Читать книгу My Reminiscences of East Africa - General von Lettow-Vorbeck - Страница 7

Table of Contents

EARLY in August, 1914, when on my way via the heliograph station of Kidodi towards Kilossa, a special messenger brought me a telegram from the Governor, to say I was to return immediately to Dar-es-Salaam; and on the following day I received the news that His Majesty had ordered mobilization, but that the state of war did not extend to the overseas possessions. A telegram from the Secretary of State of the Imperial Colonial Office called upon us to reassure the settlers.

In contrast to this a wireless message from the Admiralty Staff mentioned England also among our probable enemies.

At Kilossa I managed to catch a goods train, and so arrived at Dar-es-Salaam on the 3rd August. Here everyone was busy: the declaration of war had arrived in the middle of the preparations for a big exhibition, in the programme of which was included the ceremonial opening of the Tanganyika Railway; numerous Germans had come on a visit to Dar-es-Salaam and were now unable to get away. In order to assist in the preparations for the exhibition, Captain von Hammerstein, commanding the 6th Field Company in Ujiru, had also arrived there, and it was very fortunate that I was able at once to employ this energetic officer, who not only shared my views, but to whom I was also cordially attached, for the work of mobilization.

The question which immediately forced itself upon us was whether, in the now obviously imminent universal war in which England would almost certainly join, the Colony would remain neutral or not. As I have already explained, I considered it to be our military object to detain enemy, that is English forces if it could by any means be accomplished. This, however, was impossible if we remained neutral. In that case the situation would be that we, who did not command the sea, would have to remain inactive, with a force which, though small at the moment, had behind it a loyal, very efficient population of eight millions suitable for military service. England, on the other hand, would have no need to employ a single man in East Africa on our account; it would be able to take away the very last fit Askari, after providing for internal security, for employment in other theatres more important than East Africa. It would, therefore, obviously have been an advantage for England if any agreement had existed which condemned us to neutrality. But this was not the case: the Congo Act, which deals with the Equatorial territories, only says that in case of conflict between two of the Powers concerned, a third Power may offer its good services as a mediator. But as far as I know this step was not taken by any Power. We were therefore not obliged to restrict our operations out of regard for any agreement. From a military point of view it was a disadvantage, not for us, but for England, if war occurred in East Africa. The fact that we were not obliged to remain neutral enabled us to make use of our favourable coast as a base and refuge for the German cruiser operations in the Indian Ocean. But, above all, we were able, with our few thousand men, to contain throughout the whole duration of the war an enormously superior force of the enemy.

At the outbreak of war the Protective Force consisted of 216 Europeans (from whom a part must be deducted as on leave) and 2,540 Askari; there were, further, in the Police Force, 45 Europeans and 2,154 Askari; these were later increased by the ships’ company of the Königsberg (which had put to sea), 322 men, and of the Möve, 102 men. The total numbers enrolled in the Force during the war were about 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 Askari.

These figures include all non-combatants, such as those employed on police duty, medical personnel, supply and maintenance services, etc. How many milliards it cost to try and crush our diminutive force the English themselves will presumably some day tell us. We, on the other hand, could probably have continued the war for years to come.

For the hostile strengths no authentic figures are at my disposal; I quote from the statements of English officers and Press reports, and they must bear the responsibility for them. According to them over 130 Generals took the field against us, the total strength of the hostile troops was about 300,000, the losses in European and Indian dead amounted to 20,000; horses and mules, 140,000. These numbers, especially those of the General Officers, seem even to me rather exaggerated; I can therefore only repeat that they are taken from English sources. In any event, however, their losses were very considerable; and considering that the number of black soldiers who were killed or died is not given, the total number of enemy dead can hardly be under 60,000.

We should have been compelled, if a cruiser had sought shelter in our harbours, to refuse to admit her, by reason of our neutrality, whereas the favourable position and coastal development of East Africa made it the natural hiding-place in cruiser warfare in the Indian Ocean. As regards the agreements laid down in the Congo Act, it should be borne in mind what it would have meant for our Navy if our colonies had been declared neutral.

At Dar-es-Salaam it was very interesting during those days of tension to watch the proceedings of the English Consul King. He was to be seen everywhere, either in the Officers’ Club at a game of bridge, or at the Post Office where our telegrams were handed in. The standing orders of the English Expeditionary Force, which were subsequently captured at Tanga, and which were mainly based on King’s reports, showed how active this man had been in the time before the war, and how excellently he was informed as to the internal conditions in our Colony. His judgment on relevant matters extended so far that he even compared the relative fighting value of the Europeans in different districts, and credited those of Dar-es-Salaam with little “stomach for fighting.” To be honest, it must be admitted that in the case of a large number of the Germans in that place (and even of the local Government authorities) it actually did take some time before they were imbued with that warlike spirit without which the fulfilment of our task was simply impossible.

