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PREFACE

FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN

A PLAN I. Nihilism 1. Nihilism as an Outcome of the Valuations and Interpretations of Existence which have prevailed hitherto. 2. Further Causes of Nihilism 3. The Nihilistic Movement as an Expression of Decadence 4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence

II. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM (a) Modern Gloominess (b) The Last Centuries (c) Signs of Increasing Strength

SECOND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO.

I. CRITICISM OF RELIGION 1. Concerning the Origin of Religions 2. Concerning the History of Christianity 3. Christian Ideals

II. CRITICISM OF MORALITY 1. The Origin of Moral Valuations 2. The Herd 3. General Observations concerning Morality 4. How Virtue is made to Dominate 5. The Moral Ideal A. A Criticism of Ideals B. A Criticism of the " Good Man," of the Saint, etc. C. Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities D. A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating 6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism of Morality

III. CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY 1. General Remarks 2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy 3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers 4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philosophy

THIRD BOOK. THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION.

I. THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE (a) The Method of Investigation (b) The Starting-Point of Epistemology (c) The Belief in the " Ego." Subject (d) Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity (e) The Origin of Reason and Logic (f) Consciousness (g) Judgment. True False (h} Against Causality (i) The Thing-in- Itself and Appearance (j) The Metaphysical Need (k) The Biological Value of Knowledge (l) Science

II. THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE 1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World 2. The Will to Power as Life (a) The Organic Process (b) Man 3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations

III. THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOCIETY AND IN THE INDIVIDUAL 1. Society and the State 2. The Individual

IV. THE WILL TO POWER IN ART

FOURTH BOOK. DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING.

I. THE ORDER OF RANK 1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank 2. The Strong and the Weak 3. The Noble Man 4. The Lords of the Earth 5. The Great Man 6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future

II. DIONYSUS

III. ETERNAL RECURRENCE

PREFACE.

1. CONCERNING great things one should either be silent or one should speak loftily: loftily that is to say, cynically and innocently.

2. What I am now going to relate is the history of the next two centuries. I shall describe what will happen, what must necessarily happen: the triumph of nihilism. This history can be written already; for necessity itself is at work in bringing it about. This future is already proclaimed by a hundred different omens; as a destiny it announces its advent everywhere for this music of to-morrow all ears are already pricked. The whole of our culture in Europe has long been writhing in an agony of suspense which increases from decade to decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe: restless, violent, helter-skelter, like a torrent that will reach its borne, and refuses to reflect yea, that even dreads reflection.

3. On the other hand, the present writer has done little else, hitherto, than reflect and meditate, like an instinctive philosopher and anchorite, who found his advantage in isolation in remaining outside, in patience, procrastination, and lagging behind; like a weighing and testing spirit who has already lost his way in every labyrinth of the future; like a prophetic bird-spirit that looks backwards when it would announce what is to come; like the first perfect European nihilist, who, however, has already outlived nihilism in his own soul who has out grown, overcome, and dismissed it.

4. For the reader must not misunderstand the meaning of the title which has been given to this evangel of the future. "The Will to Power: An Attempted Revaluation of All Values" with this formula a counter-movement finds expression, in regard to both a principle and a mission; a movement which in some remote future will supersede this perfect nihilism; but which nevertheless regards it as a necessary step, both logically and psychologically, towards its own advent, and which positively cannot come, except on top of and out of it. For, why is the triumph of nihilism inevitable now? Because the very values current amongst us today will arrive at their logical conclusion in nihilism, because nihilism is the only possible outcome of our greatest values and ideals, because we must first experience nihilism before we can realize what the actual worth of these "values" was. . . . Sooner or later we shall be in need of new values.

FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN NIHILISM

1. A PLAN. 1. Nihilism is at our door: whence comes this most gruesome of all guests to us? To begin with, it is a mistake to point to "social evils," "physiological degeneration," or even to corruption as a cause of nihilism. This is the most straightforward and most sympathetic age that ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or intellectual, is, in itself, quite unable to introduce nihilism, i.e., the absolute repudiation of worth, purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet other and quite different explanations. But there is one very definite explanation of the phenomena: nihilism harbors in the heart of Christian morals. 2. The downfall of Christianity, through its morality (which is insuperable), which finally turns against the Christian God Himself (the sense of truth, highly developed through Christianity, ultimately revolts against the falsehood and fictitiousness of all Christian interpretations of the world and its history. The recoil-stroke of "God is Truth" in the fanatical belief, is: "All is false." Buddhism of action. . . .). 3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor. The downfall of the moral interpretation of the universe, which loses its raison d’etre once it has tried to take flight to a beyond, meets its end in nihilism. "Nothing has any purpose" (the inconsistency of one explanation of the world, to which men have devoted untold energy, gives rise to the suspicion that all explanations may perhaps be false). The Buddhistic feature: a yearning for nonentity (Indian Buddhism has no fundamentally moral development at the back of it; that is why nihilism in its case means only morality not overcome; existence is regarded as a punishment and conceived as an error; error is thus held to be punishment a moral valuation). Philosophical attempts to overcome the "moral God " (Hegel, Pantheism). The vanquishing of popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard. Antagonism of "true" and "beautiful" and "good" 4. Against "purposelessness" on the one hand, against moral valuations on the other: how far has all science and philosophy been cultivated hereto fore under the influence of moral judgments? And have we not got the additional factor the enmity of science, into the bargain? Or the prejudice against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian valuations everywhere present as remnants in socialistic and positivistic systems. A criticism of Christian morality is altogether lacking. 5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural science (along with its attempts to escape into a beyond). Out of its practice there finally arises a certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude towards itself a sort of anti-scientificality. Since Copernicus man has been rolling away from the centre towards x. 6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political and politico-economical way of thinking, where all principles at length become tainted with the atmosphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, in significance, dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy, etc. Punishment. Everywhere the deliverer is missing, either as a class or as a single man the justifier. 7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the "practical historian," i.e., the romanticist. The attitude of art is quite unoriginal in modern life. Its gloominess. Goethe’s so-called Olympian State. 8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Romanticism (the conclusion of Wagner’s Ring of the Nibelung).

I. Nihilism.

1. NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF EXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED HERETOFORE.

2. What does nihilism mean? That the highest values are losing their value. There is no borne. There is no answer to the question: "to what purpose?"

3. Thorough nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the view that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either divine or morality incarnate. This view is a result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a consequence of the belief in morality.

4. What advantages did the Christian hypothesis of morality offer? (1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men, which contrasted with their apparent insignificance and subordination to chance in the eternal flux of becoming and perishing. (2) It served the purpose of God s advocates, inasmuch as it granted the world a certain perfection despite its sorrow and evil it also granted the world that proverbial " freedom ": evil seemed full of meaning. (3) It assumed that man could have a know ledge of absolute values, and thus granted him adequate perception for the most important things. (4) It prevented man from despising himself as man, from turning against life, and from being driven to despair by knowledge: it was a self- preservative measure. In short: Morality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism.

5. But among the forces reared by morality, there was truthfulness: this in the end turns against morality, exposes the teleology of the latter, its interestedness, and now the recognition of this lie so long incorporated, from which we despaired of ever freeing ourselves, acts just like a stimulus. We perceive certain needs in ourselves, implanted during the long dynasty of the moral interpretation of life, which now seem to us to be needs of untruth: on the other hand, those very needs represent the highest values owing to which we are able to endure life. We have ceased from attaching any worth to what we know, and we dare not attach any more worth to that with which we would fain deceive ourselves from this antagonism there results a process of dissolution.

6. This is the antinomy: In so far as we believe in morality, we condemn existence.

7. The highest values in the service of which man ought to live, more particularly when they oppressed and constrained him most these social values owing to their tone-strengthening tendencies, were built over men’s heads as though they were the will of God, or "reality," or the actual world, or even a hope of a world to come. Now that the lowly origin of these values has become known, the whole universe seems to have been revalued and to have lost its significance but this is only an intermediate stage.

8. The consequence of nihilism (disbelief in all values) as a result of a moral valuation: We have grown to dislike egotism (even though we have realized the impossibility of altruism); we have grown to dislike what is most necessary (although we have recognized the impossibility of a liberum arbitrium and of an " intelligible freedom "). We perceive that we do not reach the spheres in which we have set our values at the same time those other spheres in which we live have not thereby gained one iota in value. On the contrary, we are tired, because we have lost the main incentive to live. "All in vain hitherto!"

9. Pessimism as a preparatory state to nihilism.

10. A. Pessimism viewed as strength in what respect? In the energy of its logic, as anarchy, nihilism, and analysis. B. Pessimism regarded as collapse in what sense? In the sense of its being a softening influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a "tout comprendre," and historical spirit. Critical tension: extremes make their appearance and become dominant.

11. The logic of pessimism leads finally to nihilism: what is the force at work? The notion that there are no values, and no purpose: the recognition of the part that moral valuations have played in all other lofty values. Result: moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the abdication of the will to live. . . .

12. THE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES. A. Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a psycho logical condition, first when we have sought in all that has happened a purpose which is not there: so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage. Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long waste of strength, the pain of "futility," uncertainty, the lack of an opportunity to recover in some way, or to attain to a state of peace concerning anything shame in one s own presence, as if one had cheated oneself too long. . . . The purpose above-mentioned might have been achieved: in the form of a "realization" of a most high canon of morality in all worldly phenomena, the moral order of the universe; or in the form of the increase of love and harmony in the traffic of humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general condition of happiness; or even in the march towards general nonentity any sort of goal always constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all these appearances is that something will be attained, through the process itself: and now we perceive that becoming has been aiming at nothing, and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusionment in regard to a so-called purpose in existence, as a cause of nihilism; whether this be in respect of a very definite purpose, or generalized into the recognition that all the hypotheses are false which have hitherto been offered as to the object of life, and which relate to the whole of "evolution" (man no longer an assistant in, let alone the culmination of, the evolutionary process). Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological condition, in the second place, when man has fixed a totality, a systematization, even an organization in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul thirsting for respect and admiration will wallow in the general idea of a highest ruling and administrative power (if it be the soul of a logician, the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning will suffice to conciliate everything). A kind of unity, some form of "monism": and as a result of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feeling of profound relativity and dependence in the presence of an all which is infinitely superior to him, a sort of divinity. "The general good exacts the surrender of the individual ..." but lo, there is no such general good! At bottom, man loses the belief in his own worth when no infinitely precious entity manifests itself through him that is to say, he conceived such an all, in order to be able to believe in his own worth. Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a third and last form. Admitting these two points of view: that no purpose can be assigned to becoming, and that no great entity rules behind all becoming, in which the individual may completely lose himself as in an element of superior value; there still remains the subterfuge which would consist in condemning this whole world of becoming as an illusion, and in discovering a world which would lie beyond it, and would be a real world. The moment, however, that man perceives that this world has been devised only for the purpose of meeting certain psychological needs, and that he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form of nihilism comes into being, which comprises a denial of a metaphysical world, and which forbids itself all belief in a real world. From this stand point, the reality of becoming is the only reality that is admitted: all bypaths to back-worlds and false godheads are abandoned but this world is no longer endured although no one wishes to disown it. What has actually happened? The feeling of worthlessness was realized when it was understood that neither the notion of "purpose" nor that of " unity" nor that of "truth" could be made to interpret the general character of existence. Nothing is achieved or obtained thereby; the unity which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is entirely lacking: the character of existence is not "true," it is false; there is certainly no longer any reason to believe in a real world. In short, the categories, "purpose," "unity," "being," by means of which we had lent some worth to life, we have once more divorced from it and the world now appears worthless to us. ... B. Admitting that we have recognized the impossibility of interpreting the world by means of these three categories, and that from this standpoint the world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask ourselves whence we derived our belief in these three categories. Let us see if it is possible to refuse to believe in them. If we can deprive them of their value, the proof that they cannot be applied to the world, is no longer a sufficient reason for depriving that world of its value. Result: The belief in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism we have measured the worth of the world according to categories which can only be applied to a purely fictitious world. Conclusion: All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have therefore deprived it of all worth (once these values have been shown to be inapplicable) all these values, are, psychologically, the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities: but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man’s exaggerated ingenuousness to regard himself as the sense and measure of all things.

13. Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological condition (the vast generalization, the conclusion that there is no purpose in anything, is pathological): whether it be that the productive forces are not yet strong enough or that decadence still hesitates and has not yet discovered its expedients. The conditions of this hypothesis: That there is no truth; that there is no absolute state of affairs no " thing-in-itself." This alone is nihilism, and of the most extreme kind. It finds that the value of things consists precisely in the fact that these values are not real and never have been real, but that they are only a symptom of strength on the part of the valuer, a simplification serving the purposes of existence.

14. Values and their modification are related to the growth of power of the valuer. The measure of disbelief and of the " freedom of spirit " which is tolerated, viewed as an expression of the growth of power. " Nihilism viewed as the ideal of the highest spiritual power; of the over-rich life, partly destructive, partly ironical.

15. What is belief? How is a belief born? All belief assumes that something is true. The extremest form of nihilism would mean that all belief all assumption of truth is false: because no real world is at hand. It were therefore: only an appearance seen in perspective, whose origin must be found in us (seeing that we are constantly in need of a narrower, a shortened, and simplified world). Nihilism. This should be realized, that the extent to which we can, in our heart of hearts, acknowledge appearance, and the necessity of falsehood, with out going to rack and ruin, is the measure of strength. In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the negation of a real world and of being, might be a divine view of the world.

16. If we are disillusioned, we have not become so in regard to life, but owing to the fact that our eyes have been opened to all kinds of "desiderata." With mocking anger we survey that which is called "ideal": we despise ourselves only because we are unable at every moment of our lives to quell that absurd emotion which is called "idealism." This pampering by means of ideals is stronger than the anger of the disillusioned one.

17. To what extent does Schopenhauerian nihilism continue to be the result of the same ideal as that which gave rise to Christian theism? The amount of certainty concerning the most exalted desiderata, the highest values and the greatest degree of perfection, was so great, that the philosophers started out from it as if it had been an a priori and absolute fact: "God " at the head, as the given quantity truth. "To become like God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being" these were for centuries the most ingenuous and most convincing desiderata (but that which convinces is not necessarily true on that account: it is nothing more nor less than convincing. An observation for donkeys). The granting of a personal-reality to this accretion of ideals has been unlearned: people have become atheistic. But has the ideal actually been abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a matter of fact, still seek their true "reality" in it the "thing-in-itself" beside which everything else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that because our world of appearance is so obviously not the expression of that ideal, it therefore cannot be " true " and at bottom does not even lead back to that metaphysical world as cause. The unconditioned, in so far as it stands for that highest degree of perfection, cannot possibly be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopenhauer, who desired it otherwise, was obliged to imagine this metaphysical basis as the antithesis to the ideal, as " an evil, blind will ": thus it could be " that which appears," that which manifests itself in the world of appearance. But even so, he did not give up that ideal absolute he circum vented it. ... (Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of " intelligible freedom," in order to relieve the ens perfectum of the responsibility of having contrived this world as it is, in short, in order to explain evil: scandalous logic for a philosopher!).

18. A general sign of modern times: in his own estimation, man has lost an infinite amount of dignity. For a long time he was the centre and tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavored to demonstrate at least his relationship to the most essential and in itself most valuable side of life as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold fast to the dignity of man, in their belief that moral values are cardinal values. He who has let God go, clings all the more strongly to the belief in morality.

19. Every purely moral valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic) terminates in nihilism: Europe must expect the same thing! It is supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious background; but in this direction the road to nihilism is opened. There is nothing in religion which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing creatures.

20. The question which nihilism puts, namely, "to what purpose?" is the outcome of a habit, hitherto, to regard the purpose as something fixed, given and exacted outside that is to say, by some super natural authority. Once the belief in this has been unlearned, the force of an old habit leads to the search after another authority, which would know how to speak unconditionally, and could point to goals and missions. The authority of the conscience now takes the first place (the more morality is emancipated from theology, the more imperative does it become) as a compensation for the personal authority. Or the authority of reason. Or the gregarious instinct (the herd). Or history with its immanent spirit, which has its goal in itself, and to which one can abandon oneself. One would like to evade the will, as also the willing of a goal and the risk of setting oneself a goal. One would like to get rid of the responsibility (Fatalism would be accepted). Finally: Happiness, and with a dash of humbug, the happiness of the greatest number. It is said: (1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary. (2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen. Precisely now, when will in its fullest strength were necessary, it is in the weakest and most pusillanimous condition. Absolute mistrust concerning the organizing power of the will.

21. The perfect nihilist. The nihilist s eye idealizes in an ugly sense, and is inconstant to what it remembers: it allows its recollections to go astray and to fade, it does not protect them from that cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all that is distant and past. And what it does not do for itself it fails to do for the whole of mankind as well that is to say, it allows it to drop.

22. Nihilism. It may be two things: A. Nihilism as a sign of enhanced spiritual strength: active nihilism. B. Nihilism as a sign of the collapse and decline of spiritual strength: passive nihilism.

23. Nihilism, a normal condition. It may be a sign of strength; spiritual vigor may have increased to such an extent that the goals toward which man has marched hitherto (the "convictions," articles of faith) are no longer suited to it (for a faith generally expresses the exigencies of the conditions of existence, a submission to the authority of an order of things which conduces to the prosperity, the growth and power of a living creature . . .); on the other hand, a sign of insufficient strength, to fix a goal, a "wherefore," and a faith for itself. It reaches its maximum of relative strength, as a powerful destructive force, in the form of active nihilism. Its opposite would be weary nihilism, which no longer attacks: its most renowned form being Buddhism: as passive nihilism, a sign of weakness: spiritual strength may be fatigued, exhausted, so that the goals and values which have prevailed hitherto are no longer suited to it and are no longer believed in so that the synthesis of values and goals (upon which every strong culture stands) decomposes, and the different values contend with one another: Disintegration, then everything which is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies, steps into the foreground under the cover of various disguises, either religious, moral, political or aesthetic, etc.

24. Nihilism is not only a meditating over the " in vain! " not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one s shoulder to the plough; one destroys. This, if you will, is illogical; but the nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being logical. ... It is the condition of strong minds and wills; and to these it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of judgment: the negation by deeds proceeds from their nature. Annihilation by the reasoning faculty seconds annihilation by the hand.

25. Concerning the genesis of the nihilist. The courage of all one really knows comes but late in life. It is only quite recently that I have acknowledged to myself that heretofore I have been a nihilist from top to toe. The energy and thoroughness with which I marched forward as a nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental principle. When one is progressing towards a goal it seems impossible that "aimlessness per se" should be one’s fundamental article of faith.

26. The Pessimism of strong natures. The "wherefore" after a terrible struggle, even after victory. That something may exist which is a hundred times more important than the question, whether we feel well or unwell, is the fundamental instinct of all strong natures and consequently too, whether the others feel well or unwell. In short, that we have a purpose, for which we would not even hesitate to sacrifice men, run all risks, and bend our backs to the worst: this is the great passion.

