Читать книгу America's Betrayal Confirmed - Elias Davidsson - Страница 34

As for flights AA11 and UA175, which reportedly left from Logan Airport, Boston, the 9/11 Commission found that “[n]one of the [security] checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported anything suspicious regarding their screening.”{132} Carter Bibbey, a manager for Globe Aviation Services Corp., who was supervising screeners at the American Airlines terminal in Boston, told the Boston Globe on 10 October 2001 that his five screeners didn’t detect any weapons — either legal or illegal on the morning of 9/11.{133}

As for flight AA77, which reportedly left from Dulles Airport, Washington, D.C., the 9/11 Commission wrote that “[w]hen the local civil aviation security office of the FAA later investigated these security screening operations, the screeners recalled nothing unusual. They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees.”{134} As for flight UA93, which reportedly left from Newark Liberty International Airport, the 9/11 Commission indicated that the “FAA interviewed the screeners later; none recalled anything unusual or suspicious.”{135} According to an undated FBI report, the ““FBI collected 14 knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash site.”{136} Yet no screener mentioned coming across a single knife that morning.{137}

A seasoned Israeli security expert, Rafi Ron, President of New Age Security Solutions, with thirty years’ experience in security, intelligence and counterterrorism for the government of Israel and formerly Director of Security at Tel-Aviv Ben-Gurion International airport, addressed the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on 21 September 2005. He said:

I would like to point out that the Achilles heel of the suicide terrorist is his behavior. A person intending to commit an extreme act of violence, in most cases for the first time in his/her life, as well as to terminate his own life is most likely not to behave like the ordinary people around him going about their daily routines. A signal example is Richard Reid (the “shoe bomber”), who was clearly detected by both security and non-security personnel as a suspicious person before and during boarding AA flight from Paris (Dec. 2001).{138}

In the light of the above testimony, it is significant that no security employee noted anything suspicious in the behavior of the 19 persons who allegedly were intending to commit an extreme act of violence and to terminate their own life within the next hour.