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THE CONTENTS

Digested into a Regular Summary.

PART I Introduction.

Tho’ natural philosophy be distinguished from moral philosophy, yet every enquiry into any part of nature is an enquiry into fact: an enquiry concerning the human mind, its powers, and affections, and their operations, is as much an enquiry into fact, as an enquiry concerning the texture of the human body.

Natural philosophy is an enquiry into the general laws, according to which all the appearances in the material or sensible world are produced: and into the fitness or goodness of these laws.

It proceeds upon these few following fundamental principles.

I. That the corporeal world cannot be an orderly, regular system, nor by consequence the object of science and imitation, unless it be governed by general laws.

II. Those are justly concluded to be general laws in the material world, which are observed to prevail and operate uniformly in it; and regularly to produce like appearances.

III. Those general laws of the material world are good general laws, which by their steady, uniform operation, produce its good, beauty and perfection in the whole.

Corolary I. No effects of such laws are absolutely evil.

II. Such effects as are reduced to general laws, are accounted for physically.

III. They are also accounted for morally, if the laws be shewn to be good.

IV. Natural philosophy, when it proceeds so far as to account morally for appearances in the material world, coincides with moral philosophy.

When it does not proceed so far, it falls short of its principal use.

Moral philosophy is an enquiry into the texture and oeconomy of the human mind, its powers, and affections, and the laws according to which these operate or are operated upon: and into the fitness, and goodness of these powers, and affections, and their laws.

It must presuppose and proceed upon the same fundamental principles as natural philosophy.

Indeed those principles which have been mentioned as the fundamental principles, or the basis of natural philosophy, are in their nature universal truths or principles.

And therefore of every system, material or moral, it must be true.

I. That unless it be constituted and governed by general laws, it cannot be regular: and consequently it must be absolutely unintelligible.

II. Those must be received as general laws in a moral as well as a material system, which are found by experience to operate uniformly or invariably in it.

III. Those are good general laws in a system, moral as well as material, which are conducive by their general operation to the greater good of that system.

Corolary I. No effects of such laws are absolutely evil, but good.

II. Those effects are accounted for physically which are reduced to general laws.

III. They are accounted for morally by shewing the laws to be good.

Hence we see how moral philosophy ought to be carried on, and what is its end and business.

It is a mistake to imagine, that natural philosophy only can be carried on in that manner: or that it is a material system only which can be governed by general laws. Moral powers, and their exercises, necessarily suppose general laws established with regard to them.

We are as sure as we can be of any thing by experience and consciousness, that we have a certain sphere of power, activity or dominion.

But a sphere of activity cannot take place but where general laws obtain.

Here some few remarks are made upon the disputes about liberty and necessity: the doctrine of necessity was very properly called by the ancients, the doctrine of inactivity.

The enquiry in which man is chiefly concerned, is the extent of his power or sphere of dominion: accordingly the design of this treatise is to enquire into the powers and affections belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to them.

This enquiry is carried on in the same way with natural philosophy.

Accordingly as the one, so the other may proceed in the double manner of analysis and synthesis.

Hypotheses are not admitted in either, any further than as questions, into the truth or reality of which it is worth while to enquire.

As natural philosophy proceeds from causes to effects, or from effects to causes, and so is compounded of experiments and reasonings from experience, so moral philosophy in like manner, &c.

The following treatise therefore consists of observations or experiments, and reasonings from experiments about the human mind, in order to give a satisfying answer to this question, “Are all the effects and appearances relative to the constitution of the human mind, effects of faculties, powers, dispositions and affections, which with all the laws and connexions belonging to them, tend to produce good, order, beauty and perfection in the whole?”

CHAPTER I.

The first general law relative to mankind, is one that extends to, or runs thro’ the whole of our constitution and circumstances. It may be called the law of our power, or activity, or the law of industry. For, in consequence of it, is it that certain effects depend upon our will, as to their existence and non-existence; and according to it, it is that any goods may be procured, or any evils may be avoided by us; and that, in general, the greatest part of our goods and evils, whether natural or moral, are of our own making or procuring.

This is matter of universal experience. And were it not so, we would be a very inferior creature to what we now are in consequence of the power allotted to us, natural and moral: we could not be capable of virtue or merit.

But such a state of things, or such power, supposes general laws to take place with regard to us; or fixed connexions of things. For how otherwise could evils be avoided or goods be procured?

It is fit to enquire a little more particularly into our sphere of activity, and the laws relating to it.

First general law. Intelligent power, depends upon knowledge and encreases with it—in the natural—and in the moral world.

It is because the acquisition of knowledge depends on us, that we have power, or can acquire and augment it.

