Читать книгу I am heartily ashamed - Gavin K. Watt - Страница 15
Оглавление2 INVASION FEARS AROUSED Oh God! It is All Over
In another “Most Secret” dispatch of November 23 to Germain, Haldimand opened with reminders of his previous warnings of the Canadiens’ reaction to the rebels’ alliance with France, in particular the clergy, which before the pact had been staunch supporters of the Crown:
The Successes, tho’ fluctuating, which we have had, joined to the vigilant Attention which I have had to their Conduct, have hitherto kept them, if not within the limits of their Duty, at least within those of Decency, but the News of the Superiority of the French Fleets & a report which is whispered of Lord Cornwallis’s Surrender, it is with great grief that I see their Attachment to France concealed under a Zeal for the Preservation of their Religion & will on the first favourable Occasion engage them in the interest of the Rebels, and it is with still greater Regret that I see many of His Majesty’s antient [British] Subjects declaring their Attachment to the Cause of the Rebels as openly as their own Safety will permit and their Expectation that the Independence of America must soon be acknowledged. — Your Lordship may be assured that if ever the Rebels shall invade the Frontiers of this Province, accompanied by a few hundred French Soldiers, a great number of Canadians will take up arms in their Favor, and that by far the greatest part of them will serve them as Guides & furnish them with Provisions and every other assistance in their Power. My observations have so confirmed me in this Belief that so far from wishing to Arm them in defence of the Province, I am apprehensive that the Attempt might in my weak state be attended with dangerous Consequences, but I must Act in this when necessary, as Circumstances shall require. Their backwardness to serve is manifested in their Seamen, some of whom from Necessity I am obliged to employ on the Upper Lakes, where notwithstanding they Receive very high Wages, they serve with utmost Reluctance and will on no account remain above two years. On the other the Rebels have been lately supplied with some Money and a great Quantity of Ammunition & other Warlike Stores. They have already established Magazines in different Places on the Frontiers, inconsiderable as yet, but which from being contiguous to Districts or Townships may be easily augmented. The Inhabitants on the Frontiers of Canada have from their Infancy been accustomed to Live in the Woods, & if the Situation of Affairs to the Southward is as bad as it is represented, it will not be difficult for the Congress to engage them, partly from Enthusiasm, Resentment of Recent Injuries, and Love of Plunder to join a Kind of a Crusade in order to subdue this Country.
The people of Vermont, notwithstanding the inclinations which many amongst them have to Shake off the Tyranny of the Congress, may find themselves under the necessity to make great and Zealous exertions against us in order to wipe off the Suspicions which from many circumstances cannot but be entertained against them. The Rebels have every intelligence which they can wish for, and have received assurances that the Canada Indians will at least remain neuter, if not join them. Every method will be put in Force to shake the approved Fidelity of the Five Nations, by convincing them that, as we are not able to give them protection, the only means to save themselves is to lose no time in embracing the Party of the Americans … This Province is very extensive & is accessible in many Places. The best of the Troops under my Command are necessarily and indispensably employed in guarding the upper posts. The greater number of those I have here are Germans and consist mostly of Invalids whom General Burgoyne left behind him or of Recruits Totally Ignorant of Military Discipline. In case of an Invasion[,] after leaving the necessary Garrisons in the Posts which I cannot abandon, I cannot assemble more the 2,500 men capable of keeping the field two months, and I have every reason to fear that many of them would take that Opportunity to desert to the Rebels. This state of things is in no Respect exaggerated, it points out the necessity of a large Reinforcement early in the Spring & of our having the Command of the Gulph of St. Lawrence, as otherwise a French Squadron may deprive this country of every Resource.
The Provisions arrived too late this year to render it possible for me to take possession of Oswego, it would have required more time and workmen that I had to employ to Build a Fort at that Place capable to resist the Force which an enterprising Enemy sensible of Incursions and Devastations which their Country would suffer from it, would not have failed to Employ against it. From many Observations which I have made and many steps which the Enemy have taken during this Summer there is Reason to apprehend that the Plan of Attack found amongst Laurence’s [Lauren’s] Papers will be renewed and prosecuted early next Spring. The great Distance and Difficulty of communication between our different Posts will create obstacles to our resisting the Attack in every Point and as the Posts are, notwithstanding all my Efforts[,] only victualled until Spring, in case a Supply of Provisions cannot be forwarded before any Invasion of the Lower Country takes place, it will be almost impossible to do it.
I have for many Months observed in the Canadian Gentlemen an Expectation of a Revolution which was to take place in the Country, and am the more confirmed in this from a letter, dated Paris the 6th of last March (which has fallen into my hands from a Mr Lotbinière, who after having Received the King’s Bounty, in London went over to the Rebels in Philadelphia) where He tells his son that He expects to see him in 14 or 15 Months from the date of the Letter and in a situation to settle His Affairs to their mutual satisfaction…. Many Letters are in the same stile and are plain indications of some design against this Province in which France cannot, now that the Provinces of Virginia & Carolina are recovered, refuse to give assistance to Congress.1
Two days later, the governor officially accepted the three companies of the 2nd battalion, King’s Rangers (KR) into the Canadian Department, placing them on full support. Whether Sir Henry Clinton had given his blessing is unclear; however, the governor’s need was great and he may simply have chosen to gamble that the small battalion would not be “recalled” south.2
On November 26, Haldimand sent a “most Private” dispatch to Germain enclosing duplicates of his recent messages about “the Critical Turn Affairs may take here in Consequence of Lord Cornwallis’s Misfortune.” Captain Justus Sherwood of the Secret Service had reported there was “not a Shadow of Hope remaining that any terms from Government will be Received by the [Vermont] People, who are now rioting in the Excesses of Licentious exultation.” Even more alarming, “He Says that a Diversion from this Province has been long Expected, and that Measures had been taken under the Veil of Being Alarmed by its approach, to have Cutt off the Retreat of our Detachment had it ventured to penetrate any Length into the Country.” This implied that the Allen faction was not in control and their opponents had sufficient sway to put a major force into action. Further, the rebels were “to make an Early [movement] against Canada next Spring — that in the course of the Winter every Preparation would be made for a General attack & that they would endeavour to get Possession of our advanced Posts upon Lake Champlain & the other Frontiers to facilitate their operations in the Spring, which are to keep Pace with a Fleet by the River St. Lawrence.”3
On November 27, Major Ross wrote from Fort Haldimand with details of his examination into the behaviour of Lieutenant Jacob Adams of the Quebec Indian Department. Before the war, Adams had been a trader with the Mississaugas and he had been lured into the service by the promise of a commission. When Fort Haldimand was built, Adams was assigned to manage the Mississaugas’ war effort. After several years, he succumbed to the lure of his commercial interests and organized his charges to gather ginseng, a medicinal plant with a lucrative world market. Ross noted that the Mississaugas were so often gathering the plant, it was difficult to bring thirty together for military purposes. Adams was dismissed.4
A day later, the ex-officers serving as Volunteers in Eben Jessup’s Pensioners’ company were ordered to submit an exact list of the men they had recruited so that they could be given preferment accordingly when additional companies were formed.5
On November 29, Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Claus, a deputy superintendent of the Six Nations’ Department, reported to headquarters that he had equipped and sent off a party of six rangers with two trusty Mohawks under the command of Lieutenant Walter Sutherland, 2KRR, “an officer, I flatter myself His Excellency the General will approve of, as being particularly well acquainted with the business and route he is to undertake, and as capable of executing the orders and instructions he carries than any person I know employed in that service.” As the rebels had ordered away everyone suspected of being friendly to government, he predicted Sutherland would have a difficult time finding a safe harbour; however, Reverend Stuart had provided the names of trusty people who might venture to assist. Claus noted that a foot of snow had fallen since the previous night, which would prove tiring for the party.
