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Table of Contents

The World As Will And Idea

Translators' Preface.

Preface To The First Edition.

Preface To The Second Edition.

First Book. The World As Idea.

First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Object Of Experience And Science.

Second Book. The World As Will.

First Aspect. The Objectification Of The Will.

Third Book. The World As Idea.

Second Aspect. The Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.

Fourth Book. The World As Will.

Second Aspect. The Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When Self-Consciousness Has Been Attained.

The World As Will And Idea II

Appendix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy.

Supplements to the First Book. First Half. The Doctrine Of The Idea Of Perception. (To § 1-7 of the First Volume.)

Chapter I. The Standpoint of Idealism.

Chapter II. The Doctrine of Perception or Knowledge Of The Understanding.

Chapter III. On The Senses.

Chapter IV. On Knowledge A Priori. Notes to the Annexed Table.

(1) To No. 4 of Matter.

(2) To No. 18 of Matter.

Second Half. The Doctrine of the Abstract Idea, or Thinking.

Chapter V.16 On The Irrational Intellect.

Chapter VI. On The Doctrine of Abstract or Rational Knowledge.

Chapter VII.19 On The Relation of the Concrete Knowledge of Perception to Abstract Knowledge.

Chapter VIII.20 On The Theory Of The Ludicrous.

Chapter IX.21 On Logic In General.

Chapter X. On The Syllogism.

Chapter XI.22 On Rhetoric.

Chapter XII.23 On The Doctrine Of Science.

Chapter XIII.25 On The Methods Of Mathematics.

Chapter XIV. On The Association Of Ideas.

Chapter XV. On The Essential Imperfections Of The Intellect.

Chapter XVI.26 On The Practical Use Of Reason And On Stoicism.

Chapter XVII.27 On Man's Need Of Metaphysics.

Supplements to the Second Book.

Chapter XVIII.29 On The Possibility Of Knowing The Thing In Itself.

Chapter XIX.30 On The Primacy Of The Will In Self-Consciousness.

Chapter XX.34 Objectification Of The Will In The Animal Organism.

Note On What Has Been Said About Bichat.

The World As Will And Idea III

Supplements To The Second Book.

Chapter XXI. Retrospect and More General View.

Chapter XXII.1 Objective View of the Intellect.

Chapter XXIII.3On The Objectification Of The Will In Unconscious Nature.

Chapter XXIV. On Matter.

Chapter XXV. Transcendent Considerations Concerning The Will As Thing In Itself.

Chapter XXVI.4 On Teleology.

Chapter XXVII. On Instinct And Mechanical Tendency.

Chapter XXVIII.6 Characterisation Of The Will To Live.

Supplements to the Third Book.

Chapter XXIX.9 On The Knowledge Of The Ideas.

Chapter XXX.10 On The Pure Subject Of Knowledge.

Chapter XXXI.11 On Genius.

Chapter XXXII.14 On Madness.

Chapter XXXIII.17 Isolated Remarks On Natural Beauty.

Chapter XXXIV.18 On The Inner Nature Of Art.

Chapter XXXV.19 On The Æsthetics Of Architecture.

Chapter XXXVI.20 Isolated Remarks On The Æsthetics Of The Plastic And Pictorial Arts.

Chapter XXXVII.21 On The Æsthetics Of Poetry.

Chapter XXXVIII.23 On History.

Chapter XXXIX.25 On The Metaphysics Of Music.

Supplements to the Fourth Book.

Chapter XL. Preface.

Chapter XLI.27 On Death And Its Relation To The Indestructibility Of Our True Nature.

Chapter XLII. The Life Of The Species.

Chapter XLIII. On Heredity.

Chapter XLIV. The Metaphysics Of The Love Of The Sexes.

Chapter XLV.40 On The Assertion Of The Will To Live.

Chapter XLVI.41 On The Vanity And Suffering Of Life.

Chapter XLVII.43 On Ethics.

Chapter XLVIII.44On The Doctrine Of The Denial Of The Will To Live.

Chapter XLIX. The Way Of Salvation.

Chapter L. Epiphilosophy.

THE BASIS OF MORALITY

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

GENERAL RETROSPECT.

CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE [1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY OF FREEDOM.

FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN.

THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS.

CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.

SCEPTICAL VIEW.

