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PART I

On Apprehension

CHAPTER 1

On the Divisions of Apprehension

Apprehension is also called perception, concept, notion, intention,¹ and idea; the word which signifies it is called a term.

Apprehension is a bare representation of a thing without any opinion (sententia) of the mind, and is either noncomplex, for instance pen, or complex, for instance, pen in the hand.

Judgment is an act of the mind by which it forms an opinion about two ideas. The sign [of a judgment] is a proposition or expression, which is an utterance that affirms or denies something of something; it is also called predication.

Discourse is an act of the mind by which from two or more judgments a third is inferred.

1. Ideas are divided into sensations, imaginations, and pure intellections.²

Sensation is twofold, external and internal. External sensation is “the perception of a corporeal thing impacting the organs of the body.”

Imagination is “the idea of a corporeal thing which is not impacting the body.”

A pure intellection is “any idea which is not reached or grasped by any of the bodily senses.” By intellection we not only discern things which are different from body as well as their modes, but we also attain more accurate ideas of numbers and of shapes which have several parts than those which the senses provide.³

The powers of bodies to excite ideas of “colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold” are called secondary qualities, or qualities which are sensible in the proper sense that we perceive each of them only by a single sense. Things which are perceived by more than one sense, by both sight and touch, for example, such as extension, figure, position, motion and rest, are primary and true qualities of bodies; hence they have the power to excite ideas of secondary qualities to which there is nothing corresponding in the bodies themselves. There are also two ideas which can be perceived both by internal and by external sense, and these are duration and number.

2. Imagination calls up a rather weak idea of a thing that had been formerly perceived by sense. And the mind can form only images whose elements have all been perceived by sense.

3. There is also an internal sense which above all furnishes pure intellections; this is called consciousness (conscientia) or the power of reflection. This sense affects all the actions, passions, and modes of the mind: namely, judgment, discourse, certainty, doubt, joy, sorrow, desires, aversions, love and hatred, virtues, vices. The more precise and abstract ideas of primary qualities are also attributed to pure intellections. But in truth all ideas arise from reflection or from [an] external sense.⁴

CHAPTER 25

1. Ideas are either clear or obscure: a clear idea is one which “vividly affects the mind”; an obscure idea is one which affects the mind faintly.

2. Ideas may be proper [ideas] and truly depict the thing put before it or at least represent the appearance (speciem) which nature commonly intended; or they may be analogical [ideas] and exhibit a kind of general and imperfect impression of a thing, not as it is in itself or as it is represented in the common order of nature, but by a kind of analogy with other, very different things which are known by proper ideas. Those who have the use of sight have a proper idea of sight; a blind man has an analogous idea, but he does still have some kind of useful notion of this faculty.

3. Ideas are either simple or complex; a simple idea is a kind of uniform representation not made up of parts that are different from each other.

A complex idea is one “which is made up of dissimilar parts into which it can also be resolved.”

The idea of being is the simplest [idea]; ideas of secondary qualities are also mostly simple, as well as abstract ideas of certain modes of thinking.

4. In respect of their names, ideas are either distinct or confused. A distinct idea is one “which is easily told apart from others.” A confused idea is one “which is not easily told apart from others from which it is thought to be different.”

But perhaps more correctly the name itself or the term which denotes the idea is said to be distinct “when a known and certain complex of ideas is bound together by a name which cannot be altered without our being aware of it”; it is confused when “that complex is not sufficiently certain, so that something may at some point be added or removed [from it] without our noticing.”

5. In respect of their objects, ideas are either of substances or of modes, or of substances together with their modes. A substance is “a being subsisting in itself.” A mode is “a being which inheres in another [being].”

6. Ideas likewise may be real (or true), or they may be fictitious. Real ideas are “ideas which have corresponding objects,” or [ideas] which arise from natural causes following the order of nature. Fictitious [ideas] are “arbitrary conjunctions of ideas not drawn from true things.”

7. Ideas are either adequate or inadequate. Adequate ideas are those “which represent the whole nature of an object,” or at least all of it that we want to conceive in our minds. Such are the complex or combined ideas of modes which the mind assembles in an arbitrary fashion without referring them to an external model; also ideas of modes of thinking or of states of mind. Our ideas of substances are all inadequate.

