More conclusive experiments, in which knowledge of what was to be transferred (usually the idea of a particular card, name, or number) was confined to the members of the investigating committee who acted as agents; with a table of results, and an estimate of probabilities

In many cases reckoned as failures there was a degree of approximate success which was very significant

The form of the impression in the percipient’s mind seems to have been sometimes visual and sometimes auditory

§ 6. Reasons why these experiments were not accessible to a larger number of observers; the chief reason being the gradual decline of the percipient faculty

§ 7. In a course of experiments of the same sort conducted by M. Charles Richet, in France, the would-be percipients were apparently not persons of any special susceptibility; but a sufficient number of trials were made for the excess of the total of successes over the total most probable if chance alone acted to be decidedly striking

The pursuit of this line of inquiry on a large scale in England has produced results which involve a practical certainty that some cause other than chance has acted

§ 8. Experiments in the reproduction of diagrams and rough drawings. In a long series conducted by Mr. Malcolm Guthrie, two percipients and a considerable number of agents were employed

Specimens of the results

§ 9. Professor Oliver J. Lodge’s experiments with Mr. Guthrie’s “subjects,” and his remarks thereon

§ 10. Experiments in the transference of elementary sensations—tastes, smells, and pains

§ 11. A different department of experiment is that where the transference does not take effect in the percipient’s consciousness, but is exhibited in his motor system, either automatically or semi-automatically. Experiments in the inhibition of utterance

§ 12. The most conclusive cases of transference of ideas which, nevertheless, do not affect the percipient’s consciousness are those where the idea is reproduced by the percipient in writing, without his being aware of what he has written. Details of a long series of trials carried out by the Rev. P. H. and Mrs. Newnham

The intelligence which acted on the percipient’s side in these experiments was in a sense an unconscious intelligence—a term which needs careful definition

§ 13. M. Richet has introduced an ingenious method for utilising what he calls “mediumship”—i.e., the liability to exhibit intelligent movements in which consciousness and will take no part—for purposes of telepathic experiment. By this method it has been clearly shown that a word on which the agent concentrates his attention may be unconsciously reproduced by the percipient

And even that a word which has only an unconscious place in the agent’s mind may be similarly transferred

These phenomena seem to involve a certain impulsive quality in the transference

§ 14. Apart from serious and systematic investigation, interesting results are sometimes obtained in a more casual way, of which some specimens are given. It is much to be wished that more persons would make experiments, under conditions which preclude the possibility of unconscious guidance. At present we are greatly in the dark as to the proportion of people in whom the specific faculty exists

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CHAPTER III.

THE TRANSITION FROM EXPERIMENTAL TO SPONTANEOUS TELEPATHY.

§ 1. There is a certain class of cases in which, though they are experiments on the agent’s part, and involve his conscious concentration of mind with a view to the result, the percipient is not consciously or voluntarily a party to the experiment. Such cases may be called transitional. In them the distance between the two persons concerned is often considerable

§ 2. Spurious examples of the sort are often adduced; and especially in connection with mesmerism, results are often attributed to the operator’s will, which are really due to some previous command or suggestion. Still, examples are not lacking of the induction of the hypnotic trance in a “subject” at a distance, by the deliberate exercise of volition

§ 3. Illustrations of the induction or inhibition of definite actions by the agent’s volition, directed towards a person who is unaware of his intent

The relation of the will to telepathic experiments is liable to be misunderstood. The idea, which we encounter in romances, that one person may acquire and exercise at a distance a dangerous dominance over another’s actions, seems quite unsupported by evidence. An extreme example of what may really occur is given

§ 4. Illustrations of the induction of definite ideas by the agent’s volition

§ 5. The transference of an idea, deliberately fixed on by the agent, to an unprepared percipient at a distance, would be hard to establish, since ideas whose origin escapes us are so constantly suggesting themselves spontaneously. Still, telepathic action may possibly extend considerably beyond the well-marked cases on which the proof of it must depend

§ 6. Illustrations of the induction of sensations by the agent’s volition.

§ 7. And especially of sensations of sight

§ 8. The best-attested examples being hallucinations representing the figure of the agent himself

§ 9. Such cases presenta marked departure from the ordinary type of experimental thought-transference, inasmuch as what the percipient perceives (the agent’s form) is not the reproduction of that with which the agent’s mind has been occupied; and this seems to preclude any simple physical conception of the transference, as due to “brain-waves,” sympathetic vibrations, dic. A similar difficulty meets us later in most of the spontaneous cases; and the rapprochement of experimental and spontaneous telepathy must be understood to be limited to their psychical aspect—a limitation which can be easily defended

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CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE EVIDENCE FOR SPONTANEOUS TELEPATHY.

