Читать книгу The Germans: Double History Of A Nation - Emil Grimm Ludwig - Страница 13

THEY were brave, these German noblemen, forerunners of the Junkers. They knew how to die and they did not spare themselves. But loyalty to their leaders was confined to battle. Afterward it was supplanted by demands for booty or for so-called fiefs which closely resembled outright property. Woe unto the leader who did not yield what the nobles demanded! They were his swords, his lances and his daggers, and he had to stand in constant fear that these human weapons might turn against him. The history of the German kings and leaders during the Middle Ages is a story of revolt and conspiracy on the part of vassals. The reason that loyalty has always been and still is held in such high esteem by the Germans is that it is so rare, an ideal emulated by but a few. A red streak of murder and treachery ran through the history of the German noble families, and if later they grew more sedate it was because there was less killing and more bargaining. The intimate memoirs of the kings are studded with plaints at the constant threats to which they so often had to yield in order to hand down their power to their sons. Indeed, the kings often showed their feelings by seeking refuge with commoners. Later the Prussian Junkers, descendants of the ancient vassals, defiantly succeeded in maintaining the subjection of all other classes down to our own days.

The lack of unity which constitutes the tragedy and at the same time the fascination of German history, this weakness which rests on the strength of German individualism, bore even at this early age the significant result that every prince provided for his own family, while few provided for the realm. Thus the new country of France was constantly divided and redivided, first by Clovis and later by his successors. This partitioning weakened the country and slowed up its attainment of national integrity.

From the welter of family feuds and partitions there emerged a valiant major-domo, who was proclaimed king. But before risking his coup d’état, he secured the blessings of heaven. He had inquiries made from the Bishop of Rome, who even then was styling himself Pope, as to what should be done with heedless kings who did nothing beyond accepting the gift offerings of the people. The situation was not unlike today when the few remaining kings are guided like puppets by dictators and by ministers.

Pope Zachary recognized the immeasurable advantage that might accrue to his successors for a thousand years to come from an alliance with the rising world power. Zachary decided upon a reply of world-historic importance: Pepin the upstart must be anointed by the Pope.

Here we see the beginnings of the German tragedy that did so much harm to the German nation. By voluntarily submitting to ecclesiastic power, the boldest leaders of Europe renounced their power as such. This established a paradox in the field of State power—a paradox that arose from the internal contradictions within the German soul which were thus perpetuated.

For Pepin was but the first of many who, having been anointed, pronounced the lie: “Not on behalf of any man but for Saint Peter alone have I gone out to do battle, that my sins may be forgiven.” It was a blending of self-interest and mysticism, typically German; and with this sentimental apology for his coup d’état Pepin spoke straight from the heart of his people, giving them the ideal pretext to justify violence. Show the Teuton a sacred motive, let him glimpse the Savior above his sword, and he will feel himself to be Saint Michael. Even when robbing alien peoples, he will believe his mission to be highly moral. With this psychology Pepin became the forerunner of a thousand years of highly moral German conquest. Even today the Germans avail themselves of God or Honor or Country as a cloak beneath which to hide the dagger.