Читать книгу Napoléon Bonaparte - Fahed Aslan Agha Al Barazi - Страница 9
ОглавлениеCHAPTER 29
THE DRUMS OF WAR
Relations between Tzar Alexander and Napoléon in 1810 were becoming more exacerbated with every passing day. Napoléon enlarged the Duchy of Warsaw by annexing the Galician provinces ceded from Austria in October 1809; the Tzar, already apprehensive about the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw, had demanded a guarantee from Napoléon that an independent kingdom of Poland would not be revived. An agreement signed to this effect by French ambassador Caulaincourt in January 1810 was rescinded by Napoléon. The subsequent modifications that the French Emperor proposed were rejected by the Tzar. To exacerbate matters further between the two emperors, Prince Poniatowski, Napoléon’s ardent Polish ally, warned the Emperor that Tzar Alexander was planning a surprise attack against the French garrisons beyond the Elbe, encouraged by their reverses in Spain. Napoléon’s secret agents had further informed him that Alexander had discussed with his Polish ally Prince Adam Czartoryski the rallying of the Poles to the Russian side. “Only if Russia guarantees an autonomous and free Poland, would they then consider defecting to the Tzar’s side,” answered Czartoryski, a thought not cherished by Alexander.
Another setback to the Russian Tzar was Sweden’s Riksdag’s approval of Bernadotte’s nomination to the Swedish throne, advocated by the pro-French Party as heir to Charles XIII.
In December 1810, Tzar Alexander, exhorted by his anglophile advisers, imposed high tariffs on French imports and, flouting the Continental System, he opened Russian Ports to neutral shipping; a portent for Napoléon that his vacillating ally of yore was now bent on re-joining the emperor’s enemy, England.
At St. Cloud, after his return from his honeymoon in Holland, Napoléon had issued four decrees in July, August and October 1810, tightening the noose further on the Continental System. Heavy import duties were imposed on all colonial produce, including coffee, tea, sugar, cocoa and tobacco. Any such products discovered in Europe were to be sequestered and destroyed. As a result, smugglers of contraband products throve, but when caught were severely punished. The Continental System and its disastrous aftermath rebounded not only on England but the whole European Continent. Even the governing body of the Council of State was complaining. and Napoléon’s speech in April 1810, meant to alleviate their foreboding, was met with deaf ears.
Calumnies, machinations and the language of war were rife amongst the Russians. The two salient abettors, each for his own reasons, were Alexander and Napoléon. To the Comte de Narbonne, the Minister of War in 1792 who had now rallied to the empire, Napoléon confided in early 1812: “Alexander the Great was as far from Moscow as when he marched to the Ganges. I have always said this to myself, ever since the siege of Acre.”
Napoléon’s allusion did not pass unnoticed. Narbonne, a Grand Seigneur of the old nobility, later commented on this conversation. “What ideas! What dreams! What a man! Where is the keeper of this genius? It was half-way between Bedlam and Pantheon.”
With Napoléon’s annexation in Dec. 1810 of the Duchy of Oldenburg, Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg, Tzar Alexander retaliated in Dec. 1810 against the French by slapping high import duties on all French goods and re-opening Russian Ports to English trade. Napoléon considered the Tzar’s actions tentamount to a covert declaration of war.
On June 1811, the French ambassador to Russia, Caulaincourt, was recalled to Paris. He warned Napoléon of the difficulties of the Russian terrains and the endless steppe, that the Russian plan was to lure him into their hinterland and exhaust his forces; logistics under such extended lines of communications would become exceedingly difficult if not impossible. Charles XIII of Sweden had suffered a tragic end, courageous as he was; his temerity had brought him a disasterous end.
“Bah! A battle will shatter the feeble Alexander and his fortifications of sand.”
Caulaincourt had correctly warned his master, to no avail.
In May 1811 Alexander had written Frederick William King of Prussia, saying “I intend to do what Wellington had done in Spain; exhaust the French armies by avoiding pitched battles, organize long lines of communications for retreat leading to entrenched camps.” All the while Alexander was dissimulating to the French Ambassador Caulaincourt, protesting his loyalty to Napoléon, while in reality he was preparing for war. Napoléon, for his part, was not to be flummoxed by Alexander’s words. On February 28, 1811, he wrote: “Your Majesty’s Ukase of Dec. 31 was specifically directed against France. Therefore in the view of England and Europe our alliance no longer exists.” As for Poland, Napoléon warned “it was French territory. I therefore insist that no one interfere in what I do beyond the Elbe.” When Napoléon received disquieting reports that recent Russian fortifications have been raised along the River Dvina, he wrote, “I am amazed by this evidence and Your Majesty coming to an arrangement with England. This I consider tantamount to stoking the fire of war between our Empires.”
