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Introduction

“You must assume either the stance of a philosopher or that of a layperson,” τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι φιλοσόφου στάσιν ἔχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.

—Epictetus (Discourses. III.15.13.)

One of the many legacies that antiquity has bequeathed to later generations is a substantial store of philosophical literature wherein different views on concepts such as ethics, epistemology, anthropology, theology, and logic have been carefully scrutinized and delineated. Modern scholarly interest in ancient philosophy has, perhaps understandably, largely focused upon explicating the theoretical content of the schools’ propositions, and to do so by, for instance, attempting to systematize their tenets, reflecting upon where cohesion and tensions between various doctrines lie, and highlighting the varying emphases and philosophical preferences that different generations of thinkers could prioritize. The richness of the intellectual depth that is contained in these texts has, perhaps understandably, tended to obscure the value of studying the schools as a sociohistorical phenomenon and in exploring the stances that their proponents took on topics that lie outside of formal philosophical discourse. In this regard, it is the intention of this book to consider ancient philosophers’ attitudes toward a group that would have constituted the largest segment of the society that surrounded them, but which their opinion of has elicited almost no scholarly attention: individuals who lacked philosophical training, laypeople.

To assess the views regarding laypeople that were held across the classical philosophical schools (e.g., Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean) and, indeed, even just across an individual philosophical tradition would be a mammoth task, and is not achievable within the space of a single monograph. To render the goal of this book more manageable, its focus will narrow upon exploring the mid-first to early second century CE Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ views of them. The reason for selecting Epictetus is that, as will become evident, he mentions laypeople with notable frequency, and so a robust reconstruction of his views of them can, quite uniquely for an ancient philosopher, be obtained.

Epictetus

Epictetus (ca. 55–135 CE) led, as one of his recent commentators has reflected, “(perhaps) not a strikingly eventual life, but yet a memorable one.”¹ Born in Hierapolis in Asia Minor, Epictetus spent his formative years as a slave in the household of Epaphroditus (ca. 25–95 CE), who was a freedman and secretary to the Emperor Nero. This placed Epictetus close to the heart of the Imperial government, which was an experience that he would sometimes draw upon to help add color to his philosophical explications. For example, when he talking about the misplaced concern for wealth that humans can exhibit, Epictetus recalls that a man had once approached his master in palpable distress because he had only a million-and-a-half sesterces (a sizeable sum) left.² Little else is known about Epictetus’ early life, and only once in the extant portions of his discussions does he explicitly refer to his previous servile status.³

Epictetus would almost certainly have remained in obscurity had his aptitude for philosophical thought, the provision of leisure time that was afforded to him by his master, and the presence of the engaging Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus in Rome not coincided. Attending Rufus’ lectures while he was still a slave,⁴ Epictetus seems to have formed a close bond—at least in terms of intellectual deference—with the Stoic scholar. As he would later relay to his own circle of pupils regarding the effect that Rufus had upon his audience:

He [Rufus] used to address us in such a manner that each of us sitting there imagined that some person had informed on him; such was his grasp of understanding how people behave, and his ability to set each person’s private faults before their eyes.⁵

τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἴεσθαι, ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν: οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν γιγνομένων, οὕτως πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά.

Epictetus also established himself as a well-regarded and popular philosophical figure during his lifetime, with, for example, several high-ranking political figures, including the procurator of Epirus and the corrector of the free cities in Greece,⁶ visiting his school in Nicopolis so they might hear him lecture or to solicit his advice. In addition, if Aelius is to be believed, even the Emperor Hadrian visited Epictetus’ school.⁷