Wherefore if knowledge be progressive, intelligent power must likewise be progressive.

But knowledge cannot but be progressive—whether knowledge by induction from experience—or scientifick, abstract knowledge.

Knowledge must likewise depend upon our situations for taking in ideas or views.

But men must be placed in various situations, and therefore they must have various views with respect to the sensible world.

And with respect to the moral world.

Knowledge must depend on application to acquire it.

It must likewise depend upon differences with respect to natural abilities.

But different abilities are necessary for many reasons.

Progress in knowledge must depend on social assistances. This likewise is necessary for various reasons.

These are the most remarkable circumstances or general laws relating to progress in knowledge, and consequently to intelligent power. And all these laws are very fitly established.

Yet there are several instances of the care and concern of nature about mankind with regard to knowledge, very consistent with these laws of progress.

Several instances are mentioned.

But as considerable as these circumstances are, they amount but to a very small share of what nature hath done for us, in order to qualify us for progress in knowledge.

We have an appetite after knowledge, and progress in it is rewarded by itself, every step our application advances.

New and uncommon objects wonderfully attract our attention.

The excellent final cause of this.

Yet this itch of novelty is for good reasons checked or ballanced by the power of habit or usage over us.

The mind is exceedingly delighted with comparing ideas, and tracing agreements and differences.

It is particularly pleased with beautiful objects, or such objects as are regular and have unity of design.

Thus we are naturally led to enquire after analogies, harmonies and general laws. Nature is beautiful, because nature works always consonant to itself, and by a few simple general laws.

We have likewise implanted in us by nature a sense of moral beauty; and thus we are naturally led to enquire after the utility, or the good final cause of laws and their operations.

We are likewise considerably assisted and directed in our researches after knowledge, by the natural delight of our mind in great objects.

But let us consider a little our faculties, by which we acquire, or lay up and retain knowledge, and have social correspondence.

The imagination is a most useful power—by it we have memory—it renders us capable of many delightful imitative arts—which is more, it renders us capable of social commerce by discourse—we could not have mutual commerce by discourse about moral objects, were not the moral world analogous to the sensible; so that moral ideas may be pictured to us under sensible images—The right method of teaching any language, would at the same time teach us this beautiful and exceeding useful analogy.

Moreover, it is by our fancy that our passionate part is touched: truths cannot find their way to the heart but thro’ the imagination.

We are so constituted for very good and wise reasons.

Imagination is not an ingovernable faculty, as is commonly imagined— but it is much neglected in education.

The other faculty of our minds that remains to be considered is invention.

A history of this faculty, and of the phenomena belonging to it is much wanted—Mean time, it is obvious, that invention is the faculty of finding out truths quickly, by ranging or disposing ideas in proper juxta-positions for discovering their relations—Every new juxta-position of ideas discovers some unknown truth—New truths cannot be any other way discovered—It is therefore by exercise that invention is improved.

In the last place, it becomes easier to make progress in knowledge, in proportion as we make advances in it: and by the help of that science, whose object is science and evidence, properly called the art of reasoning, much neglected since Plato’s time, tho’ clearly delineated and strongly recommended by the great Verulam.

General conclusion concerning our furniture for knowledge; it is very large and noble.

CHAPTER II.

A second class of laws, those relative to our embodied state, and our connexion with a material world by means of our bodies.

Communication with the material world necessarily supposes dependence on its laws—And natural philosophers have proved these laws to be good.

A material world without being perceived could be of no use.

Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, nature would not be full nor coherent.

And by our commerce with the material world, we receive a great many pleasures of the sensitive kind, which well deserve their place.

Our senses are admirably adjusted to one another, and to our whole frame.

But this is not all; our senses are instruments or means, by which we are capable of many noble sciences and arts,—of natural philosophy.

And of many ingenious imitative arts.

Nor is this all; they are the means, or afford the subjects and occasions of many virtuous exercises,—of many social virtues—And which is principal, they afford our reason and moral conscience subjects to govern and keep in due order—And thus we have a noble dominion to acquire.

But this supposes a moral sense in our mind, which shall be considered in another chapter.

Sensible pains, whence they arise—The law with regard to them is shewn to be good.

Pains are proper and useful monitors.

The only proper ones for us—Nay, we can have no other consistently with the laws relative to knowledge.

But from the necessity there is that bodily appetites should be attended with uneasy sensations arises the necessity of all the other uneasy sensations accompanying our desires, which are called passions.

The law of matter makes an infant state of body necessary—And the law of progressive knowledge and power or perfection, makes infant minds necessary—And such bodies and minds are proper mates.

There is a great variety among mankind in respect of mental powers—And this very considerably depends on physical causes,—as is generally owned— It is well worth while to enquire more fully into this phenomenon than hath been yet done.

