Читать книгу The Herodotus Encyclopedia - Группа авторов - Страница 897

ROGER BROCK

University of Leeds

Herodotus’ engagement with the issue of authority, a central concern in historiography (Marincola 1997), is an important facet of the foundations which he lays for the subsequent development of the genre (Luraghi 2006). Whereas HOMER appeals to the inspiration of a Muse, Herodotus relies for the validation of his account of past events on EVIDENCE accumulated through the process of HISTORIĒ, citing (though not systematically) both his own knowledge gained through AUTOPSY (e.g., 2.12, 29, 131; 4.195; 5.59; often implicit when he describes contemporary realities, e.g., 1.51, 66) and the information provided by informants (see SOURCE CITATIONS), sometimes endorsed by reference to personal contact (e.g., 1.20; 2.142–44; 4.76). In describing his researches, he emphasizes the pains he has taken, as when he travels to TYRE and then to THASOS to pursue his theory of the Egyptian origins of HERACLES (2.44).

He reinforces this by foregrounding his HISTORICAL METHOD (Dewald 2002): instead of prefacing his work with a general statement of principles, as THUCYDIDES was to do (1.21–22), Herodotus is constantly putting his control and handling of his material on DISPLAY, choosing between variant accounts (e.g., of the birth and death of CYRUS (II): 1.95, 212), overtly withholding information (e.g., 1.51, 2.123, or 4.43, all damning bad men to oblivion), or passing over things he knows as insufficiently important or out of religious scruple (Lateiner 1989, 64–69, 73–75), and extending or curtailing reports (e.g., 2.35; 3.60; 4.36; 6.55). Equally, he regularly acknowledges the limits of his own or possible KNOWLEDGE, including those imposed by space and TIME (e.g., 2.31, 3.115, 4.24–25; 3.122, 4.180; Lateiner 1989, 61–64). Alternative versions are commonly juxtaposed: he sometimes states or implies a preference (e.g., 8.94), but frequently leaves matters open (programmatically so at 1.5) or even invites readers to decide, thus co‐opting them into the historiographic process (3.122, 5.45; Lateiner 1989, 76–90). The critical judgment this implies becomes more overt in assessing the RELIABILITY of particular accounts: he may give an explicit endorsement (e.g., 6.53), but more often he declines to do so or overtly disagrees (e.g., 1.51, 75; 8.8), particularly with common Greek belief (e.g., 2.2, 45, both typically dismissive), and states as a general principle that his reporting something does not mean that he believes it (7.152; cf. 2.123, 4.195); hence he frequently qualifies an account with phrases such as “so it is said” (4.176; 5.42), or by presenting it in reported speech rather than simple narrative (e.g., 1.23–24). Herodotus’ critical competence invites the AUDIENCE to trust and endorse his judgment, especially when he expresses confidence; at the same time, in acknowledging that his knowledge is incomplete and provisional, he is also reassuringly modest (Dewald 2002, 286–89).

His credibility is enhanced by the deployment of argument and the language of PROOF (Thomas 2000, 168–212). He appeals to “decisive evidence” (tekmērion: 2.43, 58, 104; 3.38; 7.238; 9.100) and “testimony” (marturion/marturein: 2.18, 22; 4.29; 7.221; 8.120, the last a piece of source‐criticism) in support of his arguments and interpretations (cf. 2.13, 5.45 for others doing so), while tekmairomai is used for analogical inferences about the language of the PELASGIANS (1.57) and the length of the NILE (2.33). As well as inference and ANALOGY, his techniques of argument include deduction, reductio ad absurdum, a fortiori, and probability (eikos) and are most extensively showcased in his discussions of the nature of EGYPT and the flooding of the Nile (2.15–27). This is a notable instance of his engagement with contemporary intellectual debates and so is characterized by a marked element of polemic (Thomas 2000, especially 213–48): like the language of proof, rhetorical questions and appeals to his own experience are concentrated in the account of Egypt (Marincola 1987; Lateiner 1989, 72–73), and Herodotus’ polemic is directed not only at intellectual rivals, but also at Greek beliefs in general, and at earlier writers, notably HECATAEUS (Lateiner 1989, 91–108), the latter again a marked feature of later historiography.

Herodotus’ handling of NUMBERS likewise contributes to his authority. In part this is rhetorical: apparent caution (“five or six” already at 1.1), enumeration of numerical data, for example in army lists (e.g., 6.8; 8.1–2, 43–8; 9.28–30), and elaborate calculations (e.g., 1.32; 2.142; 4.85–86; 7.184–87) all help to create an impression of effort and expertise, but as a visualization of remote locations and the distant past, calculations have an intellectual appeal as well (Sergueenkova 2016).

Finally, and in contrast to his successors, Herodotus makes use of a prominent authorial voice to guide his readers through the complexities of the narrative with its vast geographical and temporal sweep, huge cast, and extensive DIGRESSIONS: it is painstakingly signposted with CROSS‐REFERENCES and progress markers (e.g., 1.94; 3.138; 9.104), as well as RING COMPOSITION, presentation markers, allusions to its forward movement and other articulating stylistic features (de Jong 2002, 259–66; Brock 2003), while explanatory asides are helpfully inserted like footnotes to aid comprehension. By seeming to talk directly to the reader, Herodotus fashions an appealing narrative personality which inspires confidence in readers and draws them on with its charm.

SEE ALSO: Narratology; Prose; Rhetoric; Truth