§ 1. When we pass to spontaneous exhibitions of telepathy, the nature of the evidence changes; for the events are described by persons who played their part in them unawares, without any idea that they were matter for scientific observation. The method of inquiry will now have to be the historical method, and will involve difficult questions as to the judgment of human testimony, and a complex estimate of probabilities

§ 2. The most general objection to evidence for phenomena transcending the recognised scope of science is that, in a thickly populated world where mal-observation and exaggeration are easy and common, there is (within certain limits) no marvel for which evidence of a sort may not be obtained. This objection is often enforced by reference to the superstition of witchcraft, which in quite modern times was supported by a large array of contemporary evidence

But when this instance is carefully examined, we find (1) that the direct testimony came exclusively from the uneducated class and (2) that, owing to the ignorance which, in the witch-epoch, was universal as to the psychology of various abnormal and morbid states, the hypothesis of unconscious self-deception on the part of the witnesses was never allowed for

Our present knowledge of hypnotism, hysteria, and hystero-epilepsy, enables us to account for many of the phenomena attributed to demonic possession, as neither fact nor fraud, but as bonâ fide hallucinations

While for the more bizarre and incredible marvels there is absolutely no direct, firsthand, independent testimony

The better-attested cases are just those which, if genuine, might be explained as telepathic; but the evidence for them is not strong enough to support any definite conclusion

§ 3. The evidence for telepathy in the present work presents a complete contrast to that which has supported the belief in magical occurrences. It comes for the most part from educated persons, who were not predisposed to admit the reality of the phenomena; while the phenomena themselves are not strongly associated with any prevalent beliefs or habits of thought, differing in this respect, e.g., from alleged apparitions of the dead. Still we must not, on such grounds as these, assume that the evidence is trustworthy

§ 4. The errors which may affect it are of various sorts. Error of observation may result in a mistake of identity. Thus a stranger in the street may be mistaken for a friend, who turns out to have died at that time, and whose phantasm is therefore asserted to have appeared. But it is only to a very small minority of the cases which follow that such a hypothesis could possibly be applied

Error of inference is not a prominent danger; as what concerns the telepathic evidence is simply what the percipient seemed to himself to see or hear, not what he inferred therefrom

§ 5. Of more importance are errors of narration, due to the tendency to make an account edifying, or graphic, or startling. In first-hand testimony this tendency may be to some extent counterbalanced by the desire to be believed; which has less influence in cases where the narrator is not personally responsible, as, e.g., in the spurious and sensational anecdotes of anonymous newspaper paragraphs, or of dinner-tame gossip

§ 6. Errors of memory are more insidious. If the witness regards the facts in a particular speculative or emotional light, facts will be apt, in memory, to accommodate themselves to this view, and details will get introduced or dropped out in such a manner as to aid the harmonious effect. Even apart from any special bias, the mere effort to make definite what has become dim may fill in the picture with wrong detail; or the tendency to lighten the burden of retention may invest the whole occurrence with a spurious trenchancy and simplicity of form

§ 7. We have to consider how these various sources of error may affect the evidence for a case of spontaneous telepathy. Such a case presents a coincidence of a particular kind, with four main points to look to:—(1) A particular state of the agent, e.g., the crisis of death; (2) a particular experience of the percipient, e.g., the impression of seeing the agent before him in visible form; (3) the date of (1); (4) the date of (2)

§ 8. The risk of mistake as to the state of the agent is seldom appreciable: his death, for instance, if that is what has befallen him, can usually be proved beyond dispute

For the experience of the percipient, on the other hand, we have generally nothing but his own word to depend on. But for what is required, his word is often sufficient. For the evidential point is simply his statement that hø has had an impression or sensation of a peculiar kind, which, if he had it, he knew that he had; and this point is quite independent of his interpretation of his experience, which may easily be erroneous, e.g., if he attributes objective reality to what was really a hallucination

The risk of misrepresentation is smallest if his description of his experience, or a distinct course of action due to his experience, has preceded his knowledge of what has happened to the agent

§ 9. Where his description of his experience dates from a time subsequent to his knowledge of what has happened to the agent, there is a possibility that this knowledge may have made the experience seem more striking and distinctive than it really was. Still, we have not detected definite instances of this sort of inaccuracy. Nor would the fact (often expressly stated by the witness) that the experience did not at the time of its occurrence suggest the agent, by any means destroy—though it would of course weaken—the presumption that it was telepathic