Mean time, it is evident, that such a dependence is involved in the very idea of union between mind and body.

And it hath very good effects.

True morality, therefore, must consider man as a compound creature, neither merely sensitive nor purely moral,—but, as he really is, Nexus utriusque mundi.

All the observations made by naturalists upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, and of other animals, might be inserted here—But the preceeding remarks will prepare every intelligent reader for making a proper use of such, as they occur to them in their reading and studies. The laws relative to our communion with a material world are therefore very fitly chosen.

CHAPTER III.

Another class of laws. Those relative to the association of ideas and habits.

Both these effects take their rise from one principle.—And they are inseparable, or must go together; if the one take place, the other must likewise take place. The formation of habits supposes association of ideas; and where association of ideas takes place, habits must be contracted.

But whether these effects are reduced to one principle in our nature or not, they do really take place, i.e. ideas are associated, and habits are formed by us. And both proceed from a most useful principle in our nature.

Which is really the law of improvement to perfection: for by means of it only do we, or can we arrive at perfection of any kind.

But, in order to treat more fully of so useful and extensive a law of our nature, an associated idea is defined and exemplified, in order to distinguish it from a complex idea.

From the very definition, it is plain, that almost all our ideas have something in them of the associated kind.

This is the necessary effect of a world, governed by general laws, upon minds which have the associating quality, or are capable of forming habits.

Accordingly, when we come to philosophize, natural philosophy consists, in a great measure, in separating ideas, which the order of nature hath associated in our mind.

And it is one great business, if not the chief in moral philosophy, to break or separate associations.

Many associations are made by ourselves. But many are inevitably formed in consequence of the order of nature, or the methods in which ideas are independently of us conveyed into our mind.

What hath been said is no objection against the law of association. For, in general, it is the law of improvement to perfection.

Several good effects arise from it—Without it we could never become acquainted with the course of nature; every thing would for ever be new to us.

Unraveling or separating ideas of associations is a very agreeable, rational employment.

It is in consequence of the law of association, that we are capable of strengthening or diminishing our desires, or of adding to our pleasures, and of alleviating our pains.

Because desires are excited by ideas, and our power over our ideas lies chiefly in associating and separating.

Another circumstance with respect to association merits attention—Like ideas are very easily associated. Wit consists in associating—Judgment in separating—Both suppose the law of association to take place—It is therefore in consequence of the law of association, in a great measure, that there are different genius’s among mankind—The same law gives rise to an equal diversity of moral characters.

But so far as temper depends on association of ideas, it depends on ourselves.

Wit and its instruments, metaphor and simile, are associations—Philosophy is separating work—Both may run into extravagances.

Practical philosophy, or the government of our affections, consists in the assiduous examination of our ideas, fancies and opinions—The chief business of education is to establish early the habit of self-examination.

Associations cannot be broken by mere refutation of false opinions, but by contrary practice—Were it not so, the law of association would not have its effect.

I proceed next to consider active habits, properly so called,—from our power of contracting habits, proceed memory,—habitual knowledge, taste of every kind,—and perfection of whatever faculty.

Instruction and education presuppose the power of habit—How memory may be improved in consequence of this law—We are imitative creatures, but it is in consequence of the law of habits that imitation hath its effect, or example its influence.

Habit renders that agreeable which was at first disagreeble.

It ballances our natural desire after novelty.

By the law of habit, passive impressions grow weaker in proportion as practical habits are strengthened—instances.

It is in consequence of the law of habits that temper is formed—In consequence of it, we are able to establish in our mind the deliberative habit,—which is self-command, and true moral liberty.

It is therefore this law which renders us capable of liberty, or of being free agents.

The laws relating to association of ideas and habits, are therefore good general laws,—an useful corolary.

CHAPTER IV.

Another class of laws relative to our guiding principle and our moral conduct—Our excellence consists in our having reason and a moral sense to guide our conduct.

It is by our reason, that we rise above merely perceptive beings in the scale of life—It is all our force, or, at least, our chief one.

Reason is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as such.

There are two things to be considered with respect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct—Our sense of right and wrong,—and our sense of happiness—That these two do not disagree, shall be shewn afterwards.

But first let us consider our sense of right and wrong—whether we have such a sense or not is a question of fact—But that we have it is plain, for we are not only capable of electing, but of approving—These two are very different operations.

If we have an approving and disapproving sense, we have a moral sense, or a sense of right and wrong.

What are the qualities which excite approbation or disapprobation—Actions must be done with affection, freedom and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemnation.

Of such actions, veracity, candor, benevolence, &c. excite our approbation, and their contraries our disapprobation.

