Читать книгу The Red Army in Austria - Группа авторов - Страница 16

Eisenhower’s assumption of the presidency almost coincided with the surprising death of Iosif Stalin in early March 1953. Early on in office he had to deal with the new Soviet leader, Georgii Malenkov, who announced the new Soviet foreign policy initiative of “peaceful coexistence.” Was it typical Kremlin propaganda, or was it a serious policy departure to improve relations with the West? Eisenhower’s staff was divided. Secretary of State J. F. Dulles strongly advocated not negotiating with the new Kremlin leaders. Eisenhower responded in mid-April with one of the most important speeches of his career before the Society of American Newspaper Editors. Eisenhower told the Kremlin that he expected “deeds not words.” The Kremlin could prove its seriousness for better relations by signing the German and the Austrian peace treaties, by entering into an armistice and ending the Korean War, and by initiating nuclear disarmament. This was a tall order. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill strongly advocated that the American President negotiate with Moscow. Churchill wanted to meet Malenkov and the new Kremlin leaders in a summit meeting to personally test their intentions toward “peaceful coexistence.” Both the American leadership and the British Foreign Office opposed Churchill’s plans for summitry since the Kremlin leaders first needed to demonstrate their will to ease tensions with the West.³⁵ On June 17, the Red Army intervened against an uprising of workers in the German Democratic Republic and squashed it with tanks. The Soviet wolves shed their sheep’s clothing.

Domestically, Eisenhower also faced a tall order to meet the onslaught of the stalwarts in his own party. In spite of a Republican in the White House, Wisconsin Senator McCarthy continued his attacks against “communists in governmental institutions.” The anti-communist crusader McCarthy suspected communists in the State Department, the CIA, and the Army. For weeks he held up in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the confirmation of the distinguished Soviet expert Charles Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union (precisely during the weeks when an experienced hand would have been needed in Moscow to help the Eisenhower administration make sense of the Kremlin’s “peaceful coexistence” initiative). McCarthy also opposed the confirmation of former Harvard President James B. Conant as Control Commissioner to Germany. In a gesture to the Republican hardliners, the Eisenhower administration continued with its rhetorical crusade of “rolling back” communism in the Soviet bloc and “liberating the captive peoples” of Eastern Europe. Dulles called for full independence for Eastern European nations no fewer than three times, charging that: “under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.”³⁶

Yet at the same time the Eisenhower administration was reviewing basic US national security strategy and its nuclear posture. In the summer of 1953, Eisenhower gathered the top national security experts to reconsider the basic American approach to dealing with the Soviet Union in the so-called “Solarium exercises.” Should Truman’s containment policy written down in the iconic document NSC 68 be continued, or should the United States embark on a more aggressive policy of rolling back communism? The experts pleaded for a continuation of containment and an end to all the dangerous talk about “rollback.” “Rollback” threatened to provoke nuclear war. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff with their truculent chairman Admiral Arthur Radford kept pushing for “aggressive actions involving force against Soviet bloc territory.” But Eisenhower personally ruled out any and all “preventive war” options. As two of the foremost experts on Eisenhower’s national security strategy put it: “for Eisenhower preventive war of aggressive rollback would be a reckless and self-defeating gamble.”³⁷

The massive review process of basic national security strategy in the Eisenhower White House resulted in what would become known as his “new look” strategy, formalized in the basic National Security Council directive NSC 162/2. For one, to save on defense spending, Eisenhower wanted to reduce the conventional force structure and increase the nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons were cheaper than divisions in the field. Eisenhower wanted “more bang for the buck,” and John Foster Dulles threatened “massive retaliation” in case of a Soviet attack. Eisenhower put it all down in the formula “in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be available for use as other munitions.” Such statements seemed to indicate that the threshold to using nuclear weapons had been reduced dramatically. In the Third World, where the Cold War was beginning to move after the massive wave of decolonization, the Eisenhower administration now put a premium on all forms of psychological warfare and cover operations. CIA covert operations pacified Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) after considerable turmoil in those countries sparked by leftish regimes.³⁸

