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Americanization is another process that is related to globalization, but is not identical, or reducible, to it (Neil Campbell 2012). We devote the most attention in this chapter to Americanization because it has been such a central part of globalization (at least until very recently), because it continues to be important, and because it has been so widely studied, analyzed, critiqued, and commented upon. We employ Richard Kuisel’s (2003: 96) definition: “Americanization is the import by non-Americans of products, images, technologies, practices and behaviour that are closely associated with America/Americans.”⁸

While we are dealing with Americanization in terms of its relationship to globalization specifically, it is worth pointing out there is much more to Americanization than that. Reflective of this greater complexity is the fact that there is an entire field known as American Studies, and even an “Americanization theory” (Grainge 2004: 215) of which the study of America’s role in globalization is only a small part. This complexity and diversity means, among other things, that it is impossible, as some globalization theorists do, to dismiss an idea that clearly is the subject of so much work and study and means so much more than its role in globalization. While it would be wrong to dismiss the idea in its entirety, or more specifically as it relates to globalization, we need to deconstruct Americanization in order to decide which elements of it, if any, can or should be retained in the larger context of a discussion of its relationship to globalization.

By the way, the term Americanization can mean not only the influence of the US, but also that of Canada and Mexico, as well as Central and South America. After all, they are part of America (North, Central, and South). While we will deal with other complexities below, to handle this one, we will focus on the US⁹ when we discuss Americanization.

Long before globalization became a central academic and lay concern, there were many works over a long period of time that dealt with America’s global influence, especially on Europe.¹⁰ In addition, there are a number of very recent works that deal with this topic.¹¹ While the continuation of this work to this day indicates that there has been no diminution of interest in Americanization, there was a particularly heavy concentration on this topic in the 1960s, at or near the summit of America’s global power (especially its industrial power given the decades it took Europe [and Japan] to recover economically from the devastation of WW II), and no work epitomizes this better than the Frenchman J.-J. Servan-Schreiber’s The American Challenge (1968).

Echoing Georges Duhamel’s (1931) notion of an American “menace,” Servan-Schreiber saw America as a business, industrial, and economic threat to Europe. His view, and the fear of the day, is reflected in the opening line of his book (which seems laughable in the light of subsequent developments such as the rise of European [e.g. BMW and Volkswagen], and the decline of American [e.g. GM], industry): “Fifteen years from now it is quite possible that the world’s third greatest industrial power, just after the US and Russia, will not be Europe, but American industry in Europe” (Servan-Schreiber 1968: 3). Whatever the errors in this view in light of today’s realities (in addition to those mentioned above, the rise of the EU, Japan, and China), it is reflective of the sense of the day of the power, especially, industrially, of Americanization.

In the ensuing years, fears of Americanization, at least of US industries, declined and were replaced by other ideas and fears, most of which were seen as threatening to the US, as well. One such idea, reflective of the remarkable post-war development of Japanese industry, was “Japanization” (Elger and Smith 1994), and that was later supplemented, and to some degree replaced, by fears of the “Asian Tigers” (e.g. Singapore), the European Union and most recently, and likely more enduringly, China (Huntington 2011).

However, other nations’ fears of Americanization and its economic power have certainly not disappeared. Concern about the expansion of American industry was replaced (at least until the Great Recession) to a large degree by a growing fear, reflective of a sea change in the American economy, of American dominance globally in the realm of consumption (Goodman 2007). The fear was no longer of industrial giants, many of which are declining (and disappearing), like US Steel and GM, but rather of the impact of behemoths in the realm of consumption such as Wal-Mart, Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, and Visa (Ritzer 1995, 2009). For its part, Wal-mart has risen to become the world’s largest private employer (Taylor 2015), with $514.4 billion in revenue and $6.7 billion in profits in 2018. This fear of the giants in the realm of consumption is reflected in concerns over processes that have been labeled “Coca-Colonization” (Kuisel 1993) (or even “Coca-Globalization” [Foster 2012]), “McDonaldization” (Ritzer 2018), “Disneyization” (Bryman 2004; Sandlin and Garlen 2016), and “Wal-Martization” (Matusitz 2014). As new leaders in the field of consumption, almost always US in origin, came to the fore, they led to new labels and new fears. For example, the growth of Starbucks (at least until recently) led to concern over “Starbuckization” (Ritzer 2018). Judging by the proliferation of its coffee shops (over 29,865) in many countries in the world (at least 75 as of this writing) there was clear reason for such concern (Ritschel 2019). Such growth illustrates the exportation of America’s consumer products and its “means (or cathedrals) of consumption” (Ritzer 2009) – fast-food restaurants, superstores, shopping malls, and so on – to Europe. (We will deal with all of these, as well as the various processes mentioned above, in Chapter 7.) As of this writing, Amazon – another American-based consumer company – is likely the example that jumps into many readers’ minds. While the focus may have shifted from production to consumption, scholarly and popular work on, and worry over, Americanization persisted and persists to this day.