ANTIMORAL[1] INCENTIVES.

CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.

STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.

THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.

THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON.

HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.

REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.

JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES.

ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER:

TRANSLATED BY MRS. RUDOLF DIRCKS.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION.

ON AUTHORSHIP AND STYLE ON NOISE ON EDUCATION ON READING AND BOOKS THE EMPTINESS OF EXISTENCE ON WOMEN THINKING FOR ONESELF SHORT DIALOGUE ON THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE BEING BY DEATH RELIGION—A DIALOGUE PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS METAPHYSICS OF LOVE PHYSIOGNOMY ON SUICIDE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER.

ON AUTHORSHIP AND STYLE.

ON READING AND BOOKS.

THE EMPTINESS OF EXISTENCE.

THINKING FOR ONESELF.

SHORT DIALOGUE ON

THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE BEING BY DEATH.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.

METAPHYSICS OF LOVE.

THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: THE ART OF CONTROVERSY

T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY— 1. PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC 2. THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC 3. STRATAGEMS ON THE COMPARATIVE PLACE OF INTEREST AND BEAUTY IN WORKS OF ART PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS GENIUS AND VIRTUE

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY.

PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC.

THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC.

ON THE COMPARATIVE PLACE OF INTEREST AND BEAUTY IN WORKS OF ART.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.

ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS.

GENIUS AND VIRTUE.

THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: STUDIES IN PESSIMISM

ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD ON THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE ON SUICIDE IMMORTALITY: A DIALOGUE PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON EDUCATION OF WOMEN ON NOISE A FEW PARABLES

ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD.

THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE.

IMMORTALITY:[1] A DIALOGUE.

THRASYMACHOS—PHILALETHES.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.

A FEW PARABLES.

THE WISDOM OF LIFE. CONTENTS.

CHAPTER INTRODUCTION I. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT II. PERSONALITY, OR WHAT A MAN IS III. PROPERTY, OR WHAT A MAN HAS IV. POSITION, OR A MAN'S PLACE IN THE ESTIMATION OF OTHERS— Sect. 1. Reputation " 2. Pride " 3. Rank " 4. Honor " 5. Fame

THE WISDOM OF LIFE.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

PERSONALITY, OR WHAT A MAN IS.

PROPERTY, OR WHAT A MAN HAS.

POSITION, OR A MAN'S PLACE IN THE ESTIMATION OF OTHERS.

T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.

ON HUMAN NATURE. CONTENTS.

HUMAN NATURE GOVERNMENT FREE-WILL AND FATALISM CHARACTER MORAL INSTINCT ETHICAL REFLECTIONS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.

MORAL INSTINCT.

ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.

THE ART OF LITERATURE. CONTENTS.

PREFACE ON AUTHORSHIP ON STYLE ON THE STUDY OF LATIN ON MEN OF LEARNING ON THINKING FOR ONESELF ON SOME FORMS OF LITERATURE ON CRITICISM ON REPUTATION ON GENIUS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

ON THE STUDY OF LATIN.

ON MEN OF LEARNING.

ON THINKING FOR ONESELF.

COUNSELS AND MAXIMS.

CONTENTS. CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION I. GENERAL RULES II. OUR RELATION TO OURSELVES III. OUR RELATION TO OTHERS IV. WORLDLY FORTUNE V. THE AGES OF LIFE

GENERAL RULES.—SECTION 1.

SECTION 2. To estimate a man's condition in regard to happiness, it is necessary to ask, not what things please him, but what things trouble him; and the more trivial these things are in themselves, the happier the man will be. To be irritated by trifles, a man must be well off; for in misfortunes trifles are unfelt.

SECTION 3. Care should be taken not to build the happiness of life upon a broad foundation—not to require a great many things in order to be happy. For happiness on such a foundation is the most easily undermined; it offers many more opportunities for accidents; and accidents are always happening. The architecture of happiness follows a plan in this respect just the opposite of that adopted in every other case, where the broadest foundation offers the greatest security. Accordingly, to reduce your claims to the lowest possible degree, in comparison with your means,—of whatever kind these may be—is the surest way of avoiding extreme misfortune.

OUR RELATION TO OURSELVES.—SECTION 4.