In October 1953, NSC 162/2 replaced NSC 68 as the basic American national security strategy. NSC 162/2 reflected the “Solarium exercises” by rejecting “rollback” of communism as a realistic strategy, now arguing “the detachment of any major satellite from the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence or by war.”³⁹ In the fall of 1953 Eisenhower’s basic policy toward Eastern Europe was refined in NSC 174. It ended Eisenhower’s active “liberation” policy. The Eisenhower administration continued psychological warfare in order to undermine Soviet control of the Eastern European satellite regimes in the long run. It promised to “support the spirit of resistance” via ongoing propaganda initiatives. But, very significantly, it wanted to avoid the “incitement of premature revolts” in the Soviet bloc. Undermining the satellite regimes in the long run would promote “conditions favorable to eventual liberation.”⁴⁰ While the Eisenhower administration’s “new look” strategy was very cautious, his “rhetorical diplomacy” was very aggressive.⁴¹

While the Eisenhower administration was reinventing its basic national security strategy, it also conducted a basic review of its Austrian policy. First, it needed to shelf the unproductive “short treaty” draft, which had been a very unproductive “propaganda” instrument and had basically arrested the negotiations of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers, which had been the most productive arena of Austrian treaty talks. Secondly, it needed to respond to Austrian initiatives that tried to restart treaty negotiations on new terms. The new government of Julius Raab had reacted positively to the Kremlin’s “peaceful coexistence” initiative, which had produced an easing of the Soviet occupation regime in its Austrian zone. Long-time Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber had begun to test the option of a neutral Austria via Indian intermediaries directly with the Kremlin. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was not (yet) ready to consider a neutralization of Austria in the summer of 1953. Washington and London viewed Gruber’s unilateral moves not coordinated with the Western powers with great suspicion (“Gruberisms”). The new Austrian government threatening to embark on its own diplomacy to end the interminable four-power occupation of the country, sparked a review of American policies vis-à-vis Austria in the summer/fall of 1953.⁴²

This review of Austrian polices culminated in NSC 164/4, adopted in October 1953; it paralleled the larger review of basic US national security policy NSC 162/2. NSC 162/2 stated: “there is no evidence that the Soviet leadership is prepared to modify its basic attitudes and accept any permanent settlement with the United States, although it may be prepared for a modus vivendi on certain issues” [my emphasis].⁴³ Might the Austrian question be such an issue? The debate in the National Security Council on adopting NSC 164/4 was vigorous. Admiral Radford, the uncompromising JCS chairman,opposed a neutralization of Austria; he feared severe repercussions on Germany and demanded that the United States “vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to U.S. interests.” Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, who was known to be a vigorous opponent of fence-sitting neutrality in the Cold War, turned out to be remarkably sensitive to the Austrian issue and noted “while we should of course oppose the neutralization of Austria just as far as possible in any negotiation, the decision in the long run would depend on the Austrians themselves” [emphasis mine]. He added “an embittered Austria would never prove a reliable ally of the U.S.” And then Harold Stassen, Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Disarmament issues, added a brilliant insight that would produce an opening in the future: “to his mind the status of neutralization did not necessarily imply disarmament.”⁴⁴ Was this an indication that he was thinking of the Swiss model of armed neutrality? We can only surmise, though we will never know.