Of course, the work on the economy, even that which includes both production and consumption, touches on only a small part of the literature on Americanization. Needless to say, there is also much interest in Americanization in such areas as politics (Harding 2008; Pont-Sorribes et al., 2018), the law (Westbrook 2006), the military (Amin 2019), culture, and so on. For example, in the realm of politics, the political campaigns in recent European elections (especially in Great Britain and France) have come to look increasingly like those in America, and prominent American political consultants have played a growing role in them.

Clearly Americanization, from the point of view of this definition, does indeed exist, in that all of these things (products, cathedrals of consumption, military expansionism, etc.) and much more are being exported by the US and being imported in great numbers by other nations. However, this also immediately gets us to another of the complexities mentioned above – which American imports are we talking about? It might be that we can agree that Americanization is an accurate label for the exportation and importation of some of these products (e.g. Coca-Cola and McDonald’s), but it does not apply in the case of others (e.g. TVs and video recorders that were largely invented by Americans and pioneered by American corporations, but few, if any, of which are produced there any longer). Thus, in discussing Americanization – as well as its absence – we need to specify the import under consideration. All imports from the US may not involve Americanization, and imports from the US may be declining, but the US remains a major exporter of all sorts of things to other nations, including many that are closely identified with it.

A similar complication occurs when we distinguish among cultural, social, communicative, political, and economic Americanization. Again, in discussing Americanization, which form are we talking about? For example, America has had a powerful influence on China economically, but its political impact in terms of democratization, at least until now, has been comparatively small. There are even differences within each of these domains. For example, within the realm of culture, it has been argued that “musically, the twentieth century was the American century” (Blake 2004: 149), but while that might be true, it almost certainly was not the case in painting or sculpture. Similar differences and complexities exist in all of the other realms mentioned above, and many more.

A further complication stems from the fact that there are also many processes closely linked to the US, and being disseminated to the rest of the world, that could be thought of as Americanization. For example, Dezalay argues that the legal field throughout much of the world has been Americanized:

The Wall Street law firm, invented over a century ago in response to the demands of American finance and industry, has become a model for similar developments everywhere, as the local lawyers, in a struggle for survival, feel they must adopt the model of the corporate law firm. (Dezalay 1990: 281)

For another, there is much talk of the Americanization of sport in many places throughout the world with one example being the commercialization, and therefore the Americanization, of sports in New Zealand (Grainger and Jackson 2005). On the global stage, the Olympics have been shaped by Americanization, or its subset, “Californization.” Specifically action sports (e.g. beach volleyball and snowboarding) have become very popular at the Olympics and “were incubated in California and are linked to the promotion of American visions of affluence” (Dyreson 2013: 256). One other example is the Disneyization of the European fairy tale (Darcy 2004: 181–96), and one could look more generally, as was mentioned above, at Disneyization, as well as McDonaldization, Wal-Martization, Starbuckization, and the like. However, while all of these are traceable to the US, and have important elements in common, much is lost if they are all simply subsumed under the heading of Americanization. A more nuanced analysis would look at each of these processes to see in what ways they are similar and how they differ, as well as the ways in which each relates to Americanization.