Several arguments to prove we have a moral sense—from analogy,—for we have a sense of beauty in material forms.

—From languages, for they suppose it.

—From the polite arts, oratory, poetry, painting, &c. for they suppose it.

Without supposing it, to account for several phenomena, we must have recourse to very subtle reflexions of which the mind is not capable, and for which it hath not time.

We can no more be bribed to approve an action, than to assent to a proposition.

Further reflexions on a moral sense—It is not worth while to dispute about a name, if the thing be owned.

And it must be owned by all who acknowledge moral differences of actions and characters.

However, it is proper, nay, necessary to give this sense or faculty in our nature a distinguishing name—This is no less necessary than it is to give distinguishing names to our other senses and faculties.

That we are determined by pleasure and pain in all our motions, is true in a certain sense—But this general proposition is of little use in philosophy, till our pleasures are distinguished and classed.

And our moral sense renders us capable of a peculiar set of them, the highest we are susceptible of, or can conceive.

The cautiousness of the ancient moralists in using the words good and evil very commendable.

If we have no moral sense, then we are only capable of computing our external interest or advantage.

But if we have a moral sense, we are capable of rising higher, and taking in what is worthy and laudable in itself into the account.

If we would but try ourselves by proper questions, we should soon feel, that we have indeed a moral sense— And it is absurd to suppose a moral sense, not to be from nature. Art cannot create.

A moral sense does not suppose innate ideas—But moral ideas are continually haunting our mind—Nature therefore hath not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice—But our moral sense, like all our other faculties, must depend on our care to improve it.

Hitherto then we have found our nature to be admirably well constituted with regard to virtue and vice—But, it remains to be enquired, how interest and virtue agree according to the constitution and laws of our nature.

CHAPTER V.

Another class of laws. Those relative to interest, or private and publick good.

First of all, the several enquiries about morals are classed.

Next, it is to be observed, that beauty is inseparably connected with utility throughout all nature—It is so in all the imitative arts—Because it is so in nature the standard of truth.

It is so in our mundan system—and with regard to the bodies of all animals.

It is so, and must be so with respect to the fabric of the human mind, affections, actions, and characters, and their effects.

The proof of this must be fetched from the anatomy or texture of the mind—Lord Shaftsbury’s reasoning to prove it, is taken notice of as an example how enquiries into the human mind ought to be carried on.

Another train of reasoning to prove that virtue is private interest—and universally acknowledged to be so.

Some observations on Cicero’s way of ascertaining human perfection and duty,—and then of proving that virtue is in all respects our truest interest.

An observation upon other ancient arguments to prove that virtue is private good,—we are not made for sensual pleasures, but for those of the mind, or rational ones.

Man is made for exercise, and to acquire dominion over his mind, and all its appetites—In this our natural greatness of mind consists, and virtue alone can content this natural desire of power, and inclination to extend our capacity. Several observations to illustrate this.

Some other considerations taken from ancient authors to prove, that virtue is man’s supreme, nay, his only happiness,—and that virtue alone can be the reward of virtue.

Virtue is therefore private interest or good.

This chapter concludes with some reflexions on the debates among philosophers about the meaning of obligation.

And then sums up all in a conclusion from the foregoing considerations concerning human nature and its maker, in Lord Shaftsbury’s words.

CHAPTER VI.

Another class of laws. Those relative to society, or the dependence of human perfection and happiness on social union, and rightly confederated abilities and powers.

A general view of our social make—Man is in as proper a sense made for society as any machine is for its end.

The fundamental error of Hobbs consists in his considering the desire of power, which is natural to man, as his only natural appetite or instinct.

But our natural desire of power, as it is conjoined in our frame with other equally natural desires, is a most noble and useful instinct.

All our affections, not only the publick ones, but even the private, have a respect to society, and are formed with a view to it.

Society or variety of social happiness.

Requires variety of talents and characters.

The exigences of our animal life require great diversity of powers and talents.

Moral happiness requires the same diversity—A variety of different tempers and characters is requisite to various reflexions or modifications of social happiness; in like manner, as various textures of bodies are necessary to the different reflexions, refractions, and transmissions of light and heat, in which the beauty of the visible world consists.

All social virtues suppose mutual dependencies and wants, for they may be all reduced to giving and receiving.

Natural diversities make different materials for a variety of good, by our own improvement, or of our own acquisition by right social union.

Benevolence or publick affection naturally works in those proper proportions, which the general good of society requires—It operates like attraction in the material world.

The notion of a publick interest is no sooner formed than due affection arises towards it—And our mind is so fitted by nature to form that notion, that we cannot avoid forming it.