While Alexander continued to protest to Caulaincourt his friendship to Napoléon, he was, in fact, preparing for war. His approaches to Prussia and Austria for an alliance proved fruitless; the two monarchs were not prepared to risk Napoléon’s wrath while his armies were fully prepared to wreak havoc on their kingdoms and strip them of additional territory. In April 1812, the Tzar told Czartoryski, “A rupture with France seems unavoidable. Napoléon wants to destroy the last standing power in Europe. He wants to deprive us of the only trade left to us with neutrals.”
When it is in the interest of France, Napoléon disregards his own prohibitions; he exempts urgently needed raw materials and grants licenses for import including dyes from England to satisfy the luxurious taste of Parisians. To circumvent the rife contraband business enjoyed by smugglers, and turn the profit to the French Coffers, Napoléon imposes a 50 percent duty on all illicit products seized by his agents on the French occupied territories.
The English retaliate by countermeasure, demanding from all neutral countries exorbitant dues for permission to call on blockade ports. The French counter by issuing decrees stipulating that all neutral vessels calling at the ports of London or Malta run the risk of capture as trophy of war.
The onerous financial consequences of the Continental System had afflicted the entire continent, in particular, England and France. The Iberian war had further drained the finances of France, with 250,000 Frenchmen tied up in a seemingly endless war of attrition; Napoléon, in 1811, still could not come to terms with the idea of withdrawing his troops and cut his losses.
Looming on the horizon, a distant threat, was Bernadotte; Napoléon distrusted ‘this Jacobin’, as he called him. During the French military presence in Swedish Pomerania, Bernadotte had made friends amongst the Swedish circles. His ascension to the Swedish throne came by fluke; when Napoléon forced the anglophile Swedish King to abdicate, replacing him with his uncle, an ardent supporter of Napoléon. The childless, old king, to please the Emperor, appointed Bernadotte, Joseph’s brother-in-law, as his successor; a poor choice for Napoléon, which he approved, when asked if he had any objections to nominating his subaltern for the Swedish throne. Bernadotte, always jealous of the emperor and humiliated at Wagram when the emperor had sent him off the field in disgrace, would bide his time to take his revenge; in 1813, he took the field at Leipzig against his master of yore.
Not before long, the emperor would be betrayed by Marshal Murat, King of Naples, and Augereau, as events will show in 1813; but now in 1811-1812, he still believed in his lucky star and the confidence of passing his good fortune to his son and heir. When a great reception was held after the birth of his son, among the elite guests was the Austrian Ambassador Prince Schwarzenberg, who was instrumental in promoting the marriage. The Emperor moved with gratitude, went to Princess Schwarzenberg, took a Scarab pin from his coat and presented it to her, saying: “I found this scarab in the tomb of an Egyptian King and have ever since worn it as a talisman. Please accept it, I no longer need such an amulet.”
Napoléon’s relationship with the Pope had deteriorated; Pius VII was removed to Savona, and kept there a virtual prisoner, deprived from his advisers and his papers. When the recalcitrant Pope threatened not to recognize the divorce, Napoléon retaliated by summoning a council of prelates from the empire. Threatened by an extorted decree from the prelates of depriving the Pope of the investiture in case of refusal to concede to the divorce, the Pope relented and agreed to the divorce. The Pope ultimately excommunicated the Emperor; this act had hardly left an impression on Napoléon’s ground accomplishments, for he had brought Catholicism back to France; the Concordat was a milestone accomplishment, the code de Napoléon had been surprisingly accepted by the inhabitants of the Papal Sates, and his vigorous road construction, drainage of the pontine marshes and embellishment of Rome’s parks added to his rising prestige amongst the Italian Populace.
When visiting the newly annexed Holland, in another jibe at the Pope, he reproached the welcoming Bishops in the presence of the Dutch Protestant clergy: “Are you of Gregory’s religion? Well I am not! Mine is the religion of Christ who said: “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s.” I am ordained by God. What proof have you that Jesus had appointed the Pope his Viceregent and that the Pope has the right to excommunicate an Emperor!?” The bewildered clergy kept their peace.
More pressing for the Emperor were his vigorous projects in embellishing Paris and making it the cynosure of European capitals. He ordered the construction of an east-west route across the capital and instructed his favourite architects, Fantaine and Percier, to construct the long, straight, arcaded Rue de Rivoli. On the far side of the Place Vendome, he constructed another straight street, the Place de la Paix, linking with the Rue de Castiglione. These new streets were a striking difference from the network of winding alleys.
