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OBS. 5.—It has been almost universally assumed by grammarians, that the positive degree is the only standard to which the other degrees can refer; though many seem to think, that the superlative always implies or includes the comparative, and is consequently inapplicable when only two things are spoken of. Neither of these positions is involved in any of the definitions which I have given above. The reader may think what he will about these points, after observing the several ways in which each form may be used. In the phrases, "greater than Solomon,"—"more than a bushel,"—"later than one o'clock," it is not immediately obvious that the positives great, much, and late, are the real terms of contrast. And how is it in the Latin phrases, "Dulcior melle, sweeter than honey,"—"Præstantior auro, better than gold?" These authors will resolve all such phrases thus: "greater, than Solomon was great,"—"more, than a bushel is much," &c. As the conjunction than never governs the objective case, it seems necessary to suppose an ellipsis of some verb after the noun which follows it as above; and possibly the foregoing solution, uncouth as it seems, may, for the English idiom, be the true one: as, "My Father is greater than I."—John, xiv, 28. That is, "My Father is greater than I am;"—or, perhaps, "than I am great." But if it appear that some degree of the same quality must always be contrasted with the comparative, there is still room to question whether this degree must always be that which we call the positive. Cicero, in exile, wrote to his wife: "Ego autem hoc miserior sum, quam tu, quæ es miserrima, quod ipsa calamitas communis est utriusque nostrùm, sed culpa mea propria est."—Epist. ad Fam., xiv, 3. "But in this I am more wretched, than thou, who art most wretched, that the calamity itself is common to us both, but the fault is all my own."

OBS. 6.—In my Institutes and First Lines of English Grammar, I used the following brief definitions: "The comparative degree is that which exceeds the positive; as, harder, softer, better." "The superlative degree is that which is not exceeded; as, hardest, softest, best." And it is rather for the sake of suggesting to the learner the peculiar application of each of these degrees, than from any decided dissatisfaction with these expressions, that I now present others. The first, however, proceeds upon the common supposition, that the comparative degree of a quality, ascribed to any object, must needs be contrasted with the positive in some other, or with the positive in the same at an other time. This idea may be plausibly maintained, though it is certain that the positive term referred to, is seldom, if ever, allowed to appear. Besides, the comparative or the superlative may appear, and in such a manner as to be, or seem to be, in the point of contrast. Thus: "Objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote."—Locke's Essay, p. 186. Upon the principle above, the explanation here must be, that the meaning is—"greater than those of a larger size are thought great." "The poor man that loveth Christ, is richer than the richest man in the world, that hates him."—Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, p. 86. This must be "richer than the richest man is rich." The riches contemplated here, are of different sorts; and the comparative or the superlative of one sort, may be exceeded by either of these degrees of an other sort, though the same epithet be used for both. So in the following instances: "He that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they."—Eccl., v, 8. That is, "He that is higher than the highest earthly dignitaries, regardeth; and there are higher authorities than these." "Fairer than aught imagined else fairest."—Pollok. "Sadder than saddest night."—Byron. It is evident that the superlative degree is not, in general, that which cannot be exceeded, but that which, in the actual state of the things included, "is not exceeded." Again, as soon as any given comparative or superlative is, by a further elevation or intension of the quality, surpassed and exceeded, that particular degree, whatever it was, becomes merely positive; for the positive degree of a quality, though it commonly includes the very lowest measure, and is understood to exceed nothing, may at any time equal the very highest. There is no paradox in all this, which is not also in the following simple examples: "Easier, indeed, I was, but far from easy."—Cowper's Life, p. 50.

"Who canst the wisest wiser make, And babes as wise as they."—Cowper's Poems.

