Читать книгу Attachment Theory and Research - Группа авторов - Страница 17

Earlier in the paper I have made it clear that, on the hypothesis advanced, primary anxiety will occur whenever any (or at least one of a number of) instinctual response systems is activated and not terminated. The primary anxiety arising when a young child is separated from his mother is thus only a special case of a more general phenomenon. Nevertheless, clinical experience suggests that it is of peculiar pathogenic significance and, if this is so, the problem remains why it should be so. The following explanation appears plausible. In the first place, the phase during which the human infant’s capacity for locomotion is limited is a long one. As a result, whether or not his attachment responses are terminated turns for some years on the initiative of others, especially his mother: he is entirely dependent on their goodwill. In the second, there is the close linkage between the instinctual response systems mediating attachment behaviour and those mediating escape, so that, whenever a young child is separated from his mother and such substitutes as he will accept, there is the risk of his experiencing not only primary anxiety but also fright, and both in conditions where there is no one available to provide comfort and security. This makes the situation doubly alarming to him and accounts for the intensity of distress we observe. Finally, because of their tremendous importance for survival, both these classes of response system appear to have special characteristics: first, they are permanently ready for activation and also readily activated; secondly, when active they are often so at great intensity; and, finally, they are not completely terminated except by the preferred mother‐figure. In several of these respects they differ from other response systems, such for example as those mediating sucking behaviour. Thus the latter vary much in their readiness for activation, in many infants being inert after food has been taken and only becoming sensitive at intervals; they are often not exhibited at great intensity, and, as regards termination, are usually more easily provided for than are those mediating attachment and escape – a bottle, a thumb, or a comforter may suffice. By contrast the instinctual response systems mediating attachment and escape behaviour are permanently ‘at the ready’ for intense activation. Primary anxiety due to separation, sometimes suffused with fright, is thus immanently present from the time these response systems have become active and narrowly directed in the early months to the time when they diminish in intensity and/or the object becomes more easily replaceable (from around the third birthday). Probably at no other time in his life is the individual at risk of such intense primary anxiety and such ‘unterminatable’ fright.

In considering why separation anxiety can so easily reach pathological intensity two further aspects of these systems require emphasis. One is the readiness with which hostility is engendered when they are impeded. The exact conditions under which hostility is evoked require much more detailed study than they have yet been given, but it has long been common knowledge that separation from the mother, rejection by the mother, and a situation in which the mother is attending to some other individual – father, sibling, or visitor – are all apt to give rise to it.²⁰ It is my belief that it is situations such as these, rather than the frustration of oral desires, that engender the most frequent and intense hostility in infants and young children, hostility, moreover, which is inevitably directed towards the loved object itself. This is of the greatest relevance when we come to consider why in some children expectant anxiety in regard to separation exists at a level above the normal.

The second is that the period when they are most active is also the period when patterns of control and of regulating conflict are being laid down. Our data demonstrate that when primary anxiety arising from separation is allowed to persist, defences of a primitive nature (such as those giving rise to detachment described earlier) come into play. There is reason to suppose that the early and intense activation of such defensive processes may create patterns which in later life are of pathogenic significance. This is a theme I have touched on in an earlier paper in connexion with critical phases of development (Bowlby, 1957) and which I hope to pursue further.

Whether or not these reasons prove to be the right ones, there can be little doubt that separation anxiety is an exceedingly common component of neurotic anxiety. This was early recognized by Freud. ‘One of the clearest indications that a child will later become neurotic’, he observed, ‘is to be seen in an insatiable demand for his parents’ affection’ (Freud, 1905, p. 223); this, of course, is another way of describing the child who exhibits, in excess, expectant anxiety in regard to separation and loss of love. Few would dispute this view today. There are, however, several hypotheses current in regard to why some children develop in this way and others do not; and it is in fact on this issue that the views advanced here differ most from those of Freud.

Hypotheses which have been advanced by psycho‐analysts not only give very varying weight to constitutional and environmental factors but also inculpate different and in some respects contradictory factors in each class. It is therefore useful to tabulate the five main hypotheses which have been advanced to account for why a particular individual suffers from an excess of separation anxiety. They are:

1 Constitutional FactorsSome ‘children have inherently a greater amount of libidinal need in their constitution than others,’ and so are more sensitive than others to an absence of gratification (Freud, 1917).Some children have inherently a stronger death instinct than others, which manifests itself in unusually strong persecutory and depressive anxiety (Klein, 1932).