In 1806, to honour the Grande Armée, he ordered the building of a temple modelled on the Parthenon. Inside, names of every soldier who had fought in Austeria and Germany would be engraved on marble plaques. For this, he chose the site north of the Place de La Concorde. The building would take about seven years to complete. For this, he commissioned the architect Vignan.
His bee-like activities were not limited to his campaigns; he embarked on building projects one after the other, each having its own purpose and message. Most of all, Napoléon’s own ideas through architecture were to leave an everlasting impression on the French and the World. In the Louvre, he added a new wing to join the Tuileries; for that purpose, he commissioned Fontaine and Percier and added a fountain in one of the courtyards. On inspecting it, he noticed a group of naiads spouting water from their breasts. He ordered; “Remove those nodrizas. The naiads were virgins.”
Napoléon takes credit for commissioning the Bourse building in Paris, the building of the Arc de Triomphe de l’Etoile, a monument dedicated to the Grande Armée, went beyond the neo-classic style; “A monument dedicated to the Grande Armée must be majestic, large and not influenced by antiquity”. Another less imposing arch stands at the entrance of the Tuileries (since then the entrance has changed); this graceful Arch is supported by four red marble columns on each side. Bronze horses were placed on the top of the Arch; during Napoléon’s absence in Spain, Denon, the painter that Napoléon commissioned during his Egyptian campaign to draw Egyptian antiquities, added a chariot and a statue of Napoléon. When Napoléon returned, he had the statue removed commenting: “The arch is designed to glorify the army that I have the honour to command; remove my statue.”
When Champagny, the Foreign Minister, planned to change the name of the Place de La Concorde to the Place Napoléon, Napoléon rejected the idea: “The Concorde Name Must remain. It is what makes France invincible.”
The imposing Arc de Triomphe, situated at the crossing of two major country lanes to the north-west of Paris, has inscribed on it the names of battles Napoléon fought triumphantly; Marengo, Arcola, Austerliz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, Borodino, Abu Qir and others. To commemorate scenes of his battles, he commissioned Gros, whom Josephine had introduced to Napoléon in Milan on his first Italian campaign. Gros’ works depicted army drills, movements of columns under fire, charge of Cavalry, artillery thundering and blazing awaybrought the battle scene on Canvas. On the other hand, David had eternalised Napoléon, depicting him charging on his black stallion and crossing the Arcola Bridge.
Napoléon’s deeds and achievements, beside his genius on the battle-field and military campaigns, is a reflection on what constitute his personality and character. He prided himself on being a member of the Science Institute, he often discussed mathematical formulas and solutions with his ‘peers at the Institute’, the only group he really felt comfortable with. He was instrumental in the writing and introducing the Civil Code or Code de Napoléon; he presided over 90 percent of the drafting of the Civil Code. The vestiges of his embellishment not just of Paris but throughout the realm of the Empire, from Italy, to Germany, Holland and every country allied or a vassal state, are still present; Napoléon’s marks are indelible. For example, when the Dutch had the tradition to use son/father names as the family name, he forced them to use proper names to indicate ‘the family’. Quite a few were at a loss, so they chose either funny names or worse, names that they regret to this day, for it got stuck with them and some, even today, are trying to change it to something more appropriate.
Music, opera, theatres, all facets of arts that concerned the people of his Empire were influenced by him in one way or the other. Napoléon loved music; amongst his favourites were Puccini and Giovanni Paisiello. Italian Opera was his favourite; he often sang out of tune but endeavoured to attend as many opera performances as time would allow while in Paris. He was a true patron of arts and music; when he found out that a renounced musician was in despair, he would rescue him and provide him with decent means to carry on with his life. A case in point was the musician Le Sueur; when Napoléon found him in a state of exigency, he provided him with the necessary means for a decent life.
During the Empire, Opera had its hey-day due to Napoléon’s personal patronage and the special care that he personally afforded it. His vigorous schedule of work never prevented him to attend to every detail that concerned his regime or his personal life. So, while his thoughts were pre-occupied with the affairs of state and, more recently, in 1810, with his premonitions about the emboldened Russian hostile daring stance, his labour never ceased to impart its accomplishments on France and the Empire.
In 1810, to curtail written subversive literature, Napoléon had ordered the censorship of books that incite against the state. In 1811, Dec., he reversed his decision and confined the censorship to strictly libellous material, allowing a more liberal policy for book publishing, yet at the same time safeguarding against incitement.
