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Chapter

2

China’s Changing Perspective of its Periphery Environment

Jianwei Wang

The periphery always occupies an important position in China’s foreign policy. However, the degree of criticalness and urgency of the peripheral diplomacy could vary depending on China’s perception of its peripheral environment: whether it is stable and benign or volatile and threatening. Decision-makers in Beijing make policy adjustments accordingly. Since 2010, China’s periphery environment has undergone significant geostrategic changes, particularly in East Asia. China’s perceptions of these changes naturally influence their foreign policy postures in the region. This chapter attempts to trace China’s evolving perspective of its peripheral environment, including its estimation and analysis of the nature of changes, the causes of changes, the implications for China’s interest and the possible ways to deal with the changing environment.

Periphery Environment: Better or Worse?

Chinese foreign policymakers and elites are fully aware that compared to other major powers, China’s peripheral environment is not necessarily favorable. Many agree that China’s peripheral environment is the most complicated among major powers.¹

It is characterized by several features. First, China has many neighboring countries with very complicated situations. Their relations with China are too changeable. Many of them are close to China in geography but not in heart. Second, China has many complicated and various legacies of disputes with its neighbors ranging from territorial, historical, maritime to humanistic ones. These disputes can be easily inflamed. Third, China’s relations with its neighbors have experienced ups and downs following the rise and fall of China’s own development.²

In the post-Cold War period, however, Chinese analysts emphasize the relative stability and peacefulness of its periphery. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and for a period of time, Eastern and Central Europe, Africa and elsewhere were characterized by war and chaos. China felt fortunate that Asia, particularly East Asia, remained relatively calm. This was in sharp contrast with the heyday of the Cold War period when Asia was plunged into one war after another while Europe enjoyed a long peace. In a way, China was a victim of the geopolitical instability in Asia. With few exceptions, China’s relations with its neighbors were characterized by tension, hostility and military conflict. The periphery in a large measure was perceived a threat to China and the Chinese had a mentality of being under siege by “imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries”. Even after China improved relations with the superpower across the Pacific and the United States, a source of much hostility behind China’s embattled interactions with its neighbors, its relations with many periphery countries remained unfriendly, a typical pattern of “be friendly with those far away and attack those nearby.” China was characterized as a regional power without a regional strategy.

China began to seriously cultivate its relations with the peripheral countries in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, China was isolated by the West and suffered from economic and political sanctions. On the other hand, “the Asian values” made China’s ties with its Asian neighbors less affected. In order to break the diplomatic isolation, China “discovered” its periphery and made its own “pivot” to Asia. For example, China significantly improved relations with the peripheral countries which resulted in normalization of relations with all ASEAN countries. Ever since then, China had put its relationship with the peripheral countries on a pretty solid ground. Some predicted that those hot spots in China’s periphery such as the Korea issue, South China Sea issue, India–Pakistan conflict would gradually die down and have less adverse effect on China’s security. The only issue that could disrupt and worsen China’s security environment was the Taiwan issue.³ The 9/11 terrorist attack provided another strategic opportunity to further deepen China’s relations with the peripheral countries. Taking advantage of the American unintended neglect of Asia resulting from the two bloody wars in Middle East, China took the initiative to speed up the process of economic integration in the region. China became the first major power in the region to establish Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN countries, surprising both the United States and Japan. The Western media was full of stories on how China’s charming offensive undermined the American influence in the region.⁴ At that time, China’s assessment of its peripheral environment was sanguine. Many considered that China’s relations with its peripheral countries were at their best in history. They claimed that the perception of “China threat” in China’s periphery was fading away and it was replaced by the perception of “China opportunity”.

The honeymoon, however, did not last for too long. After President Obama came to power in 2009, the United States had been “returning” to Asia in an accelerated pace as highlighted by his famous “Asia Rebalance” or “Pivot to Asia” strategy. Facing the joint pushing back by the United States and its allies, China’s position of “outshining others” soon began to evaporate. Particularly since 2010, a series of events in the region on the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea and South China Sea significantly increased the tension and China’s perceived hardline policy on maritime disputes reversed the favorable feelings toward China. How to assess China’s changing peripheral environment? Has it become worse or better; if worse, how much worse; what are the implications for China’s security? Chinese scholars and analysts began to reassess China’s peripheral environment and displayed somewhat different opinions on these issues.

For some, the impact of the U.S. war on terror on China’s peripheral environment is not as positive as it was thought before. Although the 9/11 did divert America’s strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. war on terror actually helped Washington increase its military presence in China’s periphery including Central Asia and South Asia, in which the United States had little military existence before. In this way, the United States pretty much completed its strategic encirclement of China.⁵ This tendency of encircling China of course was reinforced by Obama’s Asia Rebalance strategy. Some argue that China’s periphery environment has become less favorable and more risky. China is facing challenges and pressures from all directions in China’s periphery. The possibility of war has been increasing.⁶ Many believe that there have appeared some new and important changes in China’s peripheral environment and peripheral relations. These changes are characterized by intensification of territorial disputes in South China Sea and East China Sea, formation of a regional quasi-alliance to balance China’s rise and the change of direction of regional economic integration. These new changes constrained China’s ability to shape its peripheral environment and brought new challenges to China’s peripheral diplomacy.⁷

Other scholars predicted that with the U.S. Asia Rebalance strategy, China’s relations with its neighboring countries would enter a period of “intensified strategic friction”. As a result, the centrifugal tendency of China’s neighboring countries will increase reducing the mutual political trust between China and its neighboring countries; hence, increasing the uncertainty in China’s periphery.⁸ In this regard, one big change in China’s peripheral environment in recent years is that different from the past when China was not the leading factor in regional conflict, China now has become the main focus of the regional conflict and contradiction.⁹