SECTION 5. Another important element in the wise conduct of life is to preserve a proper proportion between our thought for the present and our thought for the future; in order not to spoil the one by paying over-great attention to the other. Many live too long in the present—frivolous people, I mean; others, too much in the future, ever anxious and full of care. It is seldom that a man holds the right balance between the two extremes. Those who strive and hope and live only in the future, always looking ahead and impatiently anticipating what is coming, as something which will make them happy when they get it, are, in spite of their very clever airs, exactly like those donkeys one sees in Italy, whose pace may be hurried by fixing a stick on their heads with a wisp of hay at the end of it; this is always just in front of them, and they keep on trying to get it. Such people are in a constant state of illusion as to their whole existence; they go on living ad interim, until at last they die.

SECTION 6. Limitations always make for happiness. We are happy in proportion as our range of vision, our sphere of work, our points of contact with the world, are restricted and circumscribed. We are more likely to feel worried and anxious if these limits are wide; for it means that our cares, desires and terrors are increased and intensified. That is why the blind are not so unhappy as we might be inclined to suppose; otherwise there would not be that gentle and almost serene expression of peace in their faces.

SECTION 7. Whether we are in a pleasant or a painful state depends, ultimately, upon the kind of matter that pervades and engrosses our consciousness. In this respect, purely intellectual occupation, for the mind that is capable of it, will, as a rule, do much more in the way of happiness than any form of practical life, with its constant alternations of success and failure, and all the shocks and torments it produces. But it must be confessed that for such occupation a pre-eminent amount of intellectual capacity is necessary. And in this connection it may be noted that, just as a life devoted to outward activity will distract and divert a man from study, and also deprive him of that quiet concentration of mind which is necessary for such work; so, on the other hand, a long course of thought will make him more or less unfit for the noisy pursuits of real life. It is advisable, therefore, to suspend mental work for a while, if circumstances happen which demand any degree of energy in affairs of a practical nature.

SECTION 8. To live a life that shall be entirely prudent and discreet, and to draw from experience all the instruction it contains, it is requisite to be constantly thinking back,—to make a kind of recapitulation of what we have done, of our impressions and sensations, to compare our former with our present judgments—what we set before us and struggle to achieve, with the actual result and satisfaction we have obtained. To do this is to get a repetition of the private lessons of experience,—lessons which are given to every one.

SECTION 9. To be self-sufficient, to be all in all to oneself, to want for nothing, to be able to say omnia mea mecum porto—that is assuredly the chief qualification for happiness. Hence Aristotle's remark, [Greek: hae eudaimonia ton autarchon esti][1]—to be happy means to be self-sufficient—cannot be too often repeated. It is, at bottom, the same thought as is present in the very well-turned sentence from Chamfort:

SECTION 10. Envy is natural to man; and still, it is at once a vice and a source of misery.[1] We should treat it as the enemy of our happiness, and stifle it like an evil thought. This is the advice given by Seneca; as he well puts it, we shall be pleased with what we have, if we avoid the self-torture of comparing our own lot with some other and happier one—nostra nos sine comparatione delectent; nunquam erit felix quem torquebit felicior.[2] And again, quum adspexeris quot te antecedent, cogita quot sequantur[3]—if a great many people appear to be better off than yourself, think how many there are in a worse position. It is a fact that if real calamity comes upon us, the most effective consolation—though it springs from the same source as envy—is just the thought of greater misfortunes than ours; and the next best is the society of those who are in the same luck as we—the partners of our sorrows.

SECTION 11. Give mature and repeated consideration to any plan before you proceed to carry it out; and even after you have thoroughly turned it over in your mind, make some concession to the incompetency of human judgment; for it may always happen that circumstances which cannot be investigated or foreseen, will come in and upset the whole of your calculation. This is a reflection that will always influence the negative side of the balance—a kind of warning to refrain from unnecessary action in matters of importance—quieta non movere. But having once made up your mind and begun your work, you must let it run its course and abide the result—not worry yourself by fresh reflections on what is already accomplished, or by a renewal of your scruples on the score of possible danger: free your mind from the subject altogether, and refuse to go into it again, secure in the thought that you gave it mature attention at the proper time. This is the same advice as is given by an Italian proverb—legala bene e poi lascia la andare—which Goethe has translated thus: See well to your girths, and then ride on boldly.[1]

