say, ‘These are my conscious beliefs now.’ But does it seem strange to talk about an unconscious belief?We are interested in the concept of consciousness for two reasons. So we can pursue our discussionin relation to belief: whether to hold a belief I have to be conscious of having it. Must it be explicit to my consciousness? There are related problems, to explain what it means to lack the awareness of a belief/to be aware of a belief.in relation to the possibility of holding contradictory beliefs: lacking awareness of one, or of both, or having awareness of both.in relation to the idea of personal identity. Is identity of consciousness the criterion for identity of the person?What does having the consciousness of a belief, being conscious of a belief, mean? Are either of the following correct?You don’t have to be conscious to have a belief.You don’t have to be conscious of it, to have a belief.We are not conscious of most of the beliefs we have at any given moment, even when we are conscious. To produce such a sentence, we use the word ‘conscious’ in two different ways. There are other ways as well.I am conscious if I am not unconscious, i.e. not under anaesthetic, not suffering the effect of a wallop on the head, not in a dreamless sleep. For example, I have been in a coma. But I have now ‘come round’. So I am conscious. This is the intransitive use of the term.Contrast to this the transitive use of ‘conscious’. This may take various forms, variations of a basic mode, namely ‘I am conscious that . . . .’ I say, ‘I believe that I once lived in Nashville.’ ‘I am conscious that p (‘I once lived in Nashville’). In this case the belief in the proposition is explicit since the content of the proposition is held before my mind and I assent to it. But I can be said to have the belief even when I am not at the moment aware of its specific content, even if I am not now holding it in my consciousness.

What does it mean to believe, say, that Mary was espoused to Joseph? Must the belief be explicit in their consciousness for anyone to say that they believe the proposition? Do I still believe it when I am not thinking about it, when a lot of other things are in my mind, when my concerns of the present have pushed it and many other beliefs out of my conscious thought. Am I a believer when I am asleep?

Take for example, ‘I believe Elizabeth is in the library’. My first level of awareness is of the belief. The belief is explicit in my mind. I am now assenting to the proposition ‘E is in L’. There is also a second level of belief. That occurs when I am aware that I am entertaining this belief. I step back, so to speak, and think of myself thinking my belief. If I express this I will say, ‘I am now aware that I believe that Elizabeth is in the library’. The second level of awareness occurs when e.g. I am aware of my belief that. . . . or when I am aware of my awareness. So, ‘I believe Elizabeth is in the library’, is a first level belief. So, I go looking for her. I walk here and there in the library. Then I reflect on my state of mind and become aware of my belief that Elizabeth is in the library. This is a second level awareness. I am aware that I believe that Elizabeth is in the library. If later I reflect on an act I did not notice at the time, that I walked to the opposite end of the room on the strength of my belief, I am now aware that I may not have been explicitly aware of it then when I was taking significant action at the moment of taking it. Yet I must have been in some sense conscious of taking it, to enable me to have taken it. It was my act, after all. My action is like that of the motorist who avoids an obstacle in the road but at the time is not consciously aware that he is doing so. Such sub-conscious acts sometimes reveal our beliefs, even if while performing those acts the belief that stimulates the act is not then conscious nor the act consciously connected with it. If someone had met me and asked what I was doing rather than say, ‘I am walking in the library’, I would have said, ‘I am looking for Elisabeth’. If he asked, Why? I could then have said, ‘Because I believe she is here, somewhere’, thus appealing to my belief as a reason for my action. I may of course have wanted it to be the case that she is in the building. This might lead to the consequence that, holding fast to my belief, I do not consider the evidence that she is not in the library. It is then that self-deception might take place. I do not permit myself to examine the evidence for what I believe, since I do not want to have to abandon it. There may be at some level a refusal to be aware of my belief. Does that happen? Why would I refuse to believe something that I do not know is false?

An interesting footnote can be added to these remarks. Some propositions are not compatible with explicit awareness, and turn out to be in some cases rather amusing. For example, if I said, ‘I believe that I have forgotten that once I lived in Nashville’ you would probably laugh. That ‘claim’ involves a contradiction, as the following one does not; ‘I believe that I have forgotten where I put my purse’. You will easily discern the difference between the two!