Other assessments tend to see light in the darkness. While recognizing the seriousness of new dynamics in China’s peripheral environment, some also caution that Beijing should not overestimate the severity of the changes in the region. The overall structure in China’s periphery has not been qualitatively reversed. Different from the situation in the Cold War period, a hostile ring of encirclement against China has not been formed. While the United States and many peripheral countries do share something in common to cope with a “stronger China”; they are not in a position to contain and confront China. In the meantime, one should also take into consideration that with the ever-growing Chinese power, its capability to mould its peripheral environment has also been on the rise as reflected in the increasing degree of dependency upon China by its neighbors. China has no reason to panic.¹⁰

Some analysts draw people’s attention to the dual feature of China’s peripheral environment. On the one hand, it converges the most acute contradictions and potential conflicts such as great power competition, nuclear non-proliferation, territorial disputes, terrorist and separatist forces, and energy and water resource security. On the other hand, it is also the region with the fastest economic growth in the world and a more vibrant regional economy.¹¹ This duality is also reflected in another dimension. China’s peripheral situation is characterized by the so-called “stability on land but instability in sea” (lu wen hai luan), meaning that China’s relations with its land neighbors are relatively stable and the main source of conflict comes from the sea.¹²

Related to the reassessment of China’s peripheral situation is the debate about China’s “strategic opportunity period”. This concept was first formally articulated by Jiang Zemin in 2002. He argued that the first two decades of the 21^st century will be China’s period of strategic opportunity. China should firmly grasp this opportunity to strive for big achievements.¹³ He obviously had the 9/11 episode, which dramatically changed the geostrategic structure of the world and diverted the U.S. attention from China and Asia to elsewhere for the purpose of waging the war on terror, in his mind when he made the comment. Since then, this concept has been used to justify China’s concentration on domestic economic and social development and keeping a low profile in international affairs. The assumption is that international environment including the periphery one is favorable to China.

However, the ominous developments since 2010 triggered a debate about whether this period of strategic opportunity has abruptly come to an end. Quite a few scholars and analysts argued that with the U.S. return to Asia and subsequent deterioration of China’s peripheral environment, the window of China’s strategic opportunity was closing. Instead of “period of strategic opportunity”, the next 10 years could be the period of “strategic danger”. The “strategic danger” school based its judgment on the following reasons. First, the United States is already determined to take China as its strategy adversary. Second, domestically the reform dividends have almost exhausted and China’s economic development has begun to slow down and encounter new difficulties. ¹⁴ Another variation along the same line holds the view that while the window of strategic opportunities may still be open, the “golden decade” for China has definitely gone. China has entered a period of “strategic challenge”. For the longest time in the future, China will be in a period of strategic sensitivity, tension and friction.¹⁵

Others, however, tend to be more optimistic. While they also recognize that China’s peripheral environment has become less benign and tougher, the strategic opportunity is still there for China to grab. Among other things, domestically China’s economy still has great potential for continuous growth. In terms of geopolitical environment, the limited availability of resources does not allow the United States to effectively contain China.¹⁶ It is a mission impossible.

In addition, China’s periphery is not limited to East Asia and Pacific, while China did encounter difficulties and frictions in East Asia, strategic opportunities may exist in other parts of China’s periphery including Central Asia and Northwest Asia. China could explore these opportunities with more resources and efforts. That is why some Chinese scholars came up with the idea of “going westward”. Additionally, there are some bright spots in China’s periphery. Sino-Russian relations and cross-strait relations were both the best in history. Others also pointed out that China should not overestimate “enemy’s situation”. While China is a main factor in America’s returning to Asia strategy, it is not the only factor. The United States has other goals in its mind such as reviving the U.S. economy, preventing the disintegration of its alliance system in Asia-Pacific, etc. China should not take the strategy as exclusively targeting at China; thus, should not react excessively. In sum, while China’s peripheral environment did become worse and more complicated, that does not necessarily mean the period of strategic opportunity is gone. Rather, its intension has been changing, and is different from the past.¹⁷

This line of analysis later was acknowledged in an official discourse on the same issue. The work report of the 18^th Party Congress reaffirms that “China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved”, although it also admits that the nature and conditions of this period have been changing and these changes have to be correctly understood.¹⁸ In his speech at the high-level meeting on China’s peripheral diplomacy in 2013, Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of maintaining and making full use of China’s period of strategic opportunities. While characterizing China’s overall peripheral environment as stable, he also recognized that China’s peripheral environment and its relations with peripheral countries have changed a lot.¹⁹ This judgment was further confirmed by Xi Jinping’s report at the 19^th Party Congress in 2017 in which he asserted that although China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex changes, China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development.²⁰

Consistent with the reconfirmation of “period of strategic opportunity”, it is noticeable that as a general trend, China’s assessment of its peripheral environment has become more positive in the recent years. Some Chinese pundits believe that China’s deteriorating peripheral environment has been largely reversed in the last 5 years. While some hot spots in China’s periphery remain outstanding, the overall situation has improved. The peripheral configuration has been moving toward a better direction and China has enough reason to be highly confident about the peripheral development in the next 5 years.²¹

An editorial of Global Time at the end of 2017 typically reflected Beijing’s more sanguine views of its periphery.²² According to the editorial, 2017 witnessed the generally positive development in China’s relations with neighboring countries. Although some trouble spots remain, strategic stability has increased. As a rising power, China is getting to know better how to adapt to its surrounding nations. China made progress in managing the hot button issues and difficult relations in its surrounding area. By the end of 2016, tensions in the South China Sea started to ease and this trend was greatly consolidated in 2017. The Philippines and Vietnam have maintained their momentum of improving ties with China. ASEAN countries including Singapore have been attaching more importance to their relations with Beijing. The framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea has been agreed upon. The Sino-Japanese relationship has finally broken out of its slump. Ties between Beijing and Seoul returned to a more amicable path of collaboration since Moon Jae-in was elected as the South Korean President. China and India resolved the Doklam standoff peacefully. The biggest challenge in China’s periphery in 2017 was the situation on the Korean Peninsula, demonstrating the limitations of China’s ability to shape the landscape around it. With the unexpected thaw between ROK and DPRK and the prospect of DPRK–U.S. summit in 2018, however, even the tension on Korean Peninsula has significantly tempered. The editorial concludes that although problems on China’s periphery cannot be avoided in years to come, the progress in 2017 indicates that “emerging China has the resources to solve and control the problems even as they increase.” As long as Beijing keeps its strong development momentum, China will be able to implement even greater strategic initiatives in its periphery.