Very difficult was the position of the coast towns, which were inhabited by numerous Europeans (among them many women and children), and which were of course exposed to bombardment by English men-of-war at any minute. The Governor maintained that such a bombardment must be avoided under all circumstances. According to an ordinance, which certainly did not contemplate the case of foreign war, the supreme military power in the Colony was in the hands of the Governor, and communication with home having ceased, it was anyhow physically impossible to get this altered. So I was obliged to make the best of this, from a military point of view, very serious difficulty and to reckon with the possibility that, if the Governor’s instructions were faithfully executed, Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga for instance, the termini of our railways and the obvious bases for hostile operations from the coast towards the interior, would fall into the enemy’s hands without a struggle.

My view was that we would best protect our colony by threatening the enemy in his own territory. We could very effectively tackle him at a sensitive point, the Uganda Railway, and one might almost say that the numerous German settlers in the country traversed by our Northern Railway (Tanga-Moshi) were already deployed for this object. The Governor, however, did not agree with the proposal I had already previously put forward in case of war, namely, to concentrate our forces in the North near Kilima Njaro. But, in order to act at all, it was obviously necessary to collect our troops, who were scattered all over the country. As this could not be effected in the Kilima Njaro country, as I wished, the concentration took place on the heights of Pugu, a day’s march west of Dar-es-Salaam. At this place the Dar-es-Salaam Company met those from Kilimatinde, Tabora, Ujiji, Usambara and Kissendji, which came partly by march routes and partly by rail. The Police, who, in accordance with the scanty preparations already made, were to join the Protective Force immediately, were in part, at any rate, placed at my disposal, a number of old Askari were called up, and in this way four new companies (No.’s 15 to 18) were at once formed. The German Reservists were mobilized as required, and each company was brought up to an establishment of about 16 Europeans, 160 Askari and 2 machine guns.

In some cases difficulties occurred in calling the Europeans to the colours. By mistake, the crews of a few ships of the East African Line, lying in the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, were informed, in response to their application, by the Officer in Command at the Railway Station, that there was no room for them in the Protective Force. Then, at the suggestion of the Governor’s representative, a declaration was submitted to them, according to which they were to engage in writing to remain neutral during the war. Later on the men saw that this constituted an offence against the law relating to liability for service, and their own sound feeling was opposed to it. They appealed to me, setting forth the circumstances; I had had no inkling of these proceedings, and fortunately, as the declaration had not yet fallen into the hands of the enemy, the intended decision could be reserved.

The number of carriers allotted to each company varied, and may have averaged about 250. The stores of arms, ammunition and other war-material, which were lying unprotected in the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, were distributed among various places in the interior along the railway, where depots were established. The training of the troops was at once vigorously proceeded with, and even then we realized the value of rendering our head-dress unrecognizable by means of grass and leaves, a measure proposed by a practical Company Commander, Captain Tafel. The question of course was whether we, with our Askari, would be able to fight modern troops; it was denied by many an experienced hand. But from what I had seen during the revolt in South-West Africa, from 1904 to 1906, I believed that courage and military efficiency could be awakened in the East African native also, who belongs to that same great family, the Bantu, as the Herero. That certainly was a proof; but the matter was greatly simplified by the fact that there was no possible alternative.

All questions of organization, which are usually carefully prepared and considered in time of peace, had now to be dealt with and decided on the spur of the moment. One of them was the extraordinarily important one of establishing a service of subsistence and a complete system of supply from the rear. The main point was to consider, in the first place, the main roads, which were also important in a military sense. Which roads might these be? It was immediately found how disadvantageous was the absence of railway communication between the Central and Usambara Railways. In time of peace, communication had been effected by sea between Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga; this was now impossible. Obviously the importance of a military use of the lines had not been thought of. As a substitute, we had to develop a road between Morogoro and Korogwe, on the Northern Railway. The second road ran past the western side of the Masai Reservation, from Dodoma via Kondoa-Irangi, and Ufiome to Arusha, and the third from the rich district of Tabora, the capital of the Wanyamwesi country, to Muansa, on Lake Victoria, into the country of the Wassukume, who were recognized even by Consul King as the most important of our tribes. This road was also valuable because by it we could draw on the rice crops of Lake Victoria as well as on the abundant stocks of cattle. Other roads connected Kilossa with the rich territory of Mahenge, Iringa, and even Langenburg, which last provided us with a large part of our requirements in wheat flour.