2. FURTHER CAUSES OF NIHILISM

27. The causes of nihilism: (1) The higher species is lacking, i.e., the species whose inexhaustible fruitfulness and power would uphold our belief in man (think only of what is owed to Napoleon: almost all the higher hopes of this century). (2) The inferior species ("herd," "mass," "society ") is forgetting modesty, and inflates its needs into cosmic and metaphysical values. In this way all life is vulgarized, for inasmuch as the mass of mankind rules, it tyrannizes over the exceptions, so that these lose their belief in themselves and become nihilists. All attempts to conceive of a new species come to nothing ("romanticism," the artist, the philosopher; against Carlyle’s attempt to lend them the highest moral values). The result is that higher types are resisted. The downfall and insecurity of all higher types. The struggle against genius ("popular poetry," etc.). Sympathy with the lowly and the suffering as a standard for the elevation of the soul. The philosopher is lacking, the interpreter of deeds, and not alone he who poetizes them.

28. Imperfect nihilism its forms: we are now surrounded by them. All attempts made to escape nihilism, which do not consist in revaluing the values that have prevailed hitherto, only make the matter worse; they complicate the problem.

29. The varieties of self-stupefaction. In one’s heart of hearts, not to know, whither? Emptiness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by means of emotional intoxication: emotional intoxication in the form of music, in the form of cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the noblest, and in the form of blind, gushing enthusiasm over individual men or distinct periods (in the form of hatred, etc.). The attempt to work blindly, like a scientific instrument; to keep an eye on the many small joys, like an investigator, for instance (modesty towards oneself); the mysticism of the voluptuous joy of eternal emptiness; art "for art’s sake" ("le fait"), "immaculate investigation," in the form of narcotics against the disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant work, any kind of small foolish fanaticism; the medley of all means, illness as the result of general profligacy (dissipation kills pleasure). (1) As a result, feeble will-power. (2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of petty weakness felt as a contrast.

30. The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium which enables us to live for a long while we shall not know in what direction we are travelling. We are hurling our selves headlong into the opposite valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have been engendered in man by an overvaluation of himself. Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or over strained. (a) There is a seeking after a sort of earthly solution of the problem of life, but in the same sense as that of the final triumph of truth, love, justice (socialism: "equality of persons"). (b) There is also an attempt to hold fast to the moral ideal (with altruism, self-sacrifice, and the denial of the will, in the front rank). (c) There is even an attempt to hold fast to a "beyond ": were it only as an antilogical x; but it is forthwith interpreted in such a way that a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style, may be derived from it. (d) There is an attempt to read the phenomena of life in such a way as to arrive at the divine guidance of old, with its powers of rewarding, punishing, educating, and of generally conducing to a something better in the order of things. (e) People once more believe in good and evil; so that the victory of the good and the annihilation of the evil is regarded as a duty (this is English, and is typical of that blockhead, John Stuart Mill). (f) The contempt felt for "naturalness," for the desires and for the ego: the attempt to regard even the highest intellectuality of art as a result of an impersonal and disinterested attitude. (g) The Church is still allowed to meddle in all the essential occurrences and incidents in the life of the individual, with a view to consecrating it and giving it a loftier meaning: we still have the "Christian state" and the "Christian marriage."

31. There have been more thoughtful and more destructively thoughtful times than ours: times like those in which Buddha appeared, for instance, in which the people themselves, after centuries of sectarian quarrels, had sunk so deeply into the abyss of philosophical dogmas, as, from time to time, European people have done in regard to the fine points of religious dogma. "Literature" and the press would be the last things to seduce one to any high opinion of the spirit of our times: the millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity with gymnastic exercises of that ghastly ugliness which is characteristic of all English inventions, throw more light on the subject European pessimism is still in its infancy a fact which argues against it: it has not yet attained to that prodigious and yearning fixity of sight to which it attained in India once upon a time, and in which nonentity is reflected; there is still too much of the "ready-made," and not enough of the "evolved " in its constitution, too much learned and poetic pessimism; I mean that a good deal of it has been discovered, invented, and "created," but not caused.

32. Criticism of the pessimism which has prevailed hitherto. The want of the eudaemonological standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question: what is the purpose of it all? The reduction of gloom. Our pessimism: the world has not the value which we believed it to have, our faith itself has so increased our instinct for research that we are compelled to say this today. In the first place, it seems of less value: at first it is felt to be of less value, only in this sense are we pessimists, that is to say, with the will to acknowledge this. Revaluation without reserve, and no longer, as heretofore, to deceive ourselves and chant the old old story. It is precisely in this way that we find the pathos which urges us to seek for new values. In short: the world might have far more value than we thought we must get behind the naiveté of our ideals, for it is possible that, in our conscious effort to give it the highest interpretation, we have not bestowed even a moderately just value upon it. What has been deified? The valuing instinct inside the community (that which enabled it to survive). What has been calumniated! That which has tended to separate higher men from their inferiors, the instincts which cleave gulfs and build barriers.

33. Causes effecting the rise of pessimism: (1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the future have hitherto been calumniated, so that life has a curse upon it. (2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man have led him to discover the fact that these instincts cannot be cut adrift from life, and thus he turns to embrace life. (3) Only the most mediocre, who are not conscious of this conflict, prosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration tend to dispose all hearts against them on the other hand, there is some indignation caused by the mediocre positing themselves as the end and meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question: "Why?" (4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion are steadily increasing the materialization of all these tendencies, which is called" civilization," becomes every day more simple, with the result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual despairs and surrenders.

34. Modern pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the modern world, not of the world and existence as such.

35. The "preponderance of pain over pleasure" or the reverse (hedonism); both of these doctrines are already signposts to nihilism. . . . For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the phenomenon pleasure or pain. But only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a final goal can speak in this way according to every healthy type of man, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of these secondary things. And a preponderance of pain would be possible and, in spite of it, a mighty will, a saying of yea to life, and a holding of this preponderance for necessary. "life is not worth living"; "resignation"; "what is the good of tears?" this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. "Un monstre gai vaut mieux qu’un sentimental ennuyeux."

36. The philosophic nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without sense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as being without sense and in vain. But whence comes this "there ought not to be?" whence this "sense" and this standard? At bottom the nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless being is unsatisfying to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and despair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character of existence must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher if it is to have any right to subsist. Now it is easy to understand that happiness and unhappiness, within the phenomena of this world, can only serve the purpose of means: the question yet remaining to be answered is, whether it will ever be possible for us to perceive the "object" and "purpose" of life, whether the problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not quite beyond our ken.

37. The development of nihilism out of pessimism. The denaturalization of values. Scholasticism of values. The values isolated, idealistic, instead of ruling and leading action, turn against it and condemn it. Opposites introduced in the place of natural gradations and ranks. Hatred of the order of rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian age, because they are more easy to grasp. The rejected world is opposed to an artificially constructed "true and valuable" one. At last we discover out of what material the "true" world was built; all that remains, now, is the rejected world, and to the account of our reasons for rejecting it we place our greatest disillusionment. At this point nihilism is reached; the directing values have been retained nothing more! This gives rise to the problem of strength and weakness: (1) The weak fall to pieces upon it; (2) The strong destroy what does not fall to pieces of its own accord; (3) The strongest overcome the directing values. The whole condition of affairs produces the tragic age.

3. THE NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF DECADENCE.

38. Just lately an accidental and in every way inappropriate term has been very much misused: everywhere people are speaking of "pessimism". and there is a fight around the question (to which some replies must be forthcoming): which is right pessimism or optimism? People have not yet seen what is so terribly obvious namely, that pessimism is not a problem but a symptom, that the term ought to be re placed by "nihilism," that the question, "to be or not to be," is itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy. The nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological decadence.

39. To be understood: That every kind of decline and tendency to sickness has incessantly been at work in helping to create general evaluations: that in those valuations which now dominate, decadence has even begun to preponderate, that we have not only to combat the conditions which present misery and degeneration have brought into being; but that all decadence, previous to that of our own times, has been transmitted and has therefore remained an active force amongst us. A universal departure of this kind, on the part of man, from his fundamental instincts, such universal decadence of the valuing judgment, is the note of interrogation par excellence, the real riddle, which the animal "man" sets to all philosophers.

40. The notion " decadence ": Decay, decline, and waste, are, per se, in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables us to suppress it. On the contrary, reason would have it retain its rights. It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put an end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty. . . . But that is tantamount to condemning life ... a society is not at liberty to remain young. And even in its prime it must bring forth ordure and decaying matter. The more energetically and daringly it advances, the richer will it be in failures and in deformities, and the nearer it will be to its fall. Age is not deferred by means of institutions. Nor is illness. Nor is vice.

41. Fundamental aspect of the nature of decadence: what has heretofore been regarded as its causes are its effects. In this way, the whole perspective of the problems of morality is altered. All the struggle of morals against vice, luxury, crime, and even against illness, seems a naiveté, a superfluous effort: there is no such thing as "improvement" (a word against repentance). Decadence itself is not a thing that can be withstood: it is absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the spreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism. Is that done? The very reverse is done. It is precisely on this account that one makes a stand on behalf of humanity. How do the highest values created hitherto stand in relation to this fundamental question in biology? Philosophy, religion, morality, art, etc. (The remedy: militarism, for instance, from Napoleon onwards, who regarded civilization as his natural enemy.)

42. All those things which heretofore have been regarded as the causes of degeneration are really its effects. But those things also which have been regarded as the remedies of degeneration are only palliatives of certain effects thereof: the "cured" are types of the degenerate. The results of decadence: vice viciousness; illness sickliness; crime criminality; celibacy sterility; hysteria the weakness of the will; alcoholism; pessimism, anarchy; debauchery (also of the spirit). The calumniators, underminers, sceptics, and destroyers.

43. Concerning the notion "decadence." (i) Scepticism is a result of decadence: just as spiritual debauchery is. Nihilism. (2) Moral corruption is a result of decadence (the weakness of the will and the need of strong stimulants). (3) Remedies, whether psychological or moral, do not alter the march of decadence, they do not arrest anything; physiologically they do not count. A peep into the enormous futility of these pretentious "reactions"; they are forms of anaesthetizing oneself against certain fatal symptoms resulting from the prevailing condition of things; they do not eradicate the morbid element; they are often heroic attempts to cancel the decadent man, to allow only a minimum of his deleterious influence to survive. (4) Nihilism is not a cause, but only the rationale of decadence. (5) The "good" and the "bad" are no more than two types of decadence: they come together in all its fundamental phenomena. (6) The social problem is a result of decadence. (7) Illnesses, more particularly those attacking the nerves and the head, are signs that the defensive strength of strong nature is lacking; a proof of this is that irritability which causes pleasure and pain to be regarded as problems of the first order.

44. The most common types of decadence: (i) In the belief that they are remedies, cures are chosen which only precipitate exhaustion; this is the case with Christianity (to point to the most egregious example of mistaken instinct); this is also the case with " progress." (2) The power of resisting stimuli is on the wane chance rules supreme: events are inflated and drawn out until they appear monstrous . . . a suppression of the "personality," a disintegration of the will; in this regard we may mention a whole class of morality, the altruistic, that which is incessantly preaching pity, and whose most essential feature is the weakness of the personality, so that it rings in unison, and, like an over sensitive string, does not cease from vibrating . . . extreme irritability. . . . (3) Cause and effect are confounded: decadence is not understood as physiological, and its results are taken to be the causes of the general indisposition: this applies to all religious morality. (4) A state of affairs is desired in which suffering shall cease; life is actually considered the cause of all ills unconscious and insensitive states (sleep and syncope) are held in incomparably higher esteem than the conscious states; hence a method of life.

45. Concerning the hygiene of the " weak." All that is done in weakness ends in failure. Moral: do nothing. The worst of it is, that precisely the strength required in order to stop action, and to cease from reacting, is most seriously diseased under the influence of weakness: that one never reacts more promptly or more blindly than when one should not react at all. The strength of a character is shown by the ability to delay and postpone reaction: a certain adiaphora is just as proper to it, as involuntariness in recoiling, suddenness and lack of restraint in "action," are proper to weakness. The will is weak: and the recipe for preventing foolish acts would be: to have a strong will and to do nothing contradiction. A sort of self-destruction, the instinct of self-preservation is compromised. . . . The weak man injures himself. . . . That is the decadent type. As a matter of fact, we meet with a vast amount of thought concerning the means where with impassibility may be induced. To this extent, the instincts are on the right scent; for to do nothing is more useful than to do something. . . . All the practices of private orders, of solitary philosophers, and of fakirs, are suggested by a correct consideration of the fact, that a certain kind of man is most useful to himself when he hinders his own action as much as possible. Relieving measures: absolute obedience, mechanical activity, total isolation from men and things that might exact immediate decisions and actions.

46. Weakness of will: this is a fable that can lead astray. For there is no will, consequently neither a strong nor a weak one. The multiplicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want of system in their relationship, constitute what is known as a " weak will"; their co-ordination, under the government of one individual among them, results in a "strong will" in the first case vacillation and a lack of equilibrium is noticeable: in the second, precision and definite direction.

47. That which is inherited is not illness, but predisposition to illness: a lack of the powers of resistance against injurious external influences, etc. etc., broken powers of resistance; expressed morally: resignation and humility in the presence of the enemy. I have often wondered whether it would not be possible to class all the highest values of the philosophies, moralities, and religions which have been devised hitherto, with the values of the feeble, the insane and the neurasthenic: in a milder form, they present the same evils. The value of all morbid conditions consists in the fact that they magnify certain normal phenomena which are difficult to discern in normal conditions. . . . Health and illness are not essentially different, as the ancient doctors believed and as a few practitioners still believe today. They cannot be imagined as two distinct principles or entities which fight for the living organism and make it their battlefield. That is nonsense and mere idle gossip, which no longer holds water. As a matter of fact, there is only a difference of degree between these two living conditions: exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony among the normal phenomena, constitute the morbid state (Claude Bernard). Just as "evil" may be regarded as exaggeration, discord, and want of proportion, so can "good" be regarded as a sort of protective diet against the danger of exaggeration, discord, and want of proportion. Hereditary weakness as a dominant feeling: the cause of the prevailing values. N.B. Weakness is in demand why? . . . mostly because people cannot be anything else than weak. Weakening considered a duty: The weakening of the desires, of the feelings of pleasure and of pain, of the will to power, of the will to pride, to property and to more property; weakening in the form of humility; weakening in the form of a belief; weakening in the form of repugnance and shame in the presence of all that is natural in the form of a denial of life, in the form of illness and chronic feebleness; weakening in the form of a refusal to take revenge, to offer resistance, to become an enemy, and to show anger. Blunders in the treatment: there is no attempt at combating weakness by means of any fortifying system; but by a sort of justification consisting of moralizing; i.e., by means of interpretation. Two totally different conditions are confused: for instance, the repose of strength, which is essentially abstinence from reaction (the prototype of the gods whom nothing moves), and the peace of exhaustion, rigidity to the point of anesthesia. All these philosophic and ascetic modes of procedure aspire to the second state, but actually pretend to attain to the first ... for they ascribe to the condition they have reached the attributes that would be in keeping only with a divine state.

48. The most dangerous misunderstanding. There is one concept which apparently allows of no confusion or ambiguity, and that is the concept exhaustion. Exhaustion may be acquired or inherited in any case it alters the aspect and value of things. Unlike him who involuntarily gives of the superabundance which he both feels and represents, to the things about him, and who sees them fuller, mightier, and more pregnant with promises, who, in fact, can bestow, the exhausted one belittles and disfigures everything he sees he impoverishes its worth: he is detrimental. . . . No mistake seems possible in this matter: and yet history discloses the terrible fact, that the exhausted have always been confounded with those with the most abundant resources, and the latter with the most detrimental. The pauper in vitality, the feeble one, impoverishes even life: the wealthy man, in vital powers, enriches it. The first is the parasite of the second: the second is a bestower of his abundance. How is confusion possible? When he who was exhausted came forth with the bearing of a very active and energetic man (when degeneration implied a certain excess of spiritual and nervous discharge), he was mistaken for the wealthy man. He inspired terror. The cult of the madman is also always the cult of him who is rich in vitality, and who is a powerful man. The fanatic, the one possessed, the religious epileptic, all eccentric creatures have been regarded as the highest types of power: as divine. This kind of strength which inspires terror seemed to be, above all, divine: this was the starting-point of authority; here wisdom was interpreted, hearkened to, and sought. Out of this there was developed, everywhere almost, a will to "deify," i.e., to a typical degeneration of spirit, body, and nerves: an attempt to discover the road to this higher form of being. To make oneself ill or mad, to provoke the symptoms of serious disorder was called getting stronger, becoming more superhuman, more terrible and more wise. People thought they would thus attain to such wealth of power, that they would be able to dispense it. Wheresoever there have been prayers, some one has been sought who had something to give away. What led astray, here, was the experience of intoxication. This increases the feeling of power to the highest degree, therefore, to the mind of the ingenuous, it is power. On the highest altar of power the most intoxicated man must stand, the ecstatic. (There are two causes of intoxication: superabundant life, and a condition of morbid nutrition of the brain.)

49. Acquired, not inherited exhaustion: (i) inadequate nourishment, often the result of ignorance concerning diet, as, for instance, in the case of scholars; (2) erotic precocity: the damnation more especially of the youth of France Parisian youths, above all, who are already dirtied and ruined when they step out of their lycées into the world, and who cannot break the chains of despicable tendencies; ironical and scornful towards themselves galley-slaves despite all their refinement (moreover, in the majority of cases, already a symptom of racial and family decadence, as all hypersensitiveness is; and examples of the infection of environment: to be influenced by one’s environment is also a sign of decadence); (3) alcoholism, not the instinct but the habit, foolish imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation to a ruling fashion. What a blessing a Jew is among Germans! See the obtuseness, the flaxen head, the blue eye, and the lack of intellect in the face, the language, and the bearing; the lazy habit of stretching the limbs, and the need of repose among Germans a need which is not the result of overwork, but of the disgusting excitation and over-excitation caused by alcohol.

50. A theory of exhaustion. Vice, the insane (also artists), the criminals, the anarchists these are not the oppressed classes, but the outcasts of the community of all classes hitherto. Seeing that all our classes are permeated by these elements, we have grasped the fact that modern society is not a "society" or a "body," but a diseased agglomeration of chandala, a society which no longer has the strength even to excrete. To what extent living together for centuries has very much deepened sickliness: modern virtue, modern intellect, modern science, as forms of disease.

51. The state of corruption. The interrelation of all forms of corruption should be understood, and the Christian form (Pascal as the type), as also the socialistic and communistic (a result of the Christian), should not be overlooked (from the standpoint of natural science, the highest conception of society according to socialists, is the lowest in the order of rank among societies); the "beyond" corruption: as though outside the real world of becoming there were a world of being. Here there must be no compromise, but selection, annihilation, and war the Christian nihilistic standard of value must be withdrawn from all things and attacked beneath every disguise . . . for instance, from modern sociology, music, and pessimism (all forms of the Christian ideal of values). Either one thing or the other is true: true that is to say, tending to elevate the type man. . . . The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been help less, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction of values.

