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Chapter 2

Migrant Smuggling in Southern Libya:

Implications of the New Order

Fatimah Elfeitori

Over the past several years, the migrant smuggling market has grown dramatically in Libya. As the migrant crisis in Libya has increasingly gained traction in the global media, insufficient attention has been paid to understanding smuggling networks and routes when designing policy responses. Knowledge of smuggling networks in Libya remains fragmented with diverse accounts of the sociocultural dynamics of these actors. Insufficient attention has been paid towards understanding the operation of these networks and the dynamics of migrant-smuggler relationships in this context.

There is a pressing need to address this gap in light of emerging accounts of abuse and exploitation that migrants face when transiting through Libya. Migrants face increasing recklessness of smugglers and, if arrested, inhumane treatment in the migrant detention centers, in addition to extortion by bandits.1 Despite this, the welfare of migrants has remained an afterthought in international and regional policy responses to the migrant crisis which illustrates a focus on securitization and policing. Although these measures have managed to disrupt sea crossings, there is little conclusive evidence that border crossings into Libya have been stemmed and abuses against migrants have been on the rise.

This chapter aims to explore the customary and normative operation of migration in Libya from a property rights perspective. It examines the efficiency and the distributional implications of border control measures to date on the behavior of smugglers in southern Libya. It finds that the new order has generated new winners, losers and increased uncertainty, but with migrants in transit bearing the bulk of the costs.

Theoretical Framework

Under the institutional economy of property rights, a person will invest in goods or property when their claim over it is well-defined and well-enforced.2 Incentives to invest in the property are linked to one’s ability to capture the benefits of the investment and to shoulder the costs. Therefore, better defined and enforced rights result in more investment or proper care (also known as good husbandry) of the property in question. In the context of the smuggling market in Libya, the rights examined herein include that of control of, access to, and exclusion of others from the smuggling routes.

Criminal and informal governance can indeed be efficient and the illegality of the enterprise does not necessarily imply market violence.3 Elinor Ostrom’s work highlights how informal or private arrangements can be effective in resource governance.4 In fact, government solutions may often underperform in terms of efficiency when compared to communal solutions.5 Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that contrary to Garret Hardin’s conceptualization of the ‘tragedy of commons,’ communal self-governance is achievable as actors in well-defined communities with strong internal norms recognize that a better outcome is possible. They are able to devise institutions that “constrain each other and harmonize individual incentives with social cooperation.”6

In the case of Libya’s south, a relative degree of communal self-governance provided an efficient equilibrium for years. This equilibrium was disrupted following the Libyan Revolution, with a dramatic increase in competing claims over the smuggling market by new actors from the North. The resulting costs of the conflict and dire economic situation have had adverse consequences on many of these border communities who were dependent on the income generated from the illicit market, in the absence of the state, and consequentially on migrants’ welfare. The purpose of this paper is not to justify the illegal market but to understand it from an efficiency and rights perspective and to highlight the unintended consequences of policing on migrants and refugees.

Devising new institutional solutions is not an easy fix. Rather, it is a long-term, complex and conflict-invoking venture of deconstructing longstanding normative arrangements. For a new formalized order to effectively and efficiently replace the old, it must address communal needs and gaps which the informal order leveraged. Violent interventions can in fact serve to further complicate the situation and generate violence by disrupting these arrangements.

Ostrom explains the idea of collective action through a norm-based order with reputation and trust as its foundation. She uses Demsetz and Alchian’s formulation of property rights as a bundle of rights, whereas property is “a relationship between people about the property rather than a relationship between people and the property.”7 This formulation allows one to examine the overlapping interests in the customary arrangements in southern Libya and societal relationships more generally.