1811–1812
The events in 1811–1812 were racing ahead for a confrontation with Russia. “Victory can only be secured when I am at the head of the army”. These very words, uttered by the Emperor, were ironically repeated by Alexander. Caulincourt, when summoned by Tzar Alexander, quoted and relayed to Napoléon the Tzar’s dialogue: “I shall benefit from his own teachings, for he is the master of the art of war. Miracles only happen when the Emperor is present, and he cannot be present everywhere.” These words greatly moved the Emperor; however, his mind was set on bringing Russia to her knees.
“The Tzar has violated our alliance; he has thrown Russia open to Colonial goods, he allows British ships in Russian harbours, he raised import duties on French products; it is Alexander who is instigating war, not I. He is whimsical and weak. In one major battle I will shatter his armies.”
Nevertheless, Napoléon’s words were backed by immense preparations. He remembered well the difficulties of an invasion of Russia, and nor did he forget the difficulties he encountered during the battle of Eylau in 1807. By July 1811, he had already embarked on immense preparations, the Grande Armée, comprising half a million men, set to march on Russia by May 1812.
Meanwhile the French reverses in Spain and Marshal Massena’s failure to evict Wellington from Portugal, and his subsequent retreat, had thrown new doubts on the Emperor’s plan of invasion. He turned to his cashiered Minister of Police, Fouché, whom he had dismissed the year before, and like Talleyrand, the Emperor found in him a man who could provide him with advice about even the most private matters.
He summoned Fouché and told him, “Since my marriage, people seem to think that the lion is asleep. With my Grande Armée, I shall envelope all Europe. Did you not once say to me ‘Let your genius have its way, because it does not know the word impossible?’ I cannot help it if this great force within me drives me to be the master of the world. Those who criticise me today, and you, one of them, have you not all been accomplices? I have not yet fulfilled my destiny, and I endeavour to finish what I began. We need a European Legal Code, a European Court of Appeal, unified coinage, a common system of weights and measures. The same law must run throughout Europe. I shall fuse all the nations into one … this, Lord Duke, is the only solution that pleases me.” This was Napoléon’s grandiose plan for a United States of Europe; and although Fouché harboured no loyalty for his Emperor, he records the Emperor’s words verbatim in his memoir.
This is the man whom the Emperor had dismissed and yet kept close at hand and appointed senator. “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer,” was Napoléon’s remark. What the visionary genius had envisioned for Europe, driven through the force of arms, emulating a predecessor a millennium before, has become a reality based on reasons of economics and security, not coercion, intimidation and annexation. Yet, during his time, the Emperor saw an old Europe, fragmented and disorderly; what he saw and envisaged was alien to the other rulers. One hundred and sixty years later, the man of genius was to be proven right.
Meanwhile, the obsequious Talleyrand continued to periodically inform the Russians of the Emperor’s preparations for war. For this he was generously rewarded with import licenses for English goods in Russian harbours, which he would turn and sell for hard cash to eager merchants.
The economic blockade that had afflicted Europe had been taking its toll on French finances as wellas the rest of Europe; his remedy for the situation “lies in defeating Russia and bringing her in line with his doctrine.” When he summoned the chambers of commerce, he uttered the following plausible words: “The blockade has harmed England more than any other state; by the terms of the treaty of Tilsit, France has received in excess of a milliard Francs in indemnities, England and Russia are in a tottering financial state and Austria is on the verge of bankruptcy. Only France has money.”
While the Emperor marshalled his preparations for war against Russia, there were attempts to abort his plans. In Prussia, the renowned General Scharnhorst, who engendered and modernised the Prussian Military, advised Frederick William that it was now the time to strike by seeking an alliance with Russia. But Frederick William, who had suffered a crushing defeat at Jena by the French, considered the Emperor invincible. Besides, Prussia was surrounded by the Emperor’s troops swarming in Silesia and Poland; he was therefore cowed into alliance with the Emperor. The Austrians had made up their mind, and Emperor Francis joined in alliance with his son-in-law. In fact, an alliance between the two Emperors was celebrated in 1810, after giving his daughter’s hand Mary Louise to the French Emperor. Three years later this alliance would be broken when in 1813, on the advice of Metternich, he joined the sixth coalition.
