Читать книгу Essentials of Supersonic Commercial Aircraft Conceptual Design - Egbert Torenbeek - Страница 11

Early design studies in the 1950s by the UK industry aimed at a supersonic airliner designed for non‐stop flights between London and New York. One concept was equipped with a slender body and very thin straight wings, not unlike the general arrangement of contemporary supersonic bombers. This configuration could not generate an acceptable aerodynamic quality, resulting in an aircraft carrying only fifteen passengers with a take‐off weight of 136 metric tons. The large wave drag of its wing was the major obstacle for efficient flight and aerodynamic experts at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) soon realized that wave drag could be kept low by using a slender wing to keep the leading edge behind the Mach lines from the vertex.

In 1956 the RAE and aircraft manufacturers established the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) with the intention of taking the lead in designing and producing SST. The STAC concluded that most operational advantages of supersonic long‐range flying were secured if the vehicle cruised at a speed near 2000 km h⁻¹ (Mach 2), which would enable the airline to fly two transatlantic round trips per day. Moreover, at this speed the kinetic heating of the structure would allow the use of advanced light alloys instead of steel or titanium required for Mach 3. In 1960 Bristol Aircraft was awarded a contract for designing a supersonic commercial transport (SCT) for 130 passengers, which was completed in 1961.

Around the same time the French air ministry requested a proposal from aircraft manufacturers for a medium‐range SCT cruising at a Mach number between 2.0 and 2.2 with a capacity of 60–80 passengers. ONERA was selected for basic theoretical and experimental research and the resulting projects by Sud Aviation, Dassault and Nord Aviation were completed in 1961. The French officials concluded that the Sud design was the most promising. Despite the different payload and range requirements, the British and French teams evolved broadly the same aerodynamic design approach and it was realized that they should collaborate in a project that would benefit both industries, and the same applied to the participating British and French engine industries. After consultations with potential customers and governments it was decided that the Anglo‐French supersonic transport would carry 130 passengers over the Paris–New York Atlantic range. The formal Anglo/French agreement for development and manufacture with a production line in both countries was signed in November 1962 and prototype construction began in 1965.

The aircraft, baptized “Concorde” produced by BAC and Aerospatiale, made its first flights in early 1969. A total of twenty aircraft were constructed, including two prototypes and two pre‐production models. Fourteen of the sixteen series‐produced aircraft served mainly on North Atlantic routes, split between British Airways and Air France. They carried their passengers cruising at speeds up to Mach 2 at 18,000 m altitude and thereby saved four of the typical seven hours trip time required by high‐subsonic jetliners. However, Concorde was developed just prior to the establishment of FAR 36 noise regulations and – with its afterburners operating during the take‐off – the aircraft required a noise rule waiver to allow its operation out of American airports. Moreover, the establishment of FAR 91 rules in 1973 prohibited sonic booms over inhabited areas, making flight at Mach 2 over these areas impossible. It was not until 1980 that Concorde reached the point where it could carry a full load of hundred passengers year‐round on the North Atlantic routes.

The Concorde and Boeing SST programs were conceived at a time when fuel prices were coming down. However, supersonic cruise requires more energy per unit of payload and range, and both designs were known to be sensitive to the availability of fuel. Due to the oil crises in the 1970s and the subsequent increase in fuel price as well as the increasing concerns about the effects of supersonic flight on the environment, the interest in supersonic civil aviation decreased and Concorde remained the only SCT in regular airline use during the twentieth century. Scheduled flights were principally London–New York and Paris–New York and they attracted mostly high utilization. During the 27 years of their operational life a fleet of only twelve flying Concordes accumulated some 350,000 hours, most of the time flying at supersonic speed – more than all of the world's military aircraft together – and with high reliability. During the years of Concorde's operational life, it was generally concluded by British Airways and Air France that, despite its high maintenance costs, the technology generally satisfied or exceeded the expectations at the start of the project.

In August 2000 a piece of titanium left on Charles de Gaulle Airport's runway caused Concorde's landing gear tire to explode, damaging its wing fuel tank structure and setting an engine on fire. After lifting off, the plane could not climb out, became uncontrollable, and crashed. Although British Airways and Air France considered the Concorde to be profitable up until the accident, they concluded in 2003 that continuation of its services was no longer commercially justified. In particular, the high fuel costs per seat‐kilometer, the maintenance costs of seven times those of a Boeing 747, and the modification costs expected in that year were behind the decision to phase out its operations. Economically, Concorde did not fit into the structure of the air traffic system due to its high operational costs, and the high research and development costs could not be negotiated by the small number of aircraft produced and sold.

Figure 1.2 The North American XB‐70 Valkyrie strategic bomber/reconnaissance aircraft (first flight made in 1964) [4].

In spite of its high cruise speed reducing the time to travel drastically, and the fact that it provided a safe and reliable Atlantic service from 1976, Concorde is sometimes portrayed as a folly and a failure, but this ignores the fact that the USA once viewed it as a threat to its aerospace leadership. The Concorde was a technological and systems integration marvel in its time – an achievement that since its emergence has never been surpassed. Its development, production, and service have enriched the knowledge of European technological cooperation. Apart from the excellent flying qualities demonstrated during its service, the Anglo‐French supersonic transport was the first international aerospace program that reshaped industrial and political thinking and it paved the way for most European collaborative programs. Its legacy is today's European aerospace industry Airbus, established in 1970, and the European certification authority EASA.