He reported that the rebels were selling their wheat for four shillings, six pence, New York currency, and the loyalists were compelled to sell theirs for only two shillings. The quality of the wheat was very good, but army worms had damaged the grass and summer grains — the same pest that had done so much damage to Quebec’s crops.
Fort Frederick at Albany (head of State Street) 1765. A notorious jail for housing Tories throughout the Revolution.
On behalf of Stuart, Claus informed headquarters that, as the rebels had received no word about the priest’s exchange, they confined his surety with the common criminals in the Albany jail, which was a most unwholesome, nauseous place. The fellow was in ill health, which gave Stuart much unrest. Obviously, Stuart hoped this news would speed up the exchange process.6
On November 25, two reports of the disastrous news of Cornwallis’s capitulation arrived at Lord George Germain’s London office within hours of each other. Prime Minister Lord North received the news “as he would have taken a ball in the breast … and paced up and down the room exclaiming ‘Oh God! It is all over.’”7
On November 27, the various levels of the rebel command initiated a brisk round of correspondence about the defence of New York’s frontiers. Governor Clinton wrote to General Heath from Poughkeepsie about the imminent expiration of the New York Levies’ terms of service. As it was usual for Continental regiments to replace the Levies over the winter, he asked what arrangements were in train, in case some strategic plan should prevent adequate coverage along the frontiers and make it necessary for him to keep the Levies in service:
For although we have not to apprehend any formidable body of the enemy on our frontiers in the course of the winter, yet they have seldom failed visiting us with small parties, sufficient to annoy these posts, should they find them abandoned or possessed only by the neighbouring inhabitants & desolate the country. The raising of Levies at this season will be attended with a great expence & difficulty and an additional consumption of our provisions & stores. I, therefore, sincerely wish it might be avoided & I would fain hope that such a disposition may be made of the army as to render it unnecessary.
The following day, Washington wrote to Heath from Philadelphia on this same topic and confirmed that the New Hampshire Continentals would remain in the north and, he believed, would be adequate for the purpose. Hazen’s regiment, which had been in the Mohawk region the previous winter, had undergone “a long Tour of March and Duty” during the 1781 campaign and would not join them. He closed with, “The Success of Colo Willett at the Northward, does him great Honor; and I hope will be attended with very good Consequences.”
Stark reported to Heath on November 29 that he had dismissed all the militia and Levies at Saratoga. The two blockhouses were nearing completion and repairs were underway to the barracks, although resources were very limited. He pled for improved clothing for the New Hampshire Continentals and an adequate fuel supply, refuting Heath’s supposition that fuel was “at command,” for none could be had within a mile and half of the post. As to Heath’s advice that materials were being sent for the regimental tailors to make up clothing, he wrote that there was only one tailor in the New Hampshire Line and he was “a drunken rascal, that could be hardly compelled to make three coats in a winter.” He agreed with Heath’s observation that only a few horses should be kept with the troops and the remainder sent where forage could be had; however, there was not a man in the district who knew where that place was. Naughtily, he added, “But I suppose it is romantic to issue any more complaints, when experience has taught me that they are of so little value.”
Next, he displayed a nice turn of phrase:
I can not sufficiently admire the magnanimous conduct of our soldiers. They certainly put knight errantry out of countenance; and all those whimsical tales which are generally supposed to have existed no where but in the brains of chimerical authors, seem realized in them. But I fear that this virtue will not last forever; and, indeed, it is my opinion that nothing but their too wretched situation prevents an insurrection. However, I have not heard a syllable of the kind yet, and shall take every imaginable precaution to hinder it; and I hope that their firmness and my endeavors will prove efficacious.
He reported that Willett had eighty to one hundred three-years’ men and believed that two hundred men should be kept on the Mohawk River for its protection as less than that would be dangerous, but he cautioned that until the men were clothed, they should not be sent. Currently, the three-years’ men at Saratoga could scarce leave their barracks for lack of clothing. Their distress was so great, it was found difficult to form a guard.
There were few troops left in the district, so Stark intended to retire to Albany when the barracks and blockhouses were finished. As he anticipated little business for a general officer, he requested leave to visit home.
On November 30, General Heath responded to Governor Clinton’s request by advising that the two New Hampshire regiments, of some three hundred to four hundred men each, would winter in the north. Reflecting Washington’s opinion, he suggested they would be sufficient to man the Mohawk Valley posts when the Levies’ terms expired. He was unable to spare any other Regular troops for the other western frontiers, such as the Catskills, and pronounced that the state must provide them, if necessary. Obviously, if Willett’s recommendations were accepted, the governor would have to take the Mohawk into consideration as well. Heath also requested information about what places would “most probably [be] exposed to the incursion of the enemy during the winter, and when and in what numbers the troops will be most advantageously cantoned”.
On receiving Heath’s advice that only two New Hampshire regiments were available, Clinton wrote to Albany County’s brigadiers Peter Gansevoort and Robert Van Rensselaer reminding them that the state legislature had lately empowered him to bring into service militia levies from any of the districts any time he deemed it necessary.
Considering that the United States and their French ally had just achieved a monumental victory in Virginia and their army in the north had successfully warded off two expeditions from Canada, the governor’s message betrayed amazing anxiety. He spoke of New York’s “present distressed situation” and his earnest desire to avoid burdening the inhabitants with unnecessary expenses and trouble. He reported Heath’s plan to leave the New Hampshire brigade in the north to garrison posts on the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers and requested the opinions of each brigade’s field officers and principal gentlemen whether it was necessary to make a levy before spring and, if so, what number of men would be required to protect the frontiers of Albany, Charlotte, and Tryon counties for the winter. The governor clearly recognized the enemy was not yet defeated in the north.
Clinton gave Heath his agreement on December 4 that the two New Hampshire regiments, if as strong as reported, should answer the purpose, particularly if the season was not milder than usual; however, the addition of Hazen’s regiment would ease the burden of the duty, which might otherwise be severe, and give greater security and confidence to the exposed settlements. He listed the posts that were usually occupied over the winter: Saratoga (from where detachments could be made to White Creek and Ballstown); Fort Herkimer, Fort Rensselaer, and Johnstown (from where small detachments were occasionally made to small posts in their vicinities), and Schoharie. He was unable to comment on the relative troop strength required at each place, but thought it best to distribute the largest regiment to the western posts, without making detachments from it to Albany or Schenectady to secure public stores. He thought the Saratoga frontier was neither as extensive, nor as exposed, to the enemy and it was able to “derive more speedy & effectual succor from the militia. The western frontier of Ulster & Orange being more remote from the enemy’s posts & of course less liable to their incursions, expecially in the winter season, may with greater ease be defended by the militia of those counties who are remarkably well affected & favorably situated for the purpose.”8
Well affected, perhaps, but not very motivated or capable, to judge from the raid of the previous August.
There was some upset in the Royal Yorkers’ two battalions. Robert Leake had been appointed 2KRR’s paymaster and requested a list of commission seniorities from Quebec City headquarters, while at the same time he indicated to Captain Mathews the likelihood of a protest from Thomas Gumersall about his seniority relative to Leake’s. He also argued for the seniority of his independent company’s second lieutenant, William Fraser, relative to the ensigns who had been promoted from 1KRR.