OBS. 7.—The relative nature of these degrees deserves to be further illustrated. (1.) It is plain, that the greatest degree of a quality in one thing, may be less than the least in an other; and, consequently, that the least degree in one thing, may be greater than the greatest in an other. Thus, the heaviest wood is less heavy than the lightest of the metals; and the least valuable of the metals is perhaps of more value than the choicest wood. (2.) The comparative degree may increase upon itself, and be repeated to show the gradation. Thus, a man may ascend into the air with a balloon, and rise higher, and higher, and higher, and higher, till he is out of sight. This is no uncommon form of expression, and the intension is from comparative to comparative. (3.) If a ladder be set up for use, one of its rounds will be the highest, and one other will be the lowest, or least high. And as that which is highest, is higher than all the rest, so every one will be higher than all below it. The higher rounds, if spoken of generally, and without definite contrast, will be those in the upper half; the lower rounds, referred to in like manner, will be those in the lower half, or those not far from the ground. The highest rounds, or the lowest, if we indulge such latitude of speech, will be those near the top or the bottom; there being, absolutely, or in strictness of language, but one of each. (4.) If the highest round be removed, or left uncounted, the next becomes the highest, though not so high as the former. For every one is the highest of the number which it completes. All admit this, till we come to three. And, as the third is the highest of the three, I see not why the second is not properly the highest of the two. Yet nearly all our grammarians condemn this phrase, and prefer "the higher of the two." But can they give a reason for their preference? That the comparative degree is implied between the positive and the superlative, so that there must needs be three terms before the latter is applicable, is a doctrine which I deny. And if the second is the higher of the two, because it is higher than the first; is it not also the highest of the two, because it completes the number? (5.) It is to be observed, too, that as our ordinal numeral first, denoting the one which begins a series, and having reference of course to more, is an adjective of the superlative degree, equivalent to foremost, of which it is perhaps a contraction; so last likewise, though no numeral, is a superlative also. (6.) These, like other superlatives, admit of a looser application, and may possibly include more than one thing at the beginning or at the end of a series: as, "The last years of man are often helpless, like the first." (7.) With undoubted propriety, we may speak of the first two, the last two, the first three, the last three, &c.; but to say, the two first, the two last, &c., with this meaning, is obviously and needlessly inaccurate. "The two first men in the nation," may, I admit, be good English; but it can properly be meant only of the two most eminent. In specifying any part of a series, we ought rather to place the cardinal number after the ordinal. (8.) Many of the foregoing positions apply generally, to almost all adjectives that are susceptible of comparison. Thus, it is a common saying, "Take the best first, and all will be best." That is, remove that degree which is now superlative, and the epithet will descend to an other, "the next best."

OBS. 8.—It is a common assumption, maintained by almost all our grammarians, that the degrees which add to the adjective the terminations er and est, as well as those which are expressed by more and most, indicate an increase, or heightening, of the quality expressed by the positive. If such must needs be their import, it is certainly very improper, to apply them, as many do, to what can be only an approximation to the positive. Thus Dr. Blair: "Nothing that belongs to human nature, is more universal than the relish of beauty of one kind or other."—Lectures, p. 16. "In architecture, the Grecian models were long esteemed the most perfect."—Ib., p. 20. Again: In his reprehension of Capernaum, the Saviour said, "It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom, in the day of judgement, than for thee."—Matt., xi, 24. Now, although [Greek: anektoteron], more tolerable, is in itself a good comparative, who would dare infer from this text, that in the day of judgement Capernaum shall fare tolerably, and Sodom, still better? There is much reason to think, that the essential nature of these grammatical degrees has not been well understood by those who have heretofore pretended to explain them. If we except those few approximations to sensible qualities, which are signified by such words as whitish, greenish, &c., there will be found no actual measure, or inherent degree of any quality, to which the simple form of the adjective is not applicable; or which, by the help of intensive adverbs of a positive character, it may not be made to express; and that, too, without becoming either comparative or superlative, in the technical sense of those terms. Thus very white, exceedingly white, perfectly white, are terms quite as significant as whiter and whitest, if not more so. Some grammarians, observing this, and knowing that the Romans often used their superlative in a sense merely intensive, as altissimus for very high, have needlessly divided our English superlative into two, "the definite, and the indefinite;" giving the latter name to that degree which we mark by the adverb very, and the former to that which alone is properly called the superlative. Churchill does this: while, (as we have seen above,) in naming the degrees, he pretends to prefer "what has been established by long custom."—New Gram., p. 231. By a strange oversight also, he failed to notice, that this doctrine interferes with his scheme of five degrees, and would clearly furnish him with six: to which if he had chosen to add the "imperfect degree" of Dr. Webster, (as whitish, greenish, &c.,) which is recognized by Johnson, Murray, and others, he might have had seven. But I hope my readers will by-and-by believe there is no need of more than three.

