Читать книгу The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas - Edward Westermarck - Страница 106

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WE have discussed the general nature of those phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral blame or moral praise. We have seen that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, and we have seen why this is the case. It now remains for us to examine the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and to consider how these modes of conduct are judged of by different peoples and in different ages.

If carried out in every detail such an investigation could never come to an end. Among other things, it would have to take into account all customs existing among the various races of men, since every custom constitutes a moral rule. And the impossibility of any such undertaking becomes apparent when we consider the extent to which the conduct of man, and especially of savage man, is hampered by custom. Among the Wanika, for instance, “if a man dares to improve the style of his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary; if he should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of his fellows, he is instantly fined.”1 If, during the performance of a ceremony, the ancestors of an Australian native were in the habit of painting a white line across the forehead, their descendant must do the same.2 Dr. Nansen’s statement with reference to the Greenlanders, that their communities had originally customs and fixed rules for every possible circumstance,3 is essentially true of many, if not all, of the lower races.

1 New, Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa, p. 110.

2 Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia, p. 11.

3 Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 104.

It is necessary, then, that we should restrict ourselves to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned. These modes of conduct may be conveniently divided into six groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property, and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as chiefly concern a man’s own welfare, such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third group, which partly coincides with, but partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard as supernatural. We shall examine each of these groups separately, in the above order. And, not being content with a mere description of facts, we shall try to discover the principle which lies at the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case.

It is commonly maintained that the most sacred duty which we owe our fellow-creatures is to respect their lives. I venture to believe that this holds good not only among civilised nations, but among the lower races as well; and that, if a savage recognises that he has any moral obligations at all to his neighbours, he considers the taking of their lives to be a greater wrong than any other kind of injury inflicted upon them.

Among various uncivilised peoples, however, human life is said to be held very cheap.

The Australian Dieyerie, we are told, would for a mere trifle kill their dearest friend.4 In Fiji there is an “utter disregard of the value of human life.”5 A Masai will murder his friend or neighbour in a fight over a herd of captured cattle, and “live not a whit the less merrily afterwards.”6 Among the Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, murder “excites little sensation, excepting in the family of the person who has been murdered; and brings, it is said, no disgrace upon him who has committed it; nor uneasiness, excepting the fear of their revenge.”7 The Oráons of Bengal “are ready to take life on very slight provocation,” and Colonel Dalton doubts whether they see any moral guilt in it.8 Some of the Himalayan mountaineers are reported to put men to death merely for the satisfaction of seeing the blood flow and of marking the last struggles of the victim.9 Among the Pathans, on the north-western frontier of the Punjab, “there is hardly a man whose hands are unstained,” and each person “counts up his murders.”10

4 Gason, ‘Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,’ in Woods, Native Tribes of South Australia, p. 258.

5 Williams and Calvert, Fiji and the Fijians, p. 115.

6 Johnston, Kilima-njaro Expedition, p. 419.

7 Burchell, Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa, ii. 554.

8 Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, p. 256.

9 Fraser, Journal of a Tour through the Himālā Mountains, p. 267.

10 Temple, quoted by Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 343. For other instances of the indifference of savages to human life, see Egede, Description of Greenland, p. 123; Cranz, History of Greenland, i. 177; Holm, ‘Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,’ in Meddeleser om Grönland, x. 87, 179 sq.; Coxe, Russian Discoveries between Asia and America, p. 257 (Aleuts of Unalaska); Krasheninnikoff, History of Kamtschatka, p. 204; Steller, Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka, p. 294; Boyle, Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo, p. 116 (Malays); Powell, Wanderings in a Wild Country, p. 262 (aborigines of New Britain); Scaramucci and Giglioli, ‘Notizie sui Danakil,’ in Archivio per antropologia e la etnologia, xiv. 26; Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, ii. 310 (Gowane); Schweinfurth, Heart of Africa, i. 286 (Bongo); Arnot, Garenganze, p. 71 (Barotse); Tuckey, Expedition to Explore the River Zaire, p. 383 (Congo natives); Waul, Five Years with the Congo Cannibals, p. 105 (Bolobo).

On the other hand, there are uncivilised peoples among whom homicide or murder is said to be hardly known.

Among the Omahas, “before liquor was introduced there were no murders, even when men quarrelled.”11 Captain Lyon could learn of no instances of manslaughter having ever occurred among the Eskimo of Igloolik.12 In Tutuila, of the Samoa group, according to Brenchley, there had been but one case of assassination in the course of twenty years.13 The Veddahs of Ceylon know of manslaughter only as a punishment.14 The Bedouin of the Euphrates, says Mr. Blunt, “is essentially humane, and never takes life needlessly. If he has killed a man in war he rather conceals the fact than proclaims it aloud, while murder or even homicide is almost unknown among the tribes.”15 Among the Bakwiri, in Cameroon, Zoller never heard of any person having killed a member of his own community.16 Murders, says Caillié, “are rare among the Bambaras, and never committed by the Mandingoes.”17 Among the Wanika “wilful cold-blooded murders are almost unknown.”18 Among the Basutos perfect safety is enjoyed “on roads where the traveller might have been robbed a hundred times over without the least hope of aid, and in houses where the doors and windows have neither bolts nor bars,” and cases of murder are very rare.19

11 Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 369.