Major Gray reported there was some quibbling over the men to be brought to the Royal Yorkers from the Queen’s Loyal Rangers by Lieutenant Jeremiah French and the men of McAlpin’s to be brought by Ensign James McAlpin. Such issues were minor inconveniences in the army’s administration, but very important to those involved.9
On December 1, Butler reported to Mathews that he had taken an inventory of Indian stores and found several critical articles missing. He had asked Powell for permission to purchase them from the merchants, but was told the governor prohibited it; however, the brigadier agreed to allow the exchange of some coarse cloth of little utility to the Indians for some vital items; however, this scarcely met the greater need. Accordingly, Butler enclosed “a list of articles we are principally in want of.” Powell had also supplied a quantity of powder and had promised more, on the understanding that it would be replaced from Indian stores in the spring.
The natives had come earlier than usual to request provisions and gave as their reason the “trifling quantity of Indian corn I issued … for planting.” They claimed that, if they had received plenty of seed last spring, they would have been able to maintain themselves over the winter. “The chief part of the Onondagas are already come in, and I fear many of the different nations will follow their example.” He had recommended hunting to all the natives as an alternative to war, but they were not pleased, so as a compromise, he counselled them “to keep out small parties that the enemy might not think them asleep.”
Surgeon Kerr had earlier reported that refugees were draining the garrison’s provisions, but Butler refuted this charge, saying they were not allowed any, nor were the farmers on the Canadian side, nor the families of the Rangers, except each company’s customary two women.
As the cold season had been moderate, the farmers had been able to clear and till ground for planting and sowing early in the spring. If they waited until summer, the growing season was too short and they would fail to subsist themselves. He believed the farmers would soon be of great use to the post, as they had maintained themselves since September and had only been allowed a half ration from the outset of the project.
He then made a surprising request. As his Rangers had not been given ammunition to practice marksmanship, the corps’ many new recruits made this an essential.10
At Montreal on December 3, Major Gray reported to Brigadier de Speth that the 2KRR detachment ordered for Carleton Island had been unable to leave Lachine until January 22, as they could not be provided for earlier. They had been detained at Point Clair by severe weather and left three days later and went to The Cedars that night. Gray had not heard from them since and was concerned that severe frost and snow had prevented further travel.
Four days after Gray’s report, Ross wrote to advise that the detachment had arrived at Coteau-du-Lac after an inexplicable delay and could go no farther. Haldimand’s reinforcement had come to naught and Ross hoped the battalion would be united at Carleton Island in the spring. He reported that the neck of land below Fort Haldimand had been fortified to protect both the shipping that would winter in the bay and the storehouses on the point.
Mathews notified Gray that the men enlisted by French would be ordered to accompany him to 2KRR; however, a handful had been “made over” to French by Sherwood and were presently employed in the Secret Service and would continue in that role, but be credited to the second battalion. McAlpin’s claim was quickly dismissed, “His Excellency appointed the Young Gentleman in Consideration of His Fathers Services, as a provision for him, but that He does not consider that He has the least inherent Right to the Men who Entered in that Corps while Mr McAlpin was a Child.”11
Captain William Twiss, Canada’s chief engineer, made a tour of lower Quebec’s various fortifications. Of his visit to the troublesome Prison Island off Coteau-du-Lac, he wrote, “We found the Côteau Island extremely well arranged for the accommodation, and security of Prisoners of War, and I think your Excellency will not hear of any making their Escape from thence: the buildings as they now stand have Births for 216 Men, with a separate Room for an Hospital, and another for the Surgeon’s Mate, each room has a Fire Place, and contains only 12 Men … these Buildings are commanded by a Blockhouse, and Guard House…. I judge the distance … to the Island to be about 500 yards.” (How wrong his predictions about no more escapes would prove to be.)12
William Twiss, 1745–1827. Canada’s very accomplished chief engineer. Twiss had worked at the Tower of London, the fortifications at Gibraltar, and the defences of the Portsmouth Dockyard before coming to Canada with Burgoyne in 1776.
Brigadier Gansevoort of Albany County’s first militia brigade received an alarming letter written at Sancoick on December 4 by Lieutenant-Colonel John Van Rensselaer, OC 14ACM. He, Colonel Daniel Bratt, and some other gentlemen had been taken prisoner a few days before by “tyrannical ruffians who have disavowed allegiance to the State of New York [and] say they are subjects of the State of Vermount.” The officers were “treated scandalously and abused and carried to Bennington,” where the rioters expected aid, and no doubt praise, but were received with contempt from the authorities who allowed the Yorkers to return home.
Then, Casper Rouse of Tomhannock was taken by another armed band, but was rescued by a “number of faithfull true subjects to the State of New York.” Lieutenant-Colonel Van Rensselaer had collected a small, armed force by dramatically stating his intention to uphold the state’s supporters at the expense of his life. He entreated Gansevoort to send help with the greatest possible dispatch lest a superior force try his resolve. The next day, Gansevoort ordered Colonels Henry K. Van Rensselaer and Peter Yates to march their regiments to John Van Rensselaer’s house and quell the unrest. He urged them to be “exceedingly cautious how you conduct yourself in this matter — the utmost circumspection is to be observed.” If they took any insurgents, they were to send them to Albany with the evidence against them. The possibility of serious armed conflict loomed again.13
On December 6, Heath offered Stark his sympathies for the general’s many complaints and assured him that the Highlands Department experienced the same problems and many more that the north did not. “In October the troops were ten days without bread — the last month more. We are equally naked and destitute of pay.” Although materials were being collected to make clothing for the whole army, it would be late before it could be ready and the 1st and 2nd New Hampshire’s paymasters would have to stay below to receive the materials. Also, the army would receive three months’ pay over the winter and, again Heath asked Stark to assure the New Hampshire regiments that they would receive equal justice to the main army.
The C-in-C reminded Stark that the engagement term of Willett’s Levies would expire at month’s end and that the distribution of the Continentals should be done immediately, in particular, the 2NH should be sent to the Mohawk River in good time to relieve Willett. Contrary to Clinton’s recommendation, he suggested that part of the regiment might be left at Schenectady and the rest sent to the principal posts above, in particular, to Fort Herkimer where there were stores and ordnance. Stark’s dispositions should be “modelled” to preserve public property, curb the enemy, and protect the country. As soon as these arrangements were made, he was to forward a sufficient supply of provisions to subsist the troops until transportation reopened in the spring. Finally, he ordered that all public arms that had been issued to the militia during the late alarm be recalled. Although concern was shown about Stark’s ill health, nothing was said about granting him leave to go home.14
Also this day, Governor Clinton wrote to Willett’s major, John McKinstry, to commiserate with him over the unsuccessful attempts to complete his regiment through the vehicle of unappropriated land bounties. As less than two-thirds of the full complement had been raised and legal recruiting had ceased on August 1, he had organized the men into an independent corps.15
Gansevoort wrote to advise the governor about the Sancoick insurrection and report that he had activated two of his regiments to curb the affair. The brigadier understood that the legislature had recently discussed the problems of Vermont’s meddling in this area of the state [the Western Union] and requested advice, as he did not want to commit any more of his brigade without the governor’s assent.