This upbeat assessment was echoed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in his remarks at the year end of 2017. He asserts that China has been able to maintain the stability and the momentum of cooperation in its periphery in the last 5 years. Among other things, China improved its relations with Vietnam, Mongol and the Philippines. China–ROK relations walked out of the shadow of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and began to recover. The long-frozen relationship between China and Japan has also began to show some signs of thawing. China’s relationship with India also has stabilized after the Doklam standoff.²³

Not everyone agrees with this confident assessment. Some analysts emphasize that the overall periphery security situation has not changed fundamentally. It remains highly complex and risky like never seen before.²⁴ Security pressures from all directions have not reduced. The cost of maintaining peripheral security has been on the rise. Therefore, China has to pay more attention to the new situation and new changes in China’s periphery. First, the assault of traditional geopolitical conflict on China’s peripheral stability cannot be underestimated. The geopolitical conflict in China’s periphery resulting from major power interference constitutes the major external security pressure for China. Second, the military adventures by hegemonic powers with regard to maritime security in general and South China Sea in particular in the region cannot be underestimated. Third, the impact of peripheral security on China’s internal stability cannot be underestimated. The Internet era has increased the connection and interaction between peripheral security and internal security. As a result, there is no absolute peripheral security and no absolute internal security.²⁵ These two securities are highly intertwined making the management more difficult.

What Caused Changes: Others or Self?

Irrespective of the different assessments about the degree and nature of changes in China’s peripheral environment, most agree that significant changes have taken place in the region. Then why has the geopolitical setting suddenly shifted after a decade of relative stability and tranquility? What are the critical causes leading to changes in China’s periphery?

The most common line of analysis is to attribute the change to the extra-regional power — the United States. It was Obama’s strategy of “Pivot to Asia” or “Asia Rebalance” that triggered all these changes. This strategy started soon after Obama came to power and intensified since 2010 with the purpose of regaining the strategic superiority or initiative lost to China in recent years because of the war on terror. Encouraged by this strategy, some of China’s peripheral countries such as Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, for their own interest, began to challenge China on territorial and maritime disputes to test its base line of tolerance. Another thrust of this returning to Asia strategy is to promote domestic changes in some of China’s traditional allies such as Myanmar, leading to its alienation from Beijing.

The Asia Rebalance strategy indicates that the role of the U.S. factor in China’s periphery has changed significantly. The strategic priority of the U.S. policy altered from changing the rising China to managing the rising China. Washington began to project more military and diplomatic resources to the region continuously. From almost all new changes and hot spots in China’s periphery, one can see the shadow of the United States. The increase of the U.S. factor disrupted the peripheral security order painstakingly cultivated by China in recent years and seriously challenged China’s peaceful development.²⁶

Along the same line of arguments, some Chinese analysts point out that the U.S. “Asia Rebalance” strategy indicated three major changes in American diplomatic and security policy. First, the United States looked at the Asia-Pacific as its strategic priority, with no more ambiguity on this issue. Second, the United States completely gave up the G2 policy in dealing with China at the initial period of the Obama administration. From now on, the United State attempts to curb and contain China and also encourage its allies and security partners to do the same. Third, the United States increased its intervention into China’s maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors by taking sides so as to enhance its military, diplomatic and political presence in the region.²⁷

Another important feature of the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” strategy, in the eyes of some Chinese observers, is its emphasis on the security alliance system in East Asia and its impact on East Asia’s security structure. The Asia Rebalance strategy led to new changes in East Asia’s security structure and the alliance politics entered a new period of strategic planning in full swing. This is the fundamental reason behind the tensions in the South China Sea. As a result of this structural change, China is facing a series of new issues and unprecedented new pressures and new challenges in its peripheral security.²⁸ The U.S.– centered Asia-Pacific security system continuously squeezes China’s strategic space.²⁹

This is manifested in a series of events that have produced significant impact upon China’s security environment causing complicated changes in China’s peripheral security environment. United States was building a C-shape ring of encirclement against China. As a result, there emerged the so-called wild goose security model in which the United States formed a multi-layer security structure with the U.S. occupying a central position. The first tier is the United States which plays the role of a wild goose. The second tier is the U.S.–Japan and U.S.–Korea security alliances. The third tier is the U.S. security alliance with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. The fourth tier is the U.S. partnership with India, Vietnam and Indonesia.³⁰ The goal of this strategy is to limit the scope of the influence of China’s rise and prevent it from challenging the U.S. leadership position in the region.³¹

More specifically, the threats to China’s peripheral security mainly come from two directions. One is the Korean Peninsula. China suffered from the war brinkmanship policy of the parties involved. The growing tensions on the peninsula pushed up the military and security coordination between the United States, Korea and Japan. The first formal U.S.–Japan–Korea trilateral security mechanism emerged imposing serious challenges to China’s national security. The other threat is from the sea, namely the maritime disputes. China’s conflict with Japan in East China Sea and with Southeastern Asian countries put a lot of security pressure upon China. Many peripheral countries formed “a community of common interest” on the maritime issues to confront China.³²