SECTION 13. In all matters affecting our weal or woe, we should be careful not to let our imagination run away with us, and build no castles in the air. In the first place, they are expensive to build, because we have to pull them down again immediately, and that is a source of grief. We should be still more on our guard against distressing our hearts by depicting possible misfortunes. If these were misfortunes of a purely imaginary kind, or very remote and unlikely, we should at once see, on awaking from our dream, that the whole thing was mere illusion; we should rejoice all the more in a reality better than our dreams, or at most, be warned against misfortunes which, though very remote, were still possible. These, however, are not the sort of playthings in which imagination delights; it is only in idle hours that we build castles in the air, and they are always of a pleasing description. The matter which goes to form gloomy dreams are mischances which to some extent really threaten us, though it be from some distance; imagination makes us look larger and nearer and more terrible than they are in reality. This is a kind of dream which cannot be so readily shaken off on awaking as a pleasant one; for a pleasant dream is soon dispelled by reality, leaving, at most, a feeble hope lying in the lap of possibility. Once we have abandoned ourselves to a fit of the blues, visions are conjured up which do not so easily vanish again; for it is always just possible that the visions may be realized. But we are not always able to estimate the exact degree of possibility: possibility may easily pass into probability; and thus we deliver ourselves up to torture. Therefore we should be careful not to be over-anxious on any matter affecting our weal or our woe, not to carry our anxiety to unreasonable or injudicious limits; but coolly and dispassionately to deliberate upon the matter, as though it were an abstract question which did not touch us in particular. We should give no play to imagination here; for imagination is not judgment—it only conjures up visions, inducing an unprofitable and often very painful mood.

SECTION 14. The sight of things which do not belong to us is very apt to raise the thought: Ah, if that were only mine! making us sensible of our privation. Instead of that we should do better by more frequently putting to ourselves the opposite case: Ah, if that were not mine. What I mean is that we should sometimes try to look upon our possessions in the light in which they would appear if we had lost them; whatever they may be, property, health, friends, a wife or child or someone else we love, our horse or our dog—it is usually only when we have lost them that we begin to find out their value. But if we come to look at things in the way I recommend, we shall be doubly the gainers; we shall at once get more pleasure out of them than we did before, and we shall do everything in our power to prevent the loss of them; for instance, by not risking our property, or angering our friends, or exposing our wives to temptation, or being careless about our children's health, and so on.

SECTION 15. The things which engage our attention—whether they are matters of business or ordinary events—are of such diverse kinds, that, if taken quite separately and in no fixed order or relation, they present a medley of the most glaring contrasts, with nothing in common, except that they one and all affect us in particular. There must be a corresponding abruptness in the thoughts and anxieties which these various matters arouse in us, if our thoughts are to be in keeping with their various subjects. Therefore, in setting about anything, the first step is to withdraw our attention from everything else: this will enable us to attend to each matter at its own time, and to enjoy or put up with it, quite apart from any thought of our remaining interests. Our thoughts must be arranged, as it were, in little drawers, so that we may open one without disturbing any of the others.

SECTION 16. We must set limits to our wishes, curb our desires, moderate our anger, always remembering that an individual can attain only an infinitesimal share in anything that is worth having; and that, on the other hand, everyone must incur many of the ills of life; in a word, we must bear and forbear—abstinere et sustinere; and if we fail to observe this rule, no position of wealth or power will prevent us from feeling wretched. This is what Horace means when he recommends us to study carefully and inquire diligently what will best promote a tranquil life—not to be always agitated by fruitless desires and fears and hopes for things, which, after all, are not worth very much:—

SECTION 17. Life consists in movement, says Aristotle; and he is obviously right. We exist, physically, because our organism is the seat of constant motion; and if we are to exist intellectually, it can only be by means of continual occupation—no matter with what so long as it is some form of practical or mental activity. You may see that this is so by the way in which people who have no work or nothing to think about, immediately begin to beat the devil's tattoo with their knuckles or a stick or anything that comes handy. The truth is, that our nature is essentially restless in its character: we very soon get tired of having nothing to do; it is intolerable boredom. This impulse to activity should be regulated, and some sort of method introduced into it, which of itself will enhance the satisfaction we obtain. Activity!—doing something, if possible creating something, at any rate learning something—how fortunate it is that men cannot exist without that! A man wants to use his strength, to see, if he can, what effect it will produce; and he will get the most complete satisfaction of this desire if he can make or construct something—be it a book or a basket. There is a direct pleasure in seeing work grow under one's hands day by day, until at last it is finished. This is the pleasure attaching to a work of art or a manuscript, or even mere manual labor; and, of course, the higher the work, the greater pleasure it will give.