With Epictetus never having secured his teachings in written form, his influence would have almost certainly dissipated had one of his pupils, Arrian, not endeavored to document their contents.⁸ These exist in a series of books entitled the Discourses, which originally spanned eight volumes, but unfortunately only the first four are extant, in which Epictetus’ discussions on a variety of philosophical topics are relayed. Arrian also compiled the Enchiridion, which is a gnomological text that appears to be a mnemonic aid that was crafted to help Arrian, or his envisaged audience, to apply Epictetus’ teachings in a daily life setting.⁹ Outside of his lifetime perhaps Epictetus’ most famous and influential admirer was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, whose own philosophical interests are well known.¹⁰ Epictetus’ name, and a brief account of his ideas, especially regarding the concept of freedom ἐλευθερία, is also preserved in a second-century epigraph that was constructed by a slave/freedman, or at least someone who adopted the guise of a slave/freedman.¹¹ Furthermore, and rather beguiling given the topic of this book, the third-century Christian philosopher Origen reflected that Epictetus was the only philosopher who was read by many (πολλοὶ),¹² a remark that probably indicates the accessibility and popularity of the Encheiridon. Post-antiquity during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, Epictetus’ teachings enjoyed a remarkably wide reception, with, among others, figures such as Thomas Jefferson, René Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, the third Earl Shaftsbury, and Tolstoy all appealing and favorably referencing him in their writings or speeches.¹³

Regarding Epictetus’ views of laypeople, currently no study of extended length exists which explores the issue. Given how frequently Epictetus’ remarks upon laypeople punctuate his discussions, this is, I suggest, a surprising lacuna in Epictetan scholarship.

There are a couple of shorter studies in which the presence of lay visitors to his school are noted. In the first, within Ronald Hock’s 1992 journal article which seeks to analyze the Discourses through the prism of social network analysis, he catalogues the recorded visitors to Epictetus’ school.¹⁴ Hock highlights if any of these visitors are nonphilosophers, but aside from arguing that their presence testifies to Epictetus’ popularity, as well as observing the often abrasive manner in which he tended to deal with them, Hock is not concerned to explore Epictetus’ opinion(s) of laypeople, or to elucidate any broad framework of thought that might have influenced his views regarding them. In addition, within his 2010 book chapter, Gerald Boter notes a few instances where Epictetus interacts with laypeople, and the advice he offers to his students to not be frustrated when nonphilosophically trained individuals exhibit faltering moral awareness. Boter, however, offers little reflection on these passages beyond briefly narrating them, and commenting that they reveal the varied success Epictetus could have when he engaged with philosophically inexperienced individuals.¹⁵

Outline of the Book

In chapter 1, it is highlighted that over the past two decades research has shown that after the rise of Rome in the first century BCE philosophical schools became evermore decentralized from their traditional bases on the Attic mainland, and that the autonomy and disparate location of its affiliates across the now-sprawling Roman Republic becomes increasingly apparent in our sources. The resulting ambiguity over who was, and who was not, a legitimate adherent of philosophy and how this status could be affirmed or contested is probed at length with reference to numerous classical authors’ opinions. It is concluded that the authenticity of a person’s claim to be a philosopher would be determined, firstly, by how faithfully their behavior conformed with their chosen philosophy’s ethical principles, and, secondly, by the depth of their comprehension and the fluidity of recall they could display in annunciating its central tenets. Finally, that philosophers who were affiliated with rival traditions of philosophical thought and students who were being coached in philosophical precepts were both accepted as having a genuine claim to a philosophical identity is documented.

In chapter 2, Epictetus’ understanding of the extent and enduring nature of vice in society is explored. This chapter, therefore, highlights the most negative aspect of Epictetus’ evaluation of laypeople, and where the differences he believes exist between them and philosophically observant individuals are at their starkest. Firstly, it is demonstrated that Epictetus holds that the body’s powerful registering of pain and sensory pleasure often prompts people to channel their effort and volition in solely securing their physical comfort, and to consequently let their capacity for introspection, reasoning, and the freedom of their internal disposition atrophy. Furthermore, while it is seen that Epictetus affirms traditional Stoic monism and is not (beyond idiomatic borrowing) influenced by Platonic dualism, his repeated disregard for the body and advocacy that his students should dislocate their identity away from their flesh is deliberated at length, and the scholarly conversation on this topic is reframed. Secondly, Epictetus opines that most children are mentored by nonphilosophically informed guardians, which systematically entrenches the embedding and normalization of vice and misunderstanding across humanity, which an individual can only hope to expunge (although almost certainly not entirely) by submitting themselves to a laborious philosophical process. It is shown that Epictetus holds that theoretical learning and practical application need to be honed to work together before such a refining effect can take place. His commendation of therapeutic exercises (such as role-playing and memorizing of moral maxims) to help catalyze such a harmony in his students’ lives is then documented. Epictetus’ position that a philosophical education is limited to a small number of individuals who can apportion extended periods of free time and resources to its study and who need to have previously obtained skills such as literacy is then interacted with.