Understanding smuggling practices from a property rights theory of resource management opens the doors to examining the factors that play into involvement in this previously low-risk, high-return business and how the decay of this system impacts the way they operate. Furthermore, an examination of good husbandry in this context allows us to conceptualize a “good” or honest smuggler. Good husbandry is “the proper use or care of a thing” and is linked to one’s ability to capture its benefits.8 For example, unlike a homeowner, a tenant is less likely to invest in painting their house when they do not own it. It is even less likely for someone staying in a hotel to do so. The main distinction between the three is the strength of their claims over the property in question and their ability to capture the long-term benefits and shoulder the costs of painting the walls.

The parallel of good husbandry in the context of smuggling is the investment into maintaining a good reputation, trust and honorable behavior, all of which are long term investments. Although the term “good” smuggler may generate discomfort, the overt focus on the criminality of smuggling can cloud the ability to empirically examine smuggler migrant relationships. Money is undoubtedly part of the incentive; but contrary to popular accounts, migrant smuggler relationships, in situations of clear well-defined and well-enforced rights over the illicit market, are not primarily built on deception and exploitation, but rather on reciprocity and trust.

Setting the Stage

It is important to highlight that this paper examines human smuggling (and smuggling more broadly) rather than human trafficking. The main distinction between human smuggling and human trafficking is agency whereas in the former, the commodity exchanged is a service while in the latter the commodity exchanged is control over a person.9 Migrant smuggling was distinguished from human trafficking in the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). Human trafficking has often gained larger international attention and various legal measures have been introduced to criminalize trafficking through domestic legislation and the 1889 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. It must also be noted that Libya’s legal system still does not clearly criminalize some aspects of the trafficking economy and does not fully comply with UNTOC. The field of smuggling is not easy to capture or trace.10 It is not uncommon for migrant smuggling networks to be described as criminal organizations with hierarchal structures11 and a central command. However, this is not the reality on ground. The operation of smuggling discourages vertical hierarchal organization as the transaction costs involved in this trade influence their organization.12 It is usually composed of small-scale networks of individuals and groups13 that form “loosely coupled coalitions... coordinated through a network of temporary contracts.”14 This is in fact the case in Libya as evidence suggests that human smuggling is not based on professional transnational organizations but rather on a complex network of small organizations.

The literature has also often focused on the business model of smuggling15 which risks overlooking the cultural context and internal social relations within family and community networks that participate in the movement of people across borders and does not account for how exchange, risk and speculation work. Networks allow the formation of flexible relationships between smugglers and corrupt officials,16 relations with groups they depend on for protection or expertise17 and decreases monitoring costs.18 Migrants travel from one leg of the journey to another, making agreements for each portion of the journey.19

However, it is important to note that many of these actors are either directly involved with or maintain links with drug traffickers and other forms of money laundering networks.20 In Libya, migrant smuggling intersects with illicit trade and trafficking of other commodities.21 For example, there is believed to be a strong relationship between the trafficking of heroin and cocaine from Nigeria and the smugglings of migrants.22 This also highlights how smugglers are sometimes connected to traffickers of the origin or transit countries of migrants, and networks from Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and other sub-Saharan states have been found to be active in human trafficking and smuggling in Libya.23

Coordination amongst smugglers is often built on credible business promises rather than a hierarchal mafia- like chain of command. A such, one of the defining characteristics of criminal or smuggling networks is trust.24 Trust is scarce in illegal markets because of the risks involved, and is frequently rooted in a sense of shared habits, norms and values.25 Trust is necessary in the absence of legal mechanisms of contract enforcement in illegal markets or other guarantees. Kinship is a powerful tie and basis of trust as members in this close-knit community are easier to track, punish, and have a stake in the future of the business and are therefore more likely to have shared interests. Ethnic ties therefore provide the strongest assurance of trust among persons within a cooperative but illegal market.26 Within tribes the institution of feud is an example of a guarantee and form of efficient anarchy whereas transgressions are dealt with in a manner well respected by its members.27 28

As new spaces of exploitation emerged in Libya, a dramatic increase in armed groups and new actors entering the smuggling and trafficking business followed. The resulting evaporation of the ‘chain of trust’ between former well-established smugglers requires resort to a new and necessary form of trust in the shape of a “leap of faith.”29 This weakening of the chain of trust makes cooperation between smugglers more difficult and their actions less predictable, therefore generating uncertainty over whether the actors will capture the returns. This has impacted smugglers behavior vis-à-vis migrants and resulted the emergence of a parallel business of exploitation alongside that of smuggling.