From the Federation of the Rhine and the valley of the Main, thousands of Germans had rallied to Napoléon’s colors in Spain. Now, the Emperor’s brother, young Jérôme, king of Westphalia, headed a thirty thousand man army of Westphalians to the Oder. Saxons marched to the Vistula; Bavarious and Wurttembergers moved east to join the Emperor; Poles commanded by Prince Poniatowski: sixty thousand men joined the Emperor’s Grande Armée. At the outset of 1812, it seemed that all Europe, from Rome to Warsaw to Tilsit, had rallied to Napoléon’s standard. Yet the Emperor was beset with doubts, for he knew only too well from earlier campaigns the difficulties resulting from logistics and supply lines extending over hundreds of miles. Now his troops, cavalry, artillery train, and medical corps would have to march much further and longer; from Paris to Warsaw about fifteen hundred miles, Warsaw to Moscow around twelve hundred miles. In Italy and Germany, his army lived off the conquered land. His movements in these countries were facilitated by well-constructed roads; in Russia, the roads either did not exist, or, if they did, they could hardly be adequate for the advance of 600 thousand men, the largest army Europe had ever seentill then.
More disquieting news was to await him; to his chagrin, in Gumbinnen he found out that very few mills were available for the huge amounts of grain he had collected in Germany. Throughout 1811 and part of 1812, he had been preparing for his great campaign; arsenals of weapons and ammunition, silos in the Baltic storing the amassed wheat and rice, countless ammunition, Silos in the Baltic storing the amassed wheat and rice, countless pieces of ordnance, pontoon bridges, building material, oxen drawn wagons and others carrying the medical corps. With this colossal army, the Emperor prepared to enter Russian territory. He delays his attack until June 1812, hoping that by then the grass would be green, and enough fodder would be available for the horses and beasts of burden.
“A Russian campaign is quite unlike the Austrian campaign; without supply and siege-trains, the enterprise will be in vain,” he wrote Eugene in Dec. 1811.
Of the six hundred thousand men, including the allied and vassal states that were now massing in Poland, three hundred were French, including the fifty-thousand-strong Imperial Guard commanded by Marshal Bessiéres. Except for the Imperial Guard, many of the young inexperienced recruits were to suffer the hardships of the Russian terrain and the long marches of the seemingly endless Russian Steppe. This fact became more apparent to the Emperor when in Danzig he was dining with Murat, Bessiéres and Rapp.
“How far is it from Danzig to Cadiz?” he asks Rapp.
Boldly, Rapp answers, “Too far, sire!”
Napoléon rejoins: “Gentlemen, it is clear that you have no taste left for fighting. Murat who had asked earlier for furlough would rather be back in his pretty kingdom; Rapp would prefer enjoying the pleasure of Parisian life; Berthier would rather be with his mistress Madame Giuseppina Visconti.”
Napoléon’s words were not altogether untrue; years of war had dulled the spirit of these fighting men, and now they’d rather enjoy their recompense in a more gratifying and tranquil life.
In April 1812, Bernadotte had swung Sweden to the Russian sire; he never liked the Emperor when he was his master, resentful of Napoléon’s rebuff when informed that “the Emperor does not communicate with an heir” when Bernadotte was the heir to the Swedish throne, and when he was sent off the field in disgrace at Wagram. Furthermore, the Continental System had taken its toll on the Swedish people, and was further aggravated by the French occupation of Swedish Pomerania in January 1812. These were enough reasons for the vexed Bernadotte to bring Sweden over to the Russian side.
When informed of Bernadotte’s rancorous shift, Napoléon remarked to Berthier, “I should have had him shot! I never trusted this turncoat.” Certainly, Sweden could not put in the field more than forty thousand troops at best; militarily this left no detrimental impact on the military situation.
Of major importance to Napoléon was his elite force, the Imperial Guards. In the 1812 campaign, Marshal Bessiéres, whose Mortier was in command of the striking arm of the Imperial Guard, the cavalry, was given its command. In Spain Bessiéres distinguished himself by heading the cavalry at Somosierra and pursuing the retreating Sir John Moore toward La Coruña. At Aspern-Essling, during the 1809 campaign, he headed the reserve cavalry with special distinction; he continued his valorous command of the Guard at Wagram. And now in 1812, Napoléon re-asserted his command of the Imperial Guard’s cavalry. In August 1810, Napoléon gave Bessiéres detailed instructions to re-organise the Imperial Guard into a cohesive, self-sustaining force. A reserve force of a hundred battalions was to be added to the Guard, bringing its strength up to ninety thousand men, equipped with an ordnance corps utilising the full range of artillery. The presence of the Imperial Guards on the battlefield was of such importance that it invariably either delivered the final crushing blow to the enemy, or at least restored the stability and confidence of the other branches of the army in a precarious situation.