§ 10. As regards the interval of time which may separate the two events or experiences on the agent’s and the percipient’s side respectively, an arbitrary limit of 12 hours has been adopted—the coincidence in most cases being very much closer than this; but no case will be presented as telepathic where the percipient’s experience preceded, by however short a time, some grave event occurring to the agent, if at the time of the percipient’s experience the state of the agent was normal

§ 11. It is in the matter of the dates that the risk of mis-statement is greatest. The instinct towards simplification and dramatic completeness naturally tends to make the coincidence more exact than the facts warrant

§ 12. The date of the event that has befallen the agent is often included in the news of that event; which news, in these days of posts and telegraphs, often follows close enough on the percipient’s experience for the date of that experience to be then safely re-called

§ 13. But if a longer interval elapse, the percipient may assume too readily that his own experience fell on the critical day; and as time goes on, his certainty is likely to increase rather than diminish. Still, if the coincidence was then and there noted, and if the attention of others was called to it, it may be possible to present a tolerably strong case for its reality, even after the lapse of a considerable time

§ 14. These various evidential conditions may be arranged in a graduated scheme

§ 15. Second-hand evidence (except of one special type) is excluded from the body of the work; but the Supplement contains a certain number of second-hand cases, received from persons who were well acquainted with the original witnesses, and who had had the opportunity of becoming thoroughly acquainted with their statement of the facts

In transmitted evidence all the risks of error are greatly intensified, there being no deeply-graven sense of reality to act as a check on exaggeration or invention. Some instances are given of the breakingdown of alleged evidence under critical examination

A frequent sort of inaccuracy in transmitted evidence is the shortening of the chain of transmission—second or third-hand information being represented as first-hand; and the alleged coincidence is almost always suspiciously exact

§ 16. A certain separation of cases according to their evidential value has been attempted, the body of the work being reserved for those where the primâ facie probability that the essential facts are correctly stated is tolerably strong. But even where the facts are correctly reported, their force in the argument for telepathy will differ according to the class to which they belong; purely emotional impressions, for instance, and dreams, are very weak classes

The value of the several items of evidence is also largely affected by the mental qualities and training of the witnesses. Every case must be judged on its own merits, by reference to a variety of points; and those who study the records will have an equal opportunity of forming a judgment with those who have collected them—except in the matter of personal acquaintance with the witnesses, the effect of which it is impossible to communicate

§ 17. An all-important point is the number of the coincidences adduced. A few might be accounted accidental; but it will be inpossible to apply that hypothesis throughout. Nor can the evidence be swept out of court by a mere general appeal to the untrustworthiness of human testimony. If it is to be explained away, it must be met (as we have ourselves endeavoured to meet it) in detail; and this necessitates the confronting of the single cause, telepathy, (whose à priori improbability is fully admitted,) with a multitude of causes, more or less improbable, and in cumulation incredible

§ 18. With all their differences, the cases recorded bear strong signs of belonging to a true natural group; and their harmony, alike in what they do and in what they do not present, is very unlikely to be the accidental result of a multitude of disconnected mistakes. And it is noteworthy that certain sensational and suspicious details, here conspicuous by their absence, which often make their way into remote or badly-evidenced cases, are precisely those which the telepathic hypothesis would not cover

§ 19. But though some may regard the cumulative argument here put forward for spontaneous telepathy as amounting to a proof, the proof is not by any means of an éclatant sort: much of the evidence falls far short of the ideal standard. Still, enough has perhaps been done to justify our undertaking, and to broaden the basis of future inquiry

§ 20. The various items of evidence are, of course, not the links in a chain, but the sticks in a faggot. It is impossible to lay down the precise number of sticks necessary to a perfectly solid faggot; but the present collection is at least an instalment of what is required

§ 21. The instinct as to the amount of evidence needed may differ greatly in a mind which has, and a mind which has not, realised the facts of experimental telepathy (Chap. ii.), and the intimate relation of that branch to the spontaneous branch. Between the two branches, in spite of their difference—a difference as great in appearance as that between lightning and the electrical attraction of rubbed amber for bits of straw—the great psychological fact of a supersensuous influence of mind on mind constitutes a true generic bond

NOTE ON WITCHCRAFT.

