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[381] See Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 594.

[382] In Augustine the doctrine of imputation does not appear. Cp. Mausbach, “Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus” (1909), 2, p. 187, who, after pointing out this fact, remarks: “This doctrine of imputation was actually set up by Luther, whose mind was dominated by Nominalism.” Luther was able to introduce the continuance of original sin into Augustine’s writings only by forcing their meaning (see above, his alteration of concupiscentia into peccatum, p. 98). From the standpoint of the continuance of original sin Luther, already in his Commentary on Romans, attacks the supernatural habit of grace. Cp. Braun, “Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz bei Luther,” p. 310.

[383] Cp. Denifle-Weiss, 2, p. 305, n. 4.

[384] Cp. Loofs, “Dogmengesch.,”⁴. p. 699.

[385] Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 510.

[386] Denifle-Weiss, ibid., p. 606.

[387] In 2 Sent. in princ.: “Multa, quæ apparent manifeste contra rationem, et quorum opposita sunt consona fidei.”

[388] Quodlib. 1, q. 1: “Non potest demonstrative probari, quod tantum unus est Deus.”

[389] 1 Sent., dist. 2, q. 10, concl. 3, F.

[390] Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 608.

[391] Raynald., “Annal.,” an. 1513, n. 92 sq.; Mansi, “Coll. conc.,” 32, p. 842 seq.

[392] Drews, “Disputationen Luthers,” p. 487, No. 4-6, from the Disputation on January 11, 1539.

[393] In 1 Sent., q. 3, a. 3: “nullæ vel paucæ sunt rationes evidentes demonstrativæ ... magis opinio quam scientia, et ideo valde sunt reprehensibiles qui nimis tenaciter adhærent auctoritati Aristotelis.”

[394] “Superbia scholasticos a pœnitentia et fide viva præpediens,” etc. “Opp.” (Antv., 1706), p. 90.

[395] See above, p. 70.

[396] So Luther relates, in Gal. 2, p. 103.

[397] “Totius summæ christianarum rerum.” So the Weim. ed., 18, p. 614. “Opp. Lat. var.,” 7, p. 132, in “De servo arbitrio.”

[398] This is the work which Albert Ritschl, the well-known Protestant theologian, summed up as follows on account of the contradictions which it contained: “Luther’s work, ‘De servo arbitrio,’ is, and remains, an unfortunate piece of bungling.” “Die christl. Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,” 1², Bonn, 1882, p. 221. See below, vol. ii., xiv. 3.

[399] “Non potest probari sufficienter, quod Deus sit causa finalis,” Quodlib. 4, q. 2. Other Nominalists go still further.

[400] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 6, p. 508; “Opp. Lat. var.,” 5, p. 29, “De captivitate babylonica,” 1520.

[401] Ibid.

[402] “Opp. Lat. var.,” 6, p. 423; Weim. ed., 10, 2, p. 204. Contra regem Henricum.

[403] To Prince George or John of Anhalt, June, 1541, “Briefe” (de Wette), 6, p. 284.

[404] Cp. Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 614 ff.

[405] “Opp. Lat. var.,” 6, pp. 397, 399, 400, 425; Weim. ed., 10, 2, pp. 188, 189, 190, 206. Contra regem Henricum.

[406] Lauterbach, “Tagebuch,” p. 18. After speaking of Occam as “ingeniosissimus” he says: “illius studium erat, res dilatare et amplificare in infinitum.”

[407] H. Böhmer, “Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschungen (1910), p. 53. “What made such a deep impression on him? [in the works of Augustine]. First, if we may believe the notes in his own hand in the copy he chiefly used (‘Werke,’ Weim. ed., vol. ix.), more particularly Augustine’s mystico-philosophical considerations on God, the world, the soul, the worthlessness of all earthly things, and felicity in God. These ideas, however, were hardly quite new to him. He had already met with them, for instance, in Bernard of Clairvaux and other mystics.” That they should have “impressed him so forcibly,” as Böhmer rightly remarks, was largely owing to the fact that his ear caught in them echoes of the ideas germinating in his own mind.

[408] Cp., e.g., Tauler’s complaint against those who misuse the directions of the mystics in the sense of ethical passivity, i.e. of Quietism: “They blindly mislead their nature and become careless of all good works,” etc. “They sink into a dangerous natural quietude ... without the practice of virtue.” “Man,” on the contrary, “must recognise the commandments of God and the Church and resolve to keep the same.” “Tauler’s Sermons,” ed. Hamberger, 1, p. 194 f. Cp. J. Zahn, “Einführung in die christl. Mystik,” Paderborn, 1908, p. 313 ff.