The question addressed in chapter 3 is if Epictetus perceives that the vast majority of people who surround him to be laypeople, what is his opinion regarding widely communicating philosophical knowledge to them, and in encouraging people to begin philosophical study? After framing the exploration of this question with reference to two competing portrayals of the early Stoics’ stance toward public engagement which Diogenes Laertius’ Lives document, it is seen that Epictetus uniquely signals that a change in his perspective on this issue has occurred, namely that his youthful optimism in the possibility of impacting and enthusing laypeople with philosophical insight has been displaced by the conviction that such attempts are futile and more than likely are counterproductive. With empathy for his students’ apparently frequently felt conviction to relay the messages of the lecture room to a wider audience, it is documented that Epictetus instead repeatedly seeks to dissuade them from bringing philosophical deliberation to the public.

In this chapter, it is further established that Epictetus’ perspective on public engagement parallels his teacher Musonius Rufus’, and can be seen firsthand in the attitude that Epictetus had toward visitors who sought to glean philosophical insight from him. The question is then posed, and which the rest of this book seeks to address: Does Epictetus show any concern for those individuals whom he believes will never obtain philosophical awareness?

In chapter 4, it is noted that Stoic thinkers who claim moral progress is contingent upon the provision of philosophical instruction can also state that nonphilosophical (or layperson-like, ἰδιωτικόν) techniques can be of assistance. Whether such remarks should be understood to articulate a broader schema of thought regarding the possibility that people might gain moral awareness through nonscholastic routes is then explored. In addressing this question, our efforts are primarily centered upon the Stoic philosophers Posidonius’ and Seneca’s portrayal of primitive humanity, wherein they state that our distant ancestors exhibited uniform moral excellence which required no theoretical or epistemic underpinnings (i.e., they were proto-virtuous nonphilosophers). These Stoics posit that early humanity’s remarkable conformity to virtue was due to the absence of vicious and corrupting ideas, and the lack of material comfort which could monopolize our ancestors’ attention. Once vice began its slow installation over humanity’s affections, however, Seneca and Posidonius depict a second age where wise, although likely still not philosophically aware, leaders moderated the advance of misapprehension in society by offering guidance to people.

In turning to contemporary society, it is argued that the features the Stoics believed prompted primitive humans to live according to virtuous principles are not thought by them to have concluded. Indeed, the adoption of atavistic traits and the observing of legislation that certain wise ancients laid down is held by the Stoics to remain impacting nonphilosophically aware people in contemporary society. In this regard, the correlation between primitive circumstances and the manifestation of preferred indifferent actions in the lives of nonphilosophers is strongly seen in the remarks of Musonius Rufus and Epictetus.

Chapter 5 is prefaced with a discussion of Stoic epistemology, and then brings Epictetus’ position regarding preconceptions into focus. In this regard it is noted that several times in his discussions he reflects that people who lack philosophical awareness nevertheless hold that principles such as justice, honor, familial fidelity, and so on are self-evidently good and should hold normative force across society. He further observes that humans have an instinctive sense of shame (αἰδώς), which is often able to compel people to behave correctly without any period of contemplation or self-reflection having to be undertaken. These phenomena are understood by Epictetus within the context of the Stoic doctrine of preconceptions (προλήψεις), which posits that humans have an innate, although largely unrefined, understanding of virtuous principles. His confidence in the furnishing of preconceptions in humanity is also suggested to be observed by his frequent employment of the dialectical/elenctic method: a type of discourse that seeks to induct people through a series of questions that will throw the contradictions that exist between their moral preconceptions and daily praxis into sharp relief. A conversation that Epictetus has with an affiliate of Epicurean philosophy is proposed to have particular salience for understanding his confidence in the efficacy of preconceptions. In their exchange, when Epictetus reflects that his dialogue partner exhibits familial devotion and care, he remarks that with (as he understands it) Epicureanism mandating a range of antisocial commitments from its adherents, his dialogue partner’s instinctive sense of family obligations has evidently proved strong enough to incubate him from some of the more damaging influences of Epicurean philosophy.