The statement made in Chapter iv. as to the lack of first-hand evidence for the phenomena of magic and witchcraft (except so far as they can be completely accounted for by modern psychological knowledge) may seem a sweeping one. But extensive as is the literature of the subject, the actual records are extraordinarily meagre; and the staple prodigies, which were really nothing more than popular legends, are quoted and re-quoted ad nauseam. Examples of the so-called evidence which supported the belief in lycanthropy, and in the nocturnal rides and orgies

The case of witchcraft, so far from proving (as is sometimes represented) that a more or less imposing array of evidence will be forthcoming for any belief that does not distinctly fly in the face of average public opinion, goes, in fact, rather surprisingly far towards proving the contrary

This view of the subject is completely opposed to that of Mr. Lecky, whose treatment seems to suffer from the neglect of two important distinctions. He does not distinguish between evidence—of which, in respect of the more bizarre marvels, there was next to none; and authority—of which there was abundance, from Homer downwards. Nor does he discriminate the wholly incredible allegations (e.g., as to transportations through the air and transformations into animal forms) from the pathological phenomena, which in the eyes of contemporaries were equally supernatural, and for which, as might be expected, the direct evidence was abundant

A most important class of these pathological phenomena were subjective hallucinations of the senses, often due to terror or excitement, and sometimes probably to hypnotic suggestion, but almost invariably attributed to the direct operation of the devil. Other phenomena—of insensibility, inhibition of utterance, abnormal rapport, and the influence of reputed witches on health—were almost certainly hypnotic in character; “possession” is often simply hystero-epilepsy; while much may be accounted for by mere hysteria, or by the same sort of faith as produces the modern “mind-cures”

Learned opinion on the subject of witchcraft went through curious vicissitudes; the recession to a rational standpoint, which in many ways was of course a sceptical movement, being complicated by the fact that many of the phenomena were too genuine to be doubted. Now that the separation is complete, we see that the exploded part of witchcraft never had any real evidential foundation; while the part which had a real evidential foundation has been talen up into orthodox physiological and psychological science. With the former part we might contrast, and with the latter compare, the evidential case for telepathy

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CHAPTER V.

SPECIMENS OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF SPONTANEOUS TELEPATHY.

§ 1. As the study of any large amount of the evidence that follows is a task for which many readers will be disinclined, a selection of typical cases will be presented in this chapter, illustrative of the various classes into which the phenomena fall

§ 2. The logical starting-point is found in the class that presents most analogy to experimental thought-transference—i.e., where the percipient’s impression is not externalised as part of the objective world. An example is given of the transference of pain, and a possible example of the transference of smell: but among the phenomena of spontaneous telepathy, such literal reproductions of the agent’s bodily sensation are very exceptional

§ 3. Examples of the transference of a somewhat abstract idea; of a pictorial image; and of an emotional impression, involving some degree of physical discomfort

§ 4. Examples of dreams,—a class which needs to be treated with the greatest caution, owing to the indefinite scope which it affords for accidental coincidences. One of the examples (No. 23) presents the feature of deferment of percipience—the telepathic impression having apparently failed at first to reach the threshold of attention, and emerging into consciousness some hours after the experience on the agent’s side in which it bad its origin

§ 5. Examples of the “borderland” class—a convenient name by which to describe cases that belong to a condition neither of sleep nor of provably complete waking consciousness; but it is probable that in many of the cases so described (as in No. 26), the percipient, though in bed, was quite normally awake

§ 6. Examples of externalised impressions of sight, occurring in the midst of ordinary waking life. In some of these we find an indication that a close personal rapport between the agent and percipient is not a necessary condition of the telepathic transference; and another is peculiar in that the phantasmal figure is not recognised by the percipient

§ 7. Examples of externalised impressions of hearing; one of which was of a recognised voice, and one of an inarticulate shriek

§ 8. Example of art impression of touch; which is also, perhaps, an example of the reciprocal class, where each of the persons concerned seems to exercise a telepathic influence on the other

§ 9. Example of the collective class, where more percipients than one take part in a single telepathic incident

§ 10. Among the various conditions of telepathic agency, the death-cases form by far the commonest type. Now in these cases it is not rare for the agent to be comatose and unconscious; in other cases, again, he has been in a swoon or a deep sleep; and there is a difficulty in understanding an abnormal exercise of psychical energy at such seasons. The explanation may possibly be found in the idea of a wider consciousness, and a more complete self, which finds in what we call life very imperfect conditions of manifestation, and recognises in death not a cessation but a liberation of energy

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CHAPTER VI.

TRANSFERENCE OF IDEAS AND MENTAL PICTURES.