On June 6, 1812, the Emperor ordered his Ambassador in St. Petersburg to collect his passport and return to Paris, and for the Russian Ambassador to leave France. Then, on June 22, he issued the following proclamation to the Grande Armée:
“This will be a glorious campaign for the French armies against Russia. We shall terminate the fifty-year Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe; and then conclude a peace treaty that will guarantee these terms.”
On June 24, 1812, from Kovno, the Emperor watched the leading regiments of the Grande Armée Cross the River Niemen. This colossal army of six hundred thousand men was marching across three pontoon bridges over the river. Not since the days of antiquity, when Darius the Great led an army of three hundred thousand men against Alexander the Great at Gogemala (now Iraq), had the world witnessed such a colossal army. For eight days they marched on across the pontoon bridges. For once, the disparity in numbers with the Russians was against the French. 150,000 horses for cavalry and other duties; where could they find enough fodder? Many would die from eating the thatched roofs of the hamlets they passed. The heterogeneous army was not a cohesive force as in earlier campaigns; it comprised of motley units of Poles (60,000 men) with their cavalry, Bavarians, Saxons, Dutch, Italians, Danes, and North Germans, with the French making up one third of the total force.
The Imperial Guard was the Elite striking force of the army. They were bedecked with elaborate uniforms, white breaches and bearskins, making the 160 cm tall Grenadier look taller and more intimidating (160cm was the minimum height). The Imperial Guard Cavalry, commanded by Marshal Bessiéres, formed the Ariete of the spearhead of the army when called upon to save a precarious situation; otherwise it was kept in reserve to deal with critical moments in the ensuing battle.
The Russian campaign, or the ‘Second Polish War’, as Napoléon called it, was intended to bring Russia to her knees, and most, including Napoléon, believed this enterprise would succeed. Unfolding events would prove otherwise.
On his campaigns, Napoléon travelled in his specially prepared coach. For the Russian campaign, he rode in a carriage drawn by six horses accompanied by his Chief of Staff Marshal Berthier. Every day he would review dispatches received from his Minister of Post in Paris. Maps and books for reading material were stacked inside the carriage and when books were read, they would be thrown out, strewn on the road behind.
On the Russian side, despite earlier proclamations that Alexander was conducting defensive war against the Aggressor, in fact in April 1812 after he made an alliance with Charles XIII of Sweden, with the aid of Bernadotte’s calumnies, of course, he was bold enough to issue an ultimatum to the French:
“Napoléon must evacuate his troops from Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for the eventual settlement of the new frontiers of Europe.”
The Emperor’s answer was a six-hundred-thousand-man army marching on Russia!
Napoléon estimated that the enemy had at most a quarter of a million men at arms, comprised of two armies commanded by Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. His scouts informed him that they were somewhere in Lithuania and their total force was close to one hundred and sixty thousand men. So why this superiority in numbers that would turn into a cumbersome heterogeneous multitude with so many men and animals to feed, while in earlier campaigns with much smaller forces with adequate provisions and logistics, he was able to divide the enemy and shatter his wings? A plausible answer to this lays in his words to Caulaincourt after he received General Balachov at Vilna (now Vilnius) in a last attempt to ward off war: “I have decided once and for all to finish the colossus of the barbarian north.”
From Tilist, Napoléon marched with his army on Vilna, Lithuania, to take up position and separate the Russian forces, while he awaited his second and third armies. His objective at Vilna, 90 km inside Russian territory, was to engage and destroy Barclay’s army. But Barclay had by then abandoned Vilna, on orders from the Tzar to avoid engagement and draw the enemy further into the Russian hinterland.
Within a few days of crossing the Niemen, as his colossal army moved into enemy territory, discipline and mobility began to break down. By the time he reached Vilna, more than ten thousand horses had died; many units of his polyglot army had deserted; pillaging was rife and many fell sick as they advanced in the heat of July into the vast Russian Steppe, and wastage was on unprecedented scale, not experienced even in major battles he had fought before. Only the Imperial Guard maintained discipline.
At Vilna, the Russian rear-guard fought valiantly, allowing Barclay’s main army to head towards Vitebsk. While the Russians were retreating, Tzar Alexander, who was at Vilna before Napoléon’s arrival, had left and was now directing operations from the army’s headquarters at the entrenched camp at Drissa (now Vierchniadzvinsk). Finally, realizing the approaching danger, the Tzar withdrew in the direction of St. Petersburg, leaving the command to his generals.