52. If nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human race, is rather the result of morbid and unnatural morality. The sensitiveness of the majority of men is both morbid and unnatural. Why is it that mankind is corrupt in a moral and physiological respect? The body degenerates if one organ is unsound. The right of altruism cannot be traced to physiology, neither can the right to help and to the equality of fate: these are all premiums for degenerates and failures. There can be no solidarity in a society containing unfruitful, unproductive, and destructive members, who, by the bye, are bound to have offspring even more degenerate than they are themselves.

53. Decadence exercises a profound and perfectly unconscious influence, even over the ideals of science: all our sociology is a proof of this pro position, and it has yet to be reproached with the fact that it has only the experience of society in the process of decay, and inevitably takes its own decaying instincts as the basis of sociological judgment. The declining vitality of modern Europe formulates its social ideals in its decaying instincts: and these ideals are all so like those of old and effete races, that they might be mistaken for one another. The gregarious instinct, then, now a sovereign power, is something totally different from the instinct of an aristocratic society: and the value of the sum depends upon the value of the units constituting it. ... The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that of the herd, of a multitude of mere ciphers of which every cipher has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be naught. . . . The valuation with which the various forms of society are judged today is absolutely the same with that which assigns a higher place to peace than to war: but this principle is contrary to the teaching of biology, and is itself a mere outcome of decadent life. Life is a result of war, society is a means to war. . . . Mr. Herbert Spencer was a decadent in biology, as also in morality (he regarded the triumph of altruism as a desideratum!!!).

54. After thousands of years of error and confusion, it is my good fortune to have rediscovered the road which leads to a yea and to a nay. I teach people to say nay in the face of all that makes for weakness and exhaustion. I teach people to say yea in the face of all that makes for strength, that preserves strength, and justifies the feeling of strength. Up to the present, neither the one nor the other has been taught; but rather virtue, disinterestedness, pity, and even the negation of life. All these are values proceeding from exhausted people. After having pondered over the physiology of exhaustion for some time, I was led to the question: to what extent the judgments of exhausted people had percolated into the world of values. The result at which I arrived was as startling as it could possibly be even for one like my self who was already at home in many a strange world: I found that all prevailing values that is to say, all those which had gained ascendancy over humanity, or at least over its tamer portions, could be traced back to the judgment of exhausted people. Under the cover of the holiest names, I found the most destructive tendencies; people had actually given the name "God" to all that renders weak, teaches weakness, and infects with weakness. ... I found that the "good man" was a form of self-affirmation on the part of decadence. That virtue which Schopenhauer still pro claimed as superior to all, and as the most fundamental of all virtues; even that same pity I recognized as more dangerous than any vice. Nihilism. Deliberately to thwart the law of selection among species, and their natural means of purging their stock of degenerate members this, up to my time, had been the greatest of all virtues. . . . One should do honor to the fatality which says to the feeble: "perish! " The opposing of this fatality, the botching of mankind and the allowing of it to putrefy, was given the name "God." One shall not take the name of the Lord one s God in vain. . . . The race is corrupted not by its vices, but by its ignorance: it is corrupted because it has not recognized exhaustion as exhaustion: physiological misunderstandings are the cause of all evil. Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding. Problem: how were the exhausted able to make the laws of values? In other words, how did they who are the last, come to power? . . . How did the instincts of the animal man ever get to stand on their heads? . . .

4. THE CRISIS: NIHILISM AND THE IDEA OF RECURRENCE.

55. Extreme positions are not relieved by more moderate ones, but by extreme opposite positions. And thus the belief in the utter immorality of nature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense, are psychologically necessary attitudes when the belief in God and in an essentially moral order of things is no longer tenable. Nihilism now appears, not because the sorrows of existence are greater than they were formerly, but because, in a general way, people have grown suspicious of the "meaning" which might be given to evil and even to existence. One interpretation has been overthrown: but since it was held to be the interpretation, it seems as though there were no meaning in existence at all, as though every thing were in vain. It yet remains to be shown that this " in vain! " is the character of present nihilism. The mistrust of our former valuations has increased to such an extent that it has led to the question: are not all values merely allurements prolonging the duration of the comedy, without, however, bringing the unraveling any closer? The "long period of time" which has culminated in an "in vain," with out either goal or purpose, is the most paralyzing of thoughts, more particularly when one sees that one is duped without, however, being able to resist being duped. Let us imagine this thought in its worst form: existence, as it is, without either a purpose or a goal, but inevitably recurring, without an end in nonentity: "eternal recurrence." This is the extremest form of nihilism: nothing (purposelessness) eternal! European form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and of strength drives us to such a belief. It is the most scientific of all hypotheses. We deny final purposes. If existence had a final purpose it would have reached it. It should be understood that what is being aimed at, here, is a contradiction of pantheism: for "everything perfect, divine, eternal," also leads to the belief in eternal recurrence. Question: has this pantheistic and affirmative attitude to all things also been made possible by morality? At bottom only the moral God has been overcome. Is there any sense in imagining a God "beyond good and evil"? Would pantheism in this sense be possible? Do we withdraw the idea of purpose from the process, and affirm the process notwithstanding? This were so if, within that process, something were attained every moment and always the same thing. Spinoza won an affirmative position of this sort, in the sense that every moment, according to him, has a logical necessity: and he triumphed by means of his fundamentally logical instinct over a like conformation of the world. But his case is exceptional. If every fundamental trait of character, which lies beneath every act, and which finds expression in every act, were recognized by the individual as his fundamental trait of character, this individual would be driven to regard every moment of his existence in general, triumphantly as good. It would simply be necessary for that fundamental trait of character to be felt in oneself as something good, valuable, and pleasurable. Now, in the case of those men and classes of men who were treated with violence and oppressed by their fellows, morality saved life from despair and from the leap into nonentity: for impotence in relation to mankind and not in relation to nature is what generates the most desperate bitterness towards existence. Morality treated the powerful, the violent, and the "masters" in general, as enemies against whom the common man must be protected that is to say, emboldened, strengthened. Morality has therefore always taught the most profound hatred and contempt of the fundamental trait of character of all rulers i.e. their will to power. To suppress, to deny, and to decompose this morality, would mean to regard this most thoroughly detested instinct with the reverse of the old feeling and valuation. If the sufferer and the oppressed man were to lose his belief in his right to contemn the will to power, his position would be desperate. This would be so if the trait above-mentioned were essential to life, in which case it would follow that even that will to morality was only a cloak to this "will to power," as are also even that hatred and contempt. The oppressed man would then perceive that he stands on the same platform with the oppressor, and that he has no individual privilege, nor any higher rank than the latter. On the contrary! There is nothing on earth which can have any value, if it have not a modicum of power granted, of course, that life itself is the will to power. Morality protected the botched and bungled against nihilism, in that it gave every one of them infinite worth, metaphysical worth, and classed them altogether in one order which did not correspond with that of worldly power and order of rank: it taught submission, humility, etc. Admitting that the belief in this morality be destroyed, the botched and the bungled would no longer have any comfort, and would perish. This perishing seems like self-annihilation, like an instinctive selection of that which must be destroyed. The symptoms of this self-destruction of the botched and the bungled: self-vivisection, poisoning, intoxication, romanticism, and, above all, the instinctive constraint to acts whereby the powerful are made into mortal enemies (training, so to speak, one s own hangmen), the will to destruction as the will of a still deeper instinct of the instinct of self-destruction, of the will to nonentity. Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled have no longer any consolation, that they destroy in order to be destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the territory of the opposite principle, and will also exercise power themselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. This is the European form of Buddhism, that active negation, after all existence has lost its meaning. It must not be supposed that "poverty" has grown more acute, on the contrary! "God, morality, resignation" were remedies in the very deepest stages of misery: active nihilism made its appearance in circumstances which were relatively much more favorable. The fact, alone, that morality is regarded as overcome, presupposes a certain degree of intellectual culture; while this very culture, for its part, bears evidence to a certain relative well-being. A certain intellectual fatigue, brought on by the long struggle concerning philosophical opinions, and carried to hopeless skepticism against philosophy, shows moreover that the level of these nihilists is by no means a low one. Only think of the conditions in which Buddha appeared! The teaching of the eternal recurrence would have learned principles to go upon (just as Buddha s teaching, for instance, had the notion of causality, etc.). What do we mean today by the words "botched and bungled"? In the first place, they are used physiologically and not politically. The unhealthiest kind of man all over Europe (in all classes) is the soil out of which nihilism grows: this species of man will regard eternal recurrence as damnation once he is bitten by the thought, he can no longer recoil before any action. He would not extirpate passively, but would cause everything to be extirpated which is meaningless and without a goal to this extent; although it is only a spasm, or sort of blind rage in the presence of the fact that everything has existed again and again for an eternity even this period of nihilism and destruction. The value of such a crisis is that it purifies, that it unites similar elements, and makes them mutually destructive, that it assigns common duties to men of opposite persuasions, and brings the weaker and more un certain among them to the light, thus taking the first step towards a new order of rank among forces from the standpoint of health: recognizing commanders as commanders, subordinates as subordinates. Naturally irrespective of all the present forms of society. What class of men will prove they are strongest in this new order of things? The most moderate: they who do not require any extreme forms of belief, they who not only admit of, but actually like, a certain modicum of chance and nonsense; they who can think of man with a very moderate view of his value, without becoming weak and small on that account; the most rich in health, who are able to withstand a maximum amount of sorrow, and who are therefore not so very much afraid of sorrow, men who are certain of their power, and who represent with conscious pride the state of strength to which man has attained. How could such a man think of eternal recurrence?

56. The Periods of European Nihilism. The period of obscurity: all kinds of groping measures devised to preserve old institutions and not to arrest the progress of new ones. The period of light; men see that old and new are fundamental contraries; that the old values are born of descending life, and that the new ones are born of ascending life that all old ideals are unfriendly to life (born of decadence and determining it, however much they may be decked out in the Sunday finery of morality). We understand the old, but are far from being sufficiently strong for the new. The periods of the three great passions: contempt, pity, destruction. The periods of catastrophes: the rise of a teaching which will sift mankind . . . which drives the weak to some decision and the strong also.

II. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM

(a) MODERN GLOOMINESS.

57. My friends, we had a hard time as youths; we even suffered from youth itself as though it were a serious disease. This is owing to the age in which we were born an age of enormous internal decay and disintegration which, with all its weakness and even with the best of its strength, is opposed to the spirit of youth. Disintegration that is to say, uncertainty is peculiar to this age: nothing stands on solid ground or on a sound faith. People live for the morrow, because the day-after-tomorrow is doubtful. All our road is slippery and dangerous, while the ice which still bears us has grown unconscionably thin: we all feel the mild and gruesome breath of the thaw-wind soon, where we are walking, no one will any longer be able to stand!

58. If this is not an age of decay and of diminishing vitality, it is at least one of indiscriminate and arbitrary experimentalizing and it is probable that out of an excess of abortive experiments there has grown this general impression, as of decay: and perhaps decay itself.

59. Concerning the history of modern gloominess. The state-nomads (officials, etc.): "home less". The break-up of the family. The "good man" as a symptom of exhaustion. Justice as will to power (rearing). Lewdness and neurosis. Black music: whither has real music gone? The anarchist. Contempt of man, loathing. Most profound distinction: whether hunger or satiety is creative? The first creates the ideals of romanticism. Northern unnaturalness. The need of alcohol: the "need" of the working classes. Philosophical nihilism.

60. The slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes (including the lower kind of spirit and body), which was already well under way before the French Revolution, and would have made the same progress forward without the latter, in short, then, the preponderance of the herd over all herdsmen and bell-wethers, brings in its train: (i) Gloominess of spirit (the juxtaposition of a stoical and a frivolous appearance of happiness, peculiar to noble cultures, is on the decline; much suffering is allowed to be seen and heard which formerly was borne in concealment; (2) Moral hypocrisy (a way of distinguishing oneself through morality, but by means of the values of the herd: pity, solicitude, moderation; and not by means of those virtues which are recognized and honored outside the herd s sphere of power); (3) A really large amount of sympathy with both pain and joy (a feeling of pleasure resulting from being herded together, which is peculiar to all gregarious animals "public spirit," "patriotism," everything, in fact, which is apart from the individual).

61. Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavors to mitigate distress, to honor it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is an age of the poor. Our "rich people" they are the poorest! The real purpose of all wealth has been forgotten.

62. Criticism of modern man: "the good man," but corrupted and misled by bad institutions (tyrants and priests); reason elevated to a position of authority; history is regarded as the surmounting of errors; the future is regarded as progress; the Christian state ("God of the armies"); Christian sexual intercourse (as marriage); the realm of "justice" (the cult of "mankind"); "freedom." The romantic attitudes of the modern man: the noble man (Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand) , taking the part of the oppressed and the bungled and the botched: motto for historians and romancers; the Stoics of duty; disinterestedness regarded as art and as knowledge; altruism as the most mendacious form of egoism (utilitarianism), the most sentimental form of egoism. All this savors of the eighteenth century. But it had other qualities which were not inherited, namely, a certain insouciance, cheerfulness, elegance, spiritual clearness. The spiritual tempo has altered; the pleasure which was begotten by spiritual refinement and clearness has given room to the pleasure of color, harmony, mass, reality, etc. etc. Sensuality in spiritual things. In short, it is the eighteenth century of Rousseau.

63. Taken all in all, a considerable amount of humanity has been attained by our men of today. That we feel this is in itself a proof of the fact that we have become so sensitive in regard to small cases of distress, that we somewhat unjustly overlook what has been achieved. Here we must make allowances for the fact that a great deal of decadence is rife, and that, through such eyes, our world must appear bad and wretched. But these eyes have always seen in the same way, in all ages. (1) A certain hypersensitiveness, even in morality. (2) The quantum of bitterness and gloominess, which pessimism bears with it in its judgments- both together have helped to bring about the preponderance of the other and opposite point of view, that things are not well with our morality. The fact of credit, of the commerce of the world, and the means of traffic are expressions of an extraordinarily mild trustfulness in men. . . . To that may also be added (3) The deliverance of science from moral and religious prejudices: a very good sign, though for the most part misunderstood. In my own way, I am attempting a justification of history.

64. The second appearance of Buddhism. Its precursory signs: the increase of pity. Spiritual exhaustion. The reduction of all problems to the question of pleasure and pain. The glory of war which calls forth a counter-stroke. Just as the sharp demarcation of nations generates a counter-movement in the form of the most hearty "fraternity." The fact that it is impossible for religion to carry on its work any longer with dogma and fables. The catastrophe of nihilism will put an end to all this Buddhistic culture.

65. That which is most sorely afflicted today is the instinct and will of tradition: all institutions which owe their origin to this instinct, are opposed to the tastes of the age. ... At bottom, nothing is thought or done which is not calculated to tear up this spirit of tradition by the roots. Tradition is looked upon as a fatality; it is studied and acknowledged (in the form of " heredity "), but people will not have anything to do with it. The extension of one will over long periods of time, the selection of conditions and valuations which make it possible to dispose of centuries in advance this, precisely, is what is most utterly anti-modern. From which it follows, that disorganizing principles give our age its specific character.

66. "Be simple" a demand which, when made to us complicated and incomprehensible triers of the heart and reins, is a simple absurdity. ... Be natural: but even if we are unnatural what then?

67. The means employed in former times in order to arrive at similarly constituted and lasting types, throughout long generations: entailed property and the respect of parents (the origin of the faith in gods and heroes as ancestors). Now, the subdivision of property belongs to the opposite tendency. The centralization of an enormous number of different interests in one soul: which, to that end, must be very strong and mutable. Nihilism.

68. Why does everything become mummery. The modern man is lacking in unfailing instinct (instinct being understood here to mean that which is the outcome of a long period of activity in the same occupation on the part of one family of men); the incapability of producing anything, is simply the result of this lack of instinct: one individual alone cannot make up for the schooling his ancestors should have transmitted to him. What a morality or book of law creates: that deep instinct which renders automatism and perfection possible in life and in work. But now we have reached the opposite point; yes, we wanted to reach it the most extreme consciousness, through introspection on the part of man and of history: and thus we are practically most distant from perfection in being, doing, and willing: our desires even our will to knowledge shows how prodigiously decadent we are. We are striving after the very reverse of what strong races and strong natures will have understanding is an end. . . . That science is possible in the way in which it is practiced today, proves that all elementary instincts, the instincts which ward off danger and protect life, are no longer active. We no longer save, we are merely spending the capital of our forefathers, even in the way in which we pursue knowledge.

69. Nihilistic trait. (a) In the natural sciences ("purposelessness"), causality, mechanism, "conformity to law," an interval, a remnant. (b) Likewise in politics: the individual lacks the belief in his own right, innocence; falsehood rules supreme, as also the worship of the moment. (c) Likewise in political economy: the abolition of slavery: the lack of a redeeming class, and of one who justifies the rise of anarchy. "Education"? (d) Likewise in history: fatalism, Darwinism; the last attempts at reconciling reason and godliness fail. Sentimentality in regard to the past: biographies can no longer be endured! (Phenomenalism even here: character regarded as a mask; there are no facts.) (e) Likewise in art: romanticism and its counter-stroke (repugnance towards romantic ideals and lies). The latter, morally, as a sense of great est truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure "artists" (indifference as to the "subject"). (The psychology of the father-confessor and puritanical psychology two forms of psychological romanticism: but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to maintain a purely artistic attitude towards "men" but even in this respect no one dares to make the opposite valuation.)

70. Against the teaching of the influence of environment and external causes: the power coming from inside is infinitely superior; much that appears like influence acting from without is merely the subjection of environment to this inner power. Precisely the same environment may be used and interpreted in opposite ways: there are no facts. A genius is not explained by such theories concerning origins.

71. "Modernity" regarded in the light of nutrition and digestion. Sensitiveness is infinitely more acute (beneath moral vestments: the increase of pity), the abund ance of different impressions is greater than ever. The cosmopolitanism of articles of diet, of literature, newspapers, forms, tastes, and even landscapes. The speed of this affluence is prestissimo; impressions are wiped out, and people instinctively guard against assimilating anything or against taking anything seriously and " digesting " it; the result is a weakening of the powers of digestion. There begin a sort of adaptation to this accumulation of impressions. Man unlearns the art of doing, and all he does is to react to stimuli coming from his environment. He spends his strength, partly in the process of assimilation, partly in defending himself, and again partly in responding to stimuli. Profound enfeeblement of spontaneity: the historian, the critic, the analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader, all reactive talents, all science! Artificial modification of one s own nature in order to make it resemble a "mirror"; one is interested, but only epidermally: this is systematic coolness, equilibrium, a steady low temperature, just beneath the thin surface on which warmth, movement, "storm," and undulations play. Opposition of external mobility to a certain dead heaviness and fatigue.

72. Where must our modern world be classed under exhaustion or under increasing strength? Its multiformity and lack of repose are brought about by the highest form of consciousness.

73. Overwork, curiosity and sympathy our modern vices.

74. A contribution to the characterization of "modernity." Exaggerated development of intermediate forms; the decay of types; the break-up of tradition, schools; the predominance of the instincts (philosophically prepared: the unconscious has the greater value) after the appearance of the enfeeblement of will power and of the will to an end and to the means thereto.