In sum, Washington is the troublemaker in China’s periphery, making its otherwise benign and quiet environment grimmer. From the above cursory survey, one can clearly detect the negative evaluation of Chinese foreign policy elites of the U.S. Asia Rebalance strategy. This strategy, however, was largely discarded after Donald Trump came to power. One of the first things that Trump did after he took over power was to withdraw from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a key component of the Asia Rebalance. U.S. State Department Officials also made it clear that words like “pivot” and “rebalance” were something of the past and Trump administration will have its own formulation of Asia-Pacific policy.³³ Yet, what is President Trump’s own Asia-Pacific strategy? Until very recently most Chinese analysts agreed that the Trump administration does not have a clear and complete Asia-Pacific strategy. But some analysts argue that although Asia rebalance is no longer mentioned, the goal of American policy to contain China will not change. To fulfill this objective, the main tactics for the United States is to create trouble in China’s periphery. The Korean issue, Taiwan issue and South China Sea issue can all be used by the United States to make China suffer.³⁴

Starting from the late 2017, however, senior government officials began to use the concept “Indo-Pacific” more frequently. President Trump mentioned it during his trip to Asia last November. The new U.S. national security strategy and national defense strategy also used the term. Is this the new Asia-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration? Initially most Chinese analysts agreed that Indo-Pacific concept was not a strategy yet. Although Trump administration officials used the term many times, it lacked substantive content and had a lot of uncertainty and strategic ambiguity. The more recent movement on Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy seems to support some of the points made by Chinese analysts. The speeches and remarks made by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis at Shangri-La and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo in Washington and Southeast Asia convince Chinese analysts that the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has been substantiated.³⁵ The name change of Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command is symbolic, but indicating the Trump administration significantly raised the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. For Chinese observers, the new Indo-Pacific strategy is characterized by two pillows: geopolitics and geo-economics. Although both Mattis and Pompeo declared that the Indo-Pacific strategy aims at no one and excludes no one, there is no doubt in the eyes of the Chinese that its main target is China. In terms of geopolitics, the focal point is to maintain America’s dominance of the seas and contain China’s maritime rise. In terms of geo-economics, United States intends to offset China’s increasing regional influence by enhancing trade and investment with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. In this regard, some Chinese scholars argue there is a strong connection between Obama’s Asia Rebalance strategy and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The latter is the “enhanced” or “upgraded” version of the former. They believe that one major purpose of this strategy is to counter China’s “One Belt One Road” strategy.³⁶ For a while, no government officials including President Trump clearly defined Indo-Pacific as a strategy.³⁷ One reason, some pointed out, is that Trump is not very interested in the so-called “strategy” as he does not want to be tied up by it. He wants to have more flexibility to promote his “America First” objective. His main focus is on the domestic economic development.³⁸

While the Trump administration has not put forward a full-fledged “Indo-Pacific strategy” yet, its main goal, motivation and contour are nevertheless quite clear. The central objective of this strategy is to maintain its long-term dominant position in the region and to prevent China from controlling the region economically.³⁹ Put it differently, the United States intends to use this strategy to contain China’s rise and weaken China’s influence by comprehensive political, diplomatic and military means so as to maintain America’s hegemonic position in the region. ⁴⁰ More specifically, among other things, it is aimed at building a new security architecture of the United States, Japan, India and Australia and offsetting the economic influence of China’s BRI. In words of a Chinese scholar, preventing China from economically predominating the region is the hidden goal of the Indo-Pacific strategy.⁴¹

But why Indo-Pacific? Basically, the United States wants to use India and Japan’s contradiction with China to put more pressures on China⁴² and to consolidate its strategic superiority in both regions. Some Chinese analysts argued that the most important factor in this strategy is India. Indo-Pacific strategy actually is “India–Asia-Pacific strategy”. This is the real way to surpass Obama’s Asia Rebalance stra tegy. But one reason why India was picked up as the main instrument for this strategy is that India was alarmed by China’s BRI considering it a strategy of geopolitical expansion to harm India’s interest in the region. Therefore, the most effective way to balance out this strategy is to stabilize China’s relations with India and encourage India to adhere to its strategic autonomy. India has not publically backed the Indo-Pacific strategy. It still could make a different strategic choice. To pull India over, China would be better not to incorporate its cooperative projects with India under the scheme of BRI. Another possible way to pull this strategy apart is to improve relations with Japan to include Japan in the BRI.⁴³ Either way, the focus of China’s response to the Indo-Pacific strategy should be on improving relations with its key peripheral countries.

While attributing the deterioration of China’s peripheral environment to the United States is still the mainstream thinking in Chinese perception, increasingly Chinese analysts began to find causes for China’s periphery change in China itself. For some analysts, “China factor” is the main driving force to cause the environmental transformation in Asia-Pacific. The substantial increase in China’s comprehensive national power has changed the regional geopolitics. Almost all countries in the region, no matter what their relationship with China is, have reacted to China’s rise. In particular, the unexpected rapid improvement of China’s military might has changed the geopolitical power structure in the region.⁴⁴ According to one scholar, in terms of purchasing power, China’s military spending is very close to that of the United States. Given the fact that the United State has global military commitments and China does not, one can argue that China could spend much more than the U.S. military in the region.⁴⁵ That of course could make China’s neighboring countries unsettled and concerned.

Other scholars agree that the complex periphery environment China is facing now was mainly caused by China’s rise, so-called “China-driven”. This is inevitable during the process of rise. Because of China’s rise, its periphery environment has entered a period of transition. The dominant power, major power, and middle and small powers are bound to react to China’s rise in a more or less negative way. China has to find a way to cross this threshold before China can truly rise peacefully. How long will this kind of situation last? Not until China has completed its rise. In other words, the current problems were largely caused by the fact that China is getting stronger, but not strong enough. This could be called the “dilemma of rise”⁴⁶ or “China syndrome”.