12 Lyon, Private Journal, p. 350.

13 Brenchley, Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. “Curaçoa” among the South Sea Islands, p. 58.

14 Sarasin, Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen auf Ceylon, iii. 539. Cf. Tennent, Ceylon, ii. 444. Hartshorne, in Indian Antiquary, viii. p. 320.

15 Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, ii. 203. Cf. ibid. ii. 207.

16 Zöller, Kamerun, i. 188.

17 Caillié, Travels through Central Africa, i. 353.

18 New, op. cit. p. 98.

19 Casalis, Basutos, p. 301. For other instances, see Hall, Arctic Researches, p. 571 (Eskimo); Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abipones, ii. 148; Turner, Samoa, p. 178; Ellis, Tour through Hawaii, p. 429; Brooke, Ten Years in Saráwak, i. 61 (Sea Dyaks); Low, Sarawak, p. 133; Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 471 (Poggi Islanders); Steller, De Sangi-Archipel, p. 26; Riedel, De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua, p. 41 (Ambon and Uliase Islanders); von Siebold, Aino auf der Insel Yesso, pp. 11, 35; Munzinger, Ostafrikanische Studien, p. 532 (Barea and Kunáma); Holub, Seven Years in South Africa, ii. 319 (Marutse); Maclean, Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs, pp. 61, 143 sq.; Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p. 137.

In other instances homicide is expressly said to be regarded as wrong.

The Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen hold it atrocious to kill a fellow-creature, except in some particular cases.20 The Dacotahs say that it is a great crime to take their fellow’s life, unless in revenge, “because all have a right to live.”21 In Tierra del Fuego homicide rarely occurs, as Mr. Bridges remarks, because of an inveterate custom according to which human life is held sacred: “le meurtrier est mis au ban de ses compatriotes; isolé de tous, il est fatalement condamné à périr de faim ou à tomber un jour sous les coups d’un groupe de justiciers improvisés.”22 The Andaman Islanders condemn murder as yūbda, or sin.23 The natives of Botany Bay, New South Wales, though a trivial offence in their ideas justifies the murder of a man, “highly reprobate the crime when committed without what they esteem a just cause.”24 According to Mr. Curr’s experience, the Australian Black undoubtedly feels that murder is wrong, and its committal brings remorse; even after the perpetration of infanticide or massacres, though both are practised without disguise, those engaged in them are subject to remorse and low spirits for some time.25

20 Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 162.

21 Prescott, in Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes of the United States, ii. 195.

22 Hyades and Deniker, Mission scientifique du Cap Horn, vii. 374, 243.

23 Man, in Jour. Anthr. Inst. xii. 112.

24 Barrington, History of New South Wales, p. 19. Cf. Lumholtz, Among Cannibals, p. 126 (natives of Northern Queensland).

25 Curr, The Australian Race, i. 100, 43 sq. For other instances, see Keating, Expedition to the Source of St. Peter’s River, i. 127 (Potawatomis); Harmon, Journal of Voyages in the Interior of North America, p. 348 (Indians on the east side of the Rocky Mountains); Hall, Arctic Researches, p. 572 (Eskimo); Mariner, Natives of the Tonga Islands, ii. 162; Macdonald, Oceania, p. 208 (Efatese); Yate, Account of New Zealand, p. 145; Arbousset and Daumas, Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, p. 322 (Bechuanas); Fritsch, Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikra’s, p. 322 (Hottentots).

It is of particular importance in this connection to note that, in early civilisation, blood-revenge is regarded not as a private matter only, but as a duty, and that, where this custom does not prevail, the community punishes the murderer, frequently with death. We may without hesitation accept Professor Tylor’s statement that “no known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one another indiscriminately.”26 In every society—even where human life is, generally speaking, held in low estimation—custom prohibits homicide within a certain circle of men. But the radius of the circle varies greatly.

26 Tylor, ‘Primitive Society,’ in Contemporary Review, xxi. 714.

Savages carefully distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger. Whilst the former is under ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases allowed, and often regarded as praiseworthy. It is a very common notion in savage ethics that the chief virtue of a man is to be successful in war and to slay many enemies.

Among the Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush “killing strangers might or might not be considered inexpedient, but it would hardly be considered a crime”; killing fellow-tribesmen, on the other hand, is looked upon in a very different light.27 The Koriaks do not regard murder as a great crime, unless it occur within their own tribe.28 The early Aleuts considered the killing of a companion a crime worthy of death, “but to kill an enemy was quite another thing.”29 To an Aht Indian the murder of a man is no more than the killing of a dog, provided that the victim is not a member of his own tribe.30 According to Humboldt, the natives of Guiana “detest all who are not of their family, or their tribe; and hunt the Indians of a neighbouring tribe, who live at war with their own, as we hunt game.”31 In the opinion of the Fuegians, “a stranger and an enemy are almost synonymous terms,” hence they dare not go where they have no friends, and where they are unknown, as they would most likely be destroyed.32 The Australian Black nurtures an intense hatred of every male at least of his own race who is a stranger to him, and would never neglect to assassinate such a person at the earliest moment that he could do so without risk to himself.33 In Melanesia, also, a stranger as such was generally throughout the islands an enemy to be killed.34