CHAPTER 3

Abstraction is “the act of the mind by which it directs itself to one or some of the ideas which are contained in a complex [idea] and ignores the rest.” Abstract ideas are ideas which are denoted by names or symbols that signify several things that are similar to each other but which also have some evident differences.⁶

After the mind has observed a variety of things that give rise to various complex ideas, and has seen that they are alike in certain qualities and unlike in others, it forms a universal idea by abstracting itself from the points in which they differ, while retaining the ideas of the points in which they are alike, and by denoting them with a specific name. This is how the eighth distinction between ideas arises, that some are universal and others singular.

A singular idea is an idea “which is intended to represent one thing alone” and is denoted either by a proper noun, like Alexander the Great, or by a common noun applied to one man, for example, this man or that man.

A universal idea is an idea “which is suitable for representing several things individually” whose sign (which is a common noun) can be predicated distributively of individuals, as man [can be predicated] of Peter, Paul, etc.

Nouns which denote a collection [of things], or one thing which is an aggregate of several things, are not properly predicated of individuals and often denote singular complex ideas. Examples are the city of Rome, Alexander’s army, the human race, the world.

Complex ideas are said to have comprehension, which “is a collection of all the simpler ideas which are combined in the complex,” for example, in animal [are contained the ideas of] body, living, and sentient.

Universal ideas are said to have extension, or quantity, which is “a collection of objects which an idea can represent, or [objects] the word for which is predicable individually.”

From what has been said about abstraction, it will be clear that the greater the extension, the less the comprehension, and vice versa.

CHAPTER 4⁷

A universal idea or predicable word has five species: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident.⁸ They are defined with regard either to ideas or to terms as follows:

With respect to ideas	With respect to terms
1. A genus is a universal idea representing an object as a thing, which extends to other universal ideas.	1. A genus is a [word] predicable of several things which differ in kind (specie) in some respect (in quid) “or as a material part of the essence, as animal of man and brute.”
2. A species is “a universal idea representing a thing, which is subordinate to a more general idea,” or [an idea] which applies only to individual things.	2. A species is “a [word] predicable of several things which are numerically different in some respect (in quid ),” or as the total essence, as man [is predicable] of Peter and Paul.
The highest genus is [the genus] “which does not have a more general genus above it,” for example, being. A subaltern is one “which can be a species with respect to a more general [genus].”
The lowest species is [the species] “which covers individuals alone”; a subaltern species can be a genus.
3. A differentia is “a universal idea which represents a thing modified by an essential primary attribute,” i.e., [an idea] which divides a genus into species, and combines with a genus to constitute a species.	3. A differentia is “a [word] predicable of several things that differ in species or number, in respect of some quality (in Quale Quid )” or as a formal part of the essence; for when it is added to a genus it completes the essence of a species and its definition.
4. A property is the “universal idea of a thing modified by an essential secondary attribute,” that is, [an attribute] which is contained in the idea of the thing not formally but as a consequence; for instance, being subject to law is a property of man.	4. A property is “a [word] predicable of several things in respect of a quality necessarily” (in Quale necessario), that is, [an attribute] which belongs to this species, and only this species, and the whole of this species, at all times, or as bound up with its essence.
5. An accident is “the universal idea of a thing modified by a true/true mode,” that is, [a mode] which may be either present or absent.	5. An accident is “a [word] predicable of several things in respect of a quality contingently” (in Quale contingenter).

CHAPTER 5

A genus is said to be a logical whole or universal with respect to its species which are logical parts in the division of it. On the other hand a species is said to be a metaphysical whole, with respect to its genus and its differentia, which are metaphysical parts of its essence, but is said to be a physical whole with respect to its integrating parts. For example, (1) animal is the logical whole with respect to man and the brutes; (2) man is the metaphysical whole, or formal [whole], with respect to that which is animal and rational; (3) man is the physical or integral whole with respect to body and soul. The human body is also the integral whole with respect to head, chest, abdomen, limbs, etc., which are the integrating parts.⁹

N.B. Abstract, absolute, or denominating names of true modes, as well as abstract ideas themselves, may be either genera or species when they represent objects as things, without any distinct or direct idea of the subject, for instance, justice, virtue, and their opposites; true substances regarded as appendices of other things, and their concrete and connotative names, may be differentiae, properties, or accidents, for example, golden, silvery, clothed, shod.

CHAPTER 6

A logical whole, or the extension of an idea, is expressed by a division, which is “the enumeration of the several things contained in the extension of a common idea or name.” These are its rules:

1. “The parts should be so distinct that no single one contains within its own [extension] the extension or part of the extension of another [part].”