[409] To George Leiffer, April 15, 1516, “Briefwechsel,” 1, p. 31.

[410] With regard to his ideas of the supposed animosity of mysticism for Scholasticism, W. Köhler says (“Luther und die Kirchengesch.,” 1, 1, Erlangen, p. 285): “the opposition between mysticism and Scholasticism, which has become historic, was never so acute as it appeared to Luther’s imagination. In principle, Scholasticism and mysticism stand on the same ground, one being the necessary complement of the other.”

[411] From Dungersheim’s “Dialogus adversus M. Lutherum”; Enders, “Briefwechsel,” p. 180.

[412] “Briefwechsel,” 1, p. 55: “iuxta Taulerum tuum.”

[413] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 205.

[414] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 135, he says of the earthly minded: “Nullus [est] eius Deus creator, quia non vult esse nihil, cuius ille sit creator. Nullius [read nullus] est potens, sapiens, bonus, quia non vult in infirmitate, stultitia, penalitate sustinere eum.”

[415] Ibid., p. 138, in the passage: “Quia charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris” (Rom. v. 5): “’Charitas Dei’ dicitur, quia per eam solum Deum diligimus, ubi nihil visibile, nihil experimentale nec intus nec foris est, in quod confidatur aut quod ametur aut timeatur, sed super omnia in invisibilem Deum et inexperimentalem, incomprehensibilem, sc. in medias tenebras interiores rapitur, nesciens quid amet, sciens, autem quid non amet, et omne cognitum et expertum fastidiens et id quod nondum cognoscit, tantum desiderans.... Hoc donum longissimo abest ab iis, qui suas iustitias adhuc vident et diligunt et non visis tristantur.” He thinks he must rise superior to such self-righteous, to whom his brother monks, who are zealous for good works (the Observantines?), belonged.

[416] See above, p. 43. We shall deal later with his further relations with Lang, with whom he shared an inclination to mystic studies and leanings.

[417] This is one of the seven old books discovered there in 1889-90; the glosses added by Luther to the same were edited by Buchwald in the Weim. ed., volume ix. For the glosses to Tauler, see ibid., p. 95 ff.

[418] Weim. ed., 9, pp. 98, 102 f. The real action of God on the spirit is that which takes place through Him “ignorantibus et non intelligentibus nobis id quod agit.” He complains: “Etsi sciamus quod Deus non agat in nobis, nisi prius nos et nostra destruat ... non nudi stamus in mera fide”; but the “nuda fides” is necessary because God acts contrary to our ways of thinking and does what we may fancy to be “ex diabolo.” Such exhortations to confide ourselves blindly to a higher direction may be right, but one naturally asks how is the fact of this guidance from on high to be guaranteed and distinguished from a mere leading astray. Luther in his public life simply assumed his mission to be divine because he felt it to be such (see vol. iii., xvi., 1 and 2), and because he persuaded himself that he was being led by inspiration from above “like a blind horse” to fight against Antichrist.

[419] Weim. ed., 9, p. 103: “Nullius exempli passionem vel operationem oportet sibi præstituere, sed indifferentem et nudam voluntatem habere,” etc.

[420] Ibid., p. 98 f.

[421] Ibid., p. 98: It is true he thinks he is explaining what precedes: “Nota, quod divina pati magis quam agere oportet.”

[422] Ibid., p. 104. Cp. p. 103: “Deus est intimior rebus ceteris quam ipse [i.e. ipsæ] sibi,” etc.

[423] See J. Zahn, “Einführung in die christl. Mystik,” p. 320. Reference may be made to this excellent work for the historical proofs, even from Tauler, into which we are not able to enter; p. 291, on the “Erlöschen der Ichheit.”

[424] Zahn, ibid., pp. 331, 327.

[425] “Sermons,” ed. Hamberger, 2, p. 131; in the sermon on Luke xv. 8 ff. Cp. Zahn, p. 343 ff. “Ueber die Prüfungen im mystischen Leben.”

[426] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 135 seq., p. 138: “Charitas Dei, quæ est purissima affectio in Deum, quæ sola facit rectos corde, sola aufert iniquitatem, sola exstinguit fruitionem propriæ iustitiæ. Quia non nisi solum et purum Deum diligit, non dona ipsa Dei, sicut hipocritæ iustitiarii.” P. 139, again against the “hipocritarum charitas, qui sibi ipsis fingunt et simulant se habere charitatem.... Diligere Deum propter dona et propter comodum est vilissima dilectione, i.e. concupiscentia eum diligere.” God is to be loved “propter voluntatem Dei absolute,” otherwise it is not the love of the children of God, but the love of slaves. He overlooks the fact that it is possible to recommend the higher without altogether repudiating the lower.