2 Environmental FactorsVariations in the birth process and severe traumata occurring during the first weeks of post‐natal life may increase the (organic) anxiety response and heighten the anxiety potential, thereby causing a more severe reaction to later (psychological) dangers met with in life (Greenacre, [1941] 1952, [1945] 1952).Some children are ‘spoiled’ by excess of early libidinal gratification: they therefore demand more of it and, when not gratified, miss it more (Freud, 1905, 1917, 1926).Some children are made excessively sensitive to the possibility of separation or loss of love either through the experience of actual separation (Edleston, 1943; Bowlby, 1951), or through the use of separation or loss of love as a threat (Suttie, 1935; Fairbairn, [1941] 1952).

It should be noted that whereas hypotheses 1 (a), 2 (b) and 2 (c) are framed to account for the liability to an excess in particular of separation anxiety, 1 (b) and 2 (a) are intended to account for the liability to an excess of anxiety of any kind.

I do not believe there is any clear evidence in support of the first four of these hypotheses. Since with our present research techniques there is no way of determining differences in constitutional endowment, the first pair unavoidably remain untested (though of course not disproved). As regards the next pair, the evidence in regard to 2 (a) is far from clear; indeed in her paper Phyllis Greenacre is careful to explain that she regards it as no more than a plausible hypothesis. Evidence in regard to 2 (b) seems at the best equivocal: the subjection of a child to neurotic overprotection or to excessive libidinal demands from his mother sometimes appears like excess of affection but clearly cannot be equated with it. Evidence in regard to the fifth hypothesis, 2 (c), however, is abundant and affirmative. Therefore, without necessarily rejecting the first four, the fifth hypothesis, that an excess of separation anxiety may be due either to an experience of actual separation or to threats of separation, rejection, or loss of love, can be adopted with confidence. Probably a majority of analysts today utilize it in their work in some degree.

It is strange that in his writings Freud practically never invoked it. On the contrary, in addition to postulating hypothesis 1 (a), that some children have a constitutionally greater need of libidinal gratification than others, he committed himself early and consistently to hypothesis 2 (b), that an excess of separation anxiety is due to an excess of parental affection – in other words, the traditional theory of spoiling. Thus in the Three Essays (1905), after commending the mother who strokes, rocks, and kisses her child and thereby teaches him to love, he nevertheless warns against excess: ‘An excess of parental affection does harm by causing precocious sexual maturity and also because, by spoiling the child, it makes him incapable in later life of temporarily doing without love or of being content with a smaller amount of it’ (p. 223). The same theme runs through much of his theorizing about Little Hans (1909), though it is in his discussion of this small boy’s separation anxiety that he comes nearest the view adopted here: he attributes part of it to the fact that Little Hans had been separated from his mother at the time of his baby sister’s birth (pp. 114 and 132). However, both in the Introductory Lectures (1917, p. 340) and in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926, p. 167) he makes no reference to such origins and instead explicitly adopts the theory of spoiling.

Since in my view there is no evidence to support this theory, the question arises why Freud should have favoured it. One reason seems to be that in his early work he was misled by the show of affection and overprotection which is so frequently present as an over‐compensation for a parent’s unconscious hostility to a child. This is suggested by the passage in Three Essays immediately following that already quoted: ‘… neuropathic parents, who are inclined as a rule to display excessive affection, are precisely those who are most likely by their caresses to arouse the child’s disposition to neurotic illness’ (1905, p. 223). In fact, when we come to investigate such cases psycho‐analytically we find, I believe invariably, that the child’s heightened anxiety over separation and loss of love is not a reaction to any real excess of affection from his parents, but to the unconscious hostility and rejection which lies behind it or to the threats of loss of love his parents have used to bind him to them.²¹ Children who have received a great deal of genuine affection seem to be those who in later life show in highest degree a sense of security.

In addition to this, it seems probable that another reason for Freud’s misperception of the origins of excessive separation anxiety was the delay in his recognition of the close bond of child to mother and the length of time over which it normally persists at high intensity; only if the child’s strong attachment is perceived as normal is its severance or threat of severance recognized as dangerous. It is true that by the time he wrote Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety he was of opinion that a main cause of man’s proneness to neurosis lies in ‘the long period of time during which the young of the human species is in a condition of helplessness and dependence … (which) establishes the earliest situations of danger and creates the need to be loved’ (1926, pp. 154–155). Yet, so far as I know, he never drew from this the natural conclusion that disruptions or threats of disruption of the primary bond are likely to prove a major hazard.