OBS. 9.—The true nature of the Comparative degree is this: it denotes either some excess or some relative deficiency of the quality, when one thing or party is compared with an other, in respect to what is in both: as, "Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men."—1 Cor., i, 25. "Few languages are, in fact, more copious than the English."—Blair's Rhet., p. 87. "Our style is less compact than that of the ancients."—Ib., p. 88. "They are counted to him less than nothing and vanity."—Isaiah, xl, 17. As the comparatives in a long series are necessarily many, and some of them higher than others, it may be asked, "How can the comparative degree, in this case, be merely 'that which exceeds the positive?'" Or, as our common grammarians prompt me here to say, "May not the comparative degree increase or lessen the comparative, in signification?" The latter form of the question they may answer for themselves; remembering that the comparative may advance from the comparative, step by step, from the second article in the series to the utmost. Thus, three is a higher or greater number than two; but four is higher than three; five, than four; and so on, ad infinitum. My own form of the question I answer thus: "The highest of the higher is not higher than the rest are higher, but simply higher than they are high."

OBS. 10.—The true nature of the Superlative degree is this: it denotes, in a quality, some extreme or unsurpassed extent. It may be used either absolutely, as being without bounds; or relatively, as being confined within any limits we choose to give it. It is equally applicable to that which is naturally unsurpassable, and to that which stands within the narrowest limits of comparison. The heaviest of three feathers would scarcely be thought a heavy thing, and yet the expression is proper; because the weight, whatever it is, is relatively the greatest. The youngest of three persons, may not be very young; nor need we suppose the oldest in a whole college to have arrived at the greatest conceivable age. What then shall be thought of the explanations which our grammarians have given of this degree of comparison? That of Murray I have already criticised. It is ascribed to him, not upon the supposition that he invented it; but because common sense continues to give place to the authority of his name in support of it. Comly, Russell, Alger, Ingersoll, Greenleaf, Fisk, Merchant, Kirkham, T. Smith, R. C. Smith, Hall, Hiley, and many others, have copied it into their grammars, as being better than any definition they could devise. Murray himself unquestionably took it from some obscure pedagogue among the old grammarians. Buchanan, who long preceded him, has nearly the same words: "The Superlative increases or diminishes the Positive in Signification, to the highest or [the] lowest Degree of all."—English Syntax, p. 28. If this is to be taken for a grammatical definition, what definition shall grammar itself bear?

OBS. 11.—Let us see whether our later authors have done better. "The superlative expresses a quality in the greatest or [the] least possible degree; as, wisest, coldest, least wise."—Webster's Old Gram., p. 13. In his later speculations, this author conceives that the termination ish forms the first degree of comparison; as, "Imperfect, dankish," Pos. dank, Comp. danker, Superl. dankest. "There are therefore four degrees of comparison."—Webster's Philosophical Gram. p. 65. "The fourth denotes the utmost or [the] least degree of a quality; as, bravest, wisest, poorest, smallest. This is called the superlative degree."—Ib.; also his Improved Gram., 1831, p. 47. "This degree is called the Superlative degree, from its raising the amount of the quality above that of all others."—Webber's Gram., 1832, p. 26. It is not easy to quote, from any source, a worse sentence than this; if, indeed, so strange a jumble of words can be called a sentence. "From its raising the amount," is in itself a vicious and untranslatable phrase, here put for "because it raises the amount;" and who can conceive of the superlative degree, as "raising the amount of the quality above that of all other qualities?" Or, if it be supposed to mean, "above the amount of all other degrees," what is this amount? Is it that of one and one, the positive and the comparative added numerically? or is it the sum of all the quantities which these may indicate? Perhaps the author meant, "above the amount of all other amounts." If none of these absurdities is here taught, nothing is taught, and the words are nonsense. Again: "The superlative degree increases or diminishes the positive to the highest or [the] lowest degree of which it is susceptible."—Bucke's Classical Gram., p. 49. "The superlative degree is generally formed by adding st or est to the positive; and denotes the greatest excess."—Nutting's Gram., p. 33. "The Superlative increases or diminishes the Signification of the Positive or Adjective, to a very high or a very low Degree."—British Gram., p. 97. What excess of skill, or what very high degree of acuteness, have the brightest and best of these grammarians exhibited? There must be some, if their definitions are true.