On December 7, Solomon Pendleton, a man with a checkered career as a 2ACM first lieutenant, sent the governor a great deal of information about Vermont. He had just returned from a trip to her “frontiers” and had found everything in great confusion. He observed that much was said and done that tended toward anything but peace. Folk living west of the twenty-mile line were now known as “Cattermounters” and those in “old” Vermont, “Vermounters.” The two were at odds and their enmity increased daily:
The Cattermounters compose a sort of an outrageous mob; and are supported only by the Gouvernor, Council, and a few hot-headed people in Vermont; but their supporters daily decrease in number and strength. I likewise find, that many of the people in, and about Bennington, and other parts of Vermount, are daily falling off from their new State; and would desert yet faster, if they were sure they should meet with pardon for their former conduct, from the State of New York. This change is owing to the three following reasons: first, the inconsistent and troublesome conduct of the Cattermounters; who, so far overrun the bounds of political reason, that it makes them sick of their power. Secondly, the late secret negotiations with the enemy by the Governor, council, and a few more designing men, has disgusted those who have ever had a sincear regard for the freedom of the United States in general. And thirdly, their paper currency … has answer’d them no better purpose, than to drain all the hard money out of their Treasury, and in the roome of it, they have their paper currency of no credit. The hard money thus set on float, has gone to different States for Merchandize: so that they have now, as little hard cash, in proportion to their wants, as the State of New York. To remedy this false step, they have laid a heavy tax in specie; not only upon all the inhabitants of Vermont, but likewise upon the Cattermounters, which three forths of the People of Vermont reject, as belonging to their State … I am of oppinnion, that these people [Cattermounters] will, of themselves do the business for the State of New York. It only remains, for the State to act with spirit upon the one hand; and humanity and good policy upon the other. I understand there is an application gone to your Excellency, for a military force, to quell some disturbances that are now existing, between those people that are true to New York and the Cattermounters…, but I am of oppinnion that this method may better be postponed to a futer day.16
On an issue far from insurrection, Captain Job Wright wrote from Ballstown to the governor regarding the troublesome three-years’ service. Several senior officers thought that an issue of good clothing would have done more to raise men, but the State lacked the financial capability to purchase uniforms. Wright noted the governor’s advice that there was to be no further recruiting and asked that he and Lieutenants Pliny Moore and Jesse Hubbell receive some compensation for their time and trouble in attempting to further this service. He requested a commission and reminded Clinton that he had been formerly given command of what men were raised for both regiments (Willett’s and McKinstry’s?) and, as there were sufficient men to constitute a company, he asked whether they would be grouped together for this purpose.
This information was in such contrast to Clinton’s letter to Major McKinstry wherein he had intimated that recruiting had raised almost two-thirds of a regiment — not just a single company as Wright mentioned. Was Clinton putting off McKinstry for some reason?17
On December 9, Governor Clinton wrote a detailed letter to Colonel Willett in response to his report of November 16:
The legislature having at their late meeting authorized the drawing out from the militia into actual service a number not to exceed 1500 men for the further defence of the State, I shall be happy in the continuation of your services in the command of one of the corps to be formed from such levies and the more especially as it will probably be stationed in the district of your present command, where I have the pleasure to observe your past conduct has afforded the most perfect satisfaction.
He informed Willett that the New Hampshire Continental regiments would continue in the north and thought it may not be necessary to raise new troops before the opening of the spring, but it would be essential to “make every preparatory arrangement so that the Levies could be embodied and ready to take the field the moment the frontier settlements become accessible to the enemy and the more expecially as that period it is probable the regular regiments may be withdrawn.”
Clinton asked Willett to prepare a list of officers who would be willing to serve in the new regiment. He foresaw that some crisis might arise during the winter that would require a body of militia to repel the enemy and, as it was of importance that an experienced officer acquainted with the frontier country should be available to take charge of any detachments called into service, he asked Willett to accept this responsibility in Tryon County. The colonel was to collect regimental returns from Tryon’s commanders and forward them with recommendations how they might be made more effective. Clinton agreed with the earlier suggestion about acquiring snowshoes, trusting that a small quantity would cost little.
He reported that a small company of three-years’ men under the command of Captain Job Wright should be assigned to a Mohawk Valley post most conducive to the public service. Willett was to appoint one, or two if necessary, of the subalterns to Wright’s company who had enlisted the greatest number of men.18
Stark replied to Colonel Yates’s letter about the Sancoick unrest: “the insurrection you mention must be the result of folly & madness[. Y]ou will be very cautious not to begin hostilities … but stand your ground and act defensively till reinforced.” He reported that both Albany County brigades were being called out and that he was “ready to march the whole garrison when occasion may require of which you will please give me the earliest intelligence.”19
In an express letter to a State justice, the governor reported the insurrection in Albany County’s first brigade (Sancoick), advising that “conformable to the law,” Brigadier Gansevoort had called out militia units to quell the insurgents. Although he approved of this action, it was his earnest wish, “consistent with my duty & the immediate safety of the State, that offences of this kind, should be referred to the cognizance of the civil authority.” In consequence, he had sent an individual, who had been captured by the insurgents and had personal “knowledge of their proceedings, to wait on you, that you may take his examination on the subject…. Should you conceive it proper to issue warrants against them … I will chearfuly afford the officers to whom they shall be directed, every assistance in the execution of them which may be required and consistent with my duty to grant.”
Clinton then warned Brigadier Robert Van Rensselaer, commander of Albany County’s second brigade, about the Sancoick affair and instructed him to give such aid to Gansevoort “as shall be necessary.” Then, he wrote to the latter advising that none of the recent resolutions of the legislature related to the Grants pertained to problems such as the insurrection. He approved of his actions and added that, if the force already in motion was insufficient, he should call on the second brigade for assistance.20
A reader’s letter to a Quebec newspaper of December 6 revealed much about local attitudes regarding smallpox by reacting to the intention of “a Surgeon of Eminence in this City” to inoculate two children with imported pox as an experiment. The writer agreed that, while the procedure had proven effective in Europe, “Here the malady prevaileth not naturally and thousands of grown Persons have never had the infection. It [the doctor’s sample] is now arrived from 3,000 miles distance; it is taken from we know not what Subject, and is sent by, we know not whom.” A most contentious issue indeed!21
Quebec City’s lower town.
On December 10, Mathews informed Robert Leake that Haldimand was unable to give him seniority in the (Provincial) Line over Thomas Gumersall, as the latter’s commission as captain-lieutenant was dated March 9, 1778. Although Leake had served as a captain under Burgoyne in 1777, his rank had not been confirmed until he took command of an independent company on May 23, 1779. This disappointment was offset by the news that the governor held the power to decide about seniority within a regiment, “and without intending the least Injury to Captain Gumersal His Excellency thought your Services and your Losses entitled You to the Preference — in all matters relating to the corps, you will of course command as senior captain — in the Line, Capt Gumersal must take Rank from his former Commission.”
Due to the amalgamation of so many different corps, seniority of rank in Jessup’s new battalion was a far more complex issue than within the Royal Yorkers. No doubt, the final outcomes brought many disappointments. Ignoring the two reduced lieutenant-colonels who were listed as captains on a December 10 return, the other captains were listed in order of seniority and had seen service in the following corps: 1. Justus Sherwood, Secret Service and Peters’s Queen’s Loyal Rangers; 2. Jonathon Jones, Jessup’s King’s Loyal Americans; 3. William Fraser, Fraser’s Independent Company and McAlpin’s; 4. John Jones, a deputy barrackmaster under Burgoyne and at Sorel; and 5. Peter Drummond, Drummond’s Independent Company and McAlpin’s.
Of the lieutenants, there were: 1. Henry Simmons, Peters’s; 2. Thomas Fraser, Fraser’s Independent Company and McAlpin’s; 3. David Jones, Secret Service and Jessup’s; 4. James Parrot, Secret Service and Peters’s; 5. Alexander Campbell, McAlpin’s; 6. David McFall, Peters’s; 7. John Dulmage, Secret Service and the Loyal Volunteers; and 8. Gideon Adams, Drummond’s Independent Company and McAlpin’s. Variegated indeed!22
Another patronage appointment in Butler’s Rangers was announced in General Orders at Quebec City on December 11 when Charles Godefroy de Tonnancoeur, Gentleman, was appointed a second lieutenant. The name Godefroy de Tonnancoeur ranked high amongst the provincial noblesse. Charles’s father was a committed supporter of the king’s government and the son had seen service in the defence of Fort St. John’s in 1775 and as an ensign under Captain David Monin with Burgoyne in 1777. With his connections, his native tongue, and his military experience, he would have proven most useful to the Rangers, but there is no evidence that he ever served on the frontiers.23
In a letter of December 12 to General Heath, Stark revealed new information about the Sancoick riot. He had sent a request to Bennington for particulars and was informed that it was Captain John Abbot, a former 14ACM company commander, and a number of his followers who had seized Colonel Van Rensselaer and others in a public house. As earlier reported, the insurgents had roughly used their captives, took them to Bennington, and called upon the magistrates to arrest them in “a legal manner.” The rest of the story was as previously reported.