In informal arrangements, emphasis is also placed on maintaining a good business reputation. Smuggling networks depend on the flow of information and on migrants to refer other prospective “clients.”30 This would require that migrants survive the journey and that smugglers demonstrate sustained and well-tested reliability, “due diligence” by delivering on the promised services. Smugglers can go as far as paying compensation to migrants’ families for failure to deliver on these services (i.e. in the event of death).31 Reputation is especially important as it plays into the cost-benefit analysis of migrants due to their particular vulnerability during this journey.

There is also often a conflation between smugglers, militias, and other criminal organizations when addressing migration in Libya. This may be attributed to the participation of some human smugglers in military operations and alongside warring factions.32 This lack of clarity and assumption of homogeneity is an obstacle to the introduction of adequate policy responses for each category of actors.

Despite the smudging of lines, there remains a distinction between smugglers, bandits, and militia men in Libya. Paolo Campana presents a network analysis of the southwestern smuggling route in Libya from data generated from the Italian police investigation of the Lampedusa shipwreck.33 Campana finds that smugglers, militiamen and bandits all operate distinctly with some form of division of labor or specialization, and in some cases in competition with each other.34 This is apparent in, for example, the segmentation of payments, whereas migrants pay for each leg of the journey separately (navigating the Sahara, sea crossings, etc.). Although notably, Campana finds no disconnect between the components, hence there is always a possibility that an actor can be reached by another from a different stage. Campana further deducts that coordination is more likely to happen between actors who operate in the same leg of the journey.

Migration in Libya

At the center of the illicit market in Libya lies migrant or human smuggling. Libya has long been Africa’s gateway to Europe and thus a haven for migrant smuggling and a strategic player in the fight against illegal migration. The human smuggling market in the country has grown significantly and has established an institutional basis for higher-profit criminal activities.35 In 2019, an estimate of 650,000 migrants were recorded in Libya.36 IOM recorded a total of 250,000 illegal entries into Europe associated with the Central Mediterranean route in 2016, forming sixty percent of illegal entries into Europe.

Migration is not a new issue for Libya. Gaddafi often resorted to migration diplomacy by which illegal migration is used as a lever to extract concessions and financial and technical assistance from the EU to fight illegal immigration.37 However, notably, prior to 2011, most reported deaths of migrants were related to sea crossings38 or abuse by Libyan security forces following arrests.39 This is in contrast to the recent trend of increased torture, abuse, kidnapping and inhumane treatment that migrants face while crossing through Libya.

I formulate three factors that drive migrant smuggling in the southern Libya: one related to state capacity; the other to authority; and finally, legitimacy.

Capacity

The first driver of the illicit market is the lack of state capacity to provide public services in its Saharan frontier and the effective marginalization of those communities. The population in Libya is heavily concentrated in the north with less than half a million people living in the South, also known Fezzan. Fezzan is mainly made up of ethnic Arabs, Tuareg, Tebu, Gaddadfa, and Awlad Suleiman. The absence of alternative economic activities and public services in those spaces, in addition to Libya’s strategic position as a gateway to Europe, have contributed to a land ripe with opportunity for criminal organizations.

Migration is an economic lifeline for many these groups, in the absence of state services and alternative economic activities. In fact, smuggling is frequently a resilience strategy adopted by border communities who have long been marginalized by the state.40 These nomadic communities use migration, smuggling and arbitrage as a livelihood strategy in the face of marginalization, political exclusion and racism.41 Libya’s draconian citizenship laws have further fueled this business and smuggling can almost be framed from this lens as an act of defiance. Being nomadic tribes, their loyalty to Libya has at times been questioned and approximately 30 percent of people in the south are in legal limbo with an undetermined legal status under the law.42 Following the Revolution, it is unlikely that this will be resolved in the near future due to grudges held against groups who formerly sided with Gaddafi.