[427] 2-2, q. 188, a. 5.

[428] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 123 f., quoted by Hunzinger, “Luther und die deutsche Mystik” [”Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.,” 19 (1908), Heft 11, pp. 972-88], p. 984, who remarks: the passage shows “how great the danger was at that time of Luther becoming lost in these speculations”; this is the “most extreme mystical utterance to be found in his writings.” When he says: “What is here described as a via crucis is genuinely Neo-Platonic,” all will not agree with him. Hunzinger, p. 975, also considers it a proof of Neo-Platonism when, in his Commentary on the Psalms, Luther follows St. Augustine and urges man “avertere se a visibilibus et convertere se ad invisibilia et intelligibilia.” One is more inclined to agree with his concluding sentence: “No one will wish to assert, after taking note of this proposition, that Luther in his mystical period never left the path of the ethical.”

[429] See below, viii. 2.

[430] “Briefwechsel,” 1, p. 74 f.

[431] April 8, “Briefwechsel,” 1, p. 28. See above, p. 88.

[432] Recently edited (1908) by H. Mandel according to Luther’s edition with additions from MSS.; see “Theol. Literaturztg.,” p. 493 (1909). Mandel says in the preface: “It is obviously not correct to represent Luther’s well-known experiences in the monastery [which?] as directly connected with his fundamental ideas of reform. Rather it is evident, and acknowledged by Luther himself, that he learnt his root ideas in the school of Tauler and the ‘Theologia Deutsch.’” It is true that his misapprehension of the same strengthened his mistaken notions. The very first chapter in the booklet disproves the assertion frequently made that it is decidedly Pantheistic in tone; there a definite distinction is made between God and the creature as the “perfect” and the “divided” essence: “of all the divided none is perfect. Hence the perfect is no part of the divided.” In the light of this the obscure sentence which occurs in the “Theologia Deutsch,” that God, the Perfect, is the essence of all things, without which and outside of which there is no real being, must not be understood in the Pantheistic sense. The book, in fact, contains no sentence which cannot be understood in an orthodox fashion when taken in conjunction with others.

[433] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 137.

[434] Cp. W. Köhler, “Luther und die Kirchengesch.,” 1, 1, p. 244, who quotes Tauler in the above sense from his sermons in Hamberger’s edition (Frankfurt a/M., 1826), volume i., p. 261 ff.; volume ii., pp. 408, 410, 428. Köhler remarks (p. 239) that “however much Tauler had in common with Luther ... the latter overlooked the differences”; on p. 244: “his severity to self-righteousness is a point which Luther learnt from Tauler.”

[435] In his “Asterisci,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 298, agreeing with the Resolutiones, ibid., p. 586. Cp. Köhler, pp. 248-50.

[436] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 674; Köhler, p. 252.

[437] Volume ii., p. 133.

[438] J. Zahn, “Einführung in die christl. Mystik,” p. 302.

[439] J. Zahn, ibid., p. 303. Zahn expresses himself very aptly in regard to the unfavourable moral effects of the contrary theory; the incentive which Christ expressly recommends when He says we are to rejoice in the glorious reward which awaits us in the next world (Matt. v. 12) has a very different influence. Against Fénelon’s incorrect views of pure love without any admixture of interest for eternal salvation, he has the following: “The greatest fault in Fénelon’s system lies in the coupling together of the real striving after perfection and the attainment of salvation with an unworthy egotistical working for a reward” (p. 307). The theories of Mme. Guyon, whom Fénelon defends, are simply appalling: “O Will of my God, Thou wouldst be my Paradise in Hell.” According to her, the sacrifice of salvation is the culmination of the interior life (ibid., p. 292). Cp. the propositions from the Quietist mysticism of Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI on November 20, 1687.

[440] An exposition of Luther’s directed against the Areopagite (“Werke,” Weim. ed., 5, p. 163) is accompanied with the strange information that one becomes a theologian “moriendo et damnando, non intelligendo, legendo aut speculando.”

[441] Köhler, p. 332. “There is an immense difference” when Luther speaks of trust in God or of the sufferings of Christ and when Bernard does the same. “Luther did not notice anything of this difference, though it was worth while examining ... he identified with him his own resuscitation of the gospel.”