When the insurgents discovered Gansevoort’s troops on the march, they collected their force within half a mile of the Yorkers. The two bodies, each some two hundred strong, glared at each other for a week without incident.
Stark believed that none of the insurgents were “old” Vermonters. Using Pendleton’s term, they were “Cattermounters.” He hoped the upstarts would seek compromise and avoid bloodshed. “Congress would do well to pass some severe and decisive edicts, and see that they are put in execution before spring; otherwise, the consequences may be exceedingly serious, and perhaps dangerous.”
He then reverted to issues he had raised in earlier letters. He was sorry to hear that other troops suffered more than his, “but, since some are more wretched, we must submit to our fate like good soldiers.” It was not practicable for the 2NH to be sent to the Mohawk River until they were clothed. Indeed, only thirty-six “three years” and “during the war” men, including serjeants, were fit for duty in both regiments; the remainder were so bereft of clothing they could not even obtain fuel for their own use and he had found it necessary to retain a number of Levies to perform camp duties. He hoped there was a possibility of sending some blankets, shirts, overalls, stockings, and shoes, which would provide temporary relief. Buried deep in his report was some shocking news:
My predictions in my last were realized on the evening of the 10th instant. The troops mutinied; but, by the seasonable interposition of the officers, it was quelled very easily. But, sir, this may be but a prelude to an insurrection of a more serious nature.
Some of the most forward of the mutineers are in custody, and are to be tried by court-martial. Mutiny is certainly a crime that deserves the severest punishment, but to punish one soldier for it, is unjust and cruel to the last degree.
Whenever possible, he would send the second regiment to the Mohawk River posts, but he cautioned Heath that he “must not expect impossibilities.” He reported that Willett had between eighty and one hundred three-years’ men to garrison the posts until the Continentals were clothed. Presumably, these were men over and above Wright’s little company. After some comments about being unaware of any Continental arms being issued to the militia, he added a telling postscript that emphasized that the war was far from over.
I never saw a thanksgiving before that was so melancholy. I may, I believe with safety, affirm that there will not be a thankful heart in this garrison, nor one that has cause to be satisfied with his circumstances. It may be argued that it is a blessing to have trials; but life without enjoyments, and replete with misery, is rather … a curse than a blessing.
In his turn, Heath wrote to Stark again, promising that there would be ample supplies of clothing sent north, but he re-emphasized that it would be late in coming. The two New Hampshire paymasters were confident that clothing could soon be made up for the men, which suggested it would be prepared before being sent. They had drawn hose, shoes, some overalls, and shirts “for the most necessitous men,” and these would be sent to Albany in a few days when the various detachments set out to join their regiments.
A supply of forage had at last been settled upon and a quantity of writing paper was on the road from Philadelphia. As he had no knowledge that a mutiny had occurred, he wrote, “The good temper and patience of the troops, exhibited on all occasions, does them honor. I am happy in having the evidence of a prospect of their being well fed and well clothed; and I hope they will receive some pay.”
Heath reported he was investigating whether or not Willett’s three-years’ men would remain in the Mohawk region over the winter and, almost word for word, reiterated Clinton’s opinions on the posts to be occupied over the winter.
As to Stark’s request for leave, “I wish to gratify your inclination in visiting your family, but wish you to remain a few days, as I hourly expect General Hazen in this quarter. As it may be equally agreeable to him to spend the winter at Albany, and as I should prefer having a general officer in the northern district, I will request him to repair there; if he declines it, Colonel Reid must exercise the command.”
Colonel Peter Yates wrote to Brigadier Gansevoort on December 12 from Sancoick. The general’s last instruction had given Yates permission to enter into any agreement he thought best to bring an end to the insurrection, but he thought a resolution was unlikely and enclosed an affidavit to support his contention. The affidavit had been sworn that same day by Bezalial Phelps before Justice John Younglove at Cambridge. To wit — Phelps had at times been taken into the confidence of General Safford and others from Bennington who vowed they would disperse Yates’s party either by killing or taking prisoner Yates, John Van Rensselaer, Bratt, etc. … and holding them until Vermont’s laws were in force. The agitators made several other violent expressions. From this, Yates concluded that talks were fruitless and begged for more troops, as he only had eighty on the ground and the insurgents had 146 in a blockhouse. He requested a fieldpiece and some artillerymen to resolve the issue. As to the “old” Vermonters, he thought they would do nothing more than make a great show. Stark had promised to “march his whole camp,” but he preferred that Gansevoort would come at the head of his brigade. Clearly, Yates was in over his head. Worse, the season was very troublesome and his men were restless and wanted to either fight or go home.
The governor wrote to answer Heath’s queries about three-years’ men, advising that Willett had recruited a number out of the nine months’ Levies, but their clothing was worn out and they would be of little service until supplies arrived. He had instructed Willett to appoint officers to take charge of them and to place their companies to the best advantage along the Mohawk. Although he had received no regular return, he understood there were too few to form a regiment, but it would be a loss to the public to discharge those engaged, which must be done if they were not supplied with clothing. Clinton reminded Heath that Congress had agreed to pay, clothe, and subsist these men for whom the state had made no provisions.24
Continental artillery captain, Andrew Moodie, who had served in the Mohawk Valley throughout the 1781 campaign, wrote to Governor Clinton from West Point to advise that he had enlisted nine men from the state Levies into his company for the war’s duration and to apply for the same bounty that was paid by the militia classes when a Levy volunteered for the duration in a regular infantry regiment. He had promised the men that he would discharge them if they did not get the payment before January 1782.
Moodie reported that when Lieutenant-Colonel Abraham Van Alstyne of Kinderhook had recently visited the Point, he said that all of his regiment’s classes were delinquent and it may be that those classes would be willing to hire the nine men. He opined that it would be injurious to the service if the men had to be discharged and it would incur a great cost to him personally, as he had clothed them when they joined. Three days later, Clinton’s secretary wrote to Van Alstyne with this proposal, but the outcome had not been determined yet.
Stark wrote to Meshech Weare, one of New Hampshire’s most notable politicians of the time. With considerable bitterness, the prickly general said that, although his letters were “treated with silent contempt,” his mind always turned to Weare when affairs seemed out of order, such as Vermont’s “late riotous conduct” in claiming jurisdiction of southeastern New York and eastward to the Connecticut River. He blamed Vermont for the Sancoick uprising, an act “in open defiance and violation of the rules of Congress.” He had seen the proceedings of Vermont’s legislature on the subject of admission into the union and found:
[T]hey have not only rejected the resolutions of Congress, but in reality have disavowed their authority; and I farther perceive that, in their great wisdom, they have thought proper to appoint a committee to determine whether New Hampshire shall exercise jurisdiction to the Connecticut River or not. This proceeding appears too weak and frivolous. For men of sense to suppose that New Hampshire would ever consent to an indignity so flagrant, and an abuse so pointed as this seems to be, is what I own surprises me. However, I hope, and indeed have no doubt, that New Hampshire will be more politic than to take notice of this daring insolence. What I mean by notice, is to think of treating with them upon this or any other subject until Congress shall come to a final determination with respect to these people.
