Читать книгу Ordeal by Battle - Frederick Scott Oliver - Страница 4
ОглавлениеTHE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD
German education a drill system 127 Intellectuals are ranged on the government side 129 Eighteenth-century France and modern Germany 129 Contrast between their bureaucracies 130 Between the attitude of their intellectuals 131 Between their fashions of fancy dress 131 Dangers to civilisation from within and without 132 Political thinkers are usually destructive 133 Unfitness of priesthoods for practical affairs 135 Contrast between priests and lawyers 137 Natural affinity between soldiers and priests 139 Unforeseen consequences of German thoroughness 140 May lead ultimately to ostracism of Germany 140 Types of German agents 141 Treacherous activities in time of peace 142 The German political creed 144 The true aim of this war 146
THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE
Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans 149 They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions 150 German system is not reactionary but the reverse 151 Experts are honoured and trusted 151 German esteem for men of learning 152 And for the military caste 153 And for their Kaiser 155 German contempt for party government 156 And for the character of British official news 157 And for the failure of the British Government to trust the people 160 And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices 161 And for the voluntary system 162 Their pride in the successes of German arms 163 And in the number and spirit of their new levies 163 Which they contrast with British recruiting 164 The methods of which they despise 165 What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government? 166
THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS
Two issues between England and Germany 167 Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence 168 Democracy good and bad 169 Self-criticism may be carried too far 171 The two dangers of democracy—German Arms and German Ideas 173 Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy and our own 173 German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their priesthood 174 Recantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of war 175 The cult of war 176
THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY
A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914)
In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence 181 Against highly organised materialism 183 The opening of the twentieth century 186 Spirit of constitutional change 188 Disappearance of great figures from the scene 189 Change in character of the House of Commons 192 Dearth of leadership 194 Consequent demoralisation of parties 195 And widespread anxiety 196 Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith 197 His Parliamentary supremacy 198 His maxim—wait-and-see 199 Character of his oratory 199 Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics 200 Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national policy 201 Mr. Asquith's limitations 203
THREE GOVERNING IDEAS
Situation at the death of Queen Victoria 207 Comfort and security are not synonymous 208 Two problems absorbed public attention 209 Social and Constitutional Reform 209 A third problem, security, was overlooked 210 Social Reform intrinsically the most important 211 The urgent need of peace 212 Earnestness of public opinion 212 How it was baulked by circumstances 213 Limitations of popular judgment 214 Want of leadership 216 Strangulation of sincerity by party system 218 The artificial opposition of three great ideas 221
POLICY AND ARMAMENTS
The aim of British policy 223 Organised and unorganised defences 223 Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy 225 Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind 226 Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments 228 The sad example of China 229 Policy should conform to national needs 230 Dangers threatening British security (1901–1914) 231 The Committee of Imperial Defence 232 Reasons of its comparative failure 234 Parliament and the people were left uneducated 235 Naval preparations were adequate 236 Military preparations were absurdly inadequate 237 Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as regards the adequacy of our Army 238
THE BALANCE OF POWER
Security required that we should take account of Europe 241 German aim—the suzerainty of Western Europe 243 Maintenance of the Balance of Power 244 This is the unalterable condition of British security 245 This need produced the Triple Entente 247 Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security 249 Meaning of a defensive war 249 Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to British security 250
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911)
The British 'Expeditionary Force' 252 Numbers as a test of adequacy 253 Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war 254 Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers 256 Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers 256 Germany would then endeavour to crush France 257 Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose 257 Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest 258 Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany 259 Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales 260 Our armaments did not correspond with our policy 261 Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' 261 Three periods of war—the onset, the grip, and the drag 263 In 1870 the onset decided the issue 264 By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased 265 Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) 266 Immense value of British sea-power 266 No naval success, however, can win a European war 267 Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security 268
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914)
Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 269 Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within a year 270 Inability of France to counter this effort unaided 270 French increase could not take effect till 1916 271 Russian and Austrian increases 272 No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength 273 Balkan wars (1912–1913) 273 Their effect on Balance of Power 274 Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration 275 Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 275
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS
Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? 277 The German Fleet was a challenge to British security 278 Candour of German publicists 278 British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin 279 Disregarded warnings 279 First Warning 279 (1905–1906) Morocco incident 279 After which British naval programme was reduced 280 Second Warning 281 (1908–1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval programme 281 Imperial Defence Conference 281 Third Warning 282 (1910) German sincerity under suspicion 282 The Constitutional Conference 283 Secret de Polichinelle 283 Failure of British Government to trust the people 284 Fourth Warning 285 (1911) The Agadir incident 285 Mr. Lloyd George's speech 285 Consequences of various kinds 286 Fifth Warning 287 (1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff 287 Menacing nature of German proposals 288 Dangers of amateur diplomacy 289 German love of irregular missions 290 Sixth Warning 294 (1913) German Army Bill and War Loan 294 British Government ignore the danger 295 Neglect military preparations 297 Shrink from speaking plainly to the people 298 Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey 298 Enemies in his own household 299 Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of Admiralty fomented by Germany 299 Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet 300 Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy 301 Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion 302 Danger of breaking the Liberal party 303 Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice 303 War not inevitable had England been prepared 304
