Читать книгу The Grammar of English Grammars - Goold Brown - Страница 122

OBS. 1.—Words are the least parts of significant language; that is, of language significant in each part; for, to syllables, taken merely as syllables, no meaning belongs. But, to a word, signification of some sort or other, is essential; there can be no word without it; for a sign or symbol must needs represent or signify something. And as I cannot suppose words to represent external things, I have said "A Word is one or more syllables spoken or written as the sign of some idea." But of what ideas are the words of our language significant? Are we to say, "Of all ideas;" and to recognize as an English word every syllable, or combination of syllables, to which we know a meaning is attached? No. For this, in the first place, would confound one language with an other; and destroy a distinction which must ever be practically recognized, till all men shall again speak one language. In the next place, it would compel us to embrace among our words an infinitude of terms that are significant only of local ideas, such as men any where or at any time may have had concerning any of the individuals they have known, whether persons, places, or things. But, however important they may be in the eyes of men, the names of particular persons, places, or things, because they convey only particular ideas, do not properly belong to what we call our language. Lexicographers do not collect and define proper names, because they are beyond the limits of their art, and can be explained only from history. I do not say that proper names are to be excluded from grammar; but I would show wherein consists the superiority of general terms over these. For if our common words did not differ essentially from proper names, we could demonstrate nothing in science: we could not frame from them any general or affirmative proposition at all; because all our terms would be particular, and not general; and because every individual thing in nature must necessarily be for ever itself only, and not an other.

OBS. 2.—Our common words, then, are the symbols neither of external particulars, nor merely of the sensible ideas which external particulars excite in our minds, but mainly of those general or universal ideas which belong rather to the intellect than to the senses. For intellection differs from sensation, somewhat as the understanding of a man differs from the perceptive faculty of a brute; and language, being framed for the reciprocal commerce of human minds, whose perceptions include both, is made to consist of signs of ideas both general and particular, yet without placing them on equal ground. Our general ideas—that is, our ideas conceived as common to many individuals, existing in any part of time, past, present, or future—such, for example, as belong to the words man, horse, tree, cedar, wave, motion, strength, resist—such ideas, I say, constitute that most excellent significance which belongs to words primarily, essentially, and immediately; whereas, our particular ideas, such as are conceived only of individual objects, which arc infinite in number and ever fleeting, constitute a significance which belongs to language only secondarily, accidentally, and mediately. If we express the latter at all, we do it either by proper names, of which but very few ever become generally known, or by means of certain changeable limitations which are added to our general terms; whereby language, as Harris observes, "without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite."—Hermes, p. 345. The particular manner in which this is done, I shall show hereafter, in Etymology, when I come to treat of articles and definitives.

OBS. 3.—If we examine the structure of proper names, we shall find that most of them are compounds, the parts of which have, in very many instances, some general signification. Now a complete phrase commonly conveys some particular notion or conception of the mind; but, in this case, the signification of the general terms is restricted by the other words which are added to them. Thus smith is a more general term than goldsmith; and goldsmith is more general than a goldsmith; a goldsmith, than the goldsmith; the goldsmith, than one Goldsmith; one Goldsmith, than Mr. Goldsmith; Mr. Goldsmith, than Oliver Goldsmith. Thus we see that the simplest mode of designating particular persons or objects, is that of giving them proper names; but proper names must needs be so written, that they may be known as proper names, and not be mistaken for common terms. I have before observed, that we have some names which are both proper and common; and that these should be written with capitals, and should form the plural regularly. It is surprising that the Friends, who are in some respects particularly scrupulous about language, should so generally have overlooked the necessity there is, of compounding their numerical names of the months and days, and writing them uniformly with capitals, as proper names. For proper names they certainly are, in every thing but the form, whenever they are used without the article, and without those other terms which render their general idea particular. And the compound form with a capital, is as necessary for Firstday, Secondday, Thirdday, &c., as for Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, &c. "The first day of the week,"—"The seventh day of the month,"—"The second month of summer,"—"The second month in the year," &c., are good English phrases, in which any compounding of the terms, or any additional use of capitals, would be improper; but, for common use, these phrases are found too long and too artificial. We must have a less cumbersome mode of specifying the months of the year and the days of the week. What then? Shall we merely throw away the terms of particularity, and, without substituting in their place the form of proper names, apply general terms to particular thoughts, and insist on it that this is right? And is not this precisely what is done by those who reject as heathenish the ordinary names of the months and days, and write "first day," for Sunday, in stead of "the first day of the week;" or "second month," for February, in stead of "the second month in the year;" and so forth? This phraseology may perhaps be well understood by those to whom it is familiar, but still it is an abuse of language, because it is inconsistent with the common acceptation of the terms. Example: "The departure of a ship will take place every sixth day with punctuality."—Philadelphia Weekly Messenger. The writer of this did not mean, "every Friday;" and it is absurd for the Friends so to understand it, or so to write, when that is what they mean.