SECTION 18. A man should avoid being led on by the phantoms of his imagination. This is not the same thing as to submit to the guidance of ideas clearly thought out: and yet these are rules of life which most people pervert. If you examine closely into the circumstances which, in any deliberation, ultimately turn the scale in favor of some particular course, you will generally find that the decision is influenced, not by any clear arrangement of ideas leading to a formal judgment, but by some fanciful picture which seems to stand for one of the alternatives in question.

SECTION 19. The preceding rule may be taken as a special case of the more general maxim, that a man should never let himself be mastered by the impressions of the moment, or indeed by outward appearances at all, which are incomparably more powerful in their effects than the mere play of thought or a train of ideas; not because these momentary impressions are rich in virtue of the data they supply,—it is often just the contrary,—but because they are something palpable to the senses and direct in their working; they forcibly invade our mind, disturbing our repose and shattering our resolutions.

SECTION 20. In the first part of this work I have insisted upon the great value of health as the chief and most important element in happiness. Let me emphasize and confirm what I have there said by giving a few general rules as to its preservation.

OUR RELATION TO OTHERS.—SECTION 21.

SECTION 22. It is astonishing how easily and how quickly similarity, or difference of mind and disposition, makes itself felt between one man and another as soon as they begin to talk: every little trifle shows it. When two people of totally different natures are conversing, almost everything said by the one will, in a greater or less degree, displease the other, and in many cases produce positive annoyance; even though the conversation turn upon the most out-of-the-way subject, or one in which neither of the parties has any real interest. People of similar nature, on the other hand, immediately come to feel a kind of general agreement; and if they are cast very much in the same mould, complete harmony or even unison will flow from their intercourse.

SECTION 23. No man can see over his own height. Let me explain what I mean.

SECTION 24. I feel respect for the man—and he is one in a hundred—who, when he is waiting or sitting unoccupied, refrains from rattling or beating time with anything that happens to be handy,—his stick, or knife and fork, or whatever else it may be. The probability is that he is thinking of something.

SECTION 25. La Rochefoucauld makes the striking remark that it is difficult to feel deep veneration and great affection for one and the same person. If this is so, we shall have to choose whether it is veneration or love that we want from our fellow-men.

SECTION 26. Most men are so thoroughly subjective that nothing really interests them but themselves. They always think of their own case as soon as ever any remark is made, and their whole attention is engrossed and absorbed by the merest chance reference to anything which affects them personally, be it never so remote: with the result that they have no power left for forming an objective view of things, should the conversation take that turn; neither can they admit any validity in arguments which tell against their interest or their vanity. Hence their attention is easily distracted. They are so readily offended, insulted or annoyed, that in discussing any impersonal matter with them, no care is too great to avoid letting your remarks bear the slightest possible reference to the very worthy and sensitive individuals whom you have before you; for anything you may say will perhaps hurt their feelings. People really care about nothing that does not affect them personally. True and striking observations, fine, subtle and witty things are lost upon them: they cannot understand or feel them. But anything that disturbs their petty vanity in the most remote and indirect way, or reflects prejudicially upon their exceedingly precious selves—to that, they are most tenderly sensitive. In this respect they are like the little dog whose toes you are so apt to tread upon inadvertently—you know it by the shrill bark it sets up: or, again, they resemble a sick man covered with sores and boils, with whom the greatest care must be taken to avoid unnecessary handling. And in some people this feeling reaches such a pass that, if they are talking with anyone, and he exhibits, or does not sufficiently conceal, his intelligence and discernment, they look upon it as a downright insult; although for the moment they hide their ill will, and the unsuspecting author of it afterwards ruminates in vain upon their conduct, and racks his brain to discover what he could possibly have done to excite their malice and hatred.

