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Much of the work of liberal feminist researchers in the twentieth century focused on demonstrating the minimal difference between the sexes and the considerable overlap in their capacities (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). This early work seemed to be a quest for the “real” sex differences' and thus was still essentialist in character. However the work of Maccoby and Jacklin, and the later work in this vein, such as that reviewed by Eagly et al. in 2012, was important since it demolished many myths and stereotypes about actual differences between the sexes (in North America at least). After conducting a meta‐analysis of such studies Hyde developed what she called “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis” (2005). Research showing the extent of overlap and the small size of the differences that were to be found led to the crucial conclusion that knowing the sex of any individual could not reliably inform you about their likely dispositions and traits. It should be noted that research of this kind usually addresses issues to do with the psychological attributes and competences of males and females. It does not survey such matters as mode of dress, social roles, etc. In examining some of the differences in conduct and status between men and women it might be easy to side with Lippa who counters Hyde by proposing a “Gender Reality Hypothesis,” pointing out the many ways in which the actual lives of men and women differ (2006). Adjusting the focus of any comparison and examining different samples of men and women, or boys and girls, coming from different classes or cultures may well lead to different conclusions. This kind of comparative research has its uses if not overgeneralized, but it is descriptive and leaves open the question of the origins and meaning of any differences that are detectable.

In the late 1970s some influential theorists argued that the way forward was through a revaluation of the so‐called feminine traits and dispositions. For example, Gilligan attacked existing theories about personality development as being male‐centered, saying that “Implicitly adopting the male life as the norm they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine cloth” (1979, p. 6). In her explorations of girls' and women's moral thinking she concluded that women have “a different voice” and that they work with an ethic of care rather than an ethic of justice (1982). Around the same time Chodorow wrote about the way girl children's early experience of being mothered shaped their capacity for forming relationships and a maternal orientation (1978). Both theories were widely lauded at the time but have fallen out of favor, largely because of their essentialist viewpoint. Neither theory was based on biological difference but saw male–female differences as psychically rooted in early experience and carried forward into the rest of the person's life. More recently Chodorow has admitted that her early views have changed and she disassociates herself from theories that are “universalising and essentialising” (2012, p. 7).

As far back as 1949, Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, said that “One is not born a woman but becomes one.” This maxim was positioned in direct opposition to Freud's assertion that “anatomy is destiny.” It became representative of the radical feminist stance, which, unlike the still hegemonic biological determinist viewpoint, held the door open to change and provided a platform for feminist activism. Spurred on by the second wave of feminism in the late 1960s many feminist researchers argued that the patriarchal sociopolitical context and rampant sex‐typing that were so disadvantageous to women were the main reasons for women's subordinate position and achievements. In the latter part of the twentieth century most feminist theorists advanced social explanations for differences between men and women in behavior and status, seeing differences as socially constructed, not given. As Rosenblum and Travis note,

From the constructionist perspective, difference is created rather than intrinsic to a phenomenon. Social processes … create differences, determine that some differences are more important than others and assign particular meanings to those differences. (2016, p. 3)

One social process that was given central importance in the last decades of the twentieth century was language, a focus that was influenced by postmodern thinking and “the turn to language.” Alerted by Foucault to the role discourse plays in power relations throughout all aspects of society, feminist theorists examined discourses on the body, on male–female relations and society's discursive representations of the female and the feminine (Butler 1990; Nicholson 1990). Postmodernists also resisted the longstanding focus on male–female differences, seeking to disrupt traditional binaries and oppositions like male–female and nature–nurture (Gergen 2001).

Despite the clear rejection of essentialist theories by most feminist theorists, essentialist thinking is, as I will discuss further in the concluding section of this chapter, still very evident in both popular writing on male–female difference and in those theories that promote biological explanations, which tend in recent decades to promote the “different but equal perspective” rather than the view that women are in any way inferior. The most well‐known book that trumpets this new form of essentialism is probably Gray’s Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, which was published in 1992 and has sold over a million copies, according to its Wikipedia entry. Gray focuses on what the differences are – or what he asserts they are – and does not dwell on origins, though he does say “men and women are supposed to be different” (p. 10). Essentialist theories, like those of Gray, however seemingly benign and celebratory of women's “special” qualities are quickly translated into evidence of female deficiency and used as a reason for prejudice and exclusion. Thus Carol Gilligan's (1982) theory that women favored a morality based on valuing relationship and men based their morality on the consideration of rights could potentially be used to deny a woman a traditional high‐status post like Chief Justice. As Mednick notes,

Arguments for women's intrinsic difference (from men), whether innate or deeply socialized, support conservative policies, that in fact could do little else but maintain the status quo vis a vis gender politics. (1989, p. 1122)

Rejecting all forms of essentialism may be seen to present feminists with a dilemma because if women do not share a common essence or identity how can they have a common political cause? One solution may be to adopt the “strategic essentialism” advocated by Spivak (1988). Spivak argues for “a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously political interest” (1988, p. 15). This would result in women (temporarily) setting aside their diversity and their differences in race, class, ethnicity, etc. and adopting the shared identity “woman” but for political purposes only. Stone considers the concept of strategic essentialism problematic, proposing instead that feminists continue to reject essentialism as “descriptively false” (2004, p. 1) but find unity between women in their shared history of oppression and in shared aspects of their current social positioning.