OBS. 12.—The common assertion of the grammarians, that the superlative degree is not applicable to two objects,[177] is not only unsupported by any reason in the nature of things, but it is contradicted in practice by almost every man who affirms it. Thus Maunder: "When only two persons or things are spoken of comparatively, to use the superlative is improper: as, 'Deborah, my dear, give those two boys a lump of sugar each; and let Dick's be the largest, because he spoke first.' This," says the critic, "should have been 'larger.'"—Maunder's Gram., p. 4. It is true, the comparative might here have been used; but the superlative is clearer, and more agreeable to custom. And how can "largest" be wrong, if "first" is right? "Let Dick's be the larger, because he spoke sooner," borders too much upon a different idea, that of proportion; as when we say, "The sooner the better,"—"The more the merrier." So Blair: "When only two things are compared, the comparative degree should be used, and not the superlative."—Practical Gram., p. 81. "A Trochee has the first syllable accented, and the last unaccented."—Ib., p. 118. "An Iambus has the first syllable unaccented, and the last accented."—Ibid. These two examples are found also in Jamieson's Rhetoric, p. 305; Murray's Gram., p. 253; Kirkham's, 219; Bullions's, 169; Guy's, 120; Merchant's, 166. So Hiley: "When two persons or things are compared, the comparative degree must be employed. When three or more persons or things are compared, the superlative must be used."—Treatise on English Gram., p. 78. Contradiction in practice: "Thomas is wiser than his brothers."—Ib., p. 79. Are not "three or more persons" here compared by "the comparative" wiser? "In an Iambus the first syllable is unaccented."—Ib., p. 123. An iambus has but two syllables; and this author expressly teaches that "first" is "superlative."—Ib., p. 21. So Sanborn: "The positive degree denotes the simple form of an adjective without any variation of meaning. The comparative degree increases or lessens the meaning of the positive, and denotes a comparison between two persons or things. The superlative degree increases or lessens the positive to the greatest extent, and denotes a comparison between more than two persons or things."—Analytical Gram., p. 30 and p. 86. These pretended definitions of the degrees of comparison embrace not only the absurdities which I have already censured in those of our common grammars, but several new ones peculiar to this author. Of the inconsistency of his doctrine and practice, take the following examples: "Which of two bodies, that move with the same velocity, will exercise the greatest power?"—Ib., p. 93; and again, p. 203, "'I was offered a dollar;'—'A dollar was offered (to) me.' The first form should always be avoided."—Ib., p. 127. "Nouns in apposition generally annex the sign of the possessive case to the last; as, 'For David my servant's sake.'—'John the Baptist's head.' Bible."—Ib., p. 197.