75. A capable artisan or scholar cuts a good figure if he have his pride in his art, and looks pleasantly and contentedly upon life. On the other hand, there is no sight more wretched than that of a cobbler or a schoolmaster who, with the air of a martyr, gives one to understand that he was really born for something better. There is nothing better than what is good! and that is: to have a certain kind of capacity and to use it. This is virtu in the Italian style of the Renaissance. Nowadays, when the state has a nonsensically oversized belly, in all fields and branches of work there are "representatives" over and above the real workman: for instance, in addition to the scholars, there are the journalists; in addition to the suffering masses, there is a crowd of jabbering and bragging ne'er-do-wells who "represent" that suffering not to speak of the professional politicians who, though quite satisfied with their lot, stand up in parliament and, with strong lungs, "represent" grievances. Our modern life is extremely expensive thanks to the host of middlemen that infest it; whereas in the city of antiquity, and in many a city of Spain and Italy today, where there is an echo of the ancient spirit, the man himself comes forward and will have nothing to do with a representative or an intermediary in the modern style except perhaps to kick him hence!

76. The pre-eminence of the merchant and the middleman, even in the most intellectual spheres: the journalist, the " representative," the historian (as an intermediary between the past and the pre sent), the exotic and cosmopolitan, the middleman between natural science and philosophy, the semi- theologians.

77. The men I have regarded with the most loathing, heretofore, are the parasites of intellect: they are to be found everywhere, already, in our modern Europe, and as a matter of fact their conscience is as light as it possibly can be. They may be a little turbid, and savor somewhat of Pessimism, but in the main they are voracious, dirty, dirtying, stealthy, insinuating, light-fingered gentry, scabby and as innocent as all small sinners and microbes are. They live at the expense of those who have intellect and who distribute it liberally: they know that it is peculiar to the rich mind to live in a disinterested fashion, without taking too much petty thought for the morrow, and to distribute its wealth prodigally. For intellect is a bad domestic economist, and pays no heed whatever to the fact that everything lives on it and devours it.

78. MODERN MUMMERY. The motleyness of modern men and its charm. Essentially a mask and a sign of boredom. The journalist. The political man (in the "national swindle"). Mummery in the arts: The lack of honesty in preparing and schooling oneself for them (Fromentin); The Romanticists (their lack of philosophy and science and their excess in literature); The novelists (Walter Scott, but also the monsters of the Nibelung with their inordinately nervous music); The lyricists. "Scientifically." Virtuosos (Jews). The popular ideals are overcome, but not yet in the presence of the people: The saint, the sage, the prophet.

79. The want of discipline in the modern spirit concealed beneath all kinds of moral finery. The show-words are: Toleration (for the " incapacity of saying yes or no "); la largeur de sympathie ( = a third of indifference, a third of curiosity, and a third of morbid susceptibility); "objectivity" (the lack of personality and of will, and the in ability to "love"); "freedom" in regard to the rule (Romanticism); "truth" as opposed to false hood and lying (Naturalism); the "scientific spirit" (the "human document": or, in plain English, the serial story which means "addition" instead of "composition"); "passion" in the place of disorder and intemperance; "depth" in the place of confusion and the pell-mell of symbols.

80. Concerning the criticism of big words. I am full of mistrust and malice towards what is called "ideal": this is my pessimism, that I have recognized to what extent "sublime sentiments" are a source of evil, that is to say, a belittling and depreciating of man. Every time "progress" is expected to result from an ideal, disappointment invariably follows; the triumph of an ideal has always been a retrograde movement. Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as showy words, for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to what they mean!).

81. The kind of man is known who has fallen in love with the sentence " tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner" It is the weak and, above all, the disillusioned: if there is something to pardon in everything, there is also something to contemn! It is the philosophy of disappointment, which here swathes itself so humanly in pity, and gazes out so sweetly. They are Romanticists, whose faith has gone to pot: now they at least wish to look on and see how everything vanishes and fades. They call it I art pour I art, " objectivity," etc.

82. The main symptoms of Pessimism: Dinners at Magny s; Russian Pessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoiew- 69 sky); aesthetic Pessimism, fart pour I art, " de scription " (the romantic and the anti-romantic Pessimism); Pessimism in the theory of know ledge (Schopenhauer: phenomenalism); anarchical Pessimism; the " religion of pity," Buddhistic preparation; the Pessimism of culture (exoticness, cosmopolitanism); moral Pessimism, myself.

83. " Without the Christian Faith," said Pascal, " you would yourselves be like nature and history, un monstre et un chaos" We fulfilled this prophecy: once the weak and optimistic eighteenth century had embellished and rationalised man. Schopenhauer and Pascal. In one essential point, Schopenhauer is the first who takes up Pascals movement again: un monstre et un chaos, conse quently something that must be negatived . . . history, nature, and man himself! " Our inability to know the truth is the result of our corruption, of our moral decay" says Pascal. And Schopenhauer says essentially the same. " The more profound the corruption of reason is, the more necessary is the doctrine of salvation " or, putting it into Schopenhauerian phraseology, negation.

84. Schopenhauer as an epigone (state of affairs before the Revolution): Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, Catholicism of the most intel lectual desires that is, at bottom, the good old eighteenth century. 70 Schopenhauer s fundamental misunderstanding of the will (just as though passion, instinct, and desire were the essential factors of will) is typical: the depreciation of the will to the extent of mis taking it altogether. Likewise the hatred of willing: the attempt at seeing something superior yea, even superiority itself, and that which really matters, in non-willing, in the " subject-being without aim or intention." Great symptom of fatigue or of the weakness of will: for this, in reality, is what treats the passions as master, and directs them as to the way and to the measure. . . .

85. The undignified attempt has been made to regard Wagner and Schopenhauer as types of the mentally unsound: an infinitely more essential understanding of the matter would have been gained if the exact decadent type which each of them represents had been scientifically and accurately defined.

86. In my opinion, Henrik Ibsen has become very German. With all his robust idealism and " Will to Truth," he never dared to ring himself free from moral-illusionism which says " freedom," and will not admit, even to itself, what freedom is: the second stage in the metamorphosis of the " Will to Power" in him who lacks it. In the first stage, one demands justice at the hands of those who havepower. In the second one speaks of "freedom," 71 that is to say, one wishes to " shake oneself free " from those who have power. In the third stage, one speaks of " equal rights " that is to say, so long as one is not a predominant personality one wishes to prevent one s competitors from growing in power.

87. The Decline of Protestantism: theoretically and historically understood as a half-measure. Un deniable predominance of Catholicism today: Protestant feeling is so dead that the strongest anti- Protestant movements (Wagner s Parsifal, for instance) are no longer regarded as such. The whole of the more elevated intellectuality in France is Catholic in instinct; Bismarck recognized that there was no longer any such thing as Protestantism.

88. Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and tiresome form of decadence, in which Christianity has known how to survive in the mediocre North, is something incomplete and complexly valuable for knowledge, in so far as it was able to bring experiences of different kinds and origins into the same heads.

89. What has the German spirit not made out of Christianity! And, to refer to Protestantism again, how much beer is there not still in Protestant Christianity! Can a crasser, more indolent, and more lounging form of Christian belief be imagined, than that of the average German Protestant? . . . It is indeed a very humble Christianity. I call it the Homoeopathy of Christianity! I am reminded that, today, there also exists a less humble sort of Protestantism; it is taught by royal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators: but nobody has ever maintained that any " spirit " " hovers " over these waters. It is merely a less respectable form of Christian faith, not by any means a more comprehensible one.

90. Progress. Let us be on our guard lest we deceive ourselves! Time flies forward apace, we would fain believe that everything flies forward with it, that evolution is an advancing development. . . . That is the appearance of things which deceives the most circumspect. But the nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement when compared with that of 1788. . . . Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement? that the German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism? that the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organization of society on a large scale? . . . Man is not an example of progress as compared with animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type that is to say, richer in sustaining power than the European.

(b) THE LAST CENTURIES.

91. Gloominess and pessimistic influence necessarily follow in the wake of enlightenment. Towards 1770 a falling-off in cheerfulness was already noticeable; women, with that very feminine instinct which always defends virtue, believed that immor ality was the cause of it. Galiani hit the bull s eye: he quotes Voltaire s verse: " Un monstre gai vaut mieux Qu un sentimental ennuyeux." If now I maintain that I am ahead, by a century or two of enlightenment, of Voltaire and Galiani who was much more profound, how deeply must I have sunk into gloominess! This is also true, and betimes I somewhat reluctantly manifested some caution in regard to the German and Christian narrowness and inconsistency of Schopenhauerian or, worse still, Leopardian Pessim ism, and sought the most characteristic form (Asia). But, in order to endure that extreme Pessimism (which here and there peeps out of my Birth of Tragedy), to live alone " without God or morality," I was compelled to invent a counter-prop for my self. Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so excruciat ingly that he was compelled to invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been expected, the most cheerful.

92. In regard to German culture, I have always had a feeling as of decline. The fact that I learned to know a declining form of culture has often made me unfair towards the whole phenomenon of European culture. The Germans always follow at some distance behind: they always go to the root of things, for instance: Dependance upon foreigners; Kant Rousseau, the sensualists, Hume, Swedenborg. Schopenhauer the Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire. Wagner the French cult of the ugly and of grand opera, Paris, and the flight into primitive barbarism (the marriage of brother and sister). The law of the laggard (the provinces go to Paris, Germany goes to France). How is it that precisely Germans discovered the Greek (the more an instinct is developed, the more it is tempted to run for once into its opposite). Music is the last breath of every culture.

93. Renaissance and Reformation. What does the Renaissance prove? That the reign of the "individual" can be only a short one. The out put is too great; there is not even the possibility of husbanding or of capitalizing forces, and exhaustion sets in step by step. These are times when everything is squandered, when even the strength itself with which one collects, capitalises, and heaps riches upon riches, is squandered. Even the opponents of such movements are driven to preposterous extremes in the dissipation of their strength: and they too are very soon exhausted, used up, and completely sapped. In the Reformation we are face to face with a wild and plebeian counterpart of the Italian Renaissance, generated by similar impulses, except that the former, in the backward and still vulgar North, had to assume a religious form there the concept of a higher life had not yet been divorced from that of a religious one. Even the Reformation was a movement for individual liberty; " every one his own priest " is really no more than a formula for libertinage. As a matter of fact, the words " Evangelical freedom " would have sufficed and all instincts which had reasons for remaining concealed broke out like wild hounds, the most brutal needs suddenly acquired the courage to show themselves, everything seemed justified . . . men refused to specify the kind of freedom they had aimed at, they preferred to shut their eyes. But the fact that their eyes were closed and that their lips were moistened with gushing orations, did not prevent their hands from being ready to snatch at whatever there was to snatch at, that the belly became the god of the "free gospel," and that all lusts of revenge and of hatred were indulged with insatiable fury. This lasted for a while: then exhaustion super vened, just as it had done in Southern Europe; and again here, it was a low form of exhaustion, a sort of general mere in servitium. . . . Then the disreputable century of Germany dawned.

94. Chivalry the position won by power: its gradual break-up (and partial transference to broader and more bourgeois spheres). In the case of Larochefoucauld we find a knowledge of the actual impulses of a noble temperament together with the gloomy Christian estimate of these impulses. The protraction of Christianity through the French Revolution. The seducer is Rousseau; he once again liberates woman, who thenceforward is always represented as ever more interesting suffering. Then come the slaves and Mrs. Beecher- Stowe. Then the poor and the workmen. Then the vicious and the sick all this is drawn into the foreground (even for the purpose of disposing people in favour of the genius, it has been custom ary for five hundred years to press him forward as the great sufferer!). Then comes the cursing of all voluptuousness (Beaudelaire and Schopen hauer); the most decided conviction that the lust of power is the greatest vice; absolute certainty that morality and disinterestedness are identical things; that the " happiness of all " is a goal worth 77 striving after (i.e., Christ's Kingdom of Heaven). We are on the best road to it: the Kingdom of Heaven of the poor in spirit has begun. Inter mediate stages: the bourgeois (as a result of the nouveau riche] and the workman (as a result of the machine). Greek and French culture of the time of Louis XIV. compared. A decided belief in oneself. A leisure-class which makes things hard for itself and exercises a great deal of self-control. The power of form, the will to form oneself. " Happi ness " acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength and energy behind all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of a life that is seemingly so easy. The Greeks seemed like children to the French.

95. The Three Centuries. Their different kinds of sensitiveness may perhaps be best expressed as follows: Aristocracy: Descartes, the reign of reason, evidence showing the sovereignty of the will. Feminism: Rousseau, the reign of feeling, evidence showing the sovereignty of the senses; all lies. Animalism: Schopenhauer, the reign of passion, evidence showing the sovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy. The seventeenth century is aristocratic, all for order, haughty towards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, " austere," and even free from sentiment, " non-German," averse to all that is burlesque and natural, generalizing and maintaining an attitude of sovereignty towards the past- for it believes in itself. At bottom it partakes very much of the beast of prey, and practises asceticism in order to remain master. It is the century of strength of will, as also that of strong passion. The eighteenth century is dominated by woman, it is gushing, spiritual, and flat; but with intellect at the service of aspirations and of the heart, it is a libertine in the pleasures of intellect, undermining all authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerful, clear, humane, and sociable, false to itself and at bottom very rascally. . . . The nineteenth century is more animal, more subterranean, hateful, realistic, plebeian, and on that very account " better," " more honest," more submissive to " reality " of what kind soever, and truer; but weak of will, sad, obscurely exacting and fatalistic. It has no feeling of timidity or reverence, either in the presence of " reason " or the " heart "; thoroughly convinced of the dominion of the desires (Schopenhauer said " Will," but nothing is more characteristic of his philosophy than that it entirely lacks all actual willing}. Even morality is reduced to an instinct (" Pity "). Auguste Comte is the continuation of the eighteenth century (the dominion of the heart over the head, sensuality in the theory of knowledge, altruistic exaltation). The fact that science has become as sovereign as it is today, proves how the nineteenth century has emancipated itself from the dominion of ideals. A certain absence of " needs " and wishes makes our scientific curiosity and rigor possible this is our kind of virtue. Romanticism is the counterstroke of the eighteenth century; a sort of accumulated longing for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of fact, largely mingled with mummery and self-deception: the desire was to represent strong nature and strong passion}. The nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of theories by means of which it may feel its fatalistic submission to the empire of facts justified. Hegel s success against sentimentality and romantic idealism was already a sign of its fatalistic trend of thought, in its belief that superior reason belongs to the triumphant side, and in its justification of the actual " state " (in the place of " humanity," etc.). Schopenhauer: we are something foolish, and at the best self- suppressive. The success of determinism, the genealogical derivation of obligations which were formerly held to be absolute, the teaching of environment and adaptation, the reduction of will to a process of reflex movement, the denial of the will as a " working cause "; finally a real process of re-christening: so little will is observed that the word itself becomes available for another purpose. Further theories: the teaching of objectivity, " will-less " contemplation, as the only road to truth, as also to beauty (also the belief in " genius," in order to have the right to be submissive); mechanism, the determinable rigidity of the mechanical process; so-called " Naturalism," the elimination of the choosing, directing, inter preting subject, on principle. Kant, with his " practical reason," with his moral fanaticism, is quite eighteenth century style; still completely outside the historical movement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for instance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek philosophy; he is a phantasist of the notion of duty, a sensualist with a hidden leaning to dogmatic pampering. The return to Kant in our century means a return to the eighteenth century: people desire to create themselves a right to the old ideas and to the old exaltation hence a theoryofknowledge which" describes limits," that is to say, which admits of the option of fixing a Beyond to the domain of reason. Hegel's way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of Goethe: see the latter on the subject of Spinoza, for instance. The will to deify the All and Life, in order to find both peace and happiness in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason everywhere in the presence of reason man may be submissive and resigned. In Goethe we find a kind of fatalism which is almost joyous and confiding, which neither revolts nor weakens, which strives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in totality does every thing seem good and justified, and find itself resolved.

96. The period of rationalism followed by a period of sentimentality. To what extent does Schopenhauer come under "sentimentality"? (Hegel under intellectuality?)

97. The seventeenth century suffers from humanity as from a host of contradictions (" Famas de con tradictions " that we are ); it endeavours to discover man, to co-ordinate him, to excavate him: whereas the eighteenth century tries to forget what is known of man s nature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. " Superficial, soft, humane " gushes over " humanity." The seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual in order that the artist s work may resemble life as much as possible. The eighteenth century strives to create interest in the author by means of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of culture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and social reforms. " Utopia," the " ideal man," the deification of Nature, the vanity of making one s own personality the centre of interest, subordination to the propa ganda of social ideas, charlatanism all this we derive from the eighteenth century. The style of the seventeenth century: propre exact et libre. The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or who appeals ardently to God and that obtrusive- ness and indiscretion of modern authors these things are opposites. u Showing-oneself-ofif" what a contrast to the Scholars of Port- Royal! Alfieri had a sense for the grand style. The hate of the burlesque (that which lacks dignity), the lack of a sense of Nature belongs to the seventeenth century.

98. Against Rousseau. Alas! man is no longer sufficiently evil; Rousseau s opponents, who say that " man is a beast of prey," are unfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the softening and moralising of him is the curse. In the sphere which Rousseau attacked most violently, the relatively strongest and most successful type of man was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great passions intact: Will to Power, Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability to Com mand). The man of the eighteenth century must be compared with the man of the Renaissance (also with the man of the seventeenth century in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity both signs that the dominating will is lacking: he moralises and seeks the cause of his own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the ruling classes.

99. Voltaire Rousseau. A state of nature is terrible; man is a beast of prey: our civilisation is an extraordinary triumph over this beast of prey in nature this was Voltaire s conclusion. He was conscious of the mildness, the refinements, the intellectual joys of the civilized state; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue, and the lack of delicacy even in ascetics and monks. The moral depravity of man seemed to pre occupy Rousseau; the words " unjust," " cruel," are the best possible for the purpose of exciting the instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under the ban of the vetitum and of disgrace; so that their conscience is opposed to their indulging any insurrectional desires. These emancipators seek one thing above all: to give their party the great accents and attitudes of higher Nature.