Border communities also rely on the labor provided by these movements. This becomes a cycle: smugglers profit from the movement of persons, migrants in transit seek employment to complete the next leg of their journey northward, and the local economies rely on the labor facilitated by migrants in transit. Hence, migration in the Sahel can be framed as an enterprise of “mutual dependency with various degrees of exploitation.”43 However, as these trends are reproduced, so are the inequalities and division of labor: Arab traders, Tuareg drivers, and Sahelian workers. Not to paint a rosy picture, as even before conflict pursued in Libya, foreign nationals, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa, were vulnerable to labor exploitation by their employers. Notably, control of people has traditionally been a form of asserting power by these communities. Their situation has become more difficult as Libya has descended into further chaos and lawlessness.

Authority

In the absence of government, private institutional arrangements emerge to prevent conflict and encourage cooperation.44 The political economy of organized crime emerges out of the power vacuum that is created by the absence of state enforcement. The absence of the state’s enforcement authority and effective control of the borders is a catalyst in the smuggling market. There is a noticeable cleavage between the north and south of the country. The Sahara lies beyond the state’s economic frontier, with sparse lands and low population density. State presence and authority in those spaces is limited, since from a cost benefit perspective there is little incentive to enforce a formalized rights regime.

The southwestern route from Sabha, running though Ubari and Ghat was traditionally controlled by Arab tribes but relies heavily on Tuareg groups for navigation across the Sahara. Ghat is a Tuareg controlled town, while Ghatron and Murzuq were controlled by Tebu. Tuareg groups are active between Ghadames, now controlled by Zintan, and the Salvador triangle where the borders of Libya, Algeria and Niger meet. While the southeast route is primarily controlled by the Tebu and Zway, and primarily used by migrants from Chad and Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. The Tebu and Tuareg are both longstanding traders with connections across the region and have suffered years of marginalization and denial of citizenship rights. The relationship between the Tebu and Zway is fraught with tensions, stretching back to Libya’s war with Chad and Gaddafi utilizing the Pan Arab agenda to empower the Zway in Kufra.

Border crossings did not go unnoticed under the Gaddafi regime. Border control was permeated with corruption and clientelism, and the situation only worsened with little capacity to invest in border security and training of border officials. The regime levied access and control of the illegal market to reward tribal allies in the region and establish a foothold in the region in the face of political opposition. It is likely that the regime deliberately left some forms of smuggling uncontrolled because it permitted those regions to remain to some degree self-sufficient. There was also legal uncertainty over the definitions of economic migrants in domestic immigration laws, and it has been suggested that states often blur the boundaries between the legal and the illegal, to maintain smuggling activities.

Libya became a popular destination for young Sub-Saharan Africans under Gaddafi’s regime, under the delusions of Gaddafi’s promises for African unity. Following European pressures to curb migration, Gaddafi increased the penalties levied against smugglers and migrants, as well as laws governing the employment of foreigners. Nevertheless, these unevenly enforced restrictions only resulted in the adaptation of previous patterns to well-organized private migrant smuggling networks and a profitable cross-border trade. Smugglers were able to establish connections with national administrations while maintaining networks on both sides of the Sahara.