As a result of this dilemma, different from the past when the regional flashing points usually did not directly involve China, now China often is at the center of the conflict.⁴⁷ On the other hand, while the challenges facing China are bigger and more rigorous, China’s capacity of handling the challenge is also becoming bigger. Consequently, China’s rapid rise has directly led to the emergence of “dual centers” structure of China and United States in the region.⁴⁸

That is exactly why some Chinese observers are more optimistic about the continuation of China’s period of strategic opportunities. They point out that one significant change of the content and condition in the concept of the period of strategic opportunities (PSO) is that the validity of the strategic opportunity is more and more dependent on China itself rather than on other forces. As long as China can sustain its strong economic growth, the period of strategic opportunities can also continue as China’s development per se is the fundamental foundation for the PSOs.⁴⁹ Consequently, China could no longer wait for others to spare a PSO for China as it was the case in the post-9/11 period. China needs to do more to shape its periphery environment and create PSOs.

Some analysts pay more attention to the function of mutual action and reaction between China and key players in the region in bringing about changes in China’s periphery. On the one hand, with its rise, China is seeking more and broader interests. On the other hand, China’s expansion of its interest caused strong reaction from the concerned countries in the region. The typical example is the rise of tension on the South China Sea issue. In other words, the concerned countries in and outside of the region formed a “quasi-consensus” and “quasi-coalition” to deal with a “strong China”.⁵⁰ Others saw the interaction between the U.S. Asia Rebalance and China’s response. The U.S. Asia Rebalance strategy stimulated some of China’s neighboring countries to be more willing to take risks to challenge and provoke China causing tensions in the region. China’s rightful and legitimate response to these provocations, however, was often perceived and described as “assertive”, “aggressive” and “overreacting”, with the purpose of kicking U.S. out of the region.⁵¹ The mutual interaction is also related to China’s domestic development which often influences the configuration of its periphery. While China needs a stable and prosperous periphery, the periphery also needs a stable and prosperous China. Historically, a stable and prosperous China often led to a stable and prosperous periphery thus constituting a community of common destiny.⁵²

How to Deal with Change: Reactively or Proactively?

Then how to deal with an ever-changing periphery? In terms of priority, theoretically Chinese foreign policy has long followed the formula articulated by Hu Jintao: “Big powers are the key, neighbors are paramount, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateralism is an important stage.”⁵³ Although periphery is defined as “paramount”, in reality periphery did not necessarily enjoy the priority position in China’s overall diplomacy. Starting from the Jiang Zemin period, the priority of China’s diplomacy was often put on major power relations, particularly the relations with the United States, which was considered the most important among priorities (zhong zhong zhi zhong). The thinking behind this is that as long as China can handle Sino-American relations well, other relationships would fall into place.

This emphasis began to change during Xi Jinping era. He has attached unprecedented importance to peripheral diplomacy. As an expert in a government think tank put it: “Since the 18^th Party Congress, the strategic significance of periphery to China has been further demonstrated and the party central committee has increasingly paid more attention to the periphery.”⁵⁴ In October 2013, for the first time ever, a high-level symposium exclusively dedicated to China’s periphery diplomacy was held in Beijing. The meeting was attended by all the standing committee members of the CCP’s politburo and almost the entire foreign policy establishment in the Chinese government. Xi Jinping personally chaired the meeting and delivered a keynote speech. This is indeed unprecedented in China’s foreign policy history. Normally, the Chinese government only holds working conferences to discuss foreign policy in general, not specific area or specific region of foreign policy. This highlights the critical importance and urgency that the Chinese leadership attaches to peripheral diplomacy. As Xi put it, periphery has an extremely important strategic significance for China in terms of its geographical position, natural environment and mutual relations.⁵⁵

In practice, top Chinese leaders visited China’s periphery with unprecedented intensity covering the entire “grand periphery”.⁵⁶ For example, both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang’s maiden foreign visits after they became top leaders at the 18^th Party Congress were to China’s neighboring countries. The first country Xi Jinping visited is Russia while Li Keqiang made his first trip to India. This tendency continued after the 19^th Party Congress in 2017. Immediately after the party congress, Chinese leaders including Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang swarmed out to visit China’s neighboring countries and attend regional multilateral economic forums. Most of China’s major diplomatic initiatives such as AIIB and BRI were all aimed at peripheral countries at least initially. For instance, BRI initially included Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia.⁵⁷

In the Chinese discourse of foreign policy, peripheral diplomacy began to be considered to be at least as important as, if not more than, the major power diplomacy. In the Chinese government documents, more often than before, peripheral diplomacy was listed as the top priority when discussing Chinese foreign policy. Scholars and analysts also tend to emphasize the importance of peripheral diplomacy more compared to the major power diplomacy in recent years. They argue that periphery has the most direct impact upon China’s political, economic and security interests and is an important support for China’s foreign relations. Periphery has significant impact upon China’s overall security, especially when the international situation has been undergoing dramatic changes.⁵⁸ As some scholars pointed out, from the historical experience, a peaceful and prosperous peripheral diplomacy is the best for China’s reform and openness, or a necessary condition. Peripheral instability on the other hand, definitely will drag on or disrupt China’s course of development as China was forced to get involved in several wars during the Cold War period making it hard for China to concentrate on economic development.⁵⁹ Therefore, China should put peripheral security at a prominent position in China’s overall security because at the current stage, the main external security pressures are concentrated on China’s periphery. China now also has the strategic capability to maintain its peripheral stability and is fully prepared to deal with all kinds of complexities in its periphery.⁶⁰

This leads us to China’s approach to managing an evolving periphery. For those who fully recognize the dynamic changes in China’s periphery environment, a new periphery strategy is advisable. What happened in the last 7–8 years in the periphery convinced them that the traditional approach toward China’s neighbors is no longer sufficient to maintain peripheral stability of China. A new strategy is urgently needed. This line of thinking among scholars and analysts finally reached to the top leadership. Xi Jinping tried to articulate a new strategy of China’s peripheral diplomacy at a high-level meeting in 2013.⁶¹ While he recognizes his predecessors’ contribution to China’s success in peripheral diplomacy, he did point out that the new situation demands China’s diplomatic strategy and work to keep pace with the times implying that China needs new thinking and practices to update its peripheral diplomacy.