OBS. 4.—In the ordinary business of life, it is generally desirable to express our meaning as briefly as possible; but legal phraseology is always full to the letter, and often redundant. Hence a merchant will write, "Nov. 24, 1837," or, "11 mo. 24th, 1837;" but a conveyancer will have it, "On the twenty-fourth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven;"—or, perhaps, "On the twenty-fourth day of the eleventh month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven." Accordingly we find that, in common daily use, all the names of the months, except March, May, June, and July, are abbreviated; thus, Jan., Feb., Apr., Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov., Dec. And sometimes even the Arabic number of the year is made yet shorter; as '37 for 1837; or 1835–6-7, for 1835, 1836, and 1837. In like manner, in constructing tables of time, we sometimes denote the days of the week by the simple initials of their names; as, S. for Sunday, M. for Monday, &c. But, for facility of abbreviation, the numerical names, whether of the months or of the days, are perhaps still more convenient. For, if we please, we may put the simple Arabic figures for them; though it is better to add d. for day, and mo. for month: as, 1 d., 2 d., 3 d., &c.;—1 mo., 2 mo., 3 mo., &c.:—or more compactly thus: 1d., 2d., 3d., &c.;—1mo., 2mo., 3mo., &c. But, take which mode of naming we will, our ordinary expression of these things should be in neither extreme, but should avoid alike too great brevity and too great prolixity; and, therefore, it is best to make it a general rule in our literary compositions, to use the full form of proper names for the months and days, and to denote the years by Arabic figures written in full.

OBS. 5.—In considering the nature of words, I was once a little puzzled with a curious speculation, if I may not term it an important inquiry, concerning the principle of their identity. We often speak of "the same words," and of "different words;" but wherein does the sameness or the difference of words consist? Not in their pronunciation; for the same word may be differently pronounced; as, p=at'ron or p=a'tron, m=at'ron or m=a'tron. Not in their orthography; for the same word may be differently spelled; as, favour or favor, music or musick, connexion or connection. Not in their form of presentation; for the same word may be either spoken or written; and speech and writing present what we call the same words, in two ways totally different. Not in their meaning; for the same word may have different meanings, and different words may signify precisely the same thing. This sameness of words, then, must consist in something which is to be reconciled with great diversity. Yet every word is itself, and not an other: and every word must necessarily have some property peculiar to itself, by which it may be easily distinguished from every other. Were it not so, language would be unintelligible. But it is so; and, therefore, to mistake one word for an other, is universally thought to betray great ignorance or great negligence, though such mistakes are by no means of uncommon occurrence. But that the question about the identity of words is not a very easy one, may appear from the fact, that the learned often disagree about it in practice; as when one grammarian will have an and a to be two words, and an other will affirm them to be only different forms of one and the same word.

OBS. 6.—Let us see, then, if amidst all this diversity we can find that principle of sameness, by which a dispute of this kind ought to be settled. Now, although different words do generally differ in orthography, in pronunciation, and in meaning, so that an entire sameness implies one orthography, one pronunciation, and one meaning; yet some diversity is allowed in each of these respects, so that a sign differing from an other only in one, is not therefore a different word, or a sign agreeing with an other only in one, is not therefore the same word. It follows thence, that the principle of verbal identity, the principle which distinguishes every word from every other, lies in neither extreme: it lies in a narrower compass than in all three, and yet not singly in any one, but jointly in any two. So that signs differing in any two of these characteristics of a word, are different words; and signs agreeing in any two, are the same word. Consequently, if to any difference either of spelling or of sound we add a difference of signification everybody will immediately say, that we speak or write different words, and not the same: thus dear, beloved, and deer, an animal, are two such words as no one would think to be the same; and, in like manner, use, advantage, and use, to employ, will readily be called different words. Upon this principle, an and a are different words; yet, in conformity to old usage, and because the latter is in fact but an abridgement of the former, I have always treated them as one and the same article, though I have nowhere expressly called them the same word. But, to establish the principle above named, which appears to me the only one on which any such question can be resolved, or the identity of words be fixed at all, we must assume that every word has one right pronunciation, and only one; one just orthography, and only one; and some proper signification, which, though perhaps not always the same, is always a part of its essence. For when two words of different meaning are spelled or pronounced alike, not to maintain the second point of difference, against the double orthography or the double pronunciation of either, is to confound their identity at once, and to prove by the rule that two different words are one and the same, by first absurdly making them so.