100. Rousseau: the rule founded on sentiment; Nature as the source of justice; man perfects himself in proportion as he approaches Nature (according to Voltaire, in proportion as he leaves Nature behind}. The very same periods seem to the one to demonstrate the progress of humanity and, to the other, the increase of injustice and inequality. Voltaire, who still understood umanita in the sense of the Renaissance, as also virtu (as " higher culture "), fights for the cause of the " honnetes gens" " la bonne compagnie" taste, science, arts, and even for the cause of progress and civilisation. The flare-up occurred towards 1760: On the one hand the citizen of Geneva, on the other le seigneur de Ferney. It is only from that moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of his age, the philosopher, the representative of Toleration and of Disbelief (theretofore he had been merely un bel esprit}. His envy and hatred of Rousseau s success forced him upwards. " Pour la canaille un dieu re mune rateur el vengeur " Voltaire. The criticism of both standpoints in regard to the value of civilisation. To Voltaire nothing seems finer than the social invention: there is no higher goal than to uphold and perfect it. L honnetete consists precisely in respecting social usage; virtue in a certain obedience towards various necessary " prejudices " which favour the maintenance of society. Missionary of Culture, aristocrat, representative of the triumphant and ruling classes and their values. But Rousseau remained a plebeian, even as hommes de lettres, this was preposterous] his shameless contempt for everything that was not himself. The morbid feature in Rousseau is the one which happens to have been most admired and imitated. (Lord Byron resembled him somewhat, he too screwed himself up to sublime attitudes and to revengeful rage a sign of vulgarity; later on, when Venice restored his equilibrium, he under stood what alleviates most and does the most good . . . F insouciance?) In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is proud of himself; but he is incensed if he is reminded of his origin. . . . In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brain trouble; in Voltaire rare health and lightsome- ness. The revengefulness of the sick; his periods of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his mistrust. Rousseau s defence of Providence (against Vol taire s Pessimism): he had need of God in order to be able to curse society and civilisation; every thing must be good per se, because God had created it; man alone has corrupted man. The " good man " as a man of Nature was pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God s authorship he became something probable and even not devoid of found ation. Romanticism & la Rousseau: passion (" the sovereign right of passion "); " naturalness "; the fascination of madness (foolishness reckoned as greatness); the senseless vanity of the weak; the revengefulness of the masses elevated to the posi tion of justice (" in politics, for one hundred years, the leader has always been this invalid " ).

101. Kant: makes the scepticism of Englishmen, in regard to the theory of knowledge, possible for Germans. (1) By enlisting in its cause the interest of the German s religious and moral needs: just as the new academicians used scepticism for the same reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (vide Augustine); just as Pascal even used moral scepticism in order to provoke (to justify) the need of belief; (2) By complicating and entangling it with scholastic flourishes in view of making it more acceptable to the German's scientific taste in form (for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminating, too clear that is to say, judged according to the German valuing instinct, " too superficial "). Kant: a poor psychologist and mediocre judge of human nature, made hopeless mistakes in regard to great historical values (the French Revolution); a moral fanatic a la Rousseau; with a subterranean current of Christian values; a thorough dogmatist, but bored to extinction by this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrannise over it, but quickly tired, even of skepticism; and not yet affected by any cosmopolitan thought or antique beauty ... a dawdler and a go-between, not at all original (like Leibnitz, something between mechanism and spiritualism; like Goethe, something between the taste of the eighteenth century and that of the " historical sense " [which is essentially a sense of exoticism]; like German music, between French and Italian music; like Charles the Great, who mediated and built bridges between the Roman Empire and Nationalism a dawdler par excellence],

102. In what respect have the Christian centuries with their Pessimism been stronger centuries than the eighteenth and how do they correspond with the tragic age of the Greeks? The nineteenth century versus the eighteenth. How was it an heir? how was it a step backwards from the latter? (more lacking in " spirit " and in taste) how did it show an advance on the latter? (more gloomy, more realistic, stronger).

103. How can we explain the fact that we feel something in common with the Campagna romana? And the high mountain chain? Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes in 1803 writes his first impression of the Campagna romana. The President de Brosses says of the Campagna romana: " II fallait que Romulus fut ivre quand il songea a batir une ville dans un terrain aussi laid." Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him. He loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did. The"ophile Gautier s and Richard Wagner s dislike of Rome must not be forgotten. Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo. Victor Hugo raves about Spain, " parce que aucune autre nation n a moins emprunte* a 1 antiquite", parce qu elle n a subi aucune influence classique."

104. The two great attempts that were made to overcome the eighteenth century: Napoleon, in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle for power, to life again, and conceived Europe as a political power. Goethe, in that he imagined a European culture which would consist of the whole heritage of what humanity had attained to up to his time. German culture in this century inspires mistrust the music of the period lacks that complete element which liberates and binds as well, to wit Goethe.

105. The pre-eminence of music in the romanticists of 1830 and 1840. Delacroix. Ingres a passionate musician (admired Gluck, Haydn, Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome: "Si je pouvais vous rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres" likewise Horace Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who says of himself: "Combien de lieues ne ferais-je pas a pied, et a combien de jours de prison ne me soumetterais-je pas pour entendre Don Juan ou le Matrimonio segreto; et je ne sais pour quelle autre chose je ferais cet effort." He was then fifty-six years old. The borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as a typical "Epigone," likewise Mendelssohn s cultured Protestantism (a former " soul " is turned into poetry posthumously . . .) the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used one art as a stop-gap to make up for what another lacked. the " historical sense," inspiration derived from poems, sagas. That characteristic transformation of which G. Flaubert is the most striking example among Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most striking example among Germans, shows how the romantic belief in love and the future changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50. "

106. How is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of German romanti cism? How is it that German music lacks Goethe? On the other hand, how much Schiller, or more exactly, how much " Thekla " * is there not in Beethoven! Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him. Richard Wagner has Freischutz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga, the mystic Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, " the free-spiritedness of passion " (Rousseau s intention). The Flying Dutchman savors of France, where le ttntbreux (1830) was the type of the seducer. The cult of music, the revolutionary romanticism of form. Wagner synthesises German and French romanticism.

107. From the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German culture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German mis fortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But what does it matter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also seems to me that to no country on earth is he less related than to Germany; nothing was prepared there for his advent; his whole type is simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst, wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But people carefully avoid acknowledging this: they are too kind, too square-headed too German for that. " Credo quia absurdus est ": thus did the German spirit wish it to be, in this case too hence it is content meanwhile to believe everything Richard Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In all ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in subtlety and divining powers concerning psychological matters. Now that it happens to be under the high pressure of patriotic nonsense and self-adoration, it is visibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to the problem of Wagner!

108. The Germans are not yet anything, but they are becoming something; that is why they have not yet any culture; that is why they cannot yet have any culture! They are not yet anything: that means they are all kinds of things. They are becoming something: that means that they will one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope yet. Fortunately it is a wish with which one can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a question of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation, of discomfort, yea, even of bitterness, in short, we Germans will get something out of ourselves, something that has not yet been wanted of us we want something more 91 That this " German, as he is not as yet " has a right to something better than the present German " culture "; that all who wish to become something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of contentment, an impudent " setting-oneself-at-ease," or " a process of self- censing," in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard to which my opinions have not yet changed.

(c) SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH.

109. First Principle: everything that characterises modern men savors of decay: but side by side with the prevailing sickness there are signs of a strength and powerfulness of soul which are still untried. The same causes which tend to promote the belittling of men, also force the stronger and rarer individuals upwards to greatness. no.

110. General survey: the ambiguous character of our modern world precisely the same symptoms might at the same time be indicative of either decline or strength. And the signs of strength and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional (or hereditary] appreciations concerned with the feelings, be misunderstood as indications of weakness. In short, feeling, as a means of fixing valuations, is not on a level with the times. Generalized: Every valuation is always back ward; it is merely the expression of the conditions which favoured survival and growth in a much earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence out of which it did not arise, and which it therefore necessarily misunderstands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against, all that is new.

111. The problem of the nineteenth century. To discover whether its strong and weak side belong to each other. Whether they have been cut from one and the same piece. Whether the variety of its ideals and their contradictions are conditioned by a higher purpose: whether they are something higher. For it might be the prerequisite of great ness, that growth should take place amid such violent tension. Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, might be a good sign.

112. General survey. As a matter of fact, all abundant growth involves a concomitant process of crumbling to bits and decay: suffering and the symptoms of decline belong to ages of enormous progress; every fruitful and powerful movement of mankind has always brought about a concurrent Nihilistic movement Under certain circumstances, the appearance of the extremest form of Pessimism and actual Nihilism might be the sign of a process of incisive and most essential growth, and of man kind s transit into completely new conditions of existence. This is what I have understood. Nihilism.

113. A. Starting out with a thoroughly courageous appreciation of our men of today: we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by appearance: this mankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges of lasting strength its tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is richer. Healthiness is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy body are on the point of being known, and will gradually be created, " asceticism " is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a certain confidence in the " right way," no raving: a periodical self-habituation to narrower values (such as " mother-land," " science," etc.). This whole picture, however, would still be ambiguous: it might be a movement either of increase or decline in Life. B. The belief in " progress " in lower spheres of intelligence, appears as increasing life: but this is self-deception; in higher spheres of intelligence it is a sign of declining life. Description of the symptoms. The unity of the aspect: uncertainty in regard to the standard of valuation. Fear of a general " in vain." Nihilism.

114. As a matter of fact, we are no longer so urgently in need of an antidote against the first Nihilism: Life is no longer so uncertain, accidental, and senseless in modern Europe. All such tremendous exaggeration of the value of men, of the value of evil, etc., are not so necessary now; we can endure a considerable diminution of this value, we may grant a great deal of nonsense and accident: the power man has acquired now allows of a lowering of the means of discipline, of which the strongest was the moral interpretation of the universe. The hypothesis " God " is much too extreme.

115. If anything shows that our humanisation is a genuine sign of progress, it is the fact that we no longer require excessive contraries, that we no longer require contraries at all. . . . We may love the senses; for we have spiritualised them in every way and made them artistic; We have a right to all things which hitherto have been most calumniated.

116. The reversal of the order of rank. Those pious counterfeiters thepriests arebecomingChandala in our midst: they occupy the position of the charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter, of the sorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of the will, as the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of Life, and as the rebels among the bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of our servant-caste the Sudra that is to say, our people or the body which wields the political power. On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the blasphemers, the im- moralists, the independents of all kinds, the artists, the Jews, the minstrels and, at bottom, all dis reputable classes are in the van. We have elevated ourselves to honorable thoughts, even more, we determine what honor is on earth, "nobility." ... All of us today are advocates of life. We Immoralists are today the strongest power: the other great powers are in need of us ... we re-create the world in our own image. We have transferred the label " Chandala " to the priests, the backworldsmen, and to the deformed Christian society which has become associated with these people, together with creatures of like origin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity, criminals, and men of vicious habits the whole sphere in which the idea of "God" is that of Saviour. . . . We are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and detractors of Life. . . .

117. The advance of the nineteenth century upon the eighteenth (at bottom we good Europeans are carrying on a war against the eighteenth century): 1 i ) " The return to Nature " is getting to be understood, ever more definitely, in a way which is quite the reverse of that in which Rousseau used the phrase away from idylls and operas! (2) Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic, more objective, more fearless, more industrious, more temperate, more suspicious of sudden changes. anti-revolutionary; (3) The question of bodily health is being pressed ever more decidedly in front of the health of " the soul ": the latter is regarded as a condition brought about by the former, and bodily health is believed to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual health.

118. If anything at all has been achieved, it is a more innocent attitude towards the senses, a happier, more favourable demeanour in regard to sensuality, resembling rather the position taken up by Goethe; a prouder feeling has also been developed in knowledge, and the "reine Thor" * meets with little faith.

119. We " objective people? It is not "pity" that opens up the way for us to all that is most remote and most strange in life and culture; but our Nihilism. 97 accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely does not " pity," but rather takes pleasure in hun dreds of things which formerly caused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in the presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in all its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are certainly not the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain may shake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely not inclined to be more helpful in view thereof. In this deliberate desire to look on at all pain and error, we have grown stronger and more powerful than in the eighteenth century; it is a proof of our increase of strength (we have drawn closer to the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries). But it is a profound mistake to regard our " romanticism " as a proof of our " beautified souls." We want stronger sensations than all coarser ages and classes have wanted. (This fact must not be con founded with the needs of neurotics and decadents; in their case, of course, there is a craving for pepper even for cruelty.) We are all seeking conditions which are eman cipated from the bourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of morality (every book which savors at all of priestdom and theology gives us the impression of pitiful niaiserie and mental indigence). " Good company," in fact, finds everything insipid which is not forbidden and con sidered compromising in bourgeois circles; and the case is the same with books, music, politics, and opinions on women.

120. The simplification of man in the nineteenth century (The eighteenth century was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling). Not "return to nature "; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet. Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values are the rule and the beginning; man only reaches Nature after a long struggle he never turns his " back " to her. . . . To be natural means, to dare to be as immoral as Nature is. We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony towards generous feelings, even when we are be neath them. Our haute votte, the society consisting of our rich and leisured men, is more natural: people hunt each other, the love of the sexes is a kind of sport in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle; people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily advantages stand in the first rank, and curiosity and daring are the rule. Our attitude towards knowledge is more natural; we are innocent in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic manners, we delight in that which is most strictly prohibited, we should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we were bored in acquiring it. Our attitude to morality is also more natural. Principles have become a laughing-stock; no one dares to speak of his " duty," unless in irony. But a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued. (Morality is located in instinct and the rest is despised. Besides this there are few points of honor.) Our attitude to politics is more natural: we see problems of power, of the quantum of power, against another quantum. We do not believe in a right that does not proceed from a power which is able to uphold it. We regard all rights as conquests. Our valuation of great men and things is more natural: we regard passion as a privilege; we can conceive of nothing great which does not involve a great crime; all greatness is associated in our minds with a certain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality. Our attitude to Nature is more natural: we no longer love her for her " innocence," her " reason," her " beauty," we have made her beautifully devilish and " foolish." But instead of despising her on that account, since then we have felt more closely related to her and more familiar in her presence. She does not aspire to virtue: we therefore respect her. Our attitude towards Art is more natural: we do not exact beautiful, empty lies, etc., from her; brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it ascer tains things with perfect calm. In short: there are signs showing that the European of the nineteenth century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way towards acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and immorality, without bitterness: on the contrary, he is strong enough to endure this point of view alone. To some ears this will sound as though corruption had made strides: and certain it is that man has not drawn nearer to the " Nature " which Rousseau speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the civilisation before which Rousseau stood in horror. We have grown stronger, we have drawn nearer t the seventeenth century, more particularly to the taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt, Le Sage, Renard).

121. Culture versus Civilization. culminating stages of culture and civilisation lie apart: one mutt not be led astray as regards the fundamental antagonism existing between culture and civilisa tion. From the moral standpoint, great peno in the history of culture have always been periods of corruption; while on the other hand, those periods in which man was deliberately and compulsorily tamed ("civilization") have always been periods of intolerance towards the most intellectual and most audacious natures. Civilization desires some thing different from what culture strives after: their aims may perhaps be opposed. . . .

122. What I warn people against: confounding the instincts of decadence" with those of humanity; Confounding the dissolving means of civilization and those which necessarily promote decadence, with culture; Confounding debauchery, and the principle, "laisser aller," with the Will to Power (the latter is the exact reverse of the former).

123. The unsolved problems which I set anew: the problem of civilisation, the struggle between Rous seau and Voltaire about the year 1760. Man becomes deeper, more mistrustful, more " immoral," stronger, more self-confident and therefore " more natural" , that is "progress." In this way, by a process of division of labour, the more evil strata and the milder and tamer strata of society get separated: so that the general facts are not visible at first sight. ... It is a sign of strength, and of the self-control and fascination of the strong, that these stronger strata possess the arts in order to make their greater powers for evil felt as something " higher" As soon as there is " progress " there is a Revaluation of the strengthened factors into the " good."

124. Man must have the courage of his natural instincts restored to him. The poor opinion he has of himself must be destroyed (not in the sense of the individual, but in the sense of the natural man . . .) The contradictions in things must be eradicated, after it has been well understood that we were responsible for them Social idiosyncrasies must be stamped out of existence (guilt, punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc. etc.) An advance towards " naturalness ": in all politi cal questions, even in the relations between parties, even in merchants , workmen s, or contractors parties, only questions of power come into play: " what one can do " is the first question, what one ought to do is only a secondary consideration.

125. Socialism or the tyranny of the meanest and the most brainless, that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the mummers, brought to its zenith, is, as a matter of fact, the logical con clusion of " modern ideas " and their latent anarchy: but in the genial atmosphere of demo cratic well-being the capacity for forming resolu tions or even for coming to an end at all, is paralysed. Men follow but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing than to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces of present-day socialists and what wretched and nonsensical feelings does not their style reveal to us! and the childish lamblike happiness of their hopes and desires. Nevertheless, in many places in Europe, there may be violent hand-to-hand struggles and irruptions on their account: the coming century is likely to be convulsed in more than one spot, and the Paris Commune, which finds defenders and advocates even in Germany, will seem to have been but a slight indigestion compared with what is to come. Be this as it may, there will always be too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything more than an attack of illness: and these people of property are like one man with one faith, " one must possess something in 103 order to be some one." This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of all instincts; I should add: " one must desire more than one has in order to become more." For this is the teaching which life itself preaches to all living things: the morality of Development. To have and to wish to have more, in a word, Growth that is life itself. In the teaching of socialism " a will to the denial of life " is but poorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised a teaching of this sort. In fact, I even wish a few experiments might be made to show that in a socialistic society, life denies itself, and itself cuts away its own roots. The earth is big enough and man is still unex hausted enough for a practical lesson of this sort and demonstratio ad absurdum even if it were accomplished only by a vast expenditure of lives to seem worthwhile to me. Still, Socialism, like a restless mole beneath the foundations of a society wallowing in stupidity, will be able to achieve something useful and salutary: it delays " Peace on Earth " and the whole process of character- softening of the democratic herding animal; it forces the European to have an extra supply of intellect, that is to say, craft and caution, and prevents his entirely abandoning the manly and warlike qualities, it also saves Europe awhile from the marasmus femininus which is threatening it.

126. The most favourable obstacles and remedies of modernity: (1) Compulsory military service with real wars in which all joking is laid aside. (2) National thick-headedness (which simplifies and concentrates). (3) Improved nutrition (meat). (4) Increasing cleanliness and wholesomeness in the home. (5) The predominance of physiology over theology, morality, economics, and politics. (6) Military discipline in the exaction and the practice of one s " duty " (it is no longer customary to praise).

127. I am delighted at the military development of Europe, also at the inner anarchical conditions: the period of quietude and " Chinadom " which Galiani prophesied for this century is now over. Personal and manly capacity, bodily capacity recovers its value, valuations are becoming more physical, nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh. Fine men have once more become possible. Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins at their head, as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of the past. The savage in every one of us is acknowledged even the wild animal. Precisely on that account, philosophers will have a better chance. Kant is a scarecrow!

128. I have not yet seen any reasons to feel dis couraged. He who acquires and preserves a strong will, together with a broad mind, has a more favourable chance now than ever he had. For the plasticity of man has become exceedingly great in democratic Europe: men who learn easily, who readily adapt themselves, are the rule: the gregarious animal of a high order of intelligence is prepared. He who would command finds those who must obey: I have Napoleon and Bismarck in mind, for instance. The struggle against strong and unintelligent wills, which forms the surest obstacle in one s way, is really insignificant Who would not be able to knock down these " objective " gentlemen with weak wills, such as Ranke and Renan!

129. Spiritual enlightenment is an unfailing means of making men uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in short, of developing the herding instincts in them. That is why all great artist-rulers hitherto (Confucius in China, the Roman Empire, Napoleon, Popedom at a time when they had the courage of their worldliness and frankly pursued power) in whom the ruling instincts, that had prevailed until their time, culminated, also made use of the spiritual enlighten ment; or at least allowed it to be supreme (after the style of the Popes of the Renaissance). The self-deception of the masses on this point, in every democracy for instance, is of the greatest possible value: all that makes men smaller and more amenable is pursued under the title " progress."