But benevolence, like other affections, is liable to changes,—it may be diminished or strengthened.

It is difficult to determine the original force of any affection in our hearts— But it cannot be asserted, that there is nothing social in our nature, without denying the most evident truths or facts.

It is absurd to suppose social or any affection produced by art.

But it is proper to take notice of something that is yet more peculiarly the result of our social make,—which is the necessary dependence of our happiness and perfection as a kind, on right social union.

Some states are adjusted to one end, and some to another,—and every moral end, as well as every natural one, hath its natural, proper and necessary means by which alone it can be accomplished.

Hence it is that politicks is a science,—or that the different effects of different constitutions or different internal principles of government, may be determined.

But nature could not have dealt more kindly with us than it hath done, by making us social creatures, and by pointing and prompting us to right union in order to our greatest happiness and perfection, as a kind, by our natural disposition to society, and by our moral sense of public good and order.

Thus it plainly appears, how well we are constituted for procuring to ourselves that perfection and happiness, which must, in the nature of things, be the result of right union, or well-formed society.

CHAPTER VII.

Another class of laws. Those relative to religion. Man is made for religion as well as for virtue.

He can hardly avoid forming or receiving the idea of a supreme power, upon which he absolutely depends.

And our moral sense, naturally leads us to ascribe not only intelligence, but the love of order, and the most perfect benignity of temper, to a first or original and independent mind.

The reasonings which lead us to these conclusions are natural to the human mind, if any sentiments or reasonings can be said to be such; or indeed any instinct or appetite be such.

Whence then imposture and false religion—It took its rise with tyranny, or was promoted by it.

But no argument can be brought from hence against a moral sense in our nature.

Religion is natural to man,—and religious contemplation is a very pleasant exercise.

And highly improving to virtue.

But good affections may become too strong and vehement.—The love of mankind may degenerate or be misguided,—and religious admiration is apt to degenerate into certain excesses or extravagancies.

If any other guide is set up in our mind superior to natural reason, and not to be tried by it, our whole frame is necessarily unhinged.

But the genuine effects of true well-moderated devotion, are submission to providence, and activity in doing good.

Thus, we see, we are made for religion as well as for virtue; and that indeed in our nature, religion and virtue are one and the same thing: it is the same disposition of the mind employed contemplatively in admiring and loving supreme virtue, and actively in imitating that model. The sum of religion and virtue, according to reason and revelation, is to love God and to love mankind: and these two dispositions must go together.

CHAPTER VIII.

Here is given a table of the chief phenomena, good and bad belonging to the human system; or resulting from its contexture and situation.

All these phenomena are reducible to the excellent general laws which have been delineated, by which man is fitted and qualified for a very noble end and happiness.

Wherefore there are no evils, absolutely considered, arising from our frame.

If we judge in this case as we do in other like ones, we must conclude, that all our powers are given us for a very perfect and noble end.

Indeed our moral sense cannot possibly be given us for any other reason, but to guide us to the right use of all our powers.

Our whole frame therefore is good—For all effects reducible to the laws of knowledge, to the laws of our social make, or to any other of the laws of our nature above explained,—must be sufficiently accounted for, if explication of phenomena hath any meaning at all.

For all the preceeding reasonings about the fitness of laws go on in the same way that is admitted to be good in every other case,—in natural philosophy—The preceeding account of human nature is therefore strictly philosophical.

A brief recapitulation to prove this.

General conclusion concerning human nature, that tho’ we are not the top of the creation, but are made lower than angels, yet we are crowned with glory and honour, and have a very noble dominion allotted to us, natural and moral.

Man therefore is made for virtue, whether he is made to last for a short time or for ever—But before we proceed to enquire concerning his duration, it is proper to oppose to the preceeding account of man, such a state of mankind, as it is reasonable to suppose must have been the product of a malignant Creator, who had no sense of nor regard to virtue, or the proper good and perfection of moral beings.

CHAPTER IX.

Let us now enquire what judgment ought to be formed concerning death—The phenomenon fairly stated—Futurity wisely hid from us.

Yet we have reason to infer, that death is not a dissolution of our moral powers—It is not analogous to our make to suppose that it is.

But it is proper to consider this matter very fully and accurately—Our present connexion with a sensible or material world, by means of our bodies, is arbitrary, not necessary.

We may therefore survive such a connexion,—our perishing totally with our bodies, must be the effect of an arbitrary appointment that it shall be so.

But there is no reason to apprehend such an annihilating or destroying humour in nature—The destruction of unthinking matter is not properly destruction—Wherefore the destruction of a perceiving being cannot be inferred from the destruction of matter.