[442] Cp. “Werke,” Erl. ed., 62, p. 121 f. (Table-Talk); Köhler, p. 362 f.: “Those Romanists (Emser, Eck, etc.) knew better how to appreciate Gerson than Luther did, in whom the insight into Gerson’s ‘Catholicism’ was sadly wanting.” “He ever remained a stranger to the true inwardness of Gerson.”

[443] Köhler, p. 335 f., where examples are given of Luther’s “subjective interpretation” of St. Bonaventure.

[444] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 5, p. 353.

[445] Köhler, p. 261. Köhler says that Tauler “laid great stress on the Divine initiative”; but so did the Scholastics and the Fathers.

[446] Hunzinger, “Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.,” ibid., p. 985 f. “We may say that German mysticism achieved what it did in Luther in union with his study of the Epistle to the Romans.” “Thus the acute change from Indeterminism to religious Determinism took place in Luther under the direct influence of German mysticism. In the ‘De servo arbitrio’ it attained its extremest limit. This is not explained [more correctly, entirely explained], as some have thought, by Occamism, but by German mysticism.” P. 987: After his period of mysticism Luther took leave altogether of the semi-Pelagianism and Indeterminism of Scholasticism. On p. 988 Luther’s standpoint is thus stated: “Any concurrence between free will and its faculties and grace, or any kind of preparation for grace, is altogether done away with.... God’s grace alone works for salvation, and predestination is the only cause of salvation in those who are justified.”

[447] Denifle, “Luther und Luthertum,” 1¹, more particularly from p. 413; Denifle-Weiss, 1², more particularly from p. 447; Denifle, 1², “Quellenbelege,” p. 309 ff.

[448] See Joh. Ficker, “Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief,” Leipzig, 1908, p. xxv. ff., xxx.

[449] Cp. Grauert, “P. Heinrich Denifle,” 1906, p. 53 ff. Grauert referred to J. K. Oetrich, “Entwurf einer Gesch. der Bibliothek zu Berlin” (1752, p. 63).

[450] On the glosses and scholia generally, see above, p. 63.

[451] See above, p. 93 f.

[452] See below, chapter viii. 1.

[453] Cod. Vat. palat. 1826, fol. 77; Denifle, 1², “Quellenbelege,” p. 313 f.; Ficker, “Rom. Schol.,” p. 2 f.

[454] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 4, p. 227.

[455] Ficker, p. 1.

[456] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 21 ff. Denifle had only stated generally that Luther taught absolute predestination, without quoting the passages in the Commentary. Cp. Fr. Loofs, “Dogmengesch.,”⁴ p. 709, n. 8.

[457] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 22 f.

[458] Ibid., p. 22 f.

[459] Ibid., p. 23.

[460] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 24.

[461] With regard to the fact of Luther’s tendency to a fear and terror of God, O. Scheel says (“Die Entwicklung Luthers, Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgesch.,” No. 100, Leipzig, 1910, pp. 61-230, p. 80): “We possess statements from Luther’s own pen during his life in the monastery which show that the thought of death and Divine Judgment moved him deeply. The words, that the countenance of the Lord is upon us, are [to him] terrible.... We see one fear succeeding the other in the face of sudden death ... the thought of God the Judge inspires him with horror.... It is possible that the manner in which these feelings express themselves was connected with morbid dispositions, that the attacks of fear which suddenly, without apparent cause, fell upon him, were due to an unhealthy body. That the assaults reacted on his bodily state is probable. The root of the fear, however, lies in the lively conviction of the righteous Judgment of God.” W. Braun (“Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz in Luthers Leben und Lehre,” p. 295) thinks that “Luther’s assaults in the monastery were a mystical exercise. He experienced what Tauler and the ‘Theologia Deutsch’ relate regarding the consuming inward fires of Purgatory. Luther mentions that Tauler [like himself!] was acquainted with the ‘horror conscientiæ a facie iudicii Dei.’” “Werke,” Weim. ed., 5, p. 203.

[462] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 20 f.

[463] Ibid., p. 323.

[464] Ibid., p. 322.

[465] Ibid., p. 222 f.: “Hii (qui vere bona faciunt) sciunt quod homo ex se nihil potest facere,” in contradistinction to the “Pelagians,” who “libertati arbitrii tribuunt facere quod est in se, ante gratiam.”

[466] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 221.

[467] Ibid., p. 323.

[468] Ibid., p. 221.

[469] Ibid., p. 223.

[470] Ibid., p. 214.

[471] Ibid., pp. 215-20.

[472] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 226.

[473] Ibid., p. 223: “Si enim vellent quod vult Deus, etiamsi damnatos et reprobatos vellet, non haberent malum; quia vellent, quod vult Deus, et haberent in se voluntatem Dei per patientiam.”