The web of interests between government officials, local councils, tribal leaders, and smugglers sheds light on the embedded nature of this informal regime. Although this paper terms it a ‘parallel market,’ it should be noted that this is not a case where the state has no presence or control. Rather it was a situation of partial regulation or relative control. For example, government officials collected tariffs from smugglers operating within their jurisdiction and the Gaddadfa were involved in the trade. It was a two-way street whereas officials benefited from bribes45 and locals would benefit from the transit of goods and illegal labor. Interestingly, some Tebu and Tuareg were present in the low ranks of the border patrols and “many shared the same economic and citizenship issues as their kin working the black-market economy.”46

Libya’s interim governments failed to take action against or replace armed groups taking control of border crossings as Gaddafi’s troops retreated. Interestingly, some revolutionary brigades engaged in crackdowns against smugglers and attempted to disrupt the trade. However, these measures have had little success in curbing migration and often resulted in increased violence.47

Legitimacy of the Smuggling Regime

Third, smuggling has become embedded in the local normative arrangements. Fezzan’s trade routes have long connected sub-Saharan Africa with the Mediterranean coast. These networks have operated through a horizontal network of reciprocity and connection, forming an efficient market for protection. Border control introduced by colonial and national regimes, in addition to the criminalization of migration, have resulted in the reconstruction of these regional networks, establishing new power structures and forms of control that are dependent on borders. Hence, as a response to legal impediments, these trade routes were transformed into present day smuggling routes.48 The networks through which migrants and good were smuggled have become well established and integrated into the local economies in Fezzan.

The Sahara is a fluid space that has been shaped by the passage of generations of migrants.49 Border communities and cities were established on these migration patterns and settlements of nomadic tribes. The Sahara has been described as a “vast and sparsely populated Hobbesian environment dominated by smuggling, looting, and slave trade.”50 The smuggling activities in the region date to pre-modern times and local Libyans have long facilitated the journey across the Sahara and serve as guides, drivers and provide other forms of support and utilize local ties to build legitimacy and gain protection. The Tebu and Tuareg for example, have always moved with a degree of ease in the border zones and have maintained close links with their kin in Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan.

Socio-historical ties and norms should be the starting point when addressing border crossings in the south of Libya. Involvement in the trade is considered an accepted economic practice in some communities and has become ingrained in the normative arrangements. It is also normal practice for people to bring restricted goods when crossing the border into Libya such as, drugs, cigarettes, or alcohol.51 Smugglers have increased their legitimacy by facilitating services through the transit of goods and labor, in the absence of the state. This normative order is indeed reflected in these societies, for example, the 40th street in Sabha, the main transit point along the southwestern route, is illustrative of a local transit economy that benefits both locals and migrants in transit.52 Locals have established travel agencies and businesses that transport goods and people across the borders.53

To take the Tuareg history, their livelihoods largely depended on caravan trade, as the goods in the Sahara were no longer sufficient for their survival. They established effective control of the route and ensured its continuous security. It was customary for the Tuareg to charge a fee in exchange for security services.54 This order was disturbed by restrictions on freedom of movement through colonization and the establishment of borders, which impacted the nomadic Tuareg’s livelihood. Their situation worsened with the droughts in the 1980s affecting their livestock and the increased strains from the Tuareg rebellions. Following these rebellions in the Sahel, many Tuareg in other Sub-Saharan countries joined their kin in Libya and used their knowledge of the Sahara for smuggling.55 With no alternative economic activities by the state, these tribes sustained their traditional practices despite its criminalization. The ishumar, a Tuareg who often possess multiple citizenships, illustrates the ability for informal responses to bypass formal barriers.56 It represents Tuareg’s adaptability and flexibility in bypassing formal barriers through informal mechanisms.

Present-day smuggling is essentially a continuation of the old caravan trade and often involves the same families.57 Accounts of smuggling from a business model fail to capture the reciprocity, local regulation and other forms of dependence and legitimacy that are involved in reality. These informal regimes are in fact capable of provide almost a parallel state structure and internal regulatory systems offering services in times of trouble, in the event of a breakdown of the state’s authoritative enforcement.