130. The highest equity and mildness as a condition of weakness (the New Testament and the early Christian community manifesting itself in the form of utter foolishness in the Englishmen, Darwin and Wallace). Your equity, ye higher men, drives you to universal suffrage, etc.; your " humanity " urges you to be milder towards crime and stupidity. In the end you will thus help stupidity and harmlessness to conquer. Outwardly: Ages of terrible wars, insurrections, explosions. Imwardly: ever more and more weakness among men; events take the form of excitants. The Parisian as the type of the European extreme. Consequences: (1) Savages (at first, of course, in conformity with the culture that has reigned hitherto); (2) Sovereign individuals (where powerful barbarous masses and emancipation from all that has been, are crossed). The age of greatest stupidity, brutality, and wretchedness in the masses, and in the highest individuals.

131. An incalculable number of higher individuals now perish: but he who escapes their fate is as strong as the devil. In this respect we are reminded of the conditions which prevailed in the Renaissance.

132. How are Good Europeans such as ourselves distinguished from the patriots? In the first place, we are atheists and immoralists, but we take care to support the religions and the morality which we associate with the gregarious instinct: for by means of them, an order of men is, so to speak, being prepared, which must at some time or other fall into our hands, which must actually crave for our hands. Beyond Good and Evil, certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional and strict preserva tion of herd-morality. We reserve ourselves the right to several kinds of philosophy which it is necessary to learn: under certain circumstances, the pessimistic kind as a hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable. We should probably support the development and the maturation of democratic tendencies; for it conduces to weakness of will: in " Socialism " we recognise a thorn which prevents smug ease. Attitude towards the people. Our prejudices; we pay attention to the results of cross-breeding. Detached, well-to-do, strong: irony concerning the " press " and its culture. Our care: that scientific men should not become journalists. We mistrust any form of culture that tolerates news paper reading or writing. We make our accidental positions (as Goethe and Stendhal did), our experiences, a foreground, and we lay stress upon them, so that we may deceive concerning our backgrounds. We ourselves wait and avoid putting our heart into them. They serve us as refuges,such as a wanderer might require and use but we avoid feeling at home in them. We are ahead of our fellows in that we have had a disciplina voluntatis. All strength is directed to the development of the will, an art which allows us to wear masks, an art of understanding beyond the passions (also " super- European " thought at times). This is our preparation before becoming the law-givers of the future and the lords of the earth; if not we, at least our children. Caution where marriage is concerned.

133. The twentieth century. The Abbe Galiani says somewhere: " La prfooyance est la cause des guerres actuelles de F Europe. Si I on voulait se donner la peine de ne rien prtvoir, tout le monde serait tranquille, et je ne crois pas qu on serait plus mal- heureux parce qu on ne feraitpas la guerre" As I in no way share the unwarlike views of my deceased friend Galiani, I have no fear whatever of saying something beforehand with the view of conjuring in some way the cause of wars. A condition of excessive consciousness, after the worst of earthquakes: with new questions.

134. It is the time of the great noon, of the most appalling enlightenment: my particular kind of Pessimism: the great starting-point. (i) Fundamental contradiction between civil isation and the elevation of man. (2) Moral valuations regarded as a history of lies and the art of calumny in the service of the Will to Power (of the will of the herd, which rises against stronger men). (3) The conditions which determine every elevation in culture (the facilitation of a selection being made at the cost of a crowd) are the con ditions of all growth. (4). The multiformity of the world as a question of strength, which sees all things in the perspective of their growth. The moral Christian values to be regarded as the insurrection and mendacity of slaves (in comparison with the aristrocratic values of the ancient world).

SECOND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO.

I. CRITICISM OF RELIGION

ALL the beauty and sublimity with which we have invested real and imagined things, I will show to be the property and product of man, and this should be his most beautiful apology. Man as a poet, as a thinker, as a god, as love, as power. Oh, the regal liberality with which he has lavished gifts upon things in order to im poverish himself and make himself feel wretched! Hitherto, this has been his greatest disinterested ness, that he admired and worshipped, and knew how to conceal from himself that he it was who had created what he admired.

I. CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIONS.

135. The origin of religion. Just as the illiterate man of today believes that his wrath is the cause of his being angry, that his mind is the cause of his thinking, that his soul is the cause of his feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological entities are still unthinkingly postulated as causes; so, in a still more primitive age, the same pheno mena were interpreted by man by means of personal entities. Those conditions of his soul which seemed strange, overwhelming, and raptur ous, he regarded as obsessions and bewitching influences emanating from the power of some personality. (Thus the Christian, the most puerile and backward man of this age, traces hope, peace, and the feeling of deliverance to a psychological inspiration on the part of God: being by nature a sufferer and a creature in need of repose, states of happiness, peace, and resigna tion, perforce seem strange to him, and seem to need some explanation.) Among intelligent, strong, and vigorous races, the epileptic is mostly the cause of a belief in the existence of some foreign power; but all such examples of apparent subjection as, for instance, the bearing of the exalted man, of the poet, of the great criminal, or the passions, love and revenge lead to the invention of supernatural powers. A condition is made concrete by being identified with a personality, and when this condition overtakes anybody, it is ascribed to that personality. In other words: in the psychological concept of God, a certain state of the soul is personified as a cause in order to appear as an effect. The psychological logic is as follows: when the feeling of power suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man, and this takes place in the case of all the great passions, a doubt arises in him concerning his own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing sensation and thus he posits a stronger person, a Godhead as its cause. In short, the origin of religion lies in the extreme feelings of power, which, being strange, take men by surprise: and just as the sick man, who feels one of his limbs unaccountably heavy, concludes that another man must be sitting on it, so the ingenuous homo religiosus, divides himself up into several people. Religion is an example of the " alteration de la personality? A sort of fear and sensation of terror in one s own presence. . . . But also a feeling of inordinate rapture and exaltation. Among sick people, the sensation of health suffices to awaken a belief in the proximity of God.

136. Rudimentary psychology of the religious man: All changes are effects; all effects are effects of will (the notion of " Nature " and of " natural law," is lacking); all effects presuppose an agent. Rudimentary psychology: one is only a cause oneself, when one knows that one has willed something. Result: States of power impute to man the feeling that he is not the cause of them, that he is not responsible for them: they come without being willed to do so consequently we cannot be their originators: will that is not free (that is to say, the knowledge of a change in our condition which we have not helped to bring about) requires a strong will. Consequence of this rudimentary psychology: Man has never dared to credit himself with his strong and startling moods, he has always con ceived them as " passive," as " imposed upon him from outside ": Religion is the offshoot of a doubt concerning the entity of the person, an alteration of the personality: in so far as every thing great and strong in man was considered superhuman and foreign, man belittled himself, he laid the two sides, the very pitiable and weak side, and the very strong and startling side apart, in two spheres, and called the one " Man " and the other " God." And he has continued to act on these lines; during the period of the moral idiosyncrasy he did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral states as " proceeding from his own will " or as the " work " of the person. Even the Christian himself divides his personality into two parts, the one a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and the other which he calls God (Deliverer and Saviour). Religion has lowered the concept " man "; its ultimate conclusion is that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only obtainable by the grace of God

137. One way of raising man out of his self-abase ment, which brought about the decline of the point of view that classed all lofty and strong states of the soul, as strange, was the theory of relation ship. These lofty and strong states of the soul could at least be interpreted as the influence of our forebears; we belonged to each other, we were irrevocably joined; we grew in our own esteem, by acting according to the example of a model known to us all. There is an attempt on the part of noble families to associate religion with their own feelings of self-respect. Poets and seers do the same thing; they feel proud that they have been worthy, that they have been selected for such association, they esteem it an honor, not to be considered at all as individuals, but as mere mouthpieces (Homer). Man gradually takes possession of the highest and proudest states of his soul, as also of his acts and his works. Formerly it was believed that one paid oneself the greatest honor by denying one s own responsibility for the highest deeds one accomplished, and by ascribing them to God. The will which was not free, appeared to be that which imparted a higher value to a deed: in those days a god was postulated as the author of the deed.

138. Priests are the actors of something which is supernatural, either in the way of ideals, gods, or saviours, and they have to make people believe in them; in this they find their calling, this is the purpose of their instincts; in order to make it as credible as possible, they have to exert themselves to the utmost extent in the art of posing; their actor s sagacity must, above all, aim at giving them a clean conscience, by means of which, alone, it is possible to persuade effectively.

139. The priest wishes to make it an understood thing, that he is the highest type of man, that he rules, even over those who wield the power, that he is indispensable and unassailable, that he is the strongest power in the community, not by any means to be replaced or undervalued. Means thereto: he alone is cultured; he alone is the man of virtue; he alone has sovereign power over himself: he alone is, in a certain sense, God, and ultimately goes back to the Godhead; he alone is the middleman between God and others; the Godhead administers punishment to every one who puts the priest at a disadvantage, or who thinks in opposition to him. Means thereto: Truth exists. There is only one way of attaining to it, and that is to become a priest. Everything good, which relates either to order, nature, or tradition, is to be traced to the wisdom of the priests. The Holy Book is their work. The whole of nature is only a fulfilment of the maxims which it contains. No other source of goodness exists than the priests. Every other kind of perfection, even the warrior s, is different in rank from that of the priests. Consequence: If the priest is to be the highest type, then the degrees which lead to his virtues must be the degrees of value among men. Study, emancipation from material things, inactivity, im passibility, absence of passion, solemnity; the opposite of all this is found in the lowest type of man. The priest has taught a kind of morality which conduced to his being considered the highest type of man. He conceives a type which is the reverse of his own: the Chandala. By making these as contemptible as possible, some strength is lent to the order of castes. The priest s excessive fear of sensuality also implies that the latter is the most serious threat to the order of castes (that is to say, order in general). . . . Every " free tendency " in puncto puncti overthrows the laws of marriage.

140. The philosopher considered as the development of the priestly type: He has the heritage of the priest in his blood; even as a rival he is compelled to fight with the same weapons as the priest of his time; he aspires to the highest authority. What is it that bestows authority upon men who have no physical power to wield (no army, no arms at all . . .)? How do such men gain authority over those who are in possession of material power, and who represent authority? (Philosophers enter the lists against princes, vic torious conquerors, and wise statesmen.) They can do it only by establishing the belief that they are in possession of a power which is higher and stronger God. Nothing is strong enough: every one is in need of the mediation and the services of priests. They establish themselves as indispensable intercessors. The conditions of their existence are: (i) That people believe in the absolute superiority of their god, in fact believe in their god; (2) that there is no other access, no direct access to god, save through them. The second condition alone gives rise to the concept " heterodoxy "; the first to the concept " dis believers " (that is to say, he who believes in another god).

141. A Criticism of the Holy Lie. That a lie is allowed in pursuit of holy ends is a principle which belongs to the theory of all priestcraft, and the object of this inquiry is to discover to what extent it belongs to its practice. But philosophers, too, whenever they intend taking over the leadership of mankind, with the ulterior motives of priests in their minds, have never failed to arrogate to themselves the right to lie: Plato above all. But the most elaborate of lies is the double lie, developed by the typically Arian philosophers of the Vedanta: two systems, contradicting each other in all their main points, but interchangeable, complementary, and mutually expletory, when educational ends were in question. The lie of the one has to create a condition in which the truth of the other can alone become intelligible. . . . How far does the holy lie of priests and philo sophers go? The question here is, what hypo theses do they advance in regard to education, and what are the dogmas they are compelled to invent in order to do justice to these hypotheses? First: they must have power, authority, and absolute credibility on their side. Secondly: they must have the direction of the whole of Nature, so that everything affecting the individual seems to be determined by their law. Thirdly: their domain of power must be very extensive, in order that its control may escape the notice of those they subject: they must know the penal code of the life beyond of the life " after death," and, of course, the means where by the road to blessedness may be discovered. They have to put the notion of a natural course of things out of sight, but as they are intelligent and thoughtful people, they are able to promise a host of effects, which they naturally say are con ditioned by prayer or by the strict observance of their law. They can, moreover, prescribe a large number of things which are exceedingly reasonable only they must not point to experience or empiricism as the source of this wisdom, but to revelation or to the fruits of the " most severe exercises of penance." The holy lie, therefore, applies principally to the purpose of an action (the natural purpose, reason, is made to vanish: a moral purpose, the observ ance of some law, a service to God, seems to be the purpose): to the consequence of an action (the natural consequence is interpreted as something supernatural, and, in order to be on surer ground, other incontrollable and supernatural consequences are foretold). In this way the concepts good and evil are created, and seem quite divorced from the natural concepts: " useful," " harmful," " life-promoting," " life-retarding," indeed, inasmuch as another life is imagined, the former concepts may even be antagonistic to Nature's concepts of good and evil. In this way, the proverbial concept " conscience " is created: an inner voice, which, though it makes itself heard in regard to every action, does not measure the worth of that action according to its results, but according to its conformity or non conformity to the " law." The holy lie therefore invented: (i) a god who punishes and rewards, who recognises and carefully observes the law-book of the priests, and who is particular about sending them into the world as his mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries; (2) an After Life, in which, alone, the great penal machine is supposed to be active to this end the immor tality of the soul was invented; (3) a conscience in man, understood as the knowledge that good and evil are permanent values that God himself speaks through it, whenever its counsels are in conformity with priestly precepts; (4) Morality as the denial of all natural processes, as the subjection of all phenomena to a moral order, as the inter pretation of all phenomena as the effects of a moral order of things (that is to say, the concept of punishment and reward), as the only power and only creator of all transformations; (5) Truth as given, revealed, and identical with the teaching of the priests: as the condition to all salvation and happiness in this and the next world. In short: what is the price paid for the improve- < ment supposed to be due to morality? The unhinging of reason, the reduction of all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); dependence upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of a " conscience " which establishes a false science in the place of experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not to do were predetermined a kind of contraction of the seeking and striving spirit; in short: the worst mutilation of man that can be imagined, and it is pretended that " the good man " is the result. Practically speaking, all reason, the whole heri tage of intelligence, subtlety, and caution, the first condition of the priestly canon, is arbitrarily re duced, when it is too late, to a simple mechanical process: conformity with the law becomes a pur pose in itself, it is the highest purpose; Life no longer contains any problems; the whole conception of the world is polluted by the notion of punish ment; Life itself, owing to the fact that the priesfs life is upheld as the non plus ultra of perfection, is transformed into a denial and pol lution of life; the concept " God " represents an aversion to Life, and even a criticism and a con temning of it. Truth is transformed in the mind, into priestly prevarication; the striving after truth, into the study of the Scriptures into the way to become a theologian..

142. A criticism of the Law-Book of Manu. The whole book is founded upon the holy lie. Was it the well-being of humanity that inspired the whole of this system? Was this kind of man, who believes in the interested nature of every action, interested or not interested in the success of this system? The desire to improve mankind whence comes the inspiration to this feeling? Whence is the concept improvement taken? We find a class of men, the sacerdotal class, who consider themselves the standard pattern, the highest example and most perfect expression of the type man. The notion of " improving " mankind, to this class of men, means to make man kind like themselves. They believe in their own superiority, they will be superior in practice: the cause of the holy lie is The Will to Power. . . . Establishment of the dominion: to this end, ideas which place a non plus ultra of power with the priesthood are made to prevail. Power ac quired by lying was the result of the recognition of the fact that it was not already possessed physically, in a military form. . . . Lying as a supplement to power this is a new concept of " truth." It is a mistake to presuppose unconscious and innocent development in this quarter a sort of self-deception. Fanatics are not the discoverers of such exhaustive systems of oppression. . . . Cold-blooded reflection must have been at work here; the same sort of reflection which Plato showed when he worked out his " State " " One must desire the means when one desires the end." Concerning this political maxim, all legislators have always been quite clear. We possess the classical model, and it is speci fically Arian: we can therefore hold the most gifted and most reflective type of man responsible for the most systematic lie that has ever been told. . . . Everywhere almost the lie was copied, and thus Arian influence corrupted the world. . . .

143. Much is said today about the Semitic spirit of the New Testament-, but the thing referred to is merely priestcraft, and in the purest example of an Arian law-book, in Manu, this kind of " Semitic spirit " that is to say, Sacerdotalism, is worse than anywhere else. The development of the Jewish hierarchy is not original: they learnt the scheme in Babylon it is Arian. When, later on, the same thing became dominant in Europe, under the preponderance of Germanic blood, this was in conformity to the spirit of the ruling race: a striking case of atavism. The Germanic middle ages aimed at a revival of the A rian order of castes. Mohammedanism in its turn learned from Christianity the use of a " Beyond " as an instru ment of punishment. The scheme of a permanent community, with priests at its head this oldest product of Asia s great culture in the domain of organization naturally provoked reflection and imitation in every way. Plato is an example of this, but above all, the Egyptians.

144. Moralities and religions are the principal means by which one can modify men into whatever one 126 likes; provided one is possessed of an overflow of creative power, and can cause one s will to pre vail over long periods of time.

145. If one wish to see an affirmative Arian religion which is the product of a ruling class, one should read the law-book of Manu. (The deification of the feeling of power in the Brahmin: it is in teresting to note that it originated in the warrior- caste, and was later transferred to the priests.) If one wish to see an affirmative religion of the Semitic order, which is the product of the ruling class, one should read the Koran or the earlier portions of the Old Testament. (Mohammedan ism as a religion for men, has profound contempt for the sentimentality and prevarication of Christi anity, . . . which, according to Mohammedans, is a woman s religion.) If one wish to see a negative religion of the Semitic order, which is the product of the op pressed class, one should read the New Testament (which, according to Indian and Arian points of view, is a religion for the Chandala). If one wish to see a negative Arian religion, which is the product of the ruling classes, one should study Buddhism. It is quite in the nature of things that we have no Arian religion which is the product of the oppressed classes; for that would have been a contradiction: a race of masters is either para mount or else it goes to the dogs.

146. Religion, per se, has nothing to do with morality; yet both offshoots of the Jewish religion are essentially moral religions which prescribe the rules of living, and procure obedience to their principles by means of rewards and punishment.

147. Paganism Christianity. Paganism is that which says yea to all that is natural, it is innocence in being natural, " naturalness." Christianity is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature. " Innocent ": Petronius is innocent, for in stance. Beside this happy man a Christian is absolutely devoid of innocence. But since even the Christian status is ultimately only a natural condition, the term " Christian " soon begins to mean the counterfeiting of the psychological inter pretation.

148. The Christian priest is from the root a mortal enemy of sensuality: one cannot imagine a greater contrast to his attitude than the guileless, slightly awed, and solemn attitude, which the religious rites of the most honorable women in Athens maintained in the presence of the symbol of sex. In all non-ascetic religions the procreative act is the secret per se: a sort of symbol of perfection and of the designs of the future: re-birth, im mortality.

149. Our belief in ourselves is the greatest fetter, the most telling spur, and the strongest pinion. Christianity ought to have elevated the innocence of man to the position of an article of belief men would then have become gods: in those days believing was still possible.