The limitations that Epictetus holds preconceptions have is then ­considered—in particular his stance that while concord is easily established between people regarding the importance of concepts such as “justice” or “honor,” the implementation of these ideals into legislation or normative customs is evidently frequently fallible and contradictory. It is concluded that in Epictetus’ view preconceptions only provide people with a high abstraction of what the good is and that the moral insights they offer should be systematized and elucidated in an intellectually coherent framework, that is, the philosophy of the Stoa. It is argued that although Stoics believe that in the absence of philosophical guidance the ability of preconceptions to help humans structure their lives according to virtue is significantly constrained, they are confident that they maintain a role in mediating error in society and in steering individuals toward performing suitable or appropriate actions.

In chapter 6, it is noted that apprehending Epictetus’ attitude toward civic legislation can be challenging. The topic is not made a matter of explicit deliberation in either the Discourses or the Enchiridion, and it has rarely been the object of sustained scholarly inquiry. In addition, Epictetus’ remarks about the law can appear to voice conflicting sentiments. On the one hand, he can deride the value of various pieces of legislation and openly question the integrity of the officials who are charged with enforcing them. Furthermore, he openly avers that his students should focus their concentration on how to live upon the parameters that have been established by philosophical insight, and not to those that have been borne from legal deliberation.

On the other hand, it is seen that Epictetus considers obedience to the law to be a duty that every citizen should assume and to only neglect if a particular piece of legislation is in conflict with their philosophical principles. More significantly, he praises Spartan polity for having been instituted by an ancient wise leader, Lycurgus, and for its expressing ideals that are commensurate with philosophical teachings which he believes successfully engrained themselves into the Spartan people’s character. Additionally, while referring to contemporary Roman law, a pronouncement of marriage by the legislator is claimed by Epictetus to laudably restrain men’s attempts to acquire another person’s wife, and in another passage the connection that exists between civic law and the correct understanding of ownership, material possessions, and marital relationships that are found in its citizenry is observed by him. Furthermore, regarding his friend Agrippinus Paconius’ tenure as a governor, Epictetus reflects that he was able to exercise his judicial duties so that he became like a moral physician (ἰατρός), protector (ἐπιμελητής), and guardian (κηδεμών) to the people who were arraigned before him, and that he succeeded in instigating the moral reform of their lives. It is evident, therefore, that it is not just the state’s legal doctrines that Epictetus views as having the potential to affect beneficial change in people, but, depending upon the official, also the act of dispensing justice itself. The conclusion reached is that although Epictetus believes civic law is frequently flawed or confused in its logic, he holds that it can have a useful role in highlighting and delimiting what is, and what is not, correct behavior and in influencing individuals to act according to virtuous precepts. It is, therefore, a means whereby he believes that the differences between philosophers and laypeople can be lessened.

The chapter then extends to note that it is often believed that the Stoics held a rather derisory attitude toward the rendering of the divine that was commonly advanced in the myths and rituals of popular Greco-Roman religion. Although Epictetus’ opinion of religion has been rarely scrutinized by his modern interpreters at length, several of his remarks on the topic have been highlighted as giving voice to this perspective. This chapter, however, argues that the contours of his thoughts regarding popular religion are more complex than has so far been appreciated by scholars and that it is in need of greater delineation.

Firstly, when isolating statements from Epictetus on religion that are critical in tenor, it should be noted that he ridicules the view that idols have qualities beyond those that are usually inherent to inert matter; he scolds his pupils for their intention to visit Olympia to see Pheidias’ famed statue of Zeus when they have still to perfect the divine traits that are within them. Secondly, regarding Epictetus’ more accommodating stance toward religion, after cataloguing such remarks, it is observed that he does not usually appeal to traditional religious sentiments in order to negate their worth or to redact them, but as a springboard from which he can launch an explication of Stoic philosophy. It is further highlighted that Epictetus attributes civic religion with having a role in educating and orienting individuals to accept correct patterns of thought, which he significantly holds parallels the intended results of philosophical tuition. In particular, his conviction that the mystery cults were established by wise ancients to provide education and amendment for their participants is noted and used to inform our discussion on the Stoics’ perspective regarding primitivism and the potential didactic function of religion. Thereafter Epictetus’ reflection that through mere habit Christians are steeled with a disdain for their physical security even to the point of facing death at the hands of the emperor’s soldiers, which is a stance that he argues his students should be able to hold through reason, is then commented upon. Finally, Epictetus’ conception of divination is probed, and his understanding that the mantic has been used to prompt self-reflection and philosophical inquiry among laypeople is documented. As with civic law, popular religion is, therefore, found to be another mechanism through which Epictetus believes that the differences between philosophers and laypeople can be reduced.