Furthermore, at least some of these processes cannot be restricted to an association with America. For example, McDonaldization has its roots in the bureaucratization and rationalization of German society and Max Weber’s analysis of them. And all of them, at least to some degree, have escaped from their roots in the US and are now thriving elsewhere.

There are other ways of slicing and dicing the concept of Americanization, as well. For example, in discussing Americanization, are we focusing on, among many other possibilities, its impact on people’s subconscious? On their bodies; the way Americanization is embodied by those in other societies? On the “landscapes” (Campbell 2004) of everyday life? Clearly, we could deal with all of these domains –and many others – and Americanization would mean very different things, and apply in very different ways, in each.

Analyses of Americanization can also be even more fine-grained. One example is the Americanization of the Holocaust (Eder 2016; Sznaider 2003). Here we have a phenomenon (the Holocaust) that is not American in origin and is certainly not usually associated with America and Americanization. Yet, Americans, especially American Jews, have developed a distinctive view of the Holocaust, the importance of having it memorialized, and the ways in which it should be commemorated (e.g. the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC). And this has been exported elsewhere (even to Berlin, Germany where the Jewish Museum opened in 2001), where we see the emergence of similar structures and ways of memorializing the event.

Then there is the issue of what counts as Americanization? Does something merely need to carry the American label (“made in America”) to qualify as Americanization? Or, do those who produce it, and more importantly those who import it, need to identify it as American? On the former, many products made in America (e.g. internal components for various machines, tourist trinkets for specific foreign markets) do not bring with them much, if anything, in the way of Americanization. On the latter, one can conceive of very American products that are not so identified by those in other nations. For example, many in Japan think of McDonald’s as a Japanese restaurant chain and when they travel are surprised to find it in the US (Watson 1997).

Further complexity results from the diversity that exists among other nations, and even sub-areas (local, regional) within those nations, in terms of their relationship to Americanization. It is clearly the case that some nations, and areas within them, are much more the target of, and more susceptible to, Americanization than others. France is not a nation that one thinks of as being receptive to Americanization, but in Kuisel’s view it was Americanized, at least to some extent, in the last half of the twentieth century (although it certainly has not lost its distinctive culture and identity), but some areas of France (e.g. small towns and rural areas) were, and are, less Americanized than others. In addition to variation in its impact, Americanization is also more of a public issue in some places than others and there are even locales where it may be a non-issue. That is, Americanization is more likely to spark public outcries and demonstrations in some places than in others. It could even be, and has been, welcomed in many locales.

It could be argued that Americanization has as much, or more, to do with the nation (or area) on its receiving end than it does with America (Hodson 2001). Thus, it might be argued that the focus when examining Americanization should not be on what transpires in the US, but rather on the receiving nations and the dynamics in, and differences among, them.

Then there is the view that a focus on either the US or the receiving nation is wrongheaded and that the focus should be on the relationship among and between them. Receiving nations are not passive and may play an active role in shaping Americanization. For its part, what is exported by the US may be shaped by what it (or more accurately elements in it such as big business) thinks other nations will accept and various nations may be receptive to different American exports. Americanization, then, exists in this reciprocal relationship and not in either America or the receiving nations alone.

There is also much diversity in the US and we must specify what aspects of it we are discussing when analyzing Americanization. Thus, for example, we can talk about something like “African Americanization” (White 2004: 164) – for example, in the global dissemination of jazz, hip hop, or rap music – and recognize that some nations are being affected more by it than others. Furthermore, if there is such a thing as African Americanization, there is certainly Native American, Latin–American, and Jewish–American Americanization (e.g. as discussed above in the case of the Holocaust), and so on. Furthermore, there is growing diversity in the US increasing the number of possibilities. An example is the growing number of Latin Americans and their exports to various countries, especially to Central and South America (e.g. of money in the form of remittances; see Chapter 10).