It often happens, for instance, that one person in a room begins humming a tune which is running in another’s head; but it is only very exceptionally that such a coincidence can be held to imply a psychical transference. Occasionally the idea transferred is closely connected with the auditory image of a word or phrase

§ 2. Examples of the transference of ideas and images of a simple or rudimentary sort

§ 3. Examples of the transference of more complex ideas, representing definite events; and of the occurrence of several such “veridical” impressions to the same percipients

§ 4. Cases where the idea impressed on the percipient has been simply that of the agent’s approach—a type which must be accepted with great caution, as numerous coincidences of the sort are sure to occur by pure accident

§ 5. Transferences of mental images of concrete objects and scenes with which the agent’s attention is occupied at the time

Some of these impressions are so detailed and vivid as to suggest clairvoyance; nor is there any objection to that term, so long as we recognise the difference between such telepathic, clairvoyance, and any supposed independent extension of the percipient’s senses

Occasionally the percipient seems to obtain the true impression, not by passive reception, but by a deliberate effort

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CHAPTER VII.

EMOTIONAL AND MOTOR EFFECTS.

§ 1. Emotional impressions, alleged to have coincided with some calamitous event at a distance, form a very dubious class, as (1) in retrospect, after the calamity is realised, they are apt to assume a strength and definiteness which they did not really possess; and (2) similar impressions may be common in the soi-disant percipient’s experience, and he may have omitted to remark or record the misses the many instances which have not corresponded with any real event. All cases must, of course, be rejected where there has been any appreciable ground for anxiety

§ 2. Examples which may perhaps have been telepathic; some of which include a sense of physical distress

§ 3. Examples of such transferences between twins

§ 4. Examples where the primary element in the impression is a sense of being wanted, and an impulse to movement or action of a sort unlikely to have suggested itself in the ordinary course of things

The telepathic influence in such cases must be interpreted as emotional, not as definitely directing, and still less as abrogating, the percipient’s power of choice: the movements produced may be such as the agent cannot have desired, or even thought of

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CHAPTER VIII.

DREAMS.

PART I. —THE RELATION OF DREAMS TO THE ARGUMENT FOR TELEPATHY.

§ 1. Dreams comprise the whole range of transition from ideal and emotional to sensory affections; and at every step of the transition we find instances which may reasonably be regarded as telepathic

The great interest of the distinctly sensory specimens lies in the fundamental resemblance which they offer, and the transition which they form, to the externalised “phantasms of the living” which impress waking percipients; the difference being that the dream-percepts are recognised, on reflection, as having been hallucinatory, and unrelated to that part of the external world where the percipient’s body is; while the waking phantasmal percepts are apt to be regarded as objective phenomena, which really impressed the eye or the ear from outside

§ 2. But when Ave examine dreams in respect of their evidential value—of the proof which they are capable of affording of a telepathic correspondence with the reality—we find ourselves on doubtful ground. For (1) the details of the reality, when known, will be very apt to be read back into the dream, through the general tendency to make vague things distinct; and (2) the great multitude of dreams may seem to afford almost limitless scope for accidental correspondences of a dream with an actual occurrence resembling the one dreamt of. Any answer to this last objection must depend on statistics which, until lately, there has been no attempt to obtain; and though an answer of a sort can be given, it is not such a one as would justify us in basing a theory of telepathy on the facts of dreams alone

§ 3. Most of the dreams selected for this work were exceptional in intensity; and produced marked distress, or were described, or were in some way acted on, before the news of the correspondent experience was known. In content, too, they were mostly of a distinct and unusual kind; while some of them present a considerable amount of true detail

And more than half of those selected on the above grounds are dreams of death—a fact easy to account for on the hypothesis of telepathy, and difficult to account for on the hypothesis of accident

§ 4. Dreams so definite in content as dreams of death afford an opportunity of ascertaining what their actual frequency is, and so of estimating whether the specimens which have coincided with reality are or are not more numerous than chance would fairly allow. With a view to such an estimate, a specimen group of 5360 persons, taken at random, have been asked as to their personal experiences; and, according to the result, the persons who have had a vividly distressful dream of the death of a relative or acquaintance, within the 12 years 1874-1885, amount to about 1 in 26 of the population. Taking this datum, it is shown that the number of coincidences of the sort in question that, according to the law of chances, ought to have occurred in the 12 years, among a section of the population even larger than that from which we can suppose our telepathic evidence to be drawn, is only 1. Now, (taking account only of cases where nothing had occurred to suggest the dream in a normal way,) we have encountered 24 such coincidences—i.e., a number 24 times as large as would have been expected on the hypothesis that the coincidence is due to chance alone