1 Accepting, Doubting And Abandoning A BeliefSometimes we consider a proposition but do not yet believe or disbelieve it. When does entertaining and examining a proposition become believing it? Is there such a thing as half-belief? Consider the following as possible stages:Being aware that there is a proposition to considerEntertaining the propositionGiving myself reasons for thinking it may be reasonable to believe itBeing disposed to assent to itGiving my assent to it i.e. believing it.A note needs to be added. For the fact is that we sometimes find ourselves believing and are not aware that any process has taken place. The child can hardly help believing in Santa Claus. She just does. Sometimes we do not have to ‘make up our minds’. They have already been made up for us. Once we are aware that we have not really done so before, we can as thinking beings reflect and consider those unexamined beliefs responsibly.b [= a in reverse] We can readily find examples of the processes of coming to accept a belief, and also of coming to abandon a belief. When does questioning and doubting a belief become abandoning it? The process is something like the following:Ask what the belief meansWork out its implicationsConsider the evidence for and against itAsk further about its rationality, e.g. Is it consistent, illuminating?Compare it with alternativesGive myself reasons for calling it into questionDoubt itRevise itAbandon itReplace itIf I do not understand, at least to some extent, what I say I believe, my profession of belief may well be an empty one, a kind of front with little or nothing behind it, something akin to a child holding up a banner, not understanding what is written on it. If, for example, I assert that Scripture is inerrant, I may never have asked some of the questions involved in the preceding paragraph. But I consider some of the implications of the belief as I ask, Can I really believe the Hebrew text when it says that an ass can speak because impeded by an angel, that the word of a prophet can cause an axe to float, that a captain can win a battle after he has given the sun a command to stand still?To examine other scriptural, Christian claims you will have to ask yourself rather sophisticated questions, and find reasonable answers to them. Some of us write books to help you in the process!You realise there is a distinction between believing and knowing. You have always been certain about your beliefs. But you may realise that believing and being certain is not the same as knowing. You may nevertheless hold firm to your beliefs But then you must admit you cannot be arrogant about them, cannot treat them as if there were no questions to be asked about them. Self-assurance and certainty about belief does not mean knowledge. A certain humility is always appropriate in holding and expressing one’s beliefs.About doubt. At this stage, the people who think they know every answer, or worse still, every question, are the ones who may be able to help us the least. People who have gone through an experience similar to ours a long time ago, and who have now found working answers to their questions, may have forgotten how hard-won their conclusions and attitudes were. It’s easy once you’ve found a working answer to forget the process of struggle that led up to it. It is easy then to be unsympathetic.

Those who have not gone through what we go through in this period simply live in a different world from us, and speak to us in a language which does not connect. We hear the words and see the concern. We know their affection and appreciate it. Yet sometimes the very finality and placidity with which we are told disarms us. It may even –– if we are deeply troubled by such dogmatism –– lead us to reject not only the unsatisfactory answer but also the very quest in which we are participating. This is a gesture of despair, but quite an understandable one.

For Further Reading

D. J. O’Connor and Brian Carr, Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982.

Phillips Griffiths (editor), Knowledge and Belief, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Elizabeth Maclaren, The Nature of Belief, London: Sheldon Press, 1976.

Belief and Believing: Work Sheet

1. There have been several questions inserted into the text of this chapter. Go back and give your answers to them.

2. Is there a basic meaning for the term ‘belief’? Write a paragraph explaining what you take ‘belief’ to mean. Give examples.

3. ‘I wish I could believe that!’ Is there any possibility that you might come to believe what you wish to believe?

4. Think of something you wish your friend would believe. State it explicitly. What might you do to help her believe it?

5. How does one establish the reliability of testimony? Think of a witness in a law court, and also of how to assess historical witness, for example the trustworthiness of written materials.

6. Must decision always precede belief? If not, what then? What would make you change your belief? Find a worthy example, say –– the last time you made such a change.

7. What makes the difference between a justified and an unjustified belief? Give an example of each.

8. How does it happen that you change your belief?

9. There are many different ideas about God. Perhaps you do not believe in the God I do not believe in. Since there are many ideas of God, does the idea you have of God make the difference to whether you believe or not?

10. Should we distinguish between superficial and radical doubt?

1 Does faith in God justify belief in the authority of Scripture? What does belief in the authority of Scripture entail? Questions arise that demand definition of the understanding of God, of the meaning of faith and of the coming into existence of the many writings of scripture, historical as well as theological issues are inevitably involved. Give a truncated answer to these questions and the result will be an inadequate understanding. For a careful treatment of these issues see Edward W. H. Vick, From Inspiration to Understanding.

2 Cf. Robert Audi, Epistemology, pp. 136-138.