But there is no ground to think any particle of matter is ever destroyed: what we call so, is really but change of form—a fortiori, there is no reason to think any perceiving being is destroyed.

All that can be inferred from death is, That a particular order, in which certain sensations are now conveyed into our minds, then ceases—Whence a destruction of all thinking powers cannot be deduced.

There is no likeness, no parity between death and total destruction of our being, whatever view we take of it.

The Objections of Lucretius and Pliny against immortality, absurdly suppose, that matter can think, or that we are wholly body—The facts only prove a present dependence of our body and mind according to certain laws of nature.

But further, let us consider this is a very good first state for such a progressive being as man—And a first state cannot last always, but must give way to another.

It is therefore reasonable to think, that this state only ceases as the first state of progressive beings ought to do.

That our death is attended with pain, only proves, that the laws of union with body continue to operate till the union is quite dissolved.

There is a plain reason why there should be such a being in the scale of life—But there is no reason to think it proper, that our present union with a material world, should always continue, or be the only state in which our moral powers are placed.

Nay, it is evident, that union with body and a material world cannot always last.

Hence, it is reasonable to conclude, that our moral powers, naturally capable of lasting for ever without wearing out, are only united with bodies for a time, in order to the fulness of nature, and because it is a very proper first state for our powers to be formed and improved in.

Men must live upon earth by successive generations—Our earth could not be rendered more capacious without altering our whole mundan system—When our mundan system is able to hold out no longer, there is reason from analogy to think it shall be succeeded by another proper to succeed to it, perhaps rising out of its ruins.

But if so, we have yet better reason to think this is but our first state, which shall be succeeded by one very proper to follow it.

If mankind cease to be at death, there will necessarily be a void, a chasm in nature—But we have reason to conclude from experience and analogy, that fulness and coherence is the end of nature.

This idea of the universe is natural to the mind; it greatly delights in it—Wherefore it must be true—fulness in nature can only mean a progress toward fulness, without any interruption or breach—which cannot be the case if man is not immortal.

Hitherto we have only enquired what ought to be inferred from the course of nature by analogy—But this course proves the Author of nature to be perfectly well disposed.

Let us therefore consider how the argument will stand, when instead of nature, or the course of things, we say, the wise and good Author of nature—Then the argument in the weakest state must stand thus; all looks well, upon supposition that death is only a period to a first state, but it may be nothing else, nay, it looks like nothing else, and therefore it is probably nothing else.

Several considerations add strength to this argument—We can only infer confusion and disorder, from disorder and confusion—But our present state is an excellent first state considered as such: it therefore bespeaks a good orderly future state to succeed it.

It is no objection against this reasoning that death comes upon men at all ages—For as this is the necessary effect of good present laws, so it may also be requisite to general good in a future state.

To imagine we are destroyed at death, is to think worse of the Author of nature than we can of any rational creature.

The greater good of the whole cannot make it necessary—Tis in vain to say, we who know but a small part cannot be judge of the whole.

For we are able clearly to decide several truths with regard to right administration of a moral whole—As that the world or nature, must, in order to be perfect, be governed by good general laws.

That no effects of good general laws are evils—That a whole cannot be perfect if any greater quantity of happiness could take place in it—That the good of a moral system ought to be preferred to the good of a merely animal system.

The greater happiness of moral beings cannot require the destruction of moral powers,—or the discouragement of virtue in a future state,—far less the absolute misery of virtue—Nay, the general good of a moral system must make it necessary, that tried and improved virtue be promoted.

It cannot require that the present connexions of things should be changed in favour of vice—It cannot require that moral agents should become not such—And far less can it require, that moral agents well disposed and greatly improved, should be pushed backwards, and placed in disadvantageous circumstances for moral exercises, or virtuous improvements, and the enjoyments resulting from them.

All these reasonings must hold good, if there be order in what we see at present, in that part chiefly wherein virtue is concerned. And if this state really be, as it is, a very proper first state for moral improvement.

It may be objected, how can a present state be a school to form us for a quite different state—And therefore to clear up all difficulties, a few considerations are added to shew, that our present state is a very proper school for our formation, culture and discipline with regard to any state into which we may pass; however new it may be, or different from the present, and that with respect to our understanding or our will; with respect to science or temper; knowledge or virtue; our rational faculties, or our appetites, affections and passions.

To ask, why is not virtue completely happy here, or since it is not, why we ought from analogy to conclude a succeeding state of virtue shall be completely happy, is to ask, why the end does not precede the means, or the effect its cause; why education must precede perfection, or spring, harvest. The law here is, that we reap as we sow. And that it is reasonable to think is the universal law throughout moral systems—The law with regard to our future state—And where this law obtains the administration is just, it is perfect.