The very next day, Vermont’s governor, Thomas Chittenden, sent a letter to Stark requesting him to intercede with New York’s officers and order them to suspend any operations in the Western Union and, more important, that if they should refuse to comply, he asked the general not interfere by sending his Continentals. The governor made a quite astounding offer: “If they comply … and liberate the prisoners they have taken, I will suspend the exercise of jurisdiction or law over any person or persons who profess themselves subjects of New York, during that time.” Had Vermont’s council realized their eyes had grown larger than their stomachs?
On December 16, former New York militia captain John Abott, the architect of the Sancoick insurrection, who now styled himself a Vermont colonel, wrote a petulant message to Colonel Henry Van Rensselaer claiming he had orders preventing him from holding any further negotiations. He would not meet at the time or place previously decided upon, nor would he allow Van Rensselaer to send men into his camp with messages. Little wonder that Yates was disenchanted with negotiating.25
On December 16, Marinus Willett graciously accepted Governor Clinton’s request to remain in command on the northwest frontier over the winter and for the 1782 campaign, but not without some misgivings. He took the opportunity to broach the question of his rank:
But whilst I reflect on my former and present situation, I become the subject of sensations of a very unpleasing nature. Having very early received an appointment in the Continental Army and by proper and regular gradation arrived to command of a regiment, I felt myself rather unhappy when the army became new modeled at the close of the Campaign in the year 1780 to find that it became my lott to retire. The cause, however, of that arrangement being urged by arguments of ecconomical import, and the finances of my Country requiring particular attention to this article, to find fault or to repine at a measure calculated to promote the common cause would be inconsistent with those principals of patriotism which have always bore sway in my breast. However, therefore, contrary to my secret wishes of continuing in the line Millitary (as long as there was a Brittain or a British ally to fight against in the American States) it might be, I determined chearfully to put on the habiliments of a private Citizen and was Industriously employed in arranging my affairs for doing business as such, when I was previous to the opening of the last Campaign called upon to receive the command which I at present possess, and which agreeable to your excellencie’s desire I am quite willing to continue in, if it can be done without Injustice to my former appointments and rank in the Continental army.
Your Excellency is well acquainted with the manner in which the reformed officers were obliged to retire from actual service, and must know that when they retired their former rank ceased. It is not my intention to enter into arguments concerning the propriety, conveniency or illconveniency of this mode. I remember well that one argument which was made use of at the time of its taking place, was, that if reformed officers were to have their rank retained, and be entitled to promotion agreeable to their rank, it might happen that an officer who had spend several Campaigns at home entirely devoted to his private concerns, would step into a vacancy over the head of an officer who had encountered a large portion of fatigue and danger during the whole time in the field. This had the appearance of bearing hard upon the officers who were continued in Service, but this objection can by no means lay against me. Your Excellency well knows that four months had not elapsed from the time of my being obliged to retire from service until I was again called upon, and engaged to accept of military command on the frontiers of our State; a service that has been accompanied with a proportion of Toil and Hazard equal perhaps to any in the United States, and that the short time in which I had a recess from service was when the army was in winter quarters so that the argument which I have before mentioned can no way opperate against me.
Willett went on to provide a précis of his service, starting on June 28, 1775, when he had been appointed the second senior captain, 1NY, and finishing on January 1781 as lieutenant-colonel commandant of the 5NY. He repeated, “Four months had not elapsed before I was again called upon and have served a Campaign accompanied with difficulties superiour to any that has fell to my share in any one Campaign during the war.” Then, he delivered a one-two punch:
I am happy in meeting with your Excellencie’s approbation of my conduct during the Campaign, and am not only willing, but desirous if my country requires my service, to continue in my present Command, if this, as I have before observed, can be done consistent with my former appointments, and rank in the American Army.
Your Excellency cannot be unacquainted, that by the rules for the Government of the American Army, all officers of the same Denomination receiving Commissions from any particular State, are to take rank after officers who have Commissions from Congress, even tho’ the commissions from the State should be of elder date than those from Congress. This being the case, your Excellency must at once see how disagreeable my situation is while I continue to serve under my present appointment, liable every day to be commanded by officer who I have always been accustomed to command and who by no just rule ought on any account to Command me, and a submission to which in the Ordinary course of things would be degrading to the Millitary character. That this cannot be either just or right is I humbly conceive exceeding clear. And for this reason beg leave, to request your excellency’s assistance in endeavouring to procure, for me from Congress, a Power to rank agreeable to my former appointment in the American Army.
Just a day later, Willett wrote to the governor displaying considerable anger over his pay.
[T]o serve another campaign under such disadvantages as I did the last, and to come home in the winter and sit down with empty pockets is what I cannot find a Dissposition to Comply with Unless … some better prospect should open.… The Restoring to me, however, if it can be done my former Rank as the Army appears to be new Established with the prospect of receiving such pay as would free me from present difficulties would make the Command your Excellency desires to keep me in very pleasing to me. But without this I dont see how I can continue. All these things, I think it not amiss to make known in Confidence to your Excellency.26
Adding to the Sancoick uproar, on December 15, several “friends to New York” in the Western Union held a meeting at Schaghticoke and were confronted by a handbill posted by two pro-Vermont Justices of the Peace, commanding all inhabitants of the town “to leave off their advising the people and trying to Disafect them.”
After several futile attempts at negotiation at Sancoick, Colonel Henry Van Rensselaer had scooped up some prisoners and left. Two days later, Vermont’s veteran colonel, Eben Walbridge, sent Henry Van Rensselaer two testy notes about the dangerous unrest in the Western Union. His first letter was critical of Van Rensselaer’s preemptive action and the second referred to the Yorker’s statement that he was not authorized to treat with anyone who was not a subject of his home state. Walbridge demanded the release of the prisoners, the payment of property damages by Yorker troops, and a guarantee that all inhabitants in the Western Union, whether owing allegiance to New York or Vermont, would be allowed to “rest Quiet and Unmolested” until Congress resolved the jurisdictional issues.
From his temporary headquarters at Schaghticoke, Brigadier Gansevoort countered the next day with a tough-worded letter of his own addressed to “the officer commanding Vermont troops”:
[I]n pursuance of a law of this State a part of my brigade has been detached to suppress an insurrection of some of the subjects of this State residing in the district of Schachtikoke and Hoseck. For this purpose I arrived here this day … to aid the Sheriff of this county to apprehend the insurgents by virtue of legal process. On my arrival here I am informed that a large body of troops from the Grants are marching in force with artillery…. Before I proceed any farther, I thought it expedient to write to you requesting you to inform me … what is the object of your present movement into the interior parts of this State with a military force and by what authority?27
After Willett had been visited in Albany by a number of Oneidas, he approached Governor Clinton with a new concept for the management of the rebel natives. He noted that the few Indians who continued to support the union were primarily Oneidas and Tuscaroras and that they had been, and must continue to be, sustained by the United States. “[I]t is without doubt our wisdom to have as much service from them as we can,” yet whenever they were wanted for some duty, they were not satisfied if they were unpaid, even for the most petty of scouts. To avoid this constant expense, he suggested that they should be assigned to the officer commanding on the frontiers who would be given the charge of supplying them with provisions and clothing. “This will put the officer in such a situation that he can call upon the Indians for their services and pay them for those services with such things as otherways they receive without having the benefit of their services.” He noted that it was true that they were, when inclined, very useful and, in his opinion, the way to create and preserve this inclination was to keep them in a state of dependence upon the person who needs their services. Of course, the officer commanding the frontiers was Marinus Willett.28
December 15 marked the first official appearance of the name “Loyal Rangers” to designate Major Edward Jessup’s new battalion when it was announced in Haldimand’s General Orders that Serjeant-Major Mathew Thompson, 31st Regiment, was appointed as adjutant.