2. “The division should be made into the species immediately below.”

3. “The parts should exhaust the thing divided”; or the division should be adequate.

CHAPTER 7

A metaphysical whole, or the comprehension of a complex idea, is expressed by a definition, which is “a statement which explicates the simpler ideas that are combined in a complex [idea].” There are other definitions which are improper, for instance, nominal [definition], which explicates a word, as coelum (“sky”), which is from [Greek] koilon (“hollow”). There is also accidental definition, which explicates modes, causes [and] effects. For example, man is an animal which is featherless, biped, erect, etc.; this constitutes a description. [And] there is physical definition, which explicates natural parts; for instance, man is an animal consisting of an organic body and a soul endowed with reason.

The rules [of definition] are:

1. “Definitions should be short.”

2. “They should be clear.”

3. “They should be adequate,” so that they may be reciprocating, i.e., so that the definition and the thing defined may be mutually predicated of each other distributively.

4. “Avoid metaphors.”

5. “They should consist of the nearest genus and the proper differentia.”¹⁰

Categories or predicaments are “a series of ideas or terms arranged by degrees (gradatim) under the same highest genus.” Different authorities give different categories. For Aristotle there are ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, position, and state.¹¹ He means that every predication or affirmation may be reduced to one of these. If we explain one, the rest will be understood.

These are the substances:12

Hence also that of which something is affirmed or denied in any category should be called a subject.

CHAPTER 8

A term is “a name which signifies an idea or a thing, and which can be the subject or predicate of a proposition”; hence it is called a predicable (categorema).

Other components of terms are jointly predicable (syncategoremata), such as all, no. Some are mixed, such as always, i.e., in all time; no one, i.e., no man; [he] runs, [he] is running.13

An intention of signifying, or the understanding (acceptio) of a word, is called a suppositio. When it stands for an idea or a thing, it is called a formal suppositio; when it stands for the uttered word itself, it is called a material suppositio.

An example of the former is saying, Man is an animal; an example of the latter is, Man is a monosyllable. In a formal suppositio, the name is sometimes of the first intention, or of personal supposition, that is, in a normal act of understanding (acceptio): as in the phrase, Man is an animal. Otherwise it is of the second intention, or of simple suppositio for the idea or the term, that is, when a term of art (aliquid artificiale) is used of the same thing, for example, Man is a species.¹⁴

The divisions of terms into universal and singular, abstract and concrete, are evident from the divisions of ideas.

A transcendent term is one which belongs to every real thing, such as being, thing, one, something. A supertranscendent term is one which also belongs to fictions, such as imaginable, possible. All other terms are non-transcendental.

Every term where “not” is absent is finite; where the particle “not” is present, it is infinite, as in not-man, not-learned. “Not” is said to be infinitans. Finite and infinite [terms] together comprehend every being disjunctively: every being is either learned or not-learned, and so on; they exaust the whole range of being.

A univocal term is “predicable of several things individually according to the same idea,” as animal [is predicable] of man and of beast.

An equivocal term is “predicable of several things individually according to different ideas,” like Gallus. “Where there is some underlying reason for it or affinity of meaning,” a term is said to be analogous or deliberately equivocal, as [when] healthy [is predicated] of animal and of food, or Alexander of a man and of a picture. When there is no reason, it is said to be equivocal by chance, like Gallus or (in English) canon.15

CHAPTER 9

Compatible terms may be predicated of one and the same thing at the same time, like strong and pious; they are often disparate.

Conflicting or opposed terms [are those] which “cannot be predicated of each other, nor of the same thing, in the same respect, and at the same time.” This opposition of terms is noncomplex; the opposition of propositions, on the other hand, is said to be complex.¹⁶

There are four species of noncomplex opposition: contrary, contradictory, relatively opposed, and privatively opposed. Disparates do not conflict ( pugnant), for they are “terms denoting ideas in which there is very little or nothing in common, beyond the vague idea of being or of mode,” as in brave and tall or sweet and white.

Contraries are “true opposed qualities,” such as pain and pleasure.

Contradictories are “a word and its negation,” such as learned and not-learned or man and not-man.

Relatively opposed are relative terms, such as father and son.

Privatively opposed are “a quality and its absence in a subject which has the capacity for it,” as in sighted and blind in the case of an animal.

Negatively opposed are “a quality and its absence in any kind of subject,” as in sighted and nonsighted, which are also contradictories.