In chapter 7, after providing context regarding the prevalent use of exempla in classical literature, speeches, and pedagogy, the lack of studies that plot Epictetus’ (as opposed to Seneca’s) employment of exempla is observed, and is a gap in our knowledge that this study proposes to begin to redress. First, it is documented that Epictetus’ elucidation of moral principles from the lives of philosophers chiefly pivots around the figures of Socrates (whom Epictetus presents as being the moral exempla par excellence) and Diogenes the Cynic. Aside from these individuals, his general lack of interest in highlighting philosophers, including luminaries from his own school, as having exhibited moments of commendable moral worth is argued to be striking, especially given his privileging of noting actions from some of the most deprived and uneducated groups in society, such as slaves, gladiators, and laborers. In one notable instance, it is observed that Epictetus draws a direct equivalence between the mindset that slaves and menial laborers can assume and those of Socrates, Diogenes, Cleanthes, and what he terms “the legitimate philosophers” (οἱ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῦντες). He then further assesses that both groups (the laypeople and the philosophers) can show the proper exercise of their faculty of choice/will (προαιρέσει)—a key concept in his philosophy. Thereafter the actions of certain city-states; individuals such as Menoeceus of Thebes; an anonymous athlete; and figures from literature and mythology, such as Sarpedon, Odysseus, and Heracles, are seen to be praised by Epictetus and commended as being worthy of his students’ emulation and as revealing his belief in commendable lay actions and disposition. Epictetus’ conviction that the examples of people, particularly government officials, can help prompt moral advancement across society is then observed. In addition, his advice that philosophers should attempt to leverage the didactic ability of exempla and aim to first disclose their principles to laypeople through their praxis, instead of explicating philosophical doctrines to them, is documented. In the conclusion to the chapter, Epictetus’ extensive use of exempla is argued to firstly highlight his belief that laypeople can act and think in morally beneficial ways, and to secondly disclose his position that an individual can be influenced by exempla irrespective of whether they have the ability to correctly parse or comprehend philosophical teachings or not.

Sources

Regarding sources, the chief ones for the reconstruction of Epictetus’ views are the records that Arrian has left us—namely, the surviving Discourses and the Enchiridion. Occasionally, other classical authors, such as Aulus Gellius, who make references to Epictetus’ views will though be cited. As I noted at the beginning, it is beyond the scope of this book to provide a comprehensive study of the Stoic school and its representatives’ perception(s) of laypeople. Other Stoics’ thought apart from Epictetus’ as well as texts that are accepted to relay information about the school’s position will be occasionally referenced to reveal that there are indications that Epictetus’ stance is not particular to him, but instead might be reflective of a typical Stoic viewpoint. Where they can add particular clarity to a topic, or to help elucidate the broader architecture of Stoic thought, other Stoics philosopher’s opinions will be occasionally discussed at length within the main body of the text, and this is especially so in chapter 4.

Key Terms

Finally, it should also be noted that despite the central place that the word “layperson” holds in this study’s discussion and the attention that will be directed to understand the word choice of relevant primary sources, this book is not a philological study on the Greek word that is often translated as layperson—ἰδιώτης. The presence of laypeople in Epictetus’ discussions (and other relevant classical sources) will instead be considered conceptually, that is, wherever the context implies that a person of little/no philosophical awareness is in view. The primary reason for this conceptual approach is that ἰδιώτης was not the exclusive, or indeed dominant, way in which a classical author could signify a person’s lack of philosophical training or knowledge. As it will be observed in chapter 1, other words that have no direct semantic connections to ἰδιώτης could also be used in ancient literature to relay a similar meaning, for example απαίδευτος (uneducated/cultured), αγράμματοι (the uneducated), οἱ πολλοὶ and τὸ πλῆθος (the many/the multitude), ὁ λαός (the people), and so on. In addition, people who lacked philosophical instruction could often be described in a way that meant using a particular appellation to designate them as such would be superfluous. The precise nature of how laypeople are to be defined and their presence be discerned in ancient texts will be considered in the following chapter.