Then what kind of new peripheral strategy should China pursue under the new circumstances? Xi’s speech at the peripheral diplomacy conference sketched out a broad outline. China’s overall strategic goal, according to him, remains the same, that is to maintain a stable and peaceful periphery to help realize great rejuvenation of China and make full use of the important strategic opportunity period for China’s development. However, this is not the only foreign policy goal in his mind. China should also maintain its national sovereignty, security and development interests. In other words, maintaining a stable and peaceful periphery should not be achieved at the expense of China’s security interests.

In terms of achieving these policy objectives, Xi Jinping tried to come up with something new. He suggested that China should carry out its periphery diplomacy in “a solid, polyphyletic and cross-time and space viewing angle.” He did not elaborate on what these terms really mean. It is safe to say that his point is that China’s peripheral diplomacy cannot be carried out in a one-dimensional and parochial fashion. Rather, it should be multi-dimensional, comprehensive and pursued in connection with other components of China’s diplomacy. In a way, this is a subtle criticism of China’s periphery diplomacy in the past which pretty much took “economic diplomacy” as its main thrust with the expectation that economic benefits could spillover to political and security domains in China’s relations with its neighbors. It turned out not to be the case.

Another problem with the traditional Chinese peripheral diplomacy is that it mainly deals with the government and those who are in power often neglecting the opposition and societal forces. China’s setback during Obama years in Myanmar is just one example to the point. The implications of advocating a peripheral diplomacy that’s across-space and time could point to Xi and Li’s diplomacy in recent years which pays more equal and balanced attention to China’s entire periphery instead of just focusing on one sub-region such as Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The top Chinese leadership’s diplomatic offensive in the following years seems to be the typical implementation of the Xi doctrine on periphery diplomacy, or for that matter, even for the entire Chinese foreign policy.

One interesting change in Xi’s periphery approach is that it pays more attention to enhancing China’s soft power in the region. Besides the existing slogans of yu lin wei shan, yu lin wei ban (pursuing friendship and partnership with neighbors) and mu lin, an lin, and fu lin (keeping good neighboring relationship and helping stabilizing and enriching neighbors), he puts forward another set of four Chinese words to illustrate China’s good intention, will and manner in dealing with its neighbors: qin, chen, hui and rong (intimate, sincere, benefiting and tolerant). Xi spent a lot of time talking about how China should do more benevolent work to make peripheral countries feel more warm, kinder, and intimate toward China, thus recognizing and supporting China more. China should increase its affinity and influence in the region that way. This is the “soft becoming softer” side of China’s new strategy. For the purpose of increasing China’s soft power in the periphery, China should strengthen public diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy to win the heart and soul of the population in the neighboring countries making the awareness of “community of common destiny”, a concept Xi invented in March 2013,⁶² take root in the periphery countries.

Being softer, however, does not necessarily mean China should be passive and reactive as often has been the case in the past. The new Chinese leadership obviously learnt a lesson from the sudden deterioration of China’s position in the region in the previous years. In many ways, China was caught off guard by a chain of reactions and sentiments not in favor of China in the region, putting China in a disadvantageous position. As a result, China was busy reacting to the initiatives made by others. Xi is determined to change that pattern of interactions with the periphery countries. He emphasized that China should be more proactive in its peripheral diplomacy. This is consistent with his style and tone of foreign policy as a whole. For that purpose, China should do better in grasping general trends, devising strategy and drawing up plans in order to improve China’s capabilities of controlling the overall situation. In other words, China should learn to lead than to be led, to control the development instead of being controlled. In this sense, China does not want to stay on the receiving side of the power game in the region. Instead, China intends to take the lost initiative back. The announcement of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over East China Sea in 2013 could be understood in this context. It is said that Xi mentioned this initiative at the very periphery diplomacy conference showcasing China’s soft power diplomacy and charming offensive to its neighboring countries.⁶³ By the same token, the accelerated land reclamation and island building in South China Sea since Xi Jinping came to power also showed Beijing’s urgency to secure a better strategic position in the region.

To stabilize China’s peripheral security situation, China definitely needs new thinking and new methods. Under the guidance of Xi’s new strategy, Chinese scholars and officials came up with various policy recommendations to improve China’s peripheral diplomacy. Many agree that China has become more proactive rather than reactive in its peripheral diplomacy in recent years. For example, China increasingly offers new proposals and programs for regional cooperation.⁶⁴ That is certainly a positive development. However, some scholars argue that it is not enough to just rely upon China’s great contribution to the regional economy and the BRI. For example, China should also strengthen its cooperation with Southeast Asian countries on non-traditional security issues. It should also pay much closer attention to the changes in domestic politics in neighboring countries, make objective and cool-minded analysis and come up with measures to deal with these changes in China. Finally, in dealing with maritime disputes such as the South China Sea issue, China should demonstrate its strategic determination and manage the disputes through the construction of cooperative institutions and regimes.⁶⁵