During his sojourn in Vilna, Napoléon was informed that provisions were delayed due to break down in the commissariat, and wagons carrying urgently needed supplies were bogged down in the river, forcing the troops to recourse to pillage, which Napoléon had never allowed before, but had to keep a blind eye until this temporary breakdown in logistics can be mended.
At his headquarters at Vilna, a captured Russian General is brought for interrogation. The Emperor in a stentorian voice says:
“Tell the Tzar that I have half a million men who have already crossed the Vistula. This would all have been unnecessary had the Tzar not broken our alliance.” Then the Emperor mischievously asks the General “Which is the shortest road to Moscow?”
The General wittily retorts, “Charles XII took the road to Pultava with a decimated force of twenty thousand men and no more than twelve guns. Charles XII attacked Peter the Great’s Army outnumbered four to one with 160 guns. Charles suffered a shattering defeat and took shelter with the remnant of his forces in Ottoman territory.”
While Barclay slipped away from Vilna, and marched towards Vitebsk, Bagration was retreating in the direction of a trap laid for him by Marshal Davout – But King Jérôme, commanding the VIII Westphalian corps, was dilatory in affecting a junction with Davout, allowing Bagration to slip away towards Orsha. The Emperor laid the blame on his brother Jérôme, because he was still at Grodno on July 3rd instead of engaging Bagration’s rear guard further south, affecting a junction with Davout and enveloping Bagration’s army. A question rises here: why did Marshal Davout not attack General Bagration’s army? Davout had over-exaggerated the size of Bagration’s army and was concerned about showing caution over temerity. But Napoléon’s wrath fell on his younger brother’s head, for being too slow in affecting a timely junction with Davout. The Emperor wrote Jérôme and told him, “From now on you take orders from Marshal Davout.”
Jérôme furiously confronted Davout as to why he had not engaged the enemy to prevent his escape, allowing the extra day or so for his arrival and combining their forces; the veteran Marshal simply dismissed the argument as “naïve”. Jérôme may have been partially correct, for had Davout engaged Bagration, he could have prevented him or at least delayed him from escaping towards Orsha. On July 14, an angry Jérôme resigned his command of the Westphalian VIII corps handed it over to Davout and retired himself to the comforts of his kingdom of Westphalia.
While Davout was in hot pursuit of Bagration’s army, Napoléon, at the head of the main army, was preparing to attack and destroy Barclay’s first army, who had taken up a defensive position at Drissa.
Under Napoléon’s immediate command was half the Grande Armée, close to quarter of a million men. Marshals Davout, Oudinot, Ney, Mortier, Bessiéres, Lefebvre and Murat were under Napoléon’s direct command, each of them at the head of his corps, Davout at the head of three infantry corps in addition to Westphalian VII corps that had been added to his command after Jérôme had resigned his. Ney commanded the III corps, Murat was at the head of the cavalry corps, Oudinot II corps. The self-contained Imperial Guard was commanded by three Marshals; Bessiere at the head of the Cavalry, Mortier the Young Guard, and the veteran Lefebvre heading the elite Old Guard. This was Napoléon’s main striking force, supported by two additional auxiliary armies, one under Macdonald X corps and one Von Schwarzenberg, Austrians, protecting the Emperor’s left flank and the main army’s right wing respectively. The other army corps, under his son-in-law Eugene de Beauharnais, comprised of some 70,000 Italians and Bavarians and Jérôme VIII corps Westphalians who joined Davout after Jérôme had resigned his command. Prince Poniatowski commanded the polish V corps, General Reginier the Saxon VII corps and Saint-Cyr the Bavarian VI corps. Napoléon’s reserve force was commanded by Marshals Victor and Augereau, Victor on the head of IX corps while Augereau led the XI corps.
Confident that both Barclay and Bagration would be finally trapped, Napoléon issued the order of the day to the army and advanced in pursuit of Barclay’s army, hoping to engage him at his defensive position at Vitebsk on the Danube. On July 28 when Napoléon entered Vitebsk, to his chagrin, he found out that Barclay had eluded him and withdrawn his army the night before, heading eastward and ultimately joining Bagration’s second army. Napoléon had hoped to catch up with Barclay’s army at Polotsk but was surprised to find out the enemy had withdrawn to Vitebsk; as he marched to Vitebsk in hot pursuit of Barclay’s army, his flank was under threat by General Tormassov’s third army, positioned near Brest-Litovsk and Wittgenstein’s army, now taking up position at Polotsk.