150. The egregious lie of history: as if it were the corruption of Paganism that opened the road to Christianity. As a matter of fact, it was the enfeeblement and moralisation of the man of antiquity. The new interpretation of natural functions, which made them appear like vices, had already gone before!

151. Religions are ultimately wrecked by the belief in morality. The idea of the Christian moral God becomes untenable, hence " Atheism," as though there could be no other god. Culture is likewise wrecked by the belief in morality. For when the necessary and only possible conditions of its growth are revealed, nobody will any longer countenance it (Buddh ism).

152. The physiology of Nihilistic religions. All in all, the Nihilistic religions are systematized histories of sickness described in religious and moral ter- m in o logy. In pagan cultures it is around the interpretation of the great annual cycles that the religious cult turns; in Christianity it is around a cycle of paralytic phenomena.

153. This Nihilistic religion gathers together all the decadent elements and things of like order which it can find in antiquity, viz.: (a) The weak and the botched (the refuse of the ancient world, and that of which it rid itself with most violence). (b} Those who are morally obsessed and anti- pagan. (c) Those who are weary of politics and in different (the bias Romans), the denationalised, who know not what they are. (d) Those who are tired of themselves who are happy to be party to a subterranean conspiracy.

154. Buddha versus Christ. Among the Nihilistic religions, Christianity and Buddhism may always be sharply distinguished. Buddhism is the ex pression of a fine evening, perfectly sweet and mild it is a sort of gratitude towards all that . I lies hidden, including that which it entirely lacks, viz., bitterness, disillusionment, and resent ment. Finally it possesses lofty intellectual love; it has got over all the subtlety of philosophical contradictions, and is even resting after it, though it is precisely from that source that it derives its intellectual glory and its glow as of a sunset (it originated in the higher classes). Christianity is a degenerative movement, con sisting of all kinds of decaying and excremental elements: it is not the expression of the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate to one another. ... It is therefore not a national religion, not determined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it consists of a foundation of resent ment against all that is successful and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of intellectual move ment, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it suspects the element of success and domination.

155. In Buddhism this thought prevails: " All passions, everything which creates emotions and leads to blood, is a call to action " to this extent alone are its believers warned against evil. For action has no sense, it merely binds one to existence. All existence, however, has no sense. Evil is interpreted as that which leads to irration- alism: to the affirmation of means whose end is denied. A road to nonentity is the desideratum, hence all emotional impulses are regarded with horror. For instance: " On no account seek after revenge! Be the enemy of no one! " The Hedonism of the weary finds its highest expression here. Nothing is more utterly foreign to Buddhism than the Jewish fanaticism of St. Paul: nothing could be more contrary to its instinct than the tension, fire, and unrest of the religious man, and, above all, that form of sensuality which sanctifies Christianity with the name " Love." Moreover, it is the cultured and very intellectual classes who find blessedness in Buddhism: a race wearied and besotted by centuries of philosophical quarrels, but not beneath all culture as those classes were from which Christianity sprang. ... In the Buddhistic ideal, there is essentially an emancipa tion from good and evil: a very subtle suggestion of a Beyond to all morality is thought out in its teaching, and this Beyond is supposed to be compatible with perfection, the condition being, that even good actions are only needed pro tern., merely as a means, that is to say, in order to be free from all action.

156. How very curious it is to see a Nihilistic religion such as Christianity, sprung from, and in keeping with, a decrepit and worn-out people, who have outlived all strong instincts, being transferred step by step to another environment that is to say, to a land of young people, who have not yet lived at all The joy of the final chapter, of the fold and of the evening, preached to barbarians and Germans! How thoroughly all of it must first have been barbarised, Germanised! To those who had dreamed of a Walhalla: who found happiness only in war! A -national religion preached in the midst of chaos, where no nations yet existed even.

157. The only way to refute priests and religions is this: to show that their errors are no longer beneficent -that they are rather harmful; in short, that their own " proof of power " no longer holds good. . . .

2. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.

158. Christianity as an historical reality should not be confounded with that one root which its name recalls. The other roots, from which it has sprung, are by far the more important. It is an unprecedented abuse of names to identify such manifestations of decay and such abortions as the "Christian Church," "Christian belief," and "Christian life," with that Holy Name. What did Christ deny? Everything which today is called Christian.

159. The whole of the Christian creed all Christian " truth," is idle falsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was at the bottom of the first Christian movement. All that which in the ecclesiastical sense is Christian, is just exactly what is most radically anti- Christian: crowds of things and people appear instead of symbols, history takes the place of eternal facts, it is all forms, rites, and dogmas instead of a " practice " of life. To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology. The practice of Christianity is no more an im possible phantasy than the practice of Buddhism is: it is merely a means to happiness.

160. Jesus goes straight to the point, the " Kingdom of Heaven " in the heart, and He does not find the means in duty to the Jewish Church; He even regards the reality of Judaism (its need to maintain itself) as nothing; He is concerned purely with the inner man. Neither does He make anything of all the coarse forms relating to man s intercourse with God: He is opposed to the whole of the teaching of repentance and atonement; He points out how man ought to live in order to feel himself" deified," and how futile it is on his part to hope to live properly by showing repentance and contrition for his sins. " Sin is of no account " is practically his chief standpoint. Sin, repentance, forgiveness, all this does not belong to Christianity ... it is Judaism or Paganism which has become mixed up with Christ s teaching.

161. The Kingdom of Heaven is a state of the heart (of children it is written, " for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven "): it has nothing to do with superterrestrial things. The Kingdom of God " cometh," not chronologically or historically, not on a certain day in the calendar; it is not something which one day appears and was not previously there; it is a " change of feeling in the individual," it is something which may come at any time and which may be absent at any time. . . .

162. The thief on the cross; When the criminal him self, who endures a painful death, declares: " the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without a murmur of revolt or enmity, graciously and resignedly, is the only right way," he assents to the gospel; and by this very fact he is in Paradise. . . .

163. Jesus bids us: not to resist, either by deeds or in our heart, him who ill-treats us; He bids us admit of no grounds for separating ourselves from our wives; 135 He bids us make no distinction between foreigners and fellow-countrymen, strangers and familiars; He bids us show anger to no one, and treat no one with contempt; give alms secretly; not to desire to become rich; not to swear; not to stand in judgment; become reconciled with our enemies and forgive offences; not to worship in public. " Blessedness " is nothing promised: it is here, with us, if we only wish to live and act in a par ticular way.

164. Subsequent Additions; The whole of the prophet- and thaumaturgist-attitudes and the bad temper; while the conjuring-up of a supreme tribunal of justice is an abominable corruption (see Mark vi. 1 1: " And whosoever shall not receive you. . . . Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha," etc.). The "fig tree" (Matt. xxi. 18, 19): "Now in the morning as he returned into the city, he hungered. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit grow on thee hence forward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered away."

165. The teaching of rewards and punishments has become mixed up with Christianity in a way which is quite absurd; everything is thereby spoilt. I3 6 In the same way, the practice of the first ecclesia militant, of the Apostle Paul and his attitude, is put forward as if it had been commanded or pre- determined. The subsequent glorification of the actual life and teaching of the first Christians: as if every thing had been prescribed beforehand and had been only a matter of following directions And as for the fulfilment of scriptural prophecies: how much of all that is more than forgery and cooking?

166. Jesus opposed a real life, a life in truth, to ordinary life: nothing could have been more foreign to His mind than the somewhat heavy nonsense of an eternal Peter," of the eternal duration of a single person. Precisely what He combats is the exaggerated importance of the " person ": how can He wish to immortalise it? He likewise combats the hierarchy within the community; He never promises a certain propor tion of reward for a certain proportion of deserts: how can He have meant to teach the doctrine of punishment and reward in a Beyond?

167. Christianity is an ingenuous attempt at bringing about a Buddhistic movement in favour of peace, sprung from the very heart of the resenting masses ... but transformed by Paul into a mysterious pagan cult, which was ultimately able to accord 137 with the whole of State organization . . . and which carries on war, condemns, tortures, conjures, and hates. Paul bases his teaching upon the need of mystery felt by the great masses capable of religious emotions: he seeks a victim a bloody phantasmagoria, which may be equal to a contest with the images of a secret cult: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the unto mystica with the " victim." He seeks the prolongation of life after death (the blessed and atoned after-life of the individual soul) which he puts in causal relation with the victim already referred to (according to the type of Dionysos, Mithras, Osiris). He feels the necessity of bringing notions of guilt and sin into the foreground, not a new practice of life (as Jesus Himself demonstrated and taught), but a new cult,a newbelief,a beliefin a mira culous metamorphosis (" Salvation " through belief). He understood the great needs of the pagan world, and he gave quite an absolutely arbitrary picture of those two plain facts, Christ s life and death. He gave the whole a new accent, altering the equilibrium everywhere ... he was one of the most active destroyers of primitive Christianity. The attempt made on the life of priests and theo logians culminated, thanks to Paul, in a new priest hood and theology a ruling caste and a Church. The attempt made to suppress the fussy im portance of the " person," culminated in the belief in the eternal " personality " (and in the anxiety concerning " eternal salvation " . . .), and in the 138 most paradoxical exaggeration of individual egoism. This is the humorous side of the question tragic humour: Paul again set up on a large scale precisely what Jesus had overthrown by His life. At last, when the Church edifice was complete, it even sanctioned the existence of the State.

168. The Church is precisely that against which Jesus inveighed and against which He taught His disciples to fight.

169. A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection after death all these things are the counterfeit coins of real Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held responsible. The life ivJiich must serve as an example consists in love and humility; in the abundance of hearty emotion which does not even exclude the lowliest; in the formal renunciation of all desire of making its rights felt; in conquest, in the sense of triumph over oneself; in the belief in salvation in this world, despite all sorrow, opposition, and death; in forgiveness and the absence of anger and con tempt; in the absence of a desire to be rewarded; in the refusal to be bound to anybody; abandon ment to all that is most spiritual and intellectual; 139 in fact, a very proud life controlled by the will of a servile and poor life. Once the Church had allowed itself to take over all the Christian practice, and had formally sanctioned the State, that kind of life which Jesus combats and condemns, it was obliged to lay the sense of Christianity in other things than early Christian ideals that is to say, in the faith in incredible things, in the ceremonial of prayers, worship, feasts, etc. etc. The notions " sin," " for giveness," " punishment," " reward " everything, in fact, which had nothing in common with, and was quite absent from, primitive Christianity, now comes into the foreground. An appalling stew of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism; continual judgments and condemnations; the order of rank, etc.

170. Christianity has, from the first, always trans formed the symbolical into crude realities: (1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and changed into " life here " and " life beyond." (2) The notion " eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is ephemeral, is translated into " personal immortality "; (3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and drink, after the Hebrew- Arabian manner, is interpreted as the " miracle of transubstantiation." (4) " Resurrection " which was intended to 140 mean the entrance to the " true life," in the sense of being intellectually " born again," becomes an historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after death; (5) The teaching of the Son of man as the " Son of God," that is to say, the life-relationship between man and God, becomes the " second person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relation ship of every man even the lowest to God, is done away with; (6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way to this filial relationship to God, save through the practice of life taught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a miraculous way of atoning for all sin; though not through our own endeavours, but by means of Christ: For all these purposes, " Christ on the Cross " had to be interpreted afresh. The death itself would certainly not be the principal feature of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the world that one was not to defend oneself this was the exemplary life.

171. Concerning the psychology of Paul. The im portant fact is Christ s death. This remains to be explained. . . . That there may be truth or error in an explanation never entered these people s heads: one day a sublime possibility strikes them, " His death might mean so and so " 14! and it forthwith becomes so and so. An hypo thesis is proved by the sublime ardour it lends to its discoverer. . . . " The proof of strength ": i.e., a thought is demonstrated by its effects (" by their fruits," as the Bible ingenuously says); that which fires en thusiasm must be true, what one loses one s blood for must be true In every department of this world of thought, the sudden feeling of power which an idea imparts to him who is responsible for it, is placed to the credit of that idea: and as there seems no other way of honoring an idea than by calling it true, the first epithet it is honored with is the word true, . , . How could it have any effect other wise? It was imagined by some power: if that power were not real, it could not be the cause of anything. . . . The thought is then understood as inspired: the effect it causes has something of the violent nature of a demoniacal influence A thought which a decadent like Paul could not resist and to which he completely yields, is thus " proved " true All these holy epileptics and visionaries did not possess a thousandth part of the honesty in self-criticism with which a philologist, nowadays, reads a text, or tests the truth of an historical event. . . . Beside us, such people were moral cretins.

172. whet) provided it be effective: total absence of intellectual It matters little whether a thing be true, 142 uprightness. Everything is good, whether it be lying, slander, or shameless " cooking," provided it serve to heighten the degree of heat to the point at which people " believe." We are face to face with an actual school for the teaching of the means wherewith men are seduced to a belief: we see systematic contempt for those spheres whence contradiction might come (that is to say, for reason, philosophy, wisdom, doubt, and caution); a shameless praising and glorification of the teaching, with continual refer ences to the fact that it was God who presented us with it that the apostle signifies nothing. that no criticism is brooked, but only faith, ac ceptance; that it is the greatest blessing and favour to receive such a doctrine of salvation; that the state in which one should receive it, ought to be one of the profoundest thankfulness and humility. . . . The resentment which the lowly feel against all those in high places, is continually turned to account: the fact that this teaching is revealed to them as the reverse of the wisdom of the world, against the power of the world, seduces them to it. This teaching convinces the outcasts and the botched of all sorts and conditions; it promises blessedness, advantages, and privileges to the most insignificant and most humble men; it fanaticises the poor, the small, and the foolish, and fills them with insane vanity, as though they were the mean ing and salt of the earth. Again, I say, all this cannot be sufficiently contemned, we spare ourselves a criticism of the 143 teaching; it is sufficient to take note of the means it uses in order to be aware of the nature of the phenomenon one is examining. It identified itself with virtue, it appropriated the whole of the fasci nating power of virtue, shamelessly, for its own purposes ... it availed itself of the power of paradox, and of the need, manifested by old civilisation, for pepper and absurdity; it amazed and revolted at the same time; it provoked per secutions and ill-treatment. It is the same kind of vdl-thought-out meanness with which the Jewish priesthood established their power and built up their Church. . . . One must be able to discern: (i)that warmth of passion " love " (resting on a base of ardent sensuality); (2) the thoroughly ignoble character of Christianity: the continual exaggeration and verbosity; the lack of cool intellectuality and irony; the unmilitary character of all its instincts; the priestly prejudices against manly pride, sensuality, the sciences, the arts.

173. Paul: seeks power against ruling Judaism, his attempt is too weak. . . . Revaluation of the notion " Jew ": the " race " is put aside: but that means denying the very basis of the whole struc ture. The " martyr," the " fanatic," the value of all strong belief. Christianity is fat form of decay of the old world, after the latter s collapse, and it is characterised by the fact that it brings all the most sickly and unhealthy elements and needs to the top. 144 THE WILL T0 POWER. Consequently other instincts had to step into the foreground, in order to constitute an entity, a power able to stand alone in short, a condition of tense sorrow was necessary, like that out of which the Jews had derived their instinct of self-preserva tion. . . . The persecution of Christians was invaluable for this purpose. Unity in the face of danger; the conversion of the masses becomes the only means of putting an end to the persecution of the individual. (The notion " conversion " is therefore made as elastic as possible.)

174. The Christian Judaic life: here resentment did not prevail. The great persecutions alone could have driven out the passions to that extent as also the ardour of love and hate. When the creatures a man most loves are sacrificed before his eyes for the sake of his faith, that man becomes aggressive; the triumph of Christianity is due to its persecutors. Asceticism is not specifically Christian: this is what Schopenhauer misunderstood. It only shoots up in Christianity, wherever it would have existed without that religion. Melancholy Christianity, the torture and tor ment of the conscience, is also only a peculiarity of a particular soil, where Christian values have taken root: it is not Christianity properly speaking. Christianity has absorbed all the different kinds of diseases which grow from morbid soil: one could 145 refute it at one blow by showing that it did not know how to resist any contagion. But that precisely is the essential feature of it. Christi anity is a type of decadence.

175. The reality on which Christianity was able to build up its power consisted of the small dispersed fezvish families, with their warmth, tenderness, and peculiar readiness to help, which, to the whole of the Roman Empire, was perhaps the most incom prehensible and least familiar of their character istics; they were also united by their pride at being a " chosen people," concealed beneath a cloak of humility, and by their secret denial of all that was uppermost and that possessed power and splendour, although there was no shade of envy in their denial. To have recognized this as a power, to have regarded this blessed state as com municable, seductive, and infectious even where pagans were concerned this constituted Paul s genius: to use up the treasure of latent energy and cautious happiness for the purposes of " a Jewish Church of free confession," and to avail himself of all the Jewish experience, their propa ganda, and their expertness in the preservation of a community under a foreign power this is what he conceived to be his duty. He it was who discovered that absolutely unpolitical and isolated body of paltry people, and their art of asserting themselves and pushing themselves to the front, by means of a host of acquired virtues which are made to represent the only forms of virtue (" the self-preservative measure and weapon of success of a certain class of man "). The principle of love comes from the small community of Jewish people: a very passionate soul glows here, beneath the ashes of humility and wretchedness: it is neither Greek, Indian, nor German. The song in praise of love which Paul wrote is not Christian; it is the Jewish flare of that eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity has done anything essentially new in a psychological sense, it is this, that it has increased the temperature of the soul among those cooler and more noble races who were at one time at the head of affairs; it discovered that the most wretched life could be made rich and invaluable, by means of an eleva tion of the temperature of the soul. . . . It is easily understood that a transfer of this sort could not take place among the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians were at a disadvantage owing to their bad manners spiritual strength and passion, when accompanied by Kad manners, only provoke loathing (I become aware of these bad manners while reading the New Testament). It was necessary to be related both in baseness and sorrow with this type of lower manhood in order to feel anything attractive in him. . . . The atti tude a man maintains towards the New Testament is a test of the amount of taste he may have for the classics (see Tacitus); he who is not revolted by it, he who does not feel honestly and deeply that he is in the presence of a sort of fceda superstitio when reading it, and who does not draw his hand back so as not to soil his fingers such a man does not know what is classical. A man must feel about " the cross " as Goethe did.*

176. The reaction of paltry people: Love provides the feeling of highest power. It should be under stood to what extent, not man in general, but only a certain kind of man is speaking here. " We are godly in love, we shall be the children of God; God loves us and wants nothing from us save love "; that is to say: all morality, obedi ence, and action, do not produce the same feeling of power and freedom as love does; a man does nothing wicked from sheer love, but he does much more than if he were prompted by obedience and virtue alone. Here is the happiness of the herd, the communal feeling in big things as in small, the living senti ment of unity felt as the sum of the feeling of life. Helping, caring for, and being useful, constantly kindle the feeling of power; visible success, the * Vieles kann ich ertragen. Die meisten beschwerlichen Dinge Duld ich mit ruhigem Mut, wie es ein Gott mir gebeut. Wenige sind mir jedoch wie Gift und Schlange zuwider; Viere: Rauch des Tabaks, Wanzen, und Knoblauch und J. Goethe s Venetian Epigrams, No. 67. Much can I bear. Things the most irksome I endure with such patience as comes from a god. Four things, however, repulse me like venom: Tobacco smoke, garlic, bugs, and the cross. (TRANSLATOR S NOTE.) 148 expression of pleasure, emphasise the feeling of power; pride is not lacking either, it is felt in the form of the community, the House of God, and the " chosen people." As a matter of fact, man has once more experi enced an " alteration " of his personality: this time he called his feeling of love God. The awaken ing of such a feeling must be pictured; it is a sort of ecstasy, a strange language, a " Gospel " it was this newness which did not allow man to attribute love to himself he thought it was God leading him on and taking shape in his heart. " God descends among men," one s neighbour is trans figured and becomes a God (in so far as he provokes the sentiment of love). Jesus is the neighbour, the moment He is transfigured in thought into a God, and into a cause provoking the feeling of power.