Others also argue that the understanding of China’s periphery should be updated. Instead of just talking about those countries that have a border with China, the intension and extension of China’s peripheral diplomacy should be expanded to include countries not necessarily bordering China. This is the so-called “grand or macro periphery”. China should cultivate relations with countries in all its peripheral areas, not just one: Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia making all of them into its stable strategic “backyards”; thus, providing a favorable external environment for China’s rise.⁶⁶ As alluded to earlier, the implementation of some of Xi’s big ideas on foreign policy initiatives should also start from China’s periphery. For example, Xi’s initiative to build a community with a shared future is meant to be oriented to China’s neighbors and other developing countries as a priority. China should start from its neighborhood and other developing countries in building a community of shared future for mankind. China and its neighbors share the natural conditions to build such a community.⁶⁷

While Chinese foreign policy elites conclude that China should pay more attention to its neighboring countries rather than just major powers, the United States is still looming large in the mind of some Chinese analysts. They believe that the key for China to maintain a stable peripheral environment is still the United States. To carry out peripheral diplomacy effectively, the roadblock China cannot walk around is the United States. How the two countries could reach a consensus on the regional order in the Western Pacific region is vitally important.⁶⁸ In this regard, some argue that Trump’s policy toward Asia-Pacific may create opportunity for China’s peripheral diplomacy. They characterized Trump’s foreign policy style as “transactional diplomacy” which is very often unpredictable and short-term. Such a policy would reduce U.S. strategic credibility in the region. China could take advantage of this transactional diplomacy to make breakthrough in its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Once China’s neighbors are convinced that China is a more principled and reliable partner, Trump’s transactional hardline policy toward China is unlikely to get support from these countries.⁶⁹

Conclusion

The above brief discussion of China’s perspective of its periphery environment seems to suggest that most Chinese foreign elites have recognized the significant changes in the periphery surrounding China in recent years. However, they have different opinions about the extent, nature and implications of these changes. Some emphasize the severity of the challenges imposed by the United States and its regional allies while others pay more attention to China’s strengthened capability to handle the challenges. Interestingly, while the United States and some of its allies in Asia are still largely blamed for the more troublesome periphery environment of China, some Chinese analysts began to attribute the changes more to China’s economic and military rise in the region. However, they stop short of exploring how the enhanced material basis for China’s peripheral diplomacy could also lead to the changes in China’s international behavior, which may also contribute to more negative reactions from its neighbors. Chinese perception of its periphery has also evolved in recent years, from being more pessimistic during the Obama administration to being more optimistic more recently. No matter what, one thing is clear, the importance of peripheral diplomacy in China’s overall foreign policy has significantly increased during the Xi Jinping era. Regarding how to more effectively manage China’s periphery, there is an emerging consensus that the exiting foreign policy strategy and instrument are insufficient to deal with new challenges. New ideas and approaches are badly needed. Even Xi Jinping could come up with some new concepts and discourses, yet how to implement them could still be a problem. While the Chinese rhetoric, as manifested by Xi’s speech on China’s peripheral diplomacy, is full of nice and sensible phrases, its deeds sometime are perceived otherwise by China’s neighboring countries as illustrated by the examples of ADIZ in East China Sea and island-building activities in South China Sea. In this respect, China is still struggling to find a right balance of exercising its soft and hard power in its complex and dynamic periphery.

¹Wang Baofu, Focusing peripheral security and stability in responding to the changes in the world situation, Study Times, March 2, 2017, see http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0302/c40531-29119169.html (accessed on March 18, 2018).

²Zhang Yunlin, New changes in China’s peripheral environment and the counter measures, Ideological Front, no. 1 (2012), see http://www.zhongdaonet.com/NewsInfo.aspx?id=4162 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

³How to look at China’s current and future security environment, Hong Kong Review, November 2000.

⁴Amitav Acharya, Asia-Pacific: China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia, New York Times, November 8, 2003.

⁵How to create a favorable security environment in light of the evolution and development in China’s peripheral security situation, see https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/207276222 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

⁶Liu Jiangyong, International structure and China’s periphery security, World Economics and Politics, no. 6 (2013).

⁷Zhang Yunling, To grasp the big picture of new changes in periphery environment, International Economic Review, no. 1 (2012), pp. 11–12.

⁸Ren Jingjing, China’s peripheral security environment: new trends and new features, Theoretical Horizon, no. 5. (2011), p. 48.

⁹Zhang Yunlin, op. cit.

¹⁰Zhang Yunling, op. cit., p. 12.

¹¹Ruan Zongze, China needs to build what kind a periphery? Studies of International Issues, March 2014, see http://www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2014-03/26/content_6772740.htm (accessed on March 19, 2018).

¹² Ibid.

¹³Jiang Zeming’s speech at the graduation ceremony of the cadres at the provincial and ministerial level at Central Party School, People’s Daily, June 1, 2002.

¹⁴Huang Renwei, The future ten years: Strategic opportunity or strategic danger?, February 4, 2012, see http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/3741/c0, accessed August 20, 2016.

¹⁵Yu Zhengliang, Some thinking on China’s entry into the period of strategic challenge, International Outlook, no. 6 (2011), pp. 1–7.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷Yuan Peng, China’s period of strategic opportunity has not ended, People’s Daily, July 30, 2012.

¹⁸Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18^th Party Congress, Xinhua, November 17, 2012.

¹⁹Xi Jinping, Let the idea of community of common destiny take deep root in periphery countries, Xinhua, October 25, 2013.

²⁰Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” delivered at the 19^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017.

²¹Han Lijun, Periphery order has entered a critical period of transformation, September 18, 2017, see http://www.chinareform.net/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=61&id=21817 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

²²Editorial, China’s diplomatic efforts pay off with peripheral nations, Global Times, December 25, 2017.