It will thus be seen that the views advanced in this paper differ from Freud’s not so much on the nature of separation anxiety itself but on the conditions which determine its presence in excessive degree. On this issue indeed the two views are the opposite of one another. It is perhaps because of this and because Freud’s hypothesis of spoiling has been built deep into psycho‐analytic theory that there has been so much reluctance in many analysts to accept as valid the evidence which supports the hypothesis here advanced. It is time to return to this.

In my view the best opportunity for uncovering the conditions which lead an individual to become prone to an excessive degree of separation anxiety is either by direct observation of a child undergoing an anxiety‐provoking experience or by a clinical examination in an analytically oriented child guidance clinic, in which treatment is given to both child and parent and a detailed history can be obtained both of main events in the child’s life and of parental attitudes towards him. When we review the reasons why in some children expectant anxiety in regard to separation and loss of love exist in pathogenic degree, observations made in such settings suggest there are four main ones:

1 One determinant is undoubtedly the actual experience of a period of separation. In addition to our own observations (Bowlby, 1951, 1954; Robertson, 1953a), those of Edelston (1943), Prugh et al. (1953), Heinicke (1956) and Schaffer (1958) provide abundant evidence that the child who returns after not too long a period with strangers, whether in hospital or elsewhere, will soon attach himself with great tenacity to his mother and show intense anxiety at any threat of a repetition of the experience. Many cases of older children and adults who respond to separation with unusual anxiety are most readily understood in terms of the persistence of such a psychological state.

2 Another determinant is the excessive use by parents of threats of separation or withdrawal of love as sanctions.

3 Another is the child’s experience of rejection by the mother, especially where her positive feelings are mixed with unconscious hostility.

4 Another is any actual event, such as a parent’s or sibling’s illness or death, for which the child has come to feel responsible and, therefore, guilty and unloved.

There are many papers by analysts which report cases falling under one or a combination of these last three heads (including an early one of my own: Bowlby, 1940) and others by clinical psychologists.²² In a study predominantly concerned with the consequences of actual separation, however, it would be inappropriate to discuss this large and controversial area more fully. Nevertheless it should be noted that these four sources are not necessarily exhaustive: for example, any set of conditions which results in the child feeling guilty and therefore in danger of not being loved will be effective. At the same time, it is my view that only if each of the four sources listed above has been thoroughly explored and excluded is it wise to postulate other factors. Unfortunately such exploration is, I believe, only possible in the case of younger children and when their mothers are also willing to undertake treatment.

Merely to describe these sources of increased separation anxiety, however, is insufficient: we need also to understand the nature of their effects on the emotional development of the child. It is when we come to consider these effects that the interaction of expectant anxiety and hostility, to which attention has already been drawn, is seen to be so crucial. For each of these experiences – separation, threats of separation, actual rejection or expectation of rejection – enormously increases the child’s hostility, whilst his hostility greatly increases his expectation of rejection and loss. Such vicious circles are a commonplace of psycho‐analytic practice. Since it is in emphasizing their frequency and immense clinical importance that Melanie Klein has made her special contribution, this is a convenient point at which to reconsider her ideas.

The clinical observations made by Melanie Klein in the twenties, it will be recalled, were that some children who are attached to their mother in unusual degree are, paradoxically, also possessed of strong unconscious hostility directed towards that very mother. In their play they demonstrate much violence towards mother‐figures and become concerned and anxious lest they may have destroyed or alienated them. Often after an outburst they run from the analytic room, not only for fear of consequences from the analyst, but also, it seems, to assure themselves that their mother is still alive and loving. These observations are now amply confirmed and demonstrate without doubt that the presence of unconscious hostile impulses directed towards a loved object greatly increases anxiety. This is readily intelligible. As Freud pointed out, we would not expect loss of love or castration ‘if we did not entertain certain feelings and intentions within us. Thus such instinctual impulses are determinants of external dangers and so become dangerous in themselves’ (1926, p. 145). The presence of hostile impulses directed to a parent, especially when unconscious, inevitably increases expectant anxiety. In so far as there is concern for the object’s safety, it is depressive in character; in so far as there is fear of losing his or her love, it is persecutory. The role of such depressive and persecutory anxieties, springing from unconscious hostility, in persons suffering from an increased level of expectant anxiety in regard to being separated or unloved cannot be overemphasized; and this remains so whether or not we accept Melanie Klein’s particular hypothesis in regard to their origin.