SECTION 27. When any wrong statement is made, whether in public or in society, or in books, and well received—or, at any rate, not refuted—that that is no reason why you should despair or think there the matter will rest. You should comfort yourself with the reflection that the question will be afterwards gradually subjected to examination; light will be thrown upon it; it will be thought over, considered, discussed, and generally in the end the correct view will be reached; so that, after a time—the length of which will depend upon the difficulty of the subject—everyone will come to understand that which a clear head saw at once.

SECTION 28. Men are like children, in that, if you spoil them, they become naughty.

SECTION 29. It is often the case that people of noble character and great mental gifts betray a strange lack of worldly wisdom and a deficiency in the knowledge of men, more especially when they are young; with the result that it is easy to deceive or mislead them; and that, on the other hand, natures of the commoner sort are more ready and successful in making their way in the world.

SECTION 30. No man is so formed that he can be left entirely to himself, to go his own ways; everyone needs to be guided by a preconceived plan, and to follow certain general rules. But if this is carried too far, and a man tries to take on a character which is not natural or innate in him, but it artificially acquired and evolved merely by a process of reasoning, he will very soon discover that Nature cannot be forced, and that if you drive it out, it will return despite your efforts:—

SECTION 31. A man bears the weight of his own body without knowing it, but he soon feels the weight of any other, if he tries to move it; in the same way, a man can see other people's shortcoming's and vices, but he is blind to his own. This arrangement has one advantage: it turns other people into a kind of mirror, in which a man can see clearly everything that is vicious, faulty, ill-bred and loathsome in his own nature; only, it is generally the old story of the dog barking at is own image; it is himself that he sees and not another dog, as he fancies.

SECTION 32. When he is young, a man of noble character fancies that the relations prevailing amongst mankind, and the alliances to which these relations lead, are at bottom and essentially, ideal in their nature; that is to say, that they rest upon similarity of disposition or sentiment, or taste, or intellectual power, and so on.

SECTION 33. As paper-money circulates in the world instead of real coin, so, is the place of true esteem and genuine friendship, you have the outward appearance of it—a mimic show made to look as much like the real thing as possible.

SECTION 34. A man must be still a greenhorn in the ways of the world, if he imagines that he can make himself popular in society by exhibiting intelligence and discernment. With the immense majority of people, such qualities excite hatred and resentment, which are rendered all the harder to bear by the fact that people are obliged to suppress—even from themselves—the real reason of their anger.

SECTION 35. Our trust in other people often consists in great measure of pure laziness, selfishness and vanity on our own part: I say laziness, because, instead of making inquiries ourselves, and exercising an active care, we prefer to trust others; selfishness, because we are led to confide in people by the pressure of our own affairs; and vanity, when we ask confidence for a matter on which we rather pride ourselves. And yet, for all that, we expect people to be true to the trust we repose in them.

SECTION 36. Politeness,—which the Chinese hold to be a cardinal virtue,—is based upon two considerations of policy. I have explained one of these considerations in my Ethics; the other is as follows:—Politeness is a tacit agreement that people's miserable defects, whether moral or intellectual, shall on either side be ignored and not made the subject of reproach; and since these defects are thus rendered somewhat less obtrusive, the result is mutually advantageous.[1]

SECTION 37. You ought never to take any man as a model for what you should do or leave undone; because position and circumstances are in no two cases alike, and difference of character gives a peculiar, individual tone to what a man does. Hence duo cum faciunt idem, non est idem—two persons may do the same thing with a different result. A man should act in accordance with his own character, as soon as he has carefully deliberated on what he is about to do.

SECTION 38. Never combat any man's opinion; for though you reached the age of Methuselah, you would never have done setting him right upon all the absurd things that he believes.

SECTION 39. If you want your judgment to be accepted, express it coolly and without passion. All violence has its seat in the will; and so, if your judgment is expressed with vehemence, people will consider it an effort of will, and not the outcome of knowledge, which is in its nature cold and unimpassioned. Since the will is the primary and radical element in human nature, and intellect merely supervenes as something secondary, people are more likely to believe that the opinion you express with so much vehemence is due to the excited state of your will, rather than that the excitement of the will comes only from the ardent nature of your opinion.

SECTION 40. Even when you are fully justified in praising yourself, you should never be seduced into doing so. For vanity is so very common, and merit so very uncommon, that even if a man appears to be praising himself, though very indirectly, people will be ready to lay a hundred to one that he is talking out of pure vanity, and that he has not sense enough to see what a fool he is making of himself.