Certain objections that might be taken to this estimate are to a considerable extent met by the precautions that have been used

§ 5. The same sort of argument may be cautiously applied to cases where the event exhibited in the coincident dream is not, like death, unique, and where, therefore, the basis for an arithmetical estimate is unattainable

But many more specimens of a high evidential rank are needed, before dreams can rank as a strong integral portion of the argument for telepathy. Meanwhile, it is only fair to regard them in connection with the stronger evidence of the waking phenomena; since in respect of many of them an explanation that is admitted in the waking cases cannot reasonably be rejected

PART. II.—EXAMPLES OF DREAMS WHICH MAY BE REASONABLY REGARDED AS TELEPATHIC.

§ 1. Examples of similar and simultaneous dreams

An experience which has coincided with some external fact or condition may be described as a dream, and yet be sufficiently exceptional in character to preclude an application of the theory of chances based on the limitless number of dreams

§ 2. Examples of the reproduction, in the percipient’s dream, of a special thought of the agent’s, who is at the time awake and in a normal state

§ 3. Examples of a similar reproduction where the agent is in a disturbed state

§ 4. Cases where the agent’s personality appears in the dream, but not in a specially pictorial way. Inadmissibility of dreams that occur at times of anxiety, of dreams of trivial accidents to children, and the like

§ 5. Cases where the reality which the eyes of the agent are actually beholding is pictorially represented in the dream. Reasons why the majority of alleged instances must be rejected

The appearance in the dream of the agent’s own figure, which is not presumab y occupying his own thoughts, suggests an independent development, by the percipient, of the impression that he receives

§ 6. The familiar ways in which dreams are shaped make it easy to understand bow a dreamer might supply his own setting and imagery to a “transferred impression.” Examples where the elements thus introduced are few and simple

§ 7. Examples of more complex investiture, and especially of imagery suggestive of death. Importance of the feature of repetition in some of the examples

§ 8. Examples of dreams which may be described as clairvoyant, but which still must be held to imply some sort of telepathic “agency”; since the percipient does not see any scene, but the particular scene with some actor in which he is connected

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CHAPTER IX.

“BORDERLAND” CASES.

§ 1. The transition-states between sleeping and waking—or, more generally, the seasons when a person is in bed, but not asleep—seem to be specially favourable to subjective hallucinations of the senses; of which some are known as illusions hypnagogiques; others are the prolongations of dream-images into waking moments; and some belong to neither of these classes, though experienced in the moments or minutes that precede or follow sleep

§ 2. It is not surprising that the same seasons should be favourable also to the hallucinations which, as connected with conditions external to the percipient, we should describe, not as subjective, but as telepathic

As evidence for telepathy, impressions of this “borderland” type stand on an altogether different footing from dreams; since their incalculably smaller number supplies an incalculably smaller field for the operation of chance

Very great injustice is done to the telepathic argument by confounding such impressions with dreams.; as where Lord Brougham explains away the coincidence of a unique “borderland” experience of his own with the death of the friend whose form he saw, on the ground that the “vast numbers of dreams” give any amount of scope for such “seeming miracles”

§ 3. Examples where the impression was not of a sensory sort

§ 4. Example of an apparently telepathic illusion hypnagogique

§ 5. Auditory examples. Cases where the sound heard was not articulate

Cases where distinct words were heard

§ 6. Visual examples: of which two (Nos. 159 and 160) illustrate the feature of repetition; another (No. 168) that of the appearance of more than one figure; and two others (Nos. 170 and 171) that of misrecognition on the percipient’s part

§ 7. Cases where the sense of touch was combined with that of sight or hearing. One case (No. 178) presents the important feature of marked luminosity

§ 8. Cases affecting the two senses of sight and hearing. One case (No. 189) presents the feature of non-recognition on the percipient’s part

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CHAPTER X.

HALLUCINATIONS: GENERAL SKETCH.