This precarious situation was averted by Napoléon’s back up force of his second army. In a two-pronged attack, Prince Schwarzenberg, at the head of his Austrian corps, supported by Reynier VII, blocked Tormassov’s advance, inflicting losses on the Russians and driving him back, while Saint-Cyr’s Bavarian VI corps and Oudinot’s II corps attacked and defeated General Wittgenstein at Polotsk, eliminating the immediate threat to the French left flank. As a result, General Saint-Cyr was awarded a Marshal’s baton in acknowledgement of his bravery. This was the first time Napoléon had awarded a Marshal’s Baton to one of his generals on the battlefield. As for Marshal Oudinot, he was lucky not to have been killed in action; he was wounded and had to be taken off the battlefield for medical attention.
The Tzar was right; “Napoléon cannot be everywhere”! His lines of communications stretched hundreds of miles, his Grande Armée reduced dramatically through the staggering loss of men and material; desertion was rife amongst the allied forces. By mid-August, more than one third of Napoléon’s 1st army had deserted, the endless march in the open Russian steppe had taken its toll on men, horses, pack animals and material. With a reduced force under his personal command, the first army had become slightly larger than the combined first and second armies of Barclay and Bagration, of some 140,000 men. But when Tormassov’s army was joined with the first and second Russian armies, the numerical balance in men and panoply would tip in favour of the Russian forces, which probably stood at about 200,000 men with some 820 guns, against the French under Napoléon’s immediate command, of 190,000 men and 800 guns.
Napoléon had to make a decision as to where he must strike first to bring a quick end to this seemingly endless campaign. For the more he advanced in the endless Russian space, the more endless it seemed. Marshal Berthier, Napoléon’s chief of staff, advised after initial reluctance to continue the campaign, that Napoléon’s army must strike at Russia’s heart, the capital, Moscow. But Moscow was some five hundred kilometres northeast of Vitebsk, and Kiev about 550 kilometres southeast of Vitebsk. St. Petersburg was yet a third possible strategic objective to attack, given the reports that the Tzar had taken up position in that northwestern Baltic city.
Napoléon summoned a council of war at Vitebsk that included Marshals Berthier, Murat and Prince Eugene. They implored him to halt the campaign in view of the huge losses and the shortage of supplies. Initially he agreed and announced that the campaign of 1812 was over, but two days later, he changed his mind and continued to advance to Smolensk reaching the city on August 17. He had hoped to envelope Barclay’s army and destroys it in a decisive battle. Instead he found out that the Russians had withdrawn, leaving the sacked city in flames. Napoléon ordered Marshals Murat and Ney to pursue the fleeing Russians. They caught up with Barclay’s rear-guard at Valutino on August 19, but the heroic rear-guard action against the French and the subsequent heavy losses prevented the French from halting the Russian withdrawal.
At Smolensk, Napoléon’s decision to march on Moscow was final. The capital was now only 350 kilometres away; to halt the campaign at this late stage and turn back would mean a humiliating defeat. “The eyes of Europe and the world are on us,” he told Berthier.
On August 25, the remnants of the Grande Armée advanced on Moscow; many units had to be left behind to guard the lines of communications that extended as far as Dresden. By the time the French army reached Borodino, the number of troops and cavalry had been diminished to some 14,000, with some 600 pieces of artillery.
Under pressure from nobility and clamouring of public opinion, Alexander made two major decisions on August 20. First, he replaced the lack-lustre Barclay with the renowned Marshal Kutuzov as Commander-in-Chief; then he ordered the army to halt its withdrawal and take up positions near a village south of Borodino.
At Borodino the myth of the colossal Grande Armée had evaporated; what remained, due to desertion, garrisons left behind to protect the supply lines, sickness and renegade marauders, was a force equal or even fewer in numbers than that of the Russians, which stood at about 140,000 men and cavalry, and 600 pieces of artillery. This remaining force of the Grande Armée was now facing the Russian army commanded by Kutuzov, a shrewd nobleman of sixty-eight, a veteran of prior wars who had lost his right eye in battle and had fought Napoléon at Austerlitz. His opinion of Napoléon’s outstanding military qualities and greatness can be read through his rebuke to one of his adjutants who had made a derisory remark about the Emperor:
“Young man, who gave you the right to jibe at one of the greatest of men? Stop all this unbecoming abuse.”
Kutuzov had preferred a Fabian Policy of withdrawal, evading direct engagement and letting the elements of the on setting Russian winter take its toll on the already reduced and exhausted French army; but under pressure of public opinion and the Tzar immediate circle of generals, he was forced to make a stand and fight a battle for Moscow.