The formula that the American national security managers found in the final document NSC 162/2 was a compromise. Along the lines of Radford’s cautious remarks, Washington would “vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to U.S. interests.” However, along the lines of Dulles’ thoughts, “should the Austrians, British, and French press strongly for accepting some degree of neutralization, the United States may be required to make some concession to avoid the onus of unilaterally blocking a Treaty.”⁴⁵

In the fall of 1953, the Deputies’ talks on the Austrian treaty were not resumed even though the State Department officially withdrew the still-born short treaty draft. Representatives from the great powers’ foreign offices, however, were working on an agenda for a future meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Churchill, who had been out of action all summer due to a stroke in June, kept pleading for a summit meeting. His Western allies agreed only to a Western Summit meeting in Bermuda late in 1953. Little progress was made in unmooring the deadlock of entering negotiations with the new leaders in the Kremlin on crucial issues such as Germany, Indochina, and nuclear disarmament. However, it was agreed that the Foreign Ministers’ meetings would resume in Berlin in February 1954 with the German and Austrian treaties back at the forefront of the international agenda.⁴⁶

While the Foreign Ministers made no progress on the German question, the neutralization of Austria was prominently discussed in Berlin, in the end without leading to a decisive breakthrough. Agreeing with Governor Stassen’s observation in the National Security Council’s debate over NSC 162/2, State Department position papers had stressed since October 1953: “that neutralization of a nation did not necessarily mean its disarmament.” This view seems to have percolated over to the White House as well. Before the Secretary of State departed Washington for the Berlin Council of Foreign Ministers, Eisenhower and Dulles discussed the Austrian question in a breakfast conference on January 20, 1954. The President was in agreement with the earlier State Department position on possible Austrian neutrality: “He [Eisenhower] could see no objection to the neutralization of Austria if this did not carry with it the demilitarization. If Austria could achieve a status somewhat comparable to Switzerland, this would be quite satisfactory from a military standpoint” [emphasis added].⁴⁷

The Council of Foreign Ministers met in Berlin in early February 1954. Molotov remained non-concessionary on the German issues. A high-level government delegation led by Foreign Minister Figl was officially admitted to present the Austrian point of view. They strongly pleaded for a neutral solution to end the interminable Austrian occupation. Dulles agreed with the Austrian position and made a strong statement on February 13, 1954, on behalf of Austrian armed neutrality along the lines of the Swiss model:

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss nation. However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral. It is another thing to have neutrality forcible imposed on it by the other nations as a perpetual servitude [emphasis added].⁴⁸

Molotov, however, was not prepared to make a major concession on Austria and end the Austrian occupation. He continued to link the solution of the Austrian question with the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Dulles and the Austrian delegation left Berlin highly disappointed about another breakdown of Austrian treaty negotiations.⁴⁹

For the rest of 1954 nothing happened to bring about an agreement on the Austrian question. The Western powers, however, moved decisively on the German question. After the French parliament rejected the ratification of the European Defense Community, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden quickly organized a meeting in London to find another solution to West German rearmament. The “London Agreements” of October 1954 admitted the Federal Republic into the NATO alliance. West Germany’s Adenauer government pledged not to build any ABC weapons. West German rearmament and integration into NATO constituted a major failure of Molotov’s intransigent Stalinist foreign policy.

This decisive breakthrough of West German integration into the North Atlantic defense framework sparked dramatic changes in the Kremlin leadership. By early 1955, Malenkov had been demoted because he had not “distanced himself from Beriia,”⁵⁰ Molotov lost his almost iron grip on formulating Soviet foreign policy and executing Stalin’s putative legacy, and Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the primus inter pares among Kremlin leaders. It was Khrushchev who ordered Molotov to break the linkage between the Austrian and German questions and show the Western powers goodwill to come to a resolution of the Austrian issues. After Molotov publically announced in late February that the Austrian question was no longer linked to the conclusion of a German peace treaty, dramatic movement on the Austrian treaty occurred in the next few weeks. In informal bilateral meetings in Vienna, Austrian officials heard from Soviet diplomats that armed neutrality along the lines of the Swiss model offered a viable solution to the Austrian question. Moscow invited an Austrian delegation to come to Moscow for a round of bilateral negotiations.⁵¹