[474] Ibid., p. 217.

[475] Ibid., p. 217 f.

[476] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 225.

[477] Ibid., pp. 208, 209, 210.

[478] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 219.

[479] Ibid., p. 221.

[480] Bonaventure, in iii., dist. 27, a. 2, q. 2: “Amor concupiscentiæ non repugnat amori amicitiæ in caritate,” etc. Cp. Thom. Aquin., 2-2, q. 23, a, 1.

[481] “Schol. Rom.,” pp. 210, 218.

[482] Ibid., p. 227.

[483] “Schol. Rom.”

[484] Ibid., pp. 227, 228.

[485] Ibid., p. 224.

[486] Ibid., p. 229.

[487] Ibid., 231.

[488] “Commentar. in Ep. ad Romanos,” p. 495.

[489] Formerly some few Catholic theologians found in the statements of the Apostle the so-called “prædestinatio ad gloriam ante prævisa merita” (though never a “reprobatio ante prævisa merita”); but as J. Th. Beelen remarks in his “Commentarius in Ep. ad Romanos” (1854), none of them ever sought for an exegetical foundation for the same. Cornely, l.c., p. 495 sq.

[490] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 230, and August., “Enchiridion ad Laurent.,” c. 98, Migne, P. L., xl., p. 278.

[491] S. Aug., “Contra Iulianum,” 6, n. 8, 14, 24; “Opus imperf.,” 1, c. 64, c. 132 seq., 175: “De catechiz. rudibus,” n. 52; “De spiritu et litt.,” c. 33; “Retract,” 1, c. 10, n. 2. Cp. Cornely, p. 494, on some exegetical peculiarities of Augustine.

[492] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 212.

[493] Ibid., p. 213.

[494] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 212 ff.

[495] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 1 ff.

[496] Ibid., p. 2 f.

[497] Ibid., p. 305. “Observantes invicem propter Deum pugnant, sed dilectionis præceptum nihil attendunt.”

[498] Ibid., p. 334.

[499] Cp. above, p. 88 ff., Luther’s letter to Spenlein, who had left his monastery for that at Memmingen.

[500] Kolde, “Die deutsche Augustinerkongregation,” p. 325.

[501] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 20, he speaks against the “spiritualis et subtilior idolatria”; p. 45, against those who are “vane gloriosi” in their exterior observances; p. 75, against the “nimis iusti,” “nimis intelligentes” and “nimis quærentes,” who are “incorrigibiles in suo sensu”; p. 83, a fresh outburst against those who “in suis iustitiis pacem in carne quærunt....” “Nihil capiunt quia sunt superbi.... Præsumunt quod Deus eorum sensum et opera approbabit, quia ipsis iustus et rectus apparet”; p. 86, he again attacks “omnes superbi in ecclesia spirituales, qui sunt magnorum et multorum operum.” Then, to omit many digressions against the “iustitiarii,” and merely to quote from the last part of the work, he says, p. 220, of the righteous in his own sense by whom damnation would be willingly accepted (“libentes damnari volunt”), that they shame the swarm of others, “qui sibi merita fingunt et pingunt ac bona quærunt, fugiunt mala et in absconditis suis nihil habent”; these are, according to p. 221, “superbi iustitiarii, qui certi sunt de bonis operibus suis,” or, according to p. 273, those “in sua iustitia præsumentes.” The “sapientes iustitiarii,” according to p. 331, destroy the temple of God by their false wisdom and their observances.