SECTION 41. If you have reason to suspect that a person is telling you a lie, look as though you believed every word he said. This will give him courage to go on; he will become more vehement in his assertions, and in the end betray himself.

SECTION 42. You should regard all your private affairs as secrets, and, in respect of them, treat your acquaintances, even though you are on good terms with them, as perfect strangers, letting them know nothing more than they can see for themselves. For in course of time, and under altered circumstances, you may find it a disadvantage that they know even the most harmless things about you.

SECTION 43. Money is never spent to so much advantage as when you have been cheated out of it; for at one stroke you have purchased prudence.

SECTION 44. If possible, no animosity should be felt for anyone. But carefully observe and remember the manner in which a man conducts himself, so that you may take the measure of his value,—at any rate in regard to yourself,—and regulate your bearing towards him accordingly; never losing sight of the fact that character is unalterable, and that to forget the bad features in a man's disposition is like throwing away hard-won money. Thus you will protect yourself against the results of unwise intimacy and foolish friendship.

SECTION 45. To speak angrily to a person, to show your hatred by what you say or by the way you look, is an unnecessary proceeding—dangerous, foolish, ridiculous, and vulgar.

SECTION 46. To speak without emphasizing your words—parler sans accent—is an old rule with those who are wise in the world's ways. It means that you should leave other people to discover what it is that you have said; and as their minds are slow, you can make your escape in time. On the other hand, to emphasize your meaning—parler avec accent—is to address their feelings; and the result is always the opposite of what you expect. If you are polite enough in your manner and courteous in your tone there are many people whom you may abuse outright, and yet run no immediate risk of offending them.

WORLDLY FORTUNE.—SECTION 47.

SECTION 48. An ancient writer says, very truly, that there are three great powers in the world; Sagacity, Strength, and Luck,—[Greek: sunetos, kratos, tuchu.] I think the last is the most efficacious.

SECTION 49. That Time works great changes, and that all things are in their nature fleeting—these are truths that should never be forgotten. Hence, in whatever case you may be, it is well to picture to yourself the opposite: in prosperity, to be mindful of misfortune; in friendship, of enmity; in good weather, of days when the sky is overcast; in love, of hatred; in moments of trust, to imagine the betrayal that will make you regret your confidence; and so, too, when you are in evil plight, to have a lively sense of happier times—what a lasting source of true worldly wisdom were there! We should then always reflect, and not be so very easily deceived; because, in general, we should anticipate the very changes that the years will bring.

SECTION 50. In the daily affairs of life, you will have very many opportunities of recognizing a characteristic difference between ordinary people of prudence and discretion. In estimating the possibility of danger in connection with any undertaking, an ordinary man will confine his inquiries to the kind of risk that has already attended such undertakings in the past; whereas a prudent person will look ahead, and consider everything that might possibly happen in the future, having regard to a certain Spanish maxim: lo que no acaece en un ano, acaece en un rato—a thing may not happen in a year, and yet may happen within two minutes.

SECTION 51. Whatever fate befalls you, do not give way to great rejoicings or great lamentations; partly because all things are full of change, and your fortune may turn at any moment; partly because men are so apt to be deceived in their judgment as to what is good or bad for them.

SECTION 52. What people commonly call Fate is, as a general rule, nothing but their own stupid and foolish conduct. There is a fine passage in Homer,[1] illustrating the truth of this remark, where the poet praises [GREEK: maetis]—shrewd council; and his advice is worthy of all attention. For if wickedness is atoned for only in another world, stupidity gets its reward here—although, now and then, mercy may be shown to the offender.

SECTION 53. Courage comes next to prudence as a quality of mind very essential to happiness. It is quite true that no one can endow himself with either, since a man inherits prudence from his mother and courage from his father; still, if he has these qualities, he can do much to develop them by means of resolute exercise.

THE AGES OF LIFE.

RELIGION: A DIALOGUE, ETC.

RELIGION: A DIALOGUE.

A FEW WORDS ON PANTHEISM.

ON BOOKS AND READING.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.

THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM.

THOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON

[Pg ix]INTRODUCTION.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY.[Pg 3]

[Pg 103]SCHOPENHAUER AS EDUCATOR.

The Collected Works of Arthur Schopenhauer

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