§ 1. Telepathic phantasms of the externalised sort are a species belonging to the larger genus of hallucinations; and the genus requires some preliminary discussion

Hallucinations of the senses are distinguished from other hallucinations by the fact that they do not necessarily imply false belief

They may be defined as percepts which, lack, but which can only by distinct reflection be recognised as lacking, the objective basis which they suggest; a definition which marks them off on the one hand from true perceptions, and on the other hand from remembered images or mental pictures

§ 2. The old method of defining the ideational and the sensory elements in the phenomena was very unsatisfactory. It is easy to show that the delusive appearances are not merely imagined, but are actually seen and heard—the hallucination differing from an ordinary percept only in lacking an objective basis; and this is what is implied in the word psycho-sensorial, when rightly understood

§ 3. The question as to the physiological starting-point of hallucinations—whether they are of central or of peripheral origin—has been warmly debated, often in a very one-sided manner. The construction of them, which is central and the work of the brain, is quite distinct from the excitation or initiation of them, which (though often central also) is often peripheral—i.e., due to some other part of the body that sets the brain to work

§ 4. This excitation may even be due to some objective external cause, some visible point or mark, at or near the place where the imaginary object is seen; and in such cases the imaginary object, which is, so to speak, attached to its point, may follow the course of any optical illusion (e.g., doubling by a prism, reflection by a mirror) to which that point is subjected. But such dependence on an external stimulus does not affect the fact that the actual sensory element of the hallucination, in these as in all other cases, is imposed from within by the brain

§ 5. There, are, however, a large number of hallucinations which are centrally initiated, as well as centrally constructed—the excitation being due neither to an external point, nor to any morbid disturbance in the sense-organs themselves. Such, probably, are many visual cases where the imaginary object is seen in free space, or appears to move independently of the eye, or is seen in darkness. Such, certainly, are many auditory hallucinations; some hallucinations of pain; many hallucinations which conform to the course of some more general delusion; and hallucinations voluntarily originated

§ 6. Such also are hallucinations of a particular internal kind common among mystics, in which the sensory element seems reduced to its lowest terms; and which shade by degrees, on the one side into more externalised forms, and on the other side into a mere feeling of presence, independent of any sensory affection

§ 7. A further argument for the central initiation may be drawn from the fact that repose of the sense-organs seems a condition favourable to hallucinations; and the psychological identity of waking hallucinations and dreams cannot be too strongly insisted on

§ 8. As regards the construction of hallucinations—the cerebral process involved in their having this or that particular form—the question is whether it takes place in the specific sensory centre concerned, or in some higher cortical tract

§ 9. There are reasons for considering that both places of construction are available that the simpler sorts of hallucination, many of which are clearly “after-images,” and which are often also recurrent, may take shape at the sensory centres themselves; but that the more elaborate arid variable sorts must be traced to the higher origin; and that when the higher tracts are first concerned, the production of the hallucination is due to a downward escape of the nervous impulse to the sensory centre concerned

§ 10. The construction of hallucinations in the cortical tracts of the brain, proper to the higher co-ordinations and the more general ideational activities, is perfectly compatible with the view that the specific sensory centres are themselves situated not below, but in, the cortex.

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CHAPTER XI.

TRANSIENT HALLUCINATIONS OF THE SANE: AMBIGUOUS CASES.

§ 1. Transient hallucinations of the sane (a department of mental phenomena hitherto but little studied) comprise two classes: (1) hallucinations of purely subjective origin; and (2) hallucinations of telepathic origin—i.e., “phantasms of the living” which have an objective basis in the exceptional condition of the person whom they recall or represent. Comparing the two classes, we should expect to find a large amount of resemblance, and a certain amount of difference, between them

§ 2. Certain marked resemblances at once present themselves; as that (generally speaking) neither sort of phenomenon is observably connected with any morbid state; and that each sort of phenomenon is rare—occurring to a comparatively small number of persons, and to most of these only once or twice in a lifetime

§ 3. But in pressing the comparison further, we are met by the fact that the dividing line between the two classes is not clear; and it is important to realise certain grounds of ambiguity, which often prevent us from assigning an experience with certainty to this class or that

§ 4. Various groups of hallucinations are passed in review;—“after images”; phantasmal objects which are the result of a special train of thought; phantasms of inanimate objects, and of animals, and non-vocal auditory phantasms; visual representations of fragments of human forms; auditory impressions of meaningless sentences, or of groaning, and the like; and visions of the “swarming” type. Nearly all specimens of these types may safely be referred to the purely subjective class

It is when we come to visual hallucinations representing complete and natural-looking human forms, and auditory hallucinations of distinct and intelligible words, (though here again there is every reason to suppose the majority of the cases to be purely subjective,) that the ambiguous cases are principally to be found; the ground of ambiguity being that either (1) the person represented has been man only slightly unusual state; or (2) a person in a normal state has been represented in hallucination to more than one percipient at different times; or (3) an abnormal state of the person represented has coincided with the representation loosely, but not exactly; or (4) the percipient has been in a condition of anxiety, awe, or expectancy, which might be regarded as the independent cause of his experience