The New Regime: The Decline of Good Husbandry

The collapse of the Gaddafi regime upset an order that had held for four decades. The new order generated vast distributional implications for the smuggling regime, with new players entering the market. Following Gaddafi’s overthrow, the region’s tribes have fought for control of resources, revamping long-standing feuds such as that between the Zway and Tebu. Rivalries over the control of smuggling routes were masked with political justifications and groups have focused on enhancing their local position along the routes. However, it is also noteworthy that that new actors entering the smuggling business could not completely do away with the old actors because of their unparalleled knowledge of the Sahara.

Not only have there been competing claims internally, but several international measures have been introduced to disrupt the smuggling business and curb migration flows from Libya, for example the Italian Memorandum of Understanding with the Libyan Coast Guard, or EUNAVFOR Med. Such measures have generated a debate over control and protection of migrants and refugees.58 Algeria has also increased border control and increased its presence around the Salvador Triangle, where the borders of Libya, Algeria and Niger connect. Further complicating these dynamics is the support of regional players for various armed groups, as we have seen with the UAE support of Haftar’s troops in their skirmish for the South, thus disadvantaging the Tebu who resisted. The active support of a faction overs others further fuels ethnic and tribal tensions.

The incentive behind counter-smuggling measures is to compel smugglers to suspend activities by raising the risks and costs of the smuggling business beyond a certain threshold. With increased risks by law enforcement, smugglers would in theory raise prices proportionally till it reaches a critical point when it is neither affordable for migrants nor profitable for smugglers to continue activities.

However, this is not always so simple. In the event of crackdowns smugglers often find alternative routes or other means of economic gain. Policing and securitization do not provide an alternative economic activity for smugglers who rely on that income for their livelihoods, nor does it address the underlying inequalities upon which the regime flourished. These disruptions to the trade have threatened smugglers’ historical control over these areas. Communities that had benefited in some way from Gaddafi’s policies, such as the Tuareg, found themselves subject to challenges and competition from previously disadvantaged groups. In 2012, Zintani forces seized border crossings to Tunisia and Algeria, historically controlled by the Tuareg. They also seized oil sites in Ghadames and Murzuq and recruited Tebu fighters. This alliance resulted in new winners and disempowered Tuareg who were now in a weaker position compared to Tebu.59 Tuareg residents demanded job opportunities in the oil fields and border crossings but were shut down.

With the decay of the customary smuggling regime in Libya, smugglers have converted to more exploitative measures to generate profits. The frequency by which violence is used against migrants nowadays in itself points to the weakening of these horizontal ties, as violence is a symptom of a lack of good care or investment in “good smuggling” practices. As mentioned in the beginning of the paper, the theory would stipulate that smugglers invest or practice good husbandry when their ability to capture the returns of the activity is well-enforced. While migrants previously had some degree of security when crossing Libya and could rely on smugglers’ good reputation as well as moral obligation to ensure safe arrival, and general “honorable behavior,” this is no longer the case.

The conflict and competing claims for control of the routes have shortened time horizons for smugglers, whereas it is no longer guaranteed that they will reap the benefits of longer-term investments that come with good husbandry. Smuggling has gone underground due to the pressure of increased policing.60 Migrants have borne most of the costs. For example, the decline of Bani Walid’s human-smuggling business has seen criminal actors switch from monetizing the movement of migrants to their ransoming.61

Abuses against migrants have been heavily documented in and around Sabha, the main transit point for the southwestern route.62 Migrants interview by Amnesty International reported being handed over by smugglers to criminal groups.63 Since 2013 Amnesty International received numerous reports of abductions for ransom of migrants in Libya, be it by criminal groups or smugglers themselves. Amnesty reported that ransoming has been on a rise since 2014 as the conflict in the country evolved. 64 Amnesty International has also received reports of cases where smugglers shot at migrants and refugees who tried to escape captivity.

In the absence of the normative constraints of honor and shame, sporadic violations have been committed by smugglers. Women have been raped or sexually abused by smugglers or criminal groups along the migration routes, and Amnesty documented cases where women who are unable to pay the ransom have been forced into sex in exchange for being released or continuing the journey. Most foreign nationals interviewed by Amnesty International reported being physically assaulted, threatened with knives and guns, or robbed of their possessions at least once during their stay in Libya.