Superintendent H. Hering has expressed himself candidly in the “Theologische Studien und Kritiken” (50, 1877, p. 627) on certain notable passages in Luther’s Commentary on the Psalms: “His anger,” so he says, “is almost more vehement against the Observantines than against the heretics”; to their claim to exemptions and dispensations Luther opposes the assertion that it is impossible to dispense from obedience. He refers, among other passages of Luther’s, to the beginning of his interpretation of Psalm xxxi. (“Beati quorum remissæ,” etc.), where apparently the Observantines are denounced as schismatics on account of their opposition to Staupitz and his plans: “similiter et superstitiosi seu schismatici abiiciunt per suam singularitatem suum prælatum, in quo Christus eis præficitur, quorum hodie maior est numerus (quam hæreticorum).” “Werke,” Weim. ed., 3, p. 174. In earlier passages (3, p. 172) he speaks against those who, in the singularity of their observances, “reiecta obedientia et fide suam statuunt iustitiam” and declares them, on account of their pride, to be deniers of Christ, and (p. 61) against the upholders of special statutes who fight for their ceremonies and their “vanitas observantiæ exterioris,” who “compunguntur in habitu,” etc. We seem to hear echoes of the struggle that was going on in the Order not only in the passages from the sermons quoted above (p. 80 ff.), but also in such as the following, from the year 1516: These “iustitiarii” are “irritabilissimi omnium”; they are “prompti alios vindicare ... iudicare, condemnare, quærulantes et accusantes, quod iniuriam sustineant, ipsi recte facientes”; but “they do not fulfil the spirit of the law” (“Opp. Lat. var.,” 1, p. 160; cp. 158 Weim. ed., 1, p. 114). He puts in the mouth of the “iustitiarii”: “Tu peius vivis quam ego,” and describes how they fancy themselves quite safe and have no need of Christ as their physician (ibid., p. 128; Weim. ed., 1, p. 85). He had already accused them above of disobedience and rebellion, and his charging them with revolt against their lawful superior (“abiiciunt per suam singularitatem suum prælatum”) leads one to suppose he had in view the opposition of the Observantines to Staupitz’s plans. We may perhaps find in these passages reason for applying the attacks in the Commentary on Romans to the Erfurt Observantines, though there is no actual proof of this.

Does not Staupitz himself, who was Vicar-General of the Congregation, in certain of his works (published after 1515) sometimes oppose the spirit of the Observantines, such as it appears to him? Cp. Braun, “Concupiscenz,” p. 68 ff. It would be surprising if no echo of a conflict which touched him so nearly had obtruded itself into his writings. Unfortunately historical data regarding the external progress of the breach are wanting. Braun fully recognises Luther’s alienation and that it had grounds; thus of Luther’s cutting address delivered before the Chapter of the Order at Gotha on May 1, 1515, he says: “It is obvious that sad experiences lay behind these words.... The tendency to quarrelsomeness, which, it cannot be denied, was apparent in Luther at a later date—though much may be said in excuse of it—may have made itself felt even then, long before his breach with the Church.” The “primaria nostræ unionis factio,” which Barthol. Usingen mentions (see N. Paulus, “Usingen,” p. 16, n. 5, and Oergel, “Der junge Luther,” p. 132), brought Luther’s friend, Johann Lang, in the summer of 1511 from Erfurt to Wittenberg. He joined Luther in passing over from the stricter to the more liberal party supported by Staupitz. For Cochlæus’s statement regarding Luther: “ad Staupitzium defecit,” see above, p. 38. The relations existing between the Observantines and the Conventuals, even among other Orders where a similar movement towards reform was taking place, are instructive. There was, for instance, a division in the Dominican Order. The Observantine priories of the so-called German Province of the Dominicans (prov. teutonica)—as a matter of fact, the Province of South Germany—were permitted to choose a Provincial, while the Conventual priories formed a special German Congregation (congregatio Germanica), with a Vicar-General at their head. Since 1511 Johann Faber had been Vicar-General, but he too was in favour of a reform. The cause of the conflict in this case arose from the Observantines trying to bring the Conventuals to their way of thinking by appealing to ecclesiastical and secular authority. Cp. N. Paulus in the “Histor. Jahrbuch,” 17, 1896, p. 44, and in “Die deutschen Dominikaner im Kampfe gegen Luther,” 1903, p. 299.

[502] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 273. With the above is connected the fact that in his mysticism he peremptorily demands the surrender of all rights and privileges.

[503] Ibid., p. 46.

[504] “Schol. Rom.,” pp. 11, 45, 84, 94.

[505] The reader should notice his exaggerations regarding the teachers of whose nominalistic tendency he disapproves: “docent, quod lex opere tantum sit implenda, etiam sine impletione cordis.... Nec ipsi minimo saltem cordis conatu eadem aggrediuntur, sed solummodo externo opere.” Ibid., p. 45.

[506] Ibid., p. 332.

[507] The passage here referred to in St. Aug. is in “Contra Iulianum,” 1. 8, c. 8; Migne, P. L. xliv., p. 689. Augustine there when he speaks of “servum potius quam liberum arbitrium” does so in another sense, though Luther saw fit to borrow the expression for the title of his own later work of 1525: “De servo arbitrio.”

[508] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 209.

[509] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 322.