²³Wang Yi, The speech at the opening of Symposium on International Developments and China’s Diplomacy in 2017, December 10, 2017.

²⁴Trump’s Asia trip, Beijing scholars analyze China’s peripheral security situation, November 16, 2017, see http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=104878414 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

²⁵Wang Baofu, op. cit.

²⁶Zhang Yunlin, op. cit.

²⁷Zhu Feng: China’s peripheral security situation — What kind of new changes we are facing, Contemporary World, no. 4 (2016).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹Zhang Guifeng, The construction of America’s Asia-Pacific security system and China’s strategic response, December 12, 2017, see http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1212/c1002-29702265.html (accessed on March 18, 2018).

³⁰Ren Jingjing, op. cit.

³¹Ibid., p. 50.

³²Ibid., pp. 48–49.

³³Aaron Mehta, Pivot to Asia is over, senior U.S. diplomat says, Defense News, March 14, 2017, see https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/14/pivot-to-the-pacific-is-over-senior-u-s-diplomat-says/ (accessed on March 19, 2018).

³⁴Zhu Chenhu: Trump administration’s global strategy and its influence on China’s peripheral security, November 11, 2017, see http://wemedia.ifeng.com/37146060/wemedia.shtml (accessed on March 18, 2018).

³⁵Hu Bo, “The U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy moving toward substantiation” www.inewsweek.com, see http://news.inewsweek.cn/news/politics/3216.html (accessed August 16, 2018)

³⁶Wu Minwen, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is building exclusive military and economic system and China should be alarmed,” Sino.com.cn, August 9, 2018, see http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2018-08-09/doc-ihhnunsq0983552.shtml (accessed August 17, 2018)

³⁷Hu Zhiyong, “Does Trump administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ policy target at China?” www.CRNTT.com March 15, 2018 see http://bj.crntt.com/doc/1050/0/4/0/105004059.html?coluid=0&kindid=0&docid=105004059&mdate=0315000200 (accessed January 15, 2018).

³⁸Editorial, Trump’s Asia trip cannot walk the old path of Obama, Global Times, November 11, 2017.

³⁹“Trump’s Asia trip”, op. cit.

⁴⁰Where does “Indo-Pacific strategy” go?, Xinhua Net, February 22, 2018, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-02/22/c_129814427.htm (accessed on March 19, 2018).

⁴¹Li Zheng, The U.S. “Indo-Pacific” strategy is the subversive innovation against “Asia-Pacific rebalance,” November 14, 2017, see http://www.haijiangzx.com/2017/1114/1940914.shtml (accessed on March 19, 2018).

⁴²Trump is providing diplomatic and strategic opportunity for China — interview with Dean of the School of International Relations at Tsinghua University, December 11, 2017, see http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7246/2017/20171211115140407498759/20171211115140407498759_.html (accessed on March 18, 2018).

⁴³Hu Shisheng, Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” framework and the prospect of China–India interaction, World Affairs, no. 5 (2018), see http://www.sohu.com/a/224071296_825951 (accessed on March 19, 2018).

⁴⁴The change of the Asia-Pacific security environment and China’s opportunity, International Economic Review, no, 6 (2013), see http://www.zaobao.com/wencui/politic/story20180315-842938 (accessed on March 18, 2018).

⁴⁵Huang Renwei, op. cit.

⁴⁶Www.CRNTT.com, China Review Forum: What caused the complication of China’s periphery environment?” November 11, 2013, see http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=7&docid=102877362 (accessed January 10, 2018).

⁴⁷Zhang Yunling, op. cit., pp. 11–12.

⁴⁸Ruan Zongze, op. cit.

⁴⁹Li Weijian, How to understand the change of content and conditions of the China’s current period of strategic opportunities — A perspective from the Middle East studies, Western Asia and African Studies, no. 5 (2013), p. 9.

⁵⁰Zhang Yunlin, op. cit.

⁵¹Ruan Zongze, op. cit.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³Chen Xiangyan, The direction of China’s grand diplomacy in the new period, Xinhua Net, see http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content_4954.htm (accessed on March 21, 2018).

⁵⁴Base on periphery to plan for a global reach, Xinhua Net, March 2, 2015, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2015-03/02/c_134030635.htm (accessed on March 21, 2018).

⁵⁵Chinese Central Government’s Official Web Portal, Important speech of Xi Jinping at peripheral diplomacy work conference, Xinhua, October 25, 2013 see http://www.cciced.net/cciceden/NEWSCENTER/LatestEnvironmentalandDevelopmentNews/201310/t20131030_82626.html (accessed August 12, 2018).

⁵⁶Base on periphery to plan for a global reach, op. cit.

⁵⁷Ruan Zongze, op. cit.

⁵⁸Wang Baofu, op. cit.

⁵⁹Ruan Zongze, op. cit.

⁶⁰Wang Baofu, op. cit.

⁶¹Chinese Central Government’s Official Web Portal, op. cit.

⁶²Xi’s speech at Moscow Institute of International Relations, Xinhua, March 23, 2013.

⁶³Douglas Paal, Contradictions in Chinese foreign policy, December 13, 2013, see http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/13/contradictions-in-china-s-foreign-policy-pub-53913 (accessed on March 16, 2018).

⁶⁴Ruan Zongze, op. cit.

⁶⁵Zhu Feng, op. cit.

⁶⁶Trump is providing diplomatic and strategic opportunity for China — interview with Dean of the School of International Relations at Tsinghua University, December 11, 2017, op. cit.

⁶⁷Wang Yi, op. cit.

⁶⁸Ruan Zongze, op. cit.

⁶⁹Zhang Feng, Trump’s diplomatic transformation and China’s option of peripheral diplomacy, February 14, 2017, see http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001071355?page=rest (accessed on March 18, 2018).