OBS. 13.—So Murray: "We commonly say, 'This is the weaker of the two;' or, 'The weakest of the two;'[178] but the former is the regular mode of expression, because there are only two things compared."—Octavo Gram., i, 167. What then of the following example: "Which of those two persons has most distinguished himself?"—Ib., Key, ii, 187. Again, in treating of the adjectives this and that, the same hand writes thus: "This refers to the nearest person or thing, and that to the most distant: as, 'This man is more intelligent than that.' This indicates the latter, or last mentioned; that, the former, or first mentioned: as, 'Both wealth and poverty are temptations; that tends to excite pride, this, discontent.'"—Murray's Gram., i, 56. In the former part of this example, the superlative is twice applied where only two things are spoken of; and, in the latter, it is twice made equivalent to the comparative, with a like reference. The following example shows the same equivalence: "This refers to the last mentioned or nearer thing, that to the first mentioned or more distant thing."—Webber's Gram., p. 31. So Churchill: "The superlative should not be used, when only two persons or things are compared."—New Gram., p. 80. "In the first of these two sentences."—Ib., p. 162; Lowth, p. 120. According to the rule, it should have been, "In the former of these two sentences;" but this would be here ambiguous, because former might mean maker. "When our sentence consists of two members, the longest should, generally, be the concluding one."—Blair's Rhet., p. 117: and Jamieson's, p. 99. "The shortest member being placed first, we carry it more readily in our memory as we proceed to the second."—Ib., & Ib. "Pray consider us, in this respect, as the weakest sex."—Spect., No. 533. In this last sentence, the comparative, weaker, would perhaps have been better; because, not an absolute, but merely a comparative weakness is meant. So Latham and Child: "It is better, in speaking of only two objects, to use the comparative degree rather than the superlative, even, where we use the article the. This is the better of the two, is preferable to this is the best of the two."—Elementary Gram., p. 155. Such is their rule; but very soon they forget it, and write thus: "In this case the relative refers to the last of the two."—Ib., p. 163.

OBS. 14.—Hyperboles are very commonly expressed by comparatives or superlatives; as, "My little finger shall be thicker than my father's loins."—1 Kings, xii, 10. "Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given."—Ephesians, iii, 8. Sometimes, in thus heightening or lowering the object of his conception, the writer falls into a catachresis, solecism, or abuse of the grammatical degrees; as, "Mustard-seed—which is less than all the seeds that be in the earth."—Mark, iv, 31. This expression is objectionable, because mustard-seed is a seed, and cannot be less than itself; though that which is here spoken of, may perhaps have been "the least of all seeds:" and it is the same Greek phrase, that is thus rendered in Matt, xiii, 32. Murray has inserted in his Exercises, among "unintelligible and inconsistent words and phrases," the following example from Milton:

"And, in the lowest deep, a lower deep

Still threat'ning to devour me, opens wide."—Exercises, p. 122.

For this supposed inconsistency, ho proposes in his Key the following amendment:

"And, in the lower deep, another deep Still threat'ning to devour me, opens wide."—Key, p. 254.

But, in an other part of his book, he copies from Dr. Blair the same passage, with commendation: saying, "The following sentiments of Satan in Milton, as strongly as they are described, contain nothing but what is natural and proper:

'Me miserable! which way shall I fly

Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?

Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell;

And in the lowest depth, a lower deep, Still threat'ning to devour me, opens wide, To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heaven.' P. Lost, B. iv, l. 73." Blair's Lectures, p. 153; Murray's Grammar, p. 352.

OBS. 15.—Milton's word, in the fourth line above, is deep, and not depth, as these authors here give it: nor was it very polite in them, to use a phraseology which comes so near to saying, the devil was in the poet. Alas for grammar! accuracy in its teachers has become the most rare of all qualifications. As for Murray's correction above, I see not how it can please any one who chooses to think Hell a place of great depth. A descent into his "lower deep" and "other deep," might be a plunge less horrible than two or three successive slides in one of our western caverns! But Milton supposes the arch-fiend might descend to the lowest imaginable depth of Hell, and there be liable to a still further fall of more tremendous extent. Fall whither? Into the horrid and inconceivable profundity of the bottomless pit! What signifies it, to object to his language as "unintelligible" if it conveys his idea better than any other could? In no human conception of what is infinite, can there be any real exaggeration. To amplify beyond the truth, is here impossible. Nor is there any superlation which can fix a limit to the idea of more and more in infinitude. Whatever literal absurdity there may be in it, the duplication seems greatly to augment what was even our greatest conception of the thing. Homer, with a like figure, though expressed in the positive degree, makes Jupiter threaten any rebel god, that he shall be thrown down from Olympus, to suffer the burning pains of the Tartarean gulf; not in the centre, but,

"As deep beneath th' infernal centre hurl'd, As from that centre to th' ethereal world." —Pope's Iliad, B. viii, l. 19.