Reverend John Stuart apologized in writing to the governor for his faux pas in naming his new school a “Protestant Seminary.” He had not recognized that this term might be construed to mean that pupils of different religions would not be admitted and he assured Haldimand that “every Person that has offered, Protestants, Catholics, Jews &c” had been accepted. “No Distinction shall be made on the Score of Religious Sentiments. — No Partiality shewn, either on that, or any other Pretence.”
Although painted in a later era, the equipment and clothing is similar to the Revolutionary War and reminiscent of native scouts on patrol.
On December 18, Quebec headquarters reported that Lonas Lovelace, the widow of Lieutenant Thomas Lovelace, who had been executed as a spy by the rebels, would have her husband’s pension continued until the end of the muster and afterwards would be subsisted at £20 per annum and her seven children would continue on the ration list. How she and her offspring would fare on such an allowance was an open question.
The need for reliable intelligence was unending and, on December 19, the accomplished agent, Lieutenant Walter Sutherland, 2KRR, left Ticonderoga with eight first battalion men to scout Johnstown.29
As the State’s agent had still not made adequate deliveries of flour, Heath wrote to Governor Clinton on December 19 with another plea. “The distress of this army for the want of bread has become almost insupportable — they are nearly half their time without — this obliges them to eat a larger quantity of meat than is good for their health — their naked condition for want of clothing obliges many of the soldiers to lay in the barracks nearly the whole of the time; these complicated wants are destroying their health — numbers are falling sick.”30
On December 20, two state judges wrote to Governor Clinton with news about Vermont’s leadership, referring to the republic with the usual dogged Yorker persistence as the “northeast Quarter of this State.” The evidence that Vermont was negotiating with the British to return to the empire kept building up. Two former prisoners from Canada provided specific information about these secret activities. One fellow named the key negotiators on both sides of the question and described some elements of a potential settlement that would see Vermont raising two to three thousand troops to be fed, paid, and clothed by the British, and the Crown supplying and maintaining a twenty-gun ship crewed by Vermont for service on Lake Champlain. The second man confirmed much of this information and gave as his source Han Jost Herkimer, the loyalist captain of the bateaux company at Coteau-du-Lac. As well, the man had personally seen Ira Allen at Isle aux Noix with Sherwood and Smyth and knew that Major Jonas Fay had brought thirty of Burgoyne’s Germans in for an exchange.31
In a personal letter of December 21, Stark wrote to General Washington and, after congratulating the chief on his success at Yorktown, he gave a brief review of events in the north, thoroughly dismissing St. Leger’s expedition with the comment, “they returned, with shame and disgrace.” This made it appear as if he had never suffered a moment’s concern about St. Leger, which was far from the case. As to Ross’s raid in the Mohawk, the Valley had felt “some of the effects of their inveterate malice”; however, the raiders were “driven from that country with indignity.” So much for Canada’s trifling efforts!
He went on to explain that, after St. Leger’s men had killed a Vermont serjeant, the Briton sent an inexplicable letter of apology to Chittenden. In consequence, he had written to Chittenden for an explanation of why the enemy would apologize for a military action and had been told that the subject letter had been forwarded directly to Washington. Stark theorized that a doctored copy had been sent, as the governor would hardly show the original. He continued:
The proceedings of the Vermonters have been very mysterious, until about ten days ago, when they in a manner threw off the mask, and publicly avowed their determination to continue their claim of jurisdiction to the North [Hudson] R. on the part of New York, and to Mason’s patent on the part of New Hampshire, and did actually send an armed force, with a piece of artillery, to protect and defend their adherents on the west side of the 20 mile line; and indeed have done little less than to wage war with the United States …
I believe, sir, that I may venture to predict that unless something decisive is done in the course of this winter, with respect to these people, we may have every thing to fear from them that they are capable of, in case we are under the disagreeable necessity of making another campaign.
This may be considered as strange language from me, who have ever been considered as a friend of Vermont; and, indeed, I ever was their friend, until their conduct convinced me that they were not friendly to the United States. Were I to judge by their professions, they are more mine and the State’s friend now than ever; but their actions and their words appear to carry a very different meaning. During my command, I have been promised everything from their government and their leading men that I could wish for; but they have taken particular care to perform nothing, while, on the other hand, the militia of New York, and those of Berkshire, attended to my requisitions with alacrity and uncommon spirit; and I believe the northern and western frontiers are in a great measure indebted to them for the protection of their houses.32
Brigadier Gansevoort sent two dispatches to Governor Clinton on December 21. The first included several documents detailing the clash with Vermont and a recommendation that the legislature hold a session at Albany where persons from the northeast sections of the state could more readily be examined.
One of the documents was a challenging letter from Vermont Colonel Eben Walbridge. In a convoluted manner, it essentially repeated Vermont’s claim to the Western Union and refuted New York’s right to intercede. “Should these proposals be rejected, and the people who profess to be citizens of Vermont, be imprisoned, and their property destroyed, I cannot be answerable for the consequences.”
To this was added two affidavits given by men who had been with Colonels Yates and Van Rensselaer at Sancoick. They had volunteered to go to Bennington for intelligence and when there discovered that Vermont troops had been ordered out to oppose the Yorkers’ attempts to quell the insurrection. They saw one hundred men under arms and heard a major in conversation with General Ethan Allen declare “that he would with his life and fortune protect the new union, and … that a General should not let his enemy know when he intended to strike, but give the blow and think afterwards.” Allen answered, “Now you begin to talk something like and declared himself to be of the same sentiments.” Further, a doctor “had been on the east side of the mountain where the people told [him] that they were jealous that the people of the west side were in alliance with the enemy in Canada; that the said doctor returned to Bennington on making enquiry, found that it was absolutely true.” On the men’s return to Sancoick, they came across a number of armed men and a fieldpiece drawn by four oxen inside the twenty-mile line and a few miles further on, saw armed men going to join the insurrectionists.
Gansevoort’s second report told of the actions he had taken since receiving the governor’s directions. He had gone to Saratoga to ask General Stark for a fieldpiece and a detachment of Continentals to assist his men at Schaghticoke and Hoosic. With these additions, he thought he could dislodge the insurgents from their blockhouse; however, Stark did not think a detachment was justifiable unless ordered by General Heath and, in any event, his men were almost naked and in no condition to march. Gansevoort doubted the validity of these reasons and suspected that Stark was adhering to Chittenden’s demand that he not interfere in the affair.
Gansevoort had gone to Schaghticoke to take command of his militiamen and, shortly after his arrival, the Albany sheriff came with a warrant to apprehend the insurgents. Half an hour later, his troops from Sancoick appeared, having been ordered to retire by Lieutenant-Colonel Yates in compliance with Gansevoort’s instructions not to risk an action unless their prospects of success were good. Colonel Henry Van Rensselaer arrived to report that reinforcements from Vermont had been in sight when he left. In case the reinforced rioters attempted to cut him off, Gansevoort decided to retire an additional five miles to Schaghticoke town where he could house his men from the inclement weather and secure his route of retreat. Papers were served on four captured rioters and they were jailed. He wrote a letter to the Vermont commander asking under what authority he brought a military force in “the interior parts of this State.” He was sure he knew the answer, but thought that having it in writing might prove useful to the legislature and Congress.