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE
THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE
Public opinion puzzled by military problems 309 The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909–1914) 310 Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game 312 'The blood taxes' 313 The nation realised it had not been treated with candour 313 Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace 314 Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commensurate to her population, policy, and resources 316
THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY
The Regular Army 317 Three classes of reserves 318 The Army Reserve 318 The Special Reserve 319 The Territorial Army 320 The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 321 These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple Entente 322 In the onset period untrained and half-trained troops were of no use 322 Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 323 Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 324 Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis 326 Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 326 Size of British striking force necessary as complete were of against a coolly calculated war 327 Reserves required behind this striking force 328 South African War no precedent for a European war 330
LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS
The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 332 Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 332 Attack concentrated on three passages 333 Two of these have been proved true by events 334 The other was misinterpreted by its critics 335 Liberal criticism 336 Unionist criticism 341 Ministerial rebukes 343 No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these attacks 347
LORD KITCHENER'S TASK
All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true 350 Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary system was a success 351 Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War 353 His previous record of success 354 His hold on public confidence 354 His grasp of the simple essentials 355 His determination to support France and make a New Army 355 His remarkable achievements 356 His want of knowledge of British political and industrial conditions 356 His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly 357
CHAPTER V
MATERIAL OF WAR
Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war 358 Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war material 359 The danger of labour troubles 360 Outcry about shortage of supplies 360 Official denials were disbelieved 361
METHODS OF RECRUITING
The first need was men 364 A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it 364 The second need was a system to provide men as required over the period of the war 365 No system was devised 365 The Government shrank from exercising its authority 366 Trusted to indirect pressure 366 And sensational appeals 367 They secured a new army of the highest quality 368 But they demoralised public opinion by their methods 369 Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable 372 It was ready to obey orders 373 No orders came 374 The triumph of the voluntary system 376 From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the triumph is not so clear 377 The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation 379 Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity of National Service 380
PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT
British methods of recruiting in normal times 382 The Conscription of Hunger 382 The cant of the voluntary principle 384 The 'economic' fallacy 385 The fallacy of underrating the moral of conscript armies 387 The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary' 389 'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British People 389 The true description of the British Army is 'Professional' 390 The theory of the British Army 391 That officers should pay for the privilege of serving 391 That the rank and file should contract for a term of years 392 Under pressure of want 392 At pay which is below the market rate 392 This contract is drastically enforced 393 With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion 393 Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists 394 Their crowning inconsistency 395 Other industries put pressure on society 396 Why should not a professional army? 396 The example of Rome 397 A professional army when it first interferes in politics usually does so as a liberator 397 Then military despotism follows speedily 399 A fool's paradise 399
SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS
Bugbears 401 Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts' 402 An army is no defence unless it is available for service abroad 402 The Industrial Epoch (1832–1886) 403 Its grudging attitude towards the Army 403 Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies 406 Democracy cannot subsist without personal service 406 During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service was regarded as the essence of Freedom 408 War was regarded as an anachronism 409 Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from these ideas 410 Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared 411 Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War 411 Effect of more recent events 412 Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal one, or the reverse? 412 Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to hold our Empire without sacrifices 413 The Freiherr von Hexenküchen's views— (1) On our present case of conscience 416 (2) On our voluntary system 416 The American Civil War 417 Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863) 418 His difficulties 418 Results of his firmness 419 Difference in our own case 419 Our need for conscription is much greater 419 It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it 420
THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR
The objects of this book 421 Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its purpose 422 Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe 424 Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities' 424 But the basis of Germany's policy must be understood 425 And what we are fighting for and against 425 The causes of German strength 427 The causes of British weakness 427 Illusions as to the progress of the war 428 The real cause of our going to war 430 Democracy is not by its nature invincible 431 Leadership is our chief need 433 The folly of telling half-truths to the People 435