[510] Ibid., p. 323. In connection with the proposition at the commencement of this division: “Man can of himself do nothing,” Luther attacks the mediæval theological axiom: “Facienti quod est in se, Deus non denegat gratiam” (in his Commentary on the Psalms, Weim. ed., 4, p. 262, he already gives it as: “Deus infallibiliter dat gratiam”). In order to make the matter clear we may state in advance that, according to Catholic doctrine, we cannot with the powers of nature merit grace either “de condigno” or “de congruo”; grace excludes any natural acquiring of the same; man is only able to dispose himself negatively for the acquisition of grace, not positively, i.e. not in such a way as to demand grace as a right. “Homo non movet se ipsum ad hoc, quod adipiscatur divinum auxilium, quod supra ipsum est, sed potius ad hoc adipiscendum a Deo movetur.” Thom., “Summa contra gent.,” 3, c. 149. In accordance with this, true Scholasticism did not and could not wish to express by the proposition “Facienti quod est in se,” etc., any real meriting of grace by our natural powers. Luther’s attacks, which presuppose this, were therefore of no avail against the true theology of the Middle Ages. The natural acts recognised by theology as good are generally unimportant, have no supernatural merit, and cannot positively qualify for grace in the sense of “Facienti, etc.” The axiom implies rather that whoever does his part, roused and moved thereto by actual grace, will arrive at saving grace and reach heaven; it presupposes a negative preparation; God in His mercy does not refuse His grace to whoever does his part. It was therefore presumed that the actual grace of God was at work in every good work which man performed, inviting to, co-operating with, and furthering it. Cp. Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 577 ff. The mediæval theological work most widely known in Luther’s time, the “Compendium theologicæ veritatis,” says expressly: “Without grace no one is able to do his part so as to prepare himself for salvation” (l. 5, c. 11). We find there no trace of the Pelagianism with which Luther so bitterly reproached the whole theology of the Middle Ages. (See Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 576, n. 5). “Is mere co-operation with grace Pelagian?” Denifle asks (p. 577). And what authorised Luther to say in the Schmalkald Articles (Müller-Kolde, “Die symbolischen Bücher der evangel. luther. Kirche,” 1907, p. 311) that the teaching “si faciat homo quantum in se est, Deum largiri ei certo suam gratiam” was a portentum, a heathenish dogma from which it followed that Christ had died in vain?

Luther himself had previously, in his Commentary on the Psalms (Weim. ed., 4, p. 262), written, that God gives His grace without fail to him who does his part, and yet he thereby assumed, with the whole of theology, that grace and glory were not on that account merited, but given us without any desert on our part. (Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 441.) The passage reads: “Hinc recte doctores, quod homini facienti quod est in se, Deus infallibiliter dat gratiam, et licet non de condigno sese possit ad gratiam præparare, quia est incomparabilis, tamen bene de congruo, propter promissionem istam Dei et pactum misericordiæ. “ Denifle here remarks aptly: “We must not overlook the fact, that Luther here formulates the proposition ‘Facienti,’ etc., in the nominalistic sense.” What is more important is that Luther, immediately before, had rightly excluded all supernatural merit from natural action ( “non ex meritis, sed ex mera promissione miserentis Dei “).

The Nominalists of Occam’s school went much further in allowing a natural preparation for grace (though not a meriting) than the recognised representatives of Scholasticism. Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 586: “The preparation for saving grace takes place, according to the Occamists, by purely natural acts under the general concurrence of God; particular concurrence is, according to them and speaking generally, the saving grace itself, whereas, according to Scholasticism proper, special concurrence, i.e. actual grace, intervenes between the natural and the supernatural, i.e. saving grace, and is necessary for man’s preparation for the reception of the latter; the general concurrence on the other hand is represented as insufficient because it belongs to the natural order. (See above, pp. 141 ff.) Nevertheless, the Nominalists, as A. Weiss points out (Denifle, 1², p. 578, n. 2), came to expound their theory quite satisfactorily. See Altenstaig, “Lexicon theolog.,” Venet., 1583, fol. 163, s.v. Facere quod in se est. Still, Denifle is right when he says (p. 441) that the reproach of Pelagianism later on urged against them by Luther did to some extent apply to the Occamists.

The deeper ground, however, which led Luther in the above passages of the Commentary on Romans to attack the “Facienti,” etc., was that, in his antagonism against the good works of the self-righteous, he had, with the assistance of pseudo-mysticism, reached a point where he denied that any vital act on the part of man had any potency for the working out of salvation. In the work of salvation he allows of no power of choice: “The fulfilling of the law by our own efforts is absolutely impossible “; “free will is altogether in sin and cannot choose what is good in God’s sight.” See vol. ii., xiv. 3. Cp. W. Braun, “Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz bei Luther,” pp. 215, 217, 219, 221.