Add to all this our natural desire and pre-sentiment of a future state—For there is no instance in nature of any merely animal appetite, or instinct made in vain; or to be disappointed.

Conclusion.

Man therefore is made (as all the better ancients ever believed and taught) for eternal progress in moral perfection and happiness, proportionally to his care and diligence to improve in it.

PART II Introduction.

How it is proposed to answer all objections.

All objections which terminate in demanding an impossibility, are absurd.

What the ancients meant by the inhability or obliquity of a subject, or necessity of nature.

Such an inhability or necessity does not suppose any limitation upon the divine, creating power.

All objections which terminate in demanding a change to the worse, are absurd—They do ultimately terminate in demanding an impossibility.

CHAPTER I.

Some objections against man, are really objections against his perfection,—for all our powers, dispositions and affections are so many capacities of perfection and happiness.

So are all the laws relative to their improvement or degeneracy—The law of habits in particular, which is so extensive.

The objections against man’s imperfections are no less absurd,—they know no stop.

They really demand a physical impossibility.

Hence we may see, that the only question concerning man must be, “Whether being naturally qualified for a very noble end, he does not deserve his place in the rising scale of life and perfection?”

Which he certainly does,—or plainly appears to do, in whatever light we consider his powers and affections.

CHAPTER II.

The objection taken from the prevalence of vice considered—Not so much vice in the world as is generally imagined.

In consequence of the excellent laws of our nature, some vices (morally speaking) are absolutely unavoidable,—because narrow views and wrong affections of ideas, are hardly avoidable.

But if vice once enters it must spread.

No objection can be brought from hence which does not terminate in an absurdity.

Illustration.

Vices are really but the corruptions, degeneracies, or abuses of good and useful affections.

Some are misguidances of self-love, which is a very necessary principle in our frame.

This was the opinion of the best ancient moralists.

—Who set us an excellent example of the best manner of confutation, even in questions of the greatest importance.

As does Lord Shaftsbury in several instances well worthy our consideration and imitation.

But more vices are the misguidances or degeneracies of benevolent affections themselves—Instances from Shaftsbury to prove this.

Nature could not possibly have done more to preserve us from degeneracy and corruption, or vice, than it has done,—for the original forces of affections stand right in us.

Illustration.

And nature hath given us a guiding principle,—which acquires strength in the properest manner.

Illustration.

If it be a perfection to have natural freedom and power, it must be a perfection to have moral freedom and power—But none call the first into question.

Reason, as such, must depend upon culture.

We may as well pretend to infer from vices, which prevail among mankind, that there is no such thing as a principle of self-love in our nature, as that there is no such thing as a principle of benevolence in it—But none do the first.

This reasoning applied to ignorance—of the natural—and of the moral world.

This reasoning applied to tyranny.

—and to superstition, which is found to go hand in hand with tyranny.

Without a mixture of good and evil, there could be no place or room for prudence,—that is, for good and bad choice.

Hence we see the necessity of evils,—or, at least, of pleasures far inferior to other pleasures, and so comparatively evils.

Several virtues presuppose not only physical but moral evils.

Every state of the body politic, as well as of the natural body, is incident to particular diseases or vices.

Some reflexions on the vices to which an opulent flourishing state is subject.

Men may chuse their state, but every one hath its natural, necessary attendants and consequences.

Yet in declaiming against these vices several things are misrepresented—Luxury, for example, is declaimed against in a very vague manner.

The polite arts are no part of luxury,—and they do not effeminate a people.—But other arts must be united with them to render a nation equally brave and polite.

Upon the whole, it is virtue alone that is the cement of society—’Tis virtue, and political wisdom, which educe good out of moral evil.

—Even as excrements may be rendered useful.

Supposing vices to be necessary, yet since good may be educed out of them by virtue and political wisdom, the wisdom of the moral world will stand on the same footing as the wisdom of the natural world.

But vices are in no proper sense mechanical effects, but of a very different nature.

CHAPTER III.

The objections taken from physical evils considered.—These evils classed.

Unless there be a mixture of good and evil, there can be no room for right and wrong conduct, prudent and imprudent choice.

Physical evils cannot but take place in a world filled with variety of beings, if each being must have its particular structure subject to general ascertainable laws.

We must be able to say with assurance, that we have quite exhausted the science of nature, before we can affirm, that several evils we complain of, are absolutely unavoidable by prudence and art.

But which is of principal consideration, all physical evils proceed from the uniform operation of good general laws.

Illustration.

Let those who object against physical evils, as absolute evils, well consider the excellent concatenation of things natural and moral, or how all things hang together in nature.

An illustration of this taken from an author,—whose principles have no necessary connexion with that kind of reasoning.