Chancellor Raab led such a high-level Austrian delegation to Moscow in mid-April and returned with decisive Soviet concessions. The longstanding economic issues that had been unresolved since the fall of 1949, when the Austrian treaty had come close to an agreement in the New York Deputies’ talks, were now resolved bilaterally. The Austrian government agreed to pay the Soviet Union directly the 150 million US dollars demanded by Moscow for the return of the “German assets” (including the valuable oil assets in the Soviet zone). The Austrian government would pay in kind (not in cash) over a number of years. The Soviet leaders also agreed with the Austrian delegation that Austria would declare its armed neutrality along the lines of the Swiss model after the withdrawal of occupation forces three months after the ratification of the Austrian treaty.⁵²

During the spring of 1955, the Western powers were relegated to the sidelines to watch in utter amazement the quick progress of the bilateral Austrian–Soviet negotiations. The British Foreign Office was gravely worried about the bilateral diplomacy with Moscow. Geoffrey Harrison, the experienced Soviet expert who was in charge of Austrian affairs in London, observed with a biblical allusion: “the Austrians are rushing across the precipice like the Gadarene swine.” Foreign Minister Eden, sensing Austrian eagerness to move ahead after Molotov unlinked the Austrian and the German question, expressed his worry: “I hope I won’t wake up one morning and see Raab in Moscow.” The State Department in Washington was more collected and demanded to be fully briefed by the Austrian government about Austria’s bilateral negotiations with Moscow. As Dulles had observed earlier, the Austrians could not be stopped if they wanted a treaty for the price of neutrality. CIA Director Allen Dulles observed in the National Security Council discussions after the breakthrough in Moscow that the Soviet concessions on Austria after all these years constituted “the most significant action since the end of World War II.”⁵³

After the return of the Raab delegation from Moscow, diplomacy moved at breakneck speed to finish the Austrian State Treaty. The ambassadors of the four powers met in Austria with Foreign Minister Figl to put the final touches to the Austrian treaty draft. Among many other fine points negotiated by the ambassadors, the United States demanded in a secret agreement from the Austrian government that the Western oil corporations be compensated for the loss of their assets as a result of the Soviet return of the oil assets to the Austrian Government (“Vienna Memorandum”). The final details of the extensive Austrian State Treaty draft were agreed on only two days before the foreign ministers met in Vienna to sign the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty came amid dramatic changes in the international framework in Europe. A few days before the signatures were attached to the Austrian State Treaty, Dulles had visited Paris for the official ceremony incorporating the FRG into NATO. Molotov had signed the Warsaw Pact Treaty in the Polish capital a day before the conclusion of the Austrian treaty in Vienna. The tighter military integration of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, culminating in the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, was Moscow’s answer to West German rearmament. On the other hand, Moscow’s concessionary mood could also be gathered from its withdrawal from a naval base in Finland and a marked improvement of relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia. The final conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty thus needs to be seen against a larger backdrop of dramatic changes in Soviet domestic politics and its turn toward “peaceful coexistence” as well as both the further consolidation of military blocs in Europe and the fateful steps toward the post-war division of Germany.⁵⁴

As soon as the signatures of the foreign ministers dried on the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, the Austrian Foreign Office began its whirlwind of diplomacy to get the treaty ratified by the great powers and the rest of the world. Once the ratification process was complete on July 26, the three-month clock began to tick toward the withdrawal of occupation forces. Once the occupation powers had withdrawn their troops, the Austrian parliament passed a constitutional law proclaiming Austria’s permanent neutrality to the world on October 26, 1955. Austria thus consummated its agreement with Moscow to enter a state of neutrality in accordance with the Swiss model once the Austrian treaty was concluded and the occupation powers evacuated the country. The neutralization of Austria was also the Soviet “deed” that finally broke a diplomatic logjam of sorts in East-West relations. After two years of procrastination, the Western leaders final met the Kremlin bosses to test their seriousness over promoting “peaceful coexistence” in a summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955.⁵⁵