By sunset on December 19, no answer had been received, nor had his messengers returned. He only had eighty men on hand from four different regiments and they had been “out” for a considerable time without provisions. He was convinced there was not the least prospect of success if he engaged the insurgents and he could not expect to be reinforced “in due season.” He suspected that even if his and Van Rensselaer’s whole brigades were turned out, they would not have been sufficient to suppress the insurrection, as “the people from the Grants” had intervened. He had been misled into thinking that Vermont would not interfere, but Chittenden’s letters and the appearance of her troops “undeceived” him and he dismissed his men. Gansevoort was concerned for the people who had taken an active role in attempting to put down the uprising. They daily expected to be confronted by Vermonters and forced to swear allegiance to the republic or abandon their holdings. Indeed, several had already been faced with that dilemma. New York’s attempts to enforce her jurisdiction through military intervention had clearly failed.33
Also on December 21, Brigadiers Gansevoort and Van Rensselaer reported to the governor that “a great majority” of the five field officers and twenty-two principal gentlemen surveyed about the defence of the western frontier had decided “that 200 men would be needed before spring.”34
Stark wrote to Heath on December 22 hoping that General Hazen was on his way north to assume command and presenting a request by the New Hampshire colonel, George Reid, for leave to go home to address pressing family affairs. Reid and Stark had a long history of serving together, beginning with the militia concentration outside Boston in 1775, and both had fought at Breed’s Hill. In January 1776, Reid had been appointed a captain in Stark’s 5th Continental Regiment and, in 1780, had taken command of the 2NH as lieutenant-colonel commandant. His letter to Stark, requesting leave, gave a depressing image of duty on the Mohawk River. “A dismal gloom overspreads this quarter at present. However, two damned Indians favored me [with] a piece of venison, on which I intend to dine to-morrow … I am invited to keep Christmas with Mr. Ensign. I think that man must be a Christian…. If you have not already wrote to General Heath, I pray you to write as soon as possible, representing my situation, and the pressing necessity of my being at home.”35
Lieutenant-Colonel George Reid of New Hampshire. During the first half of 1782, Reid’s battle with Willett over senior command of the Mohawk region made the task of raiding much easier for British Indians and troops.
An Indian council was held at Niagara on December 20. A Detroit Wyandot, two Onondagas, and some other Confederacy representatives delivered speeches recommending that a message be sent to General Haldimand for his assistance to mount a strike against Fort Pitt in the spring. How little the natives understood the paucity would of the governor’s resources.36
Captain Mathews wrote to Colonel John Campbell of the Quebec Indian Department on December 21 to inform him that Haldimand had rejected Dr. Kerr’s claims as the surgeon to the natives on the Ross expedition. Whether this was because of the odd nature of his submission or for some other technicality was not stated.37
The next day, chief engineer Twiss reported to Haldimand on the state of the Yamaska blockhouses. Other than some improvements to the officers’ apartments, there was nothing remarkable at the lower post; however, he had much to say about the upper blockhouse near Missisquoi Bay, which the governor had ordered built the previous winter to hinder invasion attempts from that quarter. Twiss had located the new blockhouse on a hilltop near the bottom of a cataract located twenty-one miles from the lower post. Work had begun early in the year and by the time of his inspection, the forest was cleared 250 yards around the fortification and a nearby island was being cleared for a garden. He wrote, “the Work is exceedingly well finished, and by having a bomb-proof cellar, and being surrounded with a picketing and glacis, may be considered a Post of considerable defense.”38
Késkètomah, an Onondaga Sachem. Although probably too young to have held this role during the Revolution, this sachem exhibits the dignity reported to have been common to native politicians.
Sometime in December, Powell addressed the governor’s suspicions that had been aroused by Ross’s complaints. Haldimand had noted that only 150 Rangers had been sent to Ross from Niagara, despite Butler having returned nine complete companies for a total of 450 all ranks. Powell wrote that the report had been a mistake:
[H]e must have meant that the 10th Company was complete, for I suppose the others might want forty of their complement to which[,] if 110 sick and convalescent with fifty recruits who were on duty in this Garrison are added[,] it appears only 100 remained for cutting timber and firewood, servants, guards, &c…. When the detachment went off, I think Colonel Butler informed me he had only eight men left for that [garrison] service, and some time after it was with difficulty that twenty-five men could be mustered to go to Detroit.
He referred Haldimand to the monthly return now on its way to the adjutant general “in which every man is accounted [for]” and risked being preachy:
You must be sensible, Sir, that when a regiment is called upon it is never able to furnish the number of men returned in the column “fit for duty”, and allowance should always be made for servants, convalecents, &c. I think [it] is right to observe that whenever demands are made upon the post for troops to be employed in the enemy’s country, very large allowances must be made as there are very few of the King’s Regiment [8th Foot] equal to the fatigue they necessarily undergo upon that service. In the summer there are frequently 100 of the Rangers upon the sick list owing to the ague which generally rages here at that season, which with cutting timber and firewood, providing hay, guards, servants, &c, will prevent furnishing that number of men for active service, which from returns might be expected.
He noted that a lack of clothing for the Rangers at Detroit had prevented them from “acting against the enemy” and then shifted ground to advise that Second Lieutenant Andrew Wemple had been selected for a first lieutenantcy and that Butler recommended Serjeant Silas Secord, “who distinguished himself on the last expedition, to succeed second lieutenant Frederick Docksteder, who died upon the march to the Mohawk R.”39
On Christmas Day, Captain William Fraser, LR, sent returns for the two blockhouses on the Yamaska River to General Riedesel and reported seventy-three men had been ordered for the upper blockhouse and thirty- ordered for the upper blockhouse and thirty-three for the lower one where he was personally posted. Fraser kept two scouts of six men each operating in rotation on the St. Francis River. The overall strength in both posts had shrunk, presumably due to illness, and Fraser had been unable to increase it and requested that Riedesel do so. Riedesel replied, questioning Fraser’s dispositions and the captain wrote to explain why he had assigned twelve men to scout the “river St. Francois,” exclusive of those selected for the “Grand Scout” to Hazen’s Road which numbered only twenty-eight as opposed to fifty-six of the year before.40
Although painted long after the Revolutionary War, the clothing and equipment are suggestive of a senior warrior on a winter scout.
Remarkably, Haldimand was still without reliable information about Cornwallis’s fate when, on December 27, he ordered Sherwood to go to the Loyal Blockhouse and dispatch scouting parties to get confirmation or denial of the capitulation.
That same day, the governor wrote to Brigadier de Speth about claims that certain rebel officers being held on Île Perrot, northwest of Montreal, were reported to have committed atrocities on prisoners taken from Butler’s Rangers, cutting hands and arms off some before tomahawking and scalping them. Presumably, de Speth was to keep a weather eye on these fellows while an investigation was underway. As nothing came of the story, it was presumably apocryphal.41
On Christmas Eve, Governor Clinton wrote to the state’s Congressional delegates, enclosing the letters, reports, and affidavits relating to “The Grants” and the Sancoick affair. He found it incredible that:
[P]ersons against whom there are such unquestionable proof of a traitorous correspondence, should be permitted to go at large with impunity and even at times be attending our public councils … you must be sensible of the disagreeable impression which this has made on the minds of many of our most zealous friends, who have not hesitated to attribute to this cause in a great measure our misfortunes on the Frontiers during this and the last year.
On Christmas Day, General Heath wrote to John Stark from headquarters in the Highlands commiserating over the Vermonters’ conduct. “I fear that there will, sooner or later, be serious consequences produced by their disputes.”
Heath went on to advise that the many promises of fair treatment for the Continentals in the north had finally been honoured. “The paymasters of the New Hampshire regiments have drawn clothing of every kind, and will convey it up as soon as possible. The naked condition of those regiments led me to direct that they should be first served.” This would be very welcome news for the soldiers huddling for warmth in the freezing reaches of the frontiers.42