The provisional organization of the supply system having been fixed in broad and general outline, it was not possible for the details of its development to be worked out at Headquarters. Someone had to be found whose past military career rendered him capable of working the system, not only from the administrative point of view, but also in accordance with the sometimes very urgent military requirements, and of adapting it to them. Major-General Wahle, a retired officer, who happened to have arrived on the 2nd August, on a visit to his son, and to see the Dar-es-Salaam Exhibition, at once placed himself at the disposal of the Force, and at my request took charge of the Lines of Communication. His task was particularly difficult, because where there were no railways, the bulk of the work had to be performed by native carriers. I have at my disposal no figures showing the total number of carriers employed for the service of the troops, and it is very difficult to arrive at it at all definitely. It included men who only carried the loads from one place to another before the permanent carriers took them over, but I am sure I do not exaggerate in saying that, on the whole, hundreds of thousands of carriers worked for the troops; and all of them had to be fed and medically looked after.

Of our many other difficulties one of a special nature may here be mentioned. The peace-time existence of the Europeans in tropical colonies had, even for reasons of health, accustomed them to a certain degree of comfort. When on safari (a journey) in East Africa, it is generally impossible to buy European food; but few Europeans had learnt to live on the vegetable products supplied by the natives or by Nature. Shelter is rarely to be had. Against mosquitos it is, however, imperative to protect oneself. So the white official or soldier seldom travelled with less than eleven carriers, who, besides his tent, camp-bed and clothing, also carried a considerable quantity of food. Such large numbers of carriers were, however, impossible for a force which was to be mobile. Another difficulty was that nearly every Askari had a boy. With these simple people, whose predilection for their ancient traditions and customs is further confirmed by Islam, and who are besides very proud and vain, it is particularly difficult to interfere with such Dusturis (customs). In individual cases it was not always easy for a Company Commander to find the happy mean.

In the tropical warfare which was before us medical care is one of the most important factors. Generally speaking, the native is in a great measure immune against malaria, and it does not often happen that an Askari gets really ill with it; some tribes, however, like the Wajagga, on Kilima Njaro, who inhabit elevated, non-malarial districts, and are therefore not immune from early youth, suffer severely from malaria as soon as they come down to the plains. From the evening until well into the morning mechanical protection against the malaria mosquito (anopheles), by means of a mosquito net, was strictly enforced for every European. For many months I slept on the ground, and even then the mosquito-net afforded me a high degree of protection; even so I had malaria ten times, for in the field it is not always possible to employ preventive measures to the extent that is desirable from a hygienic point of view. In our endeavour to attach a medical officer to every company we received most welcome assistance from the fact that there was a considerable number of them on Lake Tanganyika, and in the Southern territories on the Rovuma, who had come out to study and combat sleeping-sickness.

The work entailed by all this business of mobilization not only kept us going day and night, but also the native telephonist at Pugu, and it was extraordinary to see the skill with which the black man worked his instrument, both there and elsewhere. His great technical talent proved of the greatest value to us. Of difficulties there was, of course, an infinity. During the early days it happened that cattle coming from the country north of Tabora for the civilian population at Dar-es-Salaam met other cattle going in the opposite direction to feed the troops. To this day I feel something of a physical shock when I think of a collision at Pugu, between a train laden with the finest show cattle going at full speed, and another one, which nearly produced a serious reduction in the personnel required for working out our mobilization scheme.

Our place of concentration at Pugu is some twelve miles inland from Dar-es-Salaam. Our camp was situated on the slopes of the Pugu Mountains. The forest is extremely thick, and the country densely covered by plantations of natives and Europeans. In spite of its somewhat elevated position, Pugu is quite in the hot coastal area, and although in August we were still in the cold season, the temperature was still what we describe as “tropical;” it is that oppressive, somewhat damp heat, which makes long marches so exhausting for the European. At that time we had tents for the Europeans and a camp-bed with the inevitable mosquito net for everyone, so that in this respect there were no difficulties. In case of sickness we had established a provisional field hospital in the neighbouring Wichmann Plantations. Our horses did not suffer unduly. But one after another all our animals went down with tse-tse. In camp it was not possible to provide them, as we could at Dar-es-Salaam, with tse-tse proof stables, fitted with wire gauze similar to fly-proof windows.