177. Believers are aware that they owe an infinite amount to Christianity, and therefore conclude that its Founder must have been a man of the first rank. . . . This conclusion is false, but it is typical of the reverents. Regarded objectively, it is, in the first place, just possible that they are mistaken concerning the extent of their debt to Christianity: a man s convictions prove nothing concerning the thing he is convinced about, and in religions they are more likely to give rise to suspicions. . . . Secondly, it is possible that the debt owing to Christianity is not due to its Founder at all, but to the whole structure, the 149 whole thing to the Church, etc. The notion " Founder " is so very equivocal, that it may stand even for the accidental cause of a movement: the person of the Founder has been inflated in proportion as the Church has grown: but even this process of veneration allows of the conclusion that, at one time or other, this Founder was some thing exceedingly insecure and doubtful in the beginning. . . . Let any one think of the free and easy way in which Paul treats the problem of the personality of Jesus, how he almost juggles with it: some one who died, who was seen after His death, some one whom the Jews delivered up to death all this was only the theme Paul wrote the music to it.

178. The founder of a religion may be quite insignificant, a wax vesta and no more.

179. Concerning the psychological problem of Christianity. The driving forces are; resentment, popular insurrection, the revolt of the bungled and the botched. (In Buddhism it is different: it is not born of resentment. It rather combats resent ment because the latter leads to action?) This party, which stands for freedom, under stands that the abandonment of antagonism in thought and deed is a condition of distinction and preservation. Here lies the psychological difficulty which has stood in the way of Christianity being understood: the force which created it, urges to a struggle against itself. Only as a party standing ior peace and innocence can this insurrectionary movement hope to be successful: it must conquer by means of excessive mildness, sweetness, softness, and its instincts are aware of this. The feat was to deny and con demn the force, of which man is the expression, and to press the reverse of that force continually to the fore, by word and deed.

180. The pretence of youthfulness. It is a mistake to imagine that, with Christianity, an ingenuous and youthful people rose against an old culture; the story goes that it was out of the lowest levels of society, where Christianity flourished and shot its roots, that the more profound source of life gushed forth afresh: but nothing can be under stood of the psychology of Christianity, if it be supposed that it was the expression of revived youth among a people, or of the resuscitated strength of a race. It is rather a typical form of decadence, of moral-softening and of hysteria, amid a general hotch-potch of races and people that had lost all aims and had grown weary and sick. The wonderful company which gathered round this master-seducer of the populace, would not be at all out of place in a Russian novel: all the diseases of the nerves seem to give one another a rendezvous in this crowd the absence of a known duty, the feeling that every- 151 thing is nearing its end, that nothing is any longer worth while, and that contentment lies in dolce far niente. The power and certainty of the future in the Jew s instinct, its monstrous will for life and for power, lies in its ruling classes; the people who upheld primitive Christianity are best dis tinguished by this exJiausted condition of their instincts. On the one hand, they are sick of every thing; on the other, they are content with each other, with themselves and for themselves.

181. Christianity regarded as emancipated Judaism (just as a nobility which is both racial and in digenous ultimately emancipates itself from these conditions, and goes in search of kindred elements. . . .). (1) As a Church (community) on the territory of the State, as an unpolitical institution. (2) As life, breeding, practice, art of living. (3) As a religion of sin (sin committed against God, being the only recognized kind, and the only cause of all suffering), with a universal cure for it. There is no sin save against God; what is done against men, man shall not sit in judgment upon, nor call to account, except in the name of God. At the same time, all commandments (love): everything is associated with God, and all acts are performed according to God s will. Beneath this arrangement there lies exceptional intelligence (a very narrow life, such as that led by the 152 Esquimaux, can only be endured by most peaceful and indulgent people: the Judaeo-Christian dogma turns against sin in favour of the " sinner ").

182. The Jewish priesthood understood how to present everything it claimed to be right as a divine precept, as an act of obedience to God, and also to introduce all those things which conduced to preserve Israel and were the conditions of its existence (for instance: the large number of " works ": circumcision and the cult of sacrifices, as the very pivot of the national conscience), not as Nature, but as God. This process continued; within the very heart of Judaism, where the need of these " works " was not felt (that is to say, as a means of keeping a race distinct), a priestly sort of man was pictured, whose bearing towards the aristocracy was like that of " noble nature "; a sacerdotalism of the soul, which now, in order to throw its opposite into strong relief, attaches value, not to the " dutiful acts " themselves, but to the sentiment. . . . At bottom, the problem was once again, how to make a certain kind of soul prevail: it was also a popular insurrection in the midst of a priestly people a pietistic movement coming from below (sinners, publicans, women, and children). Jesus of Nazareth was the symbol of their sect. And again, in order to believe in themselves, they were in need of a theological transfiguration: they require nothing less than " the Son of God " in 153 order to create a belief for themselves. And just as the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, another attempt was made, here, to alter and falsify the whole history of mankind in such a way as to make Christianity seem like the most important event it contained. This movement could have originated only upon the soil of Judaism, the main feature of which was the confounding of guilt with sorrow and the reduction of all sin to sin against God. Of all this, Christianity is the second degree of power.

183. The symbolism of Christianity is based upon that of Judaism, which had already transfigured all reality (history, Nature) into a holy and artificial unreality which refused to recognise real history, and which showed no more interest in a natural course of things.

184. The Jews made the attempt to prevail, after two of their castes the warrior and the agri cultural castes, had disappeared from their midst. In this sense they are the " castrated people": they have their priests and then their Chandala. . . . How easily a disturbance occurs among them an insurrection of their Chandala. This was the origin of Christianity. Owing to the fact that they had no knowledge of warriors except as their masters, they introduced 154 enmity towards the nobles, the men of honor, pride, and power, and the ruling classes, into their religion: they are pessimists from indignation. . . . Thus they created a very important and novel position: the priests in the van of the Chandala against the noble classes. . . . Christianity was the logical conclusion of this movement: even in the Jewish priesthood, it still scented the existence of the caste, of the privileged and noble minority it therefore did away with priests. Christ is the unit of the Chandala who removes the priest . . . the Chandala who redeems himself. . . . That is why the French Revolution is the lineal descendant and the continuator of Christianity it is characterised by an instinct of hate towards castes, nobles, and the last privileges.

185. The " Christian Ideal " put on the stage with Jewish astuteness these are the fundamental psychological forces of its " nature ": Revolt against the ruling spiritual powers; The attempt to make those virtues which facili tate the happiness of the lowly, a standard of all values in fact, to call God that which is no more than the self-preservative instinct of that class of man possessed of least vitality; Obedience and absolute abstention from war and resistance, justified by this ideal; 155 The love of one another as a result of the love of God. The trick: The denial of all natural mobilia, and their transference to the spiritual world beyond . . . the exploitation of virtue and its veneration for wholly interested motives, gradual denial of virtue in everything that is not Christian.

186. The profound contempt with which the Christian was treated by the noble people of antiquity, is of the same order as the present instinctive aversion to Jews: it is the hatred which free and self- respecting classes feel towards those who wish to creep in secretly, and who combine an awkward bearing with foolish self-sufficiency. The New Testament is the gospel of a com pletely ignoble species of man; its pretensions to highest values yea, to all values, is, as a matter of fact, revolting even nowadays.

187. How little the subject matters! It is the spirit which gives the thing life! What a quantity of stuffy and sick-room air there is in all that chatter about " redemption," " love," " blessedness," " faith," " truth," " eternal life "! Let any one look into a really pagan book and compare the two; for in stance, in Petronius, nothing at all is done, said, desired, and valued, which, according to a bigoted Christian estimate, is not sin, or even deadly sin. And yet how happy one feels with the purer air, the 156 superior intellectuality, the quicker pace, and the free overflowing strength which is certain of the future! In the whole of the New Testament there is not one bouffonnerie: but that fact alone would suffice to refute any book. . . .

188. The prof ound lack of dignity with which all life, which is not Christian, is condemned: it does not suffice them to think meanly of their actual oppon ents, they cannot do with less than a general slander of everything that is not themselves. . . . An abject and crafty soul is in the most perfect harmony with the arrogance of piety, as witness the early Christians. The future: they see that they are heavily paid for it. . . . Theirs is the muddiest kind of spirit that exists. The whole of Christ s life is so arranged as to confirm the prophecies of the Scriptures: He behaves in suchwise in order that they may be right. . . .

189. The deceptive interpretation of the words, the doings, and the condition of dying people; the natural fear of death, for instance, is systematically confounded with the supposed fear of what is to happen " after death." . . .

190. The Christians have done exactly what the Jews did before them. They introduced what they 157 conceived to be an innovation and a thing necessary to self-preservation into their Master s teaching, and wove His life into it. They likewise credited Him with all the wisdom of a maker of proverbs in short, they represented their every day life and activity as an act of obedience, and thus sanctified their propaganda. What it all depends upon, may be gathered from Paul: it is not much. What remains is the development of a type of saint, out of the values which these people regarded as saintly. The whole of the "doctrine of miracles," in-j eluding the resurrection, is the result of self- glorification on the part of the community, which ascribed to its Master those qualities it ascribed to itself, but in a higher degree (or, better still, it derived its strength from Him. . . .).

191. The Christians have never led the life which Jesus commanded them to lead, and the impudent fable of the " justification by faith," and its unique and transcendental significance, is only the result of the Church s lack of courage and will in acknow ledging those "works" which Jesus commanded. The Buddhist behaves differently from the non- Buddhist; but the Christian behaves as all the rest of the world does, and possesses a Christianity of ceremonies and states of the soul. The profound and contemptible falsehood of Christianity in Europe makes us deserve the con tempt of the Arabs, Hindoos, and Chinese. . , . 158 Let any one listen to the words of the first German statesman, concerning that which has preoccupied Europe for the last forty years.

192. " Faith " or " works "? But that the " works," the habit of particular works may engender a certain set of values or thoughts, is just as natural as it would be unnatural for " works " to proceed from mere valuations. Man must practise, not how to strengthen feelings of value, but how to strengthen action: first of all, one must be able to do some thing. . . . Luther s Christian Dilettantism. Faith is an asses bridge. The background consists of a profound conviction on the part of Luther and his peers, that they are enabled to accomplish Christian " works," a personal fact, disguised under an extreme doubt as to whether all action is not sin and devil s work, so that the worth of life depends upon isolated and highly-strained conditions of inactivity (prayer, effusion, etc.). Ultimately, Luther would be right: the instincts which are expressed by the whole bearing of the reformers are the most brutal that exist. Only in turning absolutely away from themselves, and in becoming absorbed in the opposite of themselves, only by means of an illusion ("faith") was existence endurable to them.

193. " What was to be done in order to believe? " an absurd question. That which is wrong with Christianity is, that it does none of the things that Christ commanded, It is a mean life, but seen through the eye of contempt.

194. The entrance into the real life a man saves t his own life by living the life of the multitude.

195. Christianity has become something fundament ally different from what its Founder wished it to be. It is the great anti-pagan movement of anti quity, formulated with the use of the life, teaching, and " words " of the Founder of Christianity, but interpreted quite arbitrarily, according to a scheme embodying profoundly different needs: translated into the language of all the subterranean religions then existing. It is the rise of Pessimism (whereas Jesus wished to bring the peace and the happiness of the lambs): and moreover the Pessimism of the weak, of the inferior, of the suffering, and of the oppressed. Its mortal enemies are (i) Power, whether in the form of character, intellect, or taste, and " worldliness "; (2) the "good cheer" of classical times, the noble levity and scepticism, hard pride, eccentric dissipation, and cold frugality of the sage, Greek refinement in manners, words, and form. Its mortal enemy is as much the Roman as the Greek. The attempt on the part of anti-paganism to establish itself on a philosophical basis, and to make its tenets possible: it shows a taste for the ambiguous figures of antique culture, and above all for Plato, who was, more than any other, an anti-Hellene and Semite in instinct. . . . It also shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially the work of Semites ("dignity" is regarded as severity law; virtue is held to be greatness, self responsibility, authority, greatest sovereignty over oneself this is Semitic. The Stoic is an Arabian sheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions.

196. Christianity only resumes the fight which had already been begun against the classical ideal anc noble religion. As a matter of fact, the whole process of transformation is only an adaptation to the needs and to the level of intelligence of religious masses then existing: those masses whicl believed in Isis, Mithras, Dionysos, and great mother," and which demanded the follow ing things of a religion: (i) hopes of a beyond, (2) the bloody phantasmagoria of animal sacrmce (the mystery), (3) holy legend and the redeeming deed (4) asceticism, denial of the world, supe: stitious "purification," (5) a hierarchy as a part of the community. In short, Christianity everywhere fitted the already prevailing and increasing anti-pagan tendency those cults whicl Epicurus combated or more exactly, those l6l religions proper to the lower herd, women, slaves, and ignoble classes. The misunderstandings are therefore the following: (1) The immortality of the individual; (2) The assumed existence of another world; (3) The absurd notion of punishment and expiation in the heart of the interpretation of existence; (4) The profanation of the divine nature of man, instead of its accentuation, and the con struction of a very profound chasm, which can only be crossed by the help of a miracle or by means of the most thorough self-contempt; (5) The whole world of corrupted imagination and morbid passion, instead of a simple and loving life of action, instead of Buddhistic happiness attainable on earth; (6) An ecclesiastical order with a priesthood, theology, cults, and sacraments; in short, every thing that Jesus of Nazareth combated; (7) The miraculous in everything and every body, superstition too: while precisely the trait which distinguished Judaism and primitive Christianity was their repugnance to miracles and their relative rationalism.

197. The psychological pre-requisites: Ignorance and lack of culture, the sort of ignorance which has un learned every kind of shame: let any one imagine those impudent saints in the heart of Athens;. L 1 62 The Jewish instinct of a chosen people: they appropriate all the virtues, without further ado, as their own, and regard the rest of the world as their opposite; this is a profound sign of spiritual depravity; The total lack of real aims and real duties, for which other virtues are required than those of the bigot the State undertook this work for them: and the impudent people still behaved as though they had no need of the State. "Except ye become as little children " oh, how far we are from this psychological ingenuousness!

198. The Founder of Christianity had to pay dearly for having directed His teaching at the lowest classes of Jewish society and intelligence. They understood Him only according to the limitations of their own spirit. ... It was a disgrace to concoct a history of salvation, a personal God, a personal Saviour, a personal immortality, and to have retained all the meanness of the " person," and of the "history" of a doctrine which denies the reality of all that is personal and historical. The legend of salvation takes the place of the symbolic " now " and " all time," of the symbolic "here" and "everywhere"; and miracles appear instead of the psychological symbol.

199. Nothing is less innocent than the New Testa ment. The soil from which it sprang is known. These people, possessed of an inflexible will to assert themselves, and who, once they had lost all natural hold on life, and had long existed without any right to existence, still knew how to prevail by means of hypotheses which were as unnatural as they were imaginary (calling them selves the chosen people, the community of saints, the people of the promised land, and the " Church "): these people made use of their pia fraus with such skill, and with such "clean consciences," that one cannot be too cautious when they preach morality. When Jews step forward as the personification of innocence, the danger must be great. While reading the New Testament a man should have his small fund of intelligence, mistrust, and wickedness constantly at hand. People of the lowest origin, partly mob, out casts not only from good society, but also from respectable society; grown away from the atmosphere of culture, and free from discipline; ignorant, without even a suspicion of the fact that conscience can also rule in spiritual matters; in a word the Jews: an instinctively crafty people, able to create an advantage, a means of seduction out of every conceivable hypothesis of superstition, even out of ignorance itself.

200. I regard Christianity as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever yet existed as the greatest and most impious lie: I can discern the !6 4 last sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath every form of disguise, I decline to enter into any compromise or false position in reference to it- I urge people to declare open war with it. The morality of paltry people as the measure of all things: this is the most repugnant kind of degeneracy that civilisation has ever yet brought into existence. And this kind of ideal is hanging still, under the name of "God," over men s heads! !

201. However mo dest one s demands may be concerning intellectual cleanliness, when one touches the New Testament one cannot help experiencing a sort of inexpressible feeling of dis comfort; for the unbounded cheek with which the least qualified people will have their say in its pages, in regard to the greatest problems of existence, and claim to sit in judgment on such matters, exceeds all limits. The impudent levity with which the most unwieldy problems are spoken of here (life, the world, God, the purpose of life), as if they were not problems at all, but the most simple things which these little bigots know all about.

202. This was the most fatal form of insanity that has ever yet existed on earth: when these little lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim to the words "God," "last judgment," "truth," Move," "wisdom," "Holy Spirit," and thereby distinguishing themselves from the rest of the world; when such men begin to revalue values to suit themselves, as though they were the sense the salt, the standard, and the measure of all things; then all that one should do is this: build lunatic asylums for their incarceration. To persecute them was an egregious act of antique folly: this was taking them too seriously; it was making them serious. The whole fatality was made possible by the fact that a similar form of megalomania was already in existence, the Jewish form (once the gulf separating the Jews from the Christian-Jews was bridged, the Christian-Jews were compelled to employ those self-preservative measures afresh which were discovered by the Jewish instinct for their own self-preservation, after having accent uated them); and again through the fact that Greek moral philosophy had done everything that could be done to prepare the way for moral-fanaticism, even among Greeks and Romans, and to render it palatable. . . . Plato, the great importer of corruption, who was the first who refused to see Nature in morality, and who had already deprived the Greek gods of all their worth by his notion "good? was already tainted with Jewish bigotry (in Egypt? ).

203. These small virtues of gregarious animals do not by any means lead to eternal life ": to put them on the stage in such a way, and to use them for one s own purpose is perhaps very smart; but to him who keeps his eyes open, even here it remains, in spite of all, the most ludicrous performance. A man by no means deserves privileges, either on earth or in heaven, because he happens to have attained to perfection in the art of behaving like a good-natured little sheep; at best, he only remains a dear, absurd little ram with horns provided, of course, he does not burst with vanity or excite indignation by assuming the airs of a supreme judge. What a terrible glow of false coloring here floods the meanest virtues as though they were the reflection of divine qualities! The natural purpose and utility of every virtue is systematically hushed up it can only be valuable in the light of a divine command or model, or in the light of the good which belongs to a beyond or a spiritual world. (This is magnificent! As if it were a question of the salvation of the soul , but it was a means of making things bearable here with as many beautiful sentiments as possible.)