§ 5. The evidence that mere anxiety may produce sensory hallucination is sufficient greatly to weaken, as evidence for telepathy, any case where that condition has been present

§ 6. The same may be said of the form of awe which is connected with the near sense of death; and (except in a few “collective” cases) abnormal experiences which have followed death have been excluded from the telepathic evidence, if the fact of the death was known to the percipient. As to the included cases that have followed death by an appreciable interval, reasons are given for preferring the hypothesis of deferred development to that of post mortem influence—though the latter hypothesis would be quite compatible with the psychical conception of telepathy

§ 7. There is definite evidence to show that mere expectancy may produce hallucination

One type which is probably so explicable being the delusive impression of seeing or hearing a person whose arrival is expected

§ 8. There is, however, a group of arrival-cases where the impending arrival was unknown or unsuspected by the percipient; or where the phantasm has included some special detail of appearance which points to a telepathic origin

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CHAPTER XII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEPATHIC HALLUCINATIONS.

§ 1. There are two very principal ways in which phantasms of telepathic origin often resemble purely subjective hallucinations: (1) gradualness of development; and (2) originality of form or content, showing the activity of the percipient’s own mind in the construction

§ 2. Gradual development is briefly illustrated in the purely subjective class

§ 3. And at greater length in the telepathic class. It may exhibit itself (1) in delayed recognition of the phantasm on the part of the percipient

Or (2) in the way in which the phantasm gathers visible shape

Or (3) in the progress of the hallucination through several distinct stages, sometimes affecting more than one sense

§ 4. Originality of construction is involved to some extent in every sensory hallucination which is more than a mere revival of familiar images; but admits of very various degrees

§ 5. In telepathic hallucinations, the signs of the percipient’s own constructive activity are extremely important. For the difference from the results of experimental thought-transference, which telepathic phantasms exhibit, in representing what is not consciously occupying the agent’s mind—to wit, his own form or voice—ceases to be a difficulty in proportion as the extent of the impression transferred from the agent to the percipient can be conceived to be small, and the percipient’s own contribution to the phantasm can be conceived to be large

It may be a peculiarity of the transferred idea that it impels the receiving mind to react on it, and to embody and project it as a hallucination; but the form and detail of the embodiment admit—as in dream—of many varieties, depending on the percipient’s own idiosyncrasies and associations

§ 6. Thus the percipient may invest the idea of his friend, the agent, with features of dress or appurtenance that his own memory supplies. (One of the examples given, No. 202, illustrates a point common to the purely subjective and to the telepathic class, and about equally rare in either—the appearance of more than one figure)

§ 7. Or the investing imagery may be of a more fanciful kind—sometimes the obvious reflection of the percipient’s habitual beliefs, sometimes the mere bizarrerie of what is literally a “waking dream.” Arany difficulties vanish, when the analogy of dream is boldly insisted on

Examples of phantasmal appearances presenting features which would in reality be impossible

The luminous character of many visual phantasms is specially to be noted, as a feature common to the purely subjective and to the telepathic class

Examples of imagery connected with ideas of death, and of religion

§ 8. Sometimes, however, the phantasm includes details of dress or aspect which could not be supplied by the percipient’s mind. Such particulars may sometimes creep without warrant even into evidence where the central fact of the telepathic coincidence is correctly reported; but where genuinely observed, they must apparently be attributed to a conscious or sub-conscious image of his own appearance (or of some feature of it) in the agent’s mind, to which the percipient obtains access by what may be again described as telepathic clairvoyance. Examples

In cases where the details of the phantasm are such as either mind might conceivably have supplied, it seems simpler to regard them as the contributions of the percipient, than to suppose that a clean-cut and complete image bas been transferred to him from indefinite unconscious or sub-conscious strata of the agent’s mind

§ 9. The development of a phantasm from the nucleus of a transferred impression is a fact strongly confirmatory of the view maintained in the preceding chapters, as to the physiological starting point of many hallucinations. Especially must the hypothesis of centrifugal origin (of a process in the direction from higher to lower centres) commend itself in cases where the experience seems to have implied the quickening of vague associations and distant memories, whose physical record must certainly lie in the highest cerebral tracts

§ 10. Summary of the various points of parallelism between purely subjective and telepathic phantasms, whereby their identity as phenomena for the senses seems conclusively established. But they present also some very important contrasts

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