My Lord Shaftsbury shews us how such principles ought to be refuted—And his refutation is here inserted, because it is of great moment to my argument, or to prove the sociality of our make.

Such evils as result from social dependence and union, are really goods.

Vices punish themselves according to the natural course of things.

Several goods must fall to the share of the vicious, according to the excellent general law of power and industry.

(Here in the marginal notes, a treatise of Plutarch is referred to, where this question is fully handled, “Why the wicked are not visibly punished here in an extraordinary manner?” He hath quite exhausted that subject: and many of his reasonings coincide with the Scripture-reasons.)

Vice always produces misery in some manner and degree.—Much more of what is called misfortune, is owing to imprudence or vice than is commonly imagined, or, at least, duly attended to—History and poetry prove this.

Reflexions on the imitative arts to illustrate this.

In objections against providence, external goods and evils are much overrated.

External goods depend in general on the law of industry, which is an excellent institution of nature.—But they alone, or without virtue, cannot make man happy—Such is his frame.

The punishment of vice, as well as the reward of virtue, is wisely left in some measure to society.

Unless we suppose a mixture of goods and evils dependent on other causes than virtue,—or if we suppose external motives to virtue bestowed in a distinguishing, remarkable manner,—Virtue could not be tried as it ought to be in its first state of education and discipline, and pure love of virtue for its own sake could not be acquired,—for which end we are framed and placed as we are.

The evils which happen to the virtuous, at the same time that they only happen in consequence of excellent general laws, afford occasions and materials of great virtues,—which are their own reward.

Some reflexions on the arguments for a future state from what is called present inequality with respect to virtue and vice.

The argument stated in its true light,—and it is indeed demonstrative.

CHAPTER IV.

A complex view of the objections made against our frame and situation, in which all the parts of our constitution are shewn to be admirably adjusted one to another,—And that no change can be proposed or imagined, which is not either physically absurd,—or morally so,—tending to introduce an alteration much to the worse.

Conclusion.

A review of the manner in which we have proceeded in this enquiry—Why we have not entered into the examination of particular characters.

It is enough for our purpose to have accounted for all the powers and affections of which all the different characters among mankind are formed,—and for all the laws according to which our affections are variously mixed and compounded, &c.

As in the material world, it is sufficient to delineate the general laws from which phenomena result, so here.

And as, in the one case, so in the other, so soon as we are able to consider phenomena, as resulting from general laws, which make a whole, we are no more startled at any particular appearances,—but immediately discern order.

—’Tis to help one to take such an united view of mankind, that is, of the frame and constitution of human nature, that the principal powers and laws of powers belonging to it have been delineated in this Essay.—For this all is accounted for that is to be accounted for; namely, the powers and their laws constituting man, and the circumstances calling them forth into action; or, affording them means, subjects, materials, and occasions of exerting and gratifying themselves.

If the contriver and productor of a system be perfect, the system must be perfect—But many arguments a priori, prove the Author of the universe to be an all perfect mind.

Some observations upon these arguments to shew they are not so abstruse as is said by some, but that they are easy consequences necessarily following from a few self-evident principles.

Arguments therefore a priori and a posteriori, exactly agree or tally together, to prove the universal system, of which we are a part, to be perfectly well constituted, and under an infinitely wise and good administration.

Revelation concurs with them, and is attended with a truly philosophical evidence that proves its truth,—and it makes no encroachment upon the province or exercises of reason.

Instead of a recapitulation, the Contents being digested into a regular summary to serve that purpose; another view of human nature is laid before the reader, in twelve propositions, which sets the same truths that have been already proved in a light somewhat new.

An excellent hymn in praise of the creation quoted from an ancient writer.

A beautiful reasoning about immortality quoted from another.

Some observations on the account given us of a future state by the christian religion.

The design of this essay being in the text to prove the truth of this proposition, “That man is well made for immortal progress in virtue, which is excellently well taken care of and provided for here, and from thence to infer a future happy state for the virtuous”—And by the marginal notes to “prove the antiquity and universality of this persuasion”; some reflexions are made on the opinion of those who assert the ancients were not able to know any thing distinctly of God or a future state; or, at least, have produced no conclusive arguments on these subjects.

Some Corolaries are added relating to the improvements of moral philosophy and right education, which obviously follow from the sketch of moral philosophy delineated in this essay, and well deserve the serious attention of all who have the best interests of mankind seriously at heart.

The treatise ends with a quotation from Cicero, to prove that unactive knowledge is of little use in comparison of that which prompts to the virtuous activity for which we are made—And another, that contains the substance of what we have proved concerning man, most elegantly expressed from the same Author.

FINIS.