Читать книгу The World According to China - Elizabeth C. Economy - Страница 17

The conduct of Chinese foreign policy over the course of the first year of the pandemic and beyond offers some initial insights into how Xi has adapted his domestic governance model to the pursuit of his strategic ambitions. For example, he mobilized and deployed domestic resources across multiple domains – within China, through the BRI, and in the WHO – to promote the adoption of TCM internationally. He also used the penetration of the CCP in other countries’ societies to collect and distribute PPE via state-directed overseas Chinese organizations and to enable Chinese officials to spread disinformation on Western social media platforms such as Twitter. Moreover, he leveraged the Chinese market to try to coerce countries into thanking China publicly for PPE and into dropping their calls for an investigation into the origins of the virus.

The chapters outlined below explore in detail how Xi has utilized this model and the consequences – both intended and unintended – for his ability to realize his broader strategic objectives. Chapter 2 outlines how China utilizes soft, sharp, and hard power to shape the perceptions and policy preferences of other actors and evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of these tools. It argues that context matters. Countries that are geographically distant from China, for example, are typically less concerned about the country’s deployment of hard power than those in its backyard. And while multinationals often succumb to Chinese coercive economic leverage, countries generally do not. Perhaps most surprisingly, the level of Chinese trade and investment does not correlate closely with countries’ support for Beijing on other issues, such as its policies in Xinjiang or its actions in the South China Sea. Other factors matter more.

Chapter 3 delves into the heart of Xi’s rejuvenation ambition: the creation of a unified China. It investigates how China realized its sovereignty claims in Hong Kong, and the steps it is taking to make progress in the South China Sea and Taiwan. It reveals that China’s willingness to use soft power, as opposed to more coercive or even military actions, diminishes rather than expands as opposition among other actors to its sovereignty efforts grows. China is also willing to ignore international law, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and to endure significant disequilibrium in the international system in pursuit of its sovereignty objectives. One consequence of China’s use of economic coercion and military power has been to bolster the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Japan, India, the United States, and Australia) and to invite deeper military engagement from actors outside the region, such as Germany, France, and the UK. This expanding coalition challenges Xi’s ability to make further progress on his sovereignty ambitions for the South China Sea and Taiwan.

The heart of chapter 4 is an exploration of whether and in what ways China is selling its model and imprinting its political, economic, and security preferences on other countries through its flagship foreign policy initiative, Belt and Road. The BRI captures the essence of Xi’s strategic ambition. It places China at the center of a vast network of global physical and technological infrastructure, as well as political and security influence. The chapter delineates the sprawling and opportunistic nature of the BRI, illuminates the debates within and outside China over its sustainability, and reveals the differential impacts of Belt and Road across a range of countries. It concludes that while the BRI, more than any other initiative, has helped China realize its ambitions for a reordered world, its continued success may be derailed by discontent within host countries over Beijing’s weak governance practices and low environmental and labor standards. In addition, the spread of Chinese political, economic, and military influence via the BRI has heightened the global influence competition with other advanced economies.

Chapter 5 examines China’s effort to lead the world’s technological transformation over the 21st century. It finds that its strategic playbook has experienced mixed success. Its governance model has yielded significant gains in Chinese domestic technological capabilities and has enabled Beijing to take a commanding lead in developing the technological infrastructure for a significant number of developing economies through the Digital Silk Road and to reinforce its technological priorities in international standard setting bodies. Beijing’s relationship with advanced market democracies in Europe, North America, and Asia, however, has encountered increasing difficulty. The growing CCP control over the private sector has contributed to Chinese technology companies’ exclusion from some of these countries’ markets. Moreover, the linkages between Chinese technology companies and the Chinese military or surveillance activities, particularly in Xinjiang, have resulted in US sanctions to deprive these companies of necessary technology. In addition, CCP financial and other support for international scientific talent through its Thousand Talents Plan has triggered concerns over spying and intellectual property (IP) theft, contributing to a significant political backlash in the United States and elsewhere.

Chapter 6 investigates China’s efforts to reform global governance norms, values, and institutions in four policy arenas: the Arctic, human rights, the internet, and development finance. It reveals how Beijing has successfully enforced its own policy preferences through assuming leadership positions in international institutions; a long-term strategy of setting targets and timetables to benchmark accomplishments; mobilizing Chinese government, business, and civil society actors; leveraging its economic power; and reinforcing its priorities in multiple domains. As with the BRI and China’s global technology push, however, the more overtly China’s policies impinge on or undermine established norms and values, the more likely the international community will resist.

The final chapter offers thoughts on how the United States and the rest of the world should respond to China’s strategic ambitions. It argues that neither the traditional US policy of “constructive engagement” nor the more recent Trump administration approach of “compete, counter, and contain,” is adequate to meet the challenge. The US strategy, along with that of its allies and partners, must account for Xi Jinping’s unique policy playbook as well as to assert a positive and proactive vision of the world’s future and their place within it. Given China’s global reach and impact, moreover, the United States and traditional allies and partners must expand the tent to engage the rest of the world in this vision. While there is broad scope for cooperation between China and the United States on global challenges such as climate change, this is unlikely to alter the contest underway between two distinct sets of values and world visions.