Protestant theologians could, moreover, have found the axiom “Facienti,” etc., duly explained in the Catholic sense, with its biblical and patristic supports, even in the ordinary Catholic handbooks of theology, which would have obviated much misapprehension; cp., for instance, H. Hurter, “Theologiæ specialis pars altera,“¹¹ Innsbruck, 1903 (Compendium 3), p. 65 seq., 72 seq.

[511] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 183.

[512] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 183 f.

[513] Cp. ibid., pp. 114, 185, 187, 244.

[514] Ibid., p. 108.

[515] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 108 f. Cp. p. 178, where he complains that they had reached the “nocentissima fraus, ut baptizati vel absoluti, statim se sine omni peccato arbitrantes, securi fierent de adepta iustitia et manibus remissis quieti, nullius sc. conscii peccati, quod gemitu et lachrymis lugendo et laborando expugnarent atque expurgarent. Igitur peccatum est in spirituali homine relictum,” etc. It is clear that the continuance cf the “fomes peccati” is confused with the continuance of sin and the languor which is frequently due to weakness after the extirpation of sin, with a languor which must necessarily set in. The “grace which is given” he sometimes looks upon as actual, sometimes as saving grace. To follow him through all his erroneous notions would be endless.

[516] Ibid., p. 114.

[517] Ibid., p. 167.

[518] Ibid., p. 111.

[519] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 179.

[520] Ibid., p. 178. See above, p. 209, n. 1.

[521] Ibid., p. 178.

[522] Ibid., p. 181. The passage quoted from Augustine is in “De nuptiis et concupiscentia ad Valerium,” l. 1, c. 23; Migne, P. L., xliv., col. 428.

[523] “Contra Julianum,” l. 3, c. 26; Migne, P. L., xliv., col. 733 sq.

[524] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 182.

[525] Ibid., p. 221.

[526] Ibid. “Bonitas Dei facit nos bonos et opera nostra bona; quia non essent in se bona, nisi quia Deus reputat ea bona. Et tantum sunt vel non sunt, quantum ille reputat vel non reputat. Idcirco nostrum reputare vel non reputare nihil est. Qui sic sapit, semper pavidus est, semper Dei reputationem timet et expectat. Idcirco nescit superbire et contendere, sicut faciunt superbi iustitiarii, qui certi sunt de bonis operibus suis. Perversa itaque est definitio virtutis apud Aristotelem, quod ipsa nos perficit et opus eius laudabile reddit.” The nominalistic doctrine of acceptation also comes out in Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation (“Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, pp. 352, 356), though he explains it in such a fashion that it is clear he does not wish to go as far as Occam’s paradox to be mentioned immediately. He answers the objection that the same act cannot be pleasing and displeasing to God at the same time, thus: “The Scholastics are acquainted only with an acceptation by God without forgiveness; we, on the contrary, know that the evil in all works is forgiven through Christ, our righteousness, Who makes good all our defects; just as the saints have so-called merits only in Christ, for Whose sake God accepts graciously their works which He would not otherwise accept.” “Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 370. Cp. W. Braun, “Die Concupiscenz,” etc., p. 213, where he rightly draws attention to the fact that A. Jundt, “Le développement de la pensée religieuse de Luther jusqu’en 1517,” Paris, 1906, has not drawn his “information regarding Scholasticism from the right source, but from Harnack’s and Seeberg’s works, and even from Denifle’s quotations.” Cp. “Hist. Jahrbuch,” 27, 1906, p. 884: “Jundt knows nothing of the Catholic literature on the matter,” etc.

[527] Braun, pp. 191, 211; “Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 42; 2, p. 536.

[528] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 221.

[529] Ibid.

[530] Cp. “Schol. Rom.,” p. 183.

[531] Ibid., p. 89.

[532] Ibid., p. 90 f.

[533] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 91.

[534] Ibid., p. 93.

[535] Ibid., p. 95.

[536] Ibid., p. 96.

[537] Ibid., p. 100 f.

[538] Cp. what he says in “Schol. Rom.,” p. 85, about the “opera iusta, bona, sancta extra vel ante iustificationem.” On p. 84 he says, our good deeds should be directed towards the end “ut mereamur iustificari ex ipso (Deo).” In the interpretation of chapter ii. he explains verse 14: “Quicumque legem implet est in Christo et datur ei gratia per sui præparationem ad eandem, quantum in se est,” p. 38.

[539] Cp. Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 608.

[540] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 41.

[541] Ibid., p. 83 f.

[542] Ibid., p. 84.

[543] Ibid., p. 114 f.

[544] Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 465.

[545] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 104 f.

[546] J. Ficker in the preface to Luther’s Commentary on Romans, p. lxxi.