With the rise of former President Donald Trump in the US, and his “America first” policy, Americanization is further complicated. For starters, research has shown that the public image of the US around the world declined under Trump (Pew Research Center 2017). People around the world viewed Trump as arrogant, intolerant, and dangerous, with widespread disagreement with his policy proposals. If Americanization is largely dependent on the receptivity of a country or their inter-relationship with the US, which is likely to suffer under an “America first” policy, then demand for Americanization can naturally decrease. On the other hand, the same research shows continued high praise for American people, culture, and civil liberties. And while favorability for the US decreased around the world under Trump (although it actually increased in Russia) at least some global support is likely to return under President Biden. For a more detailed breakdown of support for the US under former Presidents Obama and Trump, refer to Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3 Trump Ratings Were Low Around Globe, While Views of US Stayed Mostly Favorable. In comparison to President Obama, global views of President Trump were much lower. However, views of the US remained mostly favourable, with some exceptions. The US was viewed most positively in Israel, the Philippines, Poland, and South Korea, and most negatively in Russia, Turkey, Tunisia, and Mexico. Source: Redrawn from How people around the world see the U.S. and Donald Trump in 10 charts. Retrieved from: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/08/how-people-around-the-world-see-the-u-s-and-donald-trump-in-10-charts/

More recently, many people around the world have been shocked at how the US handled the COVID-19 pandemic in its early days. While most countries implemented strict measures for social distancing, mask requirements, and quarantines, the US resisted many of these efforts. The virus hit China and Italy especially hard, which gave other countries – such as the US – more time to respond (Associated Press 2020). But despite the additional time to prepare, the medical knowledge about its threat, and the economic resources to handle it aggressively, the US and the Trump administration downplayed the threat, often referring to it as a hoax. As a result, it led the world in COVID-19 cases and deaths, with one of the highest per capita infection rates. At the same time, the US made efforts to acquire as much of the early vaccines produced elsewhere as possible elsewhere and outbid other purchasers to obtain medical supplies headed to other countries. Responses like this were common:

To a watching world, the absence of a fair, affordable US healthcare system, the cut-throat contest between American states for scarce medical supplies, the disproportionate death toll among ethnic minorities, chaotic social distancing rules, and a lack of centralised coordination are reminiscent of a poor, developing country, not the most powerful, influential nation on earth. That’s a title the US appears on course to lose – a fall from grace that may prove irreversible. (Tisdall 2020)

Compared to the US, citizens in other countries were far more agreeable to measures needed to curtail the virus, and interpreted them as necessary for the common good. Many commentators have wondered if the global reputation of the US will ever recover. (Associated Press 2020)

Certainly, readers can debate whether or not Americanization is declining, but it is clear that it certainly was a powerful force in the past and much of globalization, at least until very recently, has been American-led. At the minimum, that (recent) history needs to be recognized for what it was – heavily dominated by Americanization. Furthermore, no matter how far Americanization may have already declined in importance, it will be a long time before most of the nations and areas affected by it in the past will be free of its highly diverse and often powerful effects. The effects of Americanization will continue to be felt in many nations for years to come even if we think of it as slowing or even halting completely (a clearly erroneous view, at least at the present time).

The continued effects of Americanization are demonstrated by the modern fast-food restaurant, which was an American invention (specifically Ray Kroc and the creation of the McDonald’s chain beginning in the mid-1950s) that was, and is still being, actively and aggressively exported to the rest of the world. However, many nations have now created their own McDonaldized restaurants (and other forms) that in some cases (e.g. Pollo Campero from Guatemala) are being actively exported back into the US. While this may now be part of the “Latin Americanization” of the US, it has its roots in Americanization (in this case of Latin America) via the export of the fast-food restaurant. While it may be selling food more indigenous to Latin America, even a superficial look at a Pollo Campero restaurant makes it clear that it is a product of Americanization.

A more clear example of Latin-Americanization was the politics of Trump himself (Lovato 2018). For decades, many Latin American countries have been led by a “caudillo,” or strong man using fiery rhetoric. A Washington Post reporter went so far as to declare Trump “the US’s first Latin American president” (Tharoor 2017). He was a clear departure from American political norms, and rather draws upon extreme self-inflation, tough talk, authoritarianism, machismo, and public humiliation to attack his enemies. By mimicking Latin American (from both left and right) strong men in style, he brought forth a different kind of Americanization.