OBS. 7.—In no part of grammar is usage more unsettled and variable than in that which relates to the figure of words. It is a point of which modern writers have taken but very little notice. Lily, and other ancient Latin grammarians, reckoned both species and figure among the grammatical accidents of nearly all the different parts of speech; and accordingly noticed them, in their Etymology, as things worthy to be thus made distinct topics, like numbers, genders, cases, moods, tenses, &c. But the manner of compounding words in Latin, and also in Greek, is always by consolidation. No use appears to have been made of the hyphen, in joining the words of those languages, though the name of the mark is a Greek compound, meaning "under one." The compounding of words is one principal means of increasing their number; and the arbitrariness with which that is done or neglected in English, is sufficient of itself to make the number of our words a matter of great uncertainty. Such terms, however, having the advantage of explaining themselves in a much greater degree than others, have little need of definition; and when new things are formed, it is very natural and proper to give them new names of this sort: as, steamboat, railroad. The propriety or impropriety of these additions to the language, is not to be determined by dictionaries; for that must be settled by usage before any lexicographer will insert them. And so numerous, after all, are the discrepancies found in our best dictionaries, that many a word may have its day and grow obsolete, before a nation can learn from them the right way of spelling it; and many a fashionable thing may go entirely out of use, before a man can thus determine how to name it. Railroads are of so recent invention that I find the word in only one dictionary; and that one is wrong, in giving the word a hyphen, while half our printers are wrong, in keeping the words separate because Johnson did not compound them. But is it not more important, to know whether we ought to write railroad, or rail-road, or rail road, which we cannot learn from any of our dictionaries, than to find out whether we ought to write rocklo, or roquelo, or roquelaur, or roquelaure, which, in some form or other, is found in them all? The duke of Roquelaure is now forgotten, and his cloak is out of fashion.

OBS. 8.—No regular phrase, as I have taught in the second rule above, should be needlessly converted into a compound word, either by tacking its parts together with the hyphen, or by uniting them without a hyphen; for, in general, a phrase is one thing, and a word is an other: and they ought to be kept as distinct as possible.[113] But, when a whole phrase takes the relation of an adjective, the words must be compounded, and the hyphen becomes necessary; as, "An inexpressibly apt bottle-of-small-beer comparison."—Peter Pindar. The occasions for the compounding of words, are in general sufficiently plain, to any one who knows what is intended to be said; but, as we compound words, sometimes with the hyphen, and sometimes without, there is no small difficulty in ascertaining when to use this mark, and when to omit it. "Some settled rule for the use of the hyphen on these occasions, is much wanted. Modern printers have a strange predilection for it; using it on almost every possible occasion. Mr. L. Murray, who has only three lines on the subject, seems inclined to countenance this practice; which is, no doubt, convenient enough for those who do not like trouble. His words are: 'A Hyphen, marked thus - is employed in connecting compounded words: as, Lap-dog, tea-pot, pre-existence, self-love, to-morrow, mother-in-law.' Of his six examples, Johnson, our only acknowledged standard, gives the first and third without any separation between the syllables, lapdog, preexistence; his second and fifth as two distinct words each, tea pot, to morrow; and his sixth as three words, mother in law: so that only his fourth has the sanction of the lexicographer. There certainly can be no more reason for putting a hyphen after the common prefixes, than before the common affixes, ness, ly, and the rest."—Churchill's Gram., p. 374.

OBS. 9.—Again: "While it would be absurd, to sacrifice the established practice of all good authors to the ignorance of such readers [as could possibly mistake for a diphthong the two contiguous vowels in such words as preexistence, cooperate, and reenter]; it would unquestionably be advantageous, to have some principle to guide us in that labyrinth of words, in which the hyphen appears to have been admitted or rejected arbitrarily, or at hap-hazard. Thus, though we find in Johnson, alms-basket, alms-giver, with the hyphen; we have almsdeed, almshouse, almsman, without: and many similar examples of an unsettled practice might be adduced, sufficient to fill several pages. In this perplexity, is not the pronunciation of the words the best guide? In the English language, every word of more than one syllable is marked by an accent on some particular syllable. Some very long words indeed admit a secondary accent on another syllable; but still this is much inferior, and leaves one leading accent prominent: as in expos'tulatory. Accordingly, when a compound has but one accented syllable in pronunciation, as night'cap, bed'stead, broad'sword, the two words have coalesced completely into one, and no hyphen should be admitted. On the other hand, when each of the radical words has an accent, as Chris'tian-name', broad'-shoul'dered, I think the hyphen should be used. Good'-na'tured is a compound epithet with two accents, and therefore requires the hyphen: in good nature, good will, and similar expressions, good is used simply as an adjective, and of course should remain distinct from the noun. Thus, too, when a noun is used adjectively, it should remain separate from the noun it modifies; as, a gold ring, a silver buckle. When two numerals are employed to express a number, without a conjunction between them, it is usual to connect them by a hyphen; as, twenty-five, eighty-four: but when the conjunction is inserted, the hyphen is as improper as it would be between other words connected by the conjunction. This, however, is a common abuse; and we often meet with five-&—twenty, six-&—thirty, and the like."—Ib., p. 376. Thus far Churchill: who appears to me, however, too hasty about the hyphen in compound numerals. For we write one hundred, two hundred, three thousand, &c., without either hyphen or conjunction; and as five-and-twenty is equivalent to twenty-five, and virtually but one word, the hyphen, if not absolutely necessary to the sense, is certainly not so very improper as he alleges. "Christian name" is as often written without the hyphen as with it, and perhaps as accurately.