The decision to select the word “layperson” in this study to describe nonphilosophers should also be explained. The English word “layperson” (or “layman”) has two primary meanings, both of which relate to a person’s lack of technical knowledge or instruction. The first meaning is a nonordained member of a religious, usually mainstream Christian, movement, and, secondly, someone who lacks professional or specialized knowledge of a particular subject. As I will explore in more depth in the next chapter, the Greek word ἰδιώτης also holds dual, although more broader, meanings; firstly, the word is being used to designate a private rather than a political individual, and, secondly, to describe a person who is relatively unskilled or inexperienced in one or more range of activities, skills, or fields of knowledge, for example baking, warfare, oratory, and so on, and also used in a general way to refer to an uneducated or unrefined person.¹⁶ The overlap between the English and Greek terms might allow us to select either word to refer to nonphilosophers in this book. On balance, however, I suggest that the use of the English word “layperson” is preferential.¹⁷ The narrower semantic range of “layperson,” which is usually employed in English to describe a person’s lack of formal knowledge or training in a technical subject, in comparison with ἰδιώτης, which can be applied in more broader contexts, makes the former the more apt one for us to select given that this book’s topic revolves around people’s grasp of philosophical knowledge. Moreover, given my conceptual approach to identifying and discussing nonphilosophically trained individuals, and not focusing solely upon where the word ἰδιώτης is used, selecting ἰδιώτης to refer to nonphilosophers throughout the book risks unintentionally implying to its readers that ἰδιώτης is being used in a particular text when it is not. The use of the English word “layperson,” however, permits us to discuss individuals who are inexperienced in the technical understanding of philosophy and to highlight the wording in the primary texts without the abovementioned misunderstanding arising.

NOTES

1. Long (2002, 11).

2. Diss. I.26.11-12. On Epictetus’ reflections on the imperial court, see the valuable study by Miller (2002).

3. Diss. I.9.29. Epictetus’ lameness, alluded to at Diss. I.17.20 has been interpreted by some, including Origen, Cels. 7.53, 7.54, as being the result of physical harm that was inflicted upon him by Ephaproditus. For a fuller discussion on this story, see Long (2004, 10).

4. Diss. I.9.29. Hollowchak (2008), and the sources that are assembled in Inwood and Gerson (2008).

5. Diss. III.23.29.

6. Diss. III.1.12; 7.1.

7. Historia Augusta, Hadrian, 16.

8. For an extended discussion on Arrian’s records of Epictetus’ teachings, see Long (2002, 39–43). The Discourses though, as Cooper (2007, 10–11) importantly notes, do not record “the formal course of instruction in Epictetus’ school. [Rather] they were, with only a few exceptions, ancillary and informal admonishments or protreptics, or bits of practical advice, addressed to his pupils and delivered, it would seem, in the afternoons or evenings, after the main work of the day was already completed. . . . it appears, the main part of the curriculum consisted in the systematic reading out loud of classic ‘old’ Stoic texts . . . together with Epictetus’ oral commentary and interpretation of them—Diss. II.14.1, 21.10, III.21.6-7, 23.10-11 at 16.” See also Mason (2007a, 2).

9. On the likely purpose and provenance of the Enchiridion, see Long (2002, 260), and the important recent study by Boter (2017).

10. For example, see his reference to Epictetus at Med. 1.7.

11. See Ahlholm (2017, 60–63).

12. Contra Cels. 6.2.

13. See MacMillan (1979), and on the reception of Epictetus see Long (2002, 259–274).

14. Hock (1992).

15. Boter (2010, 330–331).

16. Regarding the nonspecific meaning of ἰδιώτης, consider also the remarks at Galen at In Hipp. Nat. Hom comment 3.1. For a useful overview of the definition that ἰδιώτης has within various contexts, the discussion in Pitts (2016, 62–64) is of use.

17. The English word “layperson” largely seems to derive its definition from the Latin idiotes, which means (Stock 1983, 28, 29): “someone who was ignorant of a science, a doctrine, or an area of study, and as a corollary one unperfected in a practical discipline.”