But just as unconscious hostility directed towards the loved object increases expectant anxiety, so does expectant anxiety, especially in regard to whether or not one is loved, increase hostility. It is of both great theoretical and great practical importance to determine, if we can, how these vicious circles begin. Does increased anxiety precede increased hostility, is it the other way round, or do they spring from a common source? Jones ([1929] 1948) recognizes the great difficulty of unravelling the sequence when looking backwards from data provided by the patient in analysis; and I believe this holds for young children as well as for older patients. Indeed it is at this point that I believe Melanie Klein’s method has led her to one‐sided conclusions.

Logically it is clearly possible for excess anxiety to precede excess hostility in some cases, for the sequence to be reversed in others, and for them to spring from a single source and so be coincidental in yet a third group. Such possibilities, however, are not allowed for by Melanie Klein’s formulation. It is to be noted that she attaches no importance to instinctual tensions as such and does not subscribe to the view, advanced by Freud and again here, as well as by many other writers, that primary anxiety is the result of such tension. Instead, her basic tenet is that increased anxiety is always both preceded and caused by increased sadism: that it may sometimes be independent of, sometimes itself provoke, and often spring from the same source as the increased sadism is not conceded.

In my view both an excess of separation anxiety and an excess of hostility are very commonly provoked by the same experience. Further and more important is that, because the hostility is directed towards the loved object, it is often repressed and, being repressed, tends to generate further anxiety. Thus, on this hypothesis, the increased libidinal need for the object and the increased unconscious hostility directed toward it are both active in promoting neurotic anxiety. This is a view which, it will be seen, derives from the theories both of Freud and of Melanie Klein. It also links with Freud’s early expressed belief (Little Hans, 1909) that in some way repression plays a crucial role in the genesis of pathological anxiety. Here, however, a distinction needs to be drawn between anxiety which is intense and anxiety which is pathological. Whilst it seems clear that repression is not a necessary condition for the genesis of intense anxiety – as is shown by the behaviour of young children in the weeks following return home after a time away from their mothers with strangers – it may well be a necessary condition for its development into pathological anxiety. Perhaps when there is no repression of love or hate intense anxiety provoked by separation or rejection subsides, and it is only when repression sets in that the anxiety becomes pathological. This hypothesis will need further examination.

Before ending this section a word must be said about the other pathological form of separation anxiety, namely its absence or presence at unusually low levels. It has already been emphasized that some measure of separation anxiety is the inevitable counterpart of a love relationship. The absence or attenuation of separation anxiety is thus a frequent accompaniment of absent or exiguous love relationships. The psychopathic character, the origin of which is so often a major disturbance in the early mother‐child relationship (Bowlby, 1944; Greenacre, [1945] 1952), is commonly the one who shows little or no separation anxiety. Either he has never experienced a continuous loving relationship or, more frequently, the relationship he has had has been disrupted so severely that he has not only reached but remained in a phase of detachment. As a result he remains detached and so incapable of experiencing either separation anxiety or grief. Lesser degrees of this condition are, of course, more common than the extreme degrees, and sometimes give the impression of unusually vigorous independence. Analysis, however, shows that the springs of love are frozen and that their independence is hollow.

It is not unlikely that the possibility of promoting early and often apparently vigorous independence in some young children by a measure of frustration of their need for attachment has contributed to the notion that too much affection is bad for a child. There is no doubt that, in the short run, the child who is given more affection is sometimes more strongly attached and so, therefore, more prone to separation anxiety than are some of those who are treated more toughly (though by no means more so than all of them). However, since such ‘dependence’ in the well‐loved child is outgrown and later provides the basis for a stable independence, it would be a mistake to suppose it pathological. On the contrary, as in the case of grief, the capacity to experience separation anxiety must be regarded as a sign of the healthy personality.

Though I believe that much of the variation between different individuals in respect of their proneness to pathological anxiety is to be understood as resulting from experiences such as we have been discussing, it seems probable that part of it is due to other factors. Thus it is most unlikely that all human infants are equipped by inheritance with instinctual response systems prone to develop responses of the same degree of intensity; whilst in others brain damage, caused before, during, or after birth, may make for undue sensitivity. Whatever the reason for it may be, those in whom the potential intensity is high will be greater risks for becoming entangled in the vicious circle of anxiety–hatred–more anxiety–more hatred–than will others. Only direct observations made whilst the child is developing in relation to his mother during the first two or three years of life can, I believe, throw light on this issue. It is to this task that research needs to be directed.