Overall, since the introduction of these measures, departures have been conducted in a more reckless manner, and with higher prices charged. Interviews conducted with migrants in 2018 indicate a price increase compared to previous years.65 Additionally, smugglers previously tended to use large wooden vessels captained by someone with seafaring experience, but patterns changed from 2012 onwards.66 Dangerously lower quality rubber vessels carrying more people became common. Although international stakeholders have blamed these trends on search and rescue operations moving closer to Libya, this is a surface-level analysis that does not capture the roots of the problem.

Migrants became a costly liability for smugglers whose horizontal ties weakened and who no longer had the means to transport migrants. For example, seven migrants died by suffocation after being abandoned by smugglers in a truck outside Garabulli.67 Smugglers have also resorted to forced labor and ransoming along the different smuggling routes to recover costs. The amount of money demanded for ransom has also increased significantly.68

Additionally, not only have these policies increased refugee and migrant detention in both official and unofficial centers,69 but general conditions inside detention centers also appear to be worsening. Migrants have reported going for days without food, being routinely beaten, shot at, and tortured. While conditions in detention centers have long been known to be bad, there appears to be a general deterioration in conditions in these detention centers as part of the readjustment to the new rights regime.

However, despite the deterioration in smugglers’ behavior, smuggling still provides a relatively safer means for migration compared to other methods. A recent survey of refugees and migrants reveals that those who reported using smugglers to help initiate or continue their journey were less likely to be detained than those who did not mention using smugglers.70 Those who only used one smuggler were particularly less likely to end up in detention compared to those who used multiple smugglers.

Conclusion

Smuggling networks in Libya reflect not only institutional failure and absence of state authority and capacity to enforce order in the south, but also highlight a web of social, tribal, criminal, and state relations which maintain this order. This parallel order perseveres through the construction of social traditions which have thus become inserted into the local economy.

The relative success of recent measures to curb migration into Europe weigh only a fraction compared to their impacts for migrants. Only 55,001 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2018, compared to 250,000 in 2016. However, measures to dismantle smuggling networks that infringe upon the rights and safety of migrants and refugees are in no way a success. These crackdowns and recent distributional changes have altered the customary arrangement of migration in Libya and placed migrants in a far more vulnerable position. The evidence examined in this chapter suggests that the impact on smugglers’ behavior has contributed to undermining customary rights claims and protection of migrants.

While smuggling is by no means desirable, the new regime has resulted in a more violent market plagued with exploitation. With an acute lack of capacity for Libyan authorities to deliver on their security promises, armed groups have replaced smugglers and used rents from predatory activities to fuel the war; rents under the previous order provided returns to border communities.

The use of force has become less costly, providing a ripe climate for the potential emergence of hierarchical criminal organizations.71 Furthermore, not only are smugglers more reckless towards the treatment of migrants due to the shortened time horizons and lower costs of using force, but the desire to control smuggling routes has also generated conflict between armed groups who fight to assert their position in the eyes of the international community as a crime-fighting force, while continuing to benefit from the trade.

Upon closer observation, factors such as marginalization and horizontal inequalities72 appear to be the main drivers of this economy. Libyans in the South maintain significant control of human smuggling routes and therefore any measures to address the problem must first tackle deeper issues of marginalization, development, and capacity building.

Policing does not serve to deconstruct normative patterns, nor does it address the underlying inequalities that drive this market. Smuggling is embedded in the very fabric of these society and the establishment of a new order will take far more than crackdowns at scattered points and refouling migrants. A deconstruction of these norms will require the replacement with a new order that addresses the grievances for those involved in the trade, mainly: development, job opportunities and political and citizenship rights. The only solution to effectively disincentivize them from carrying on a generational trend is to provide an alternative that is sufficient and sustainable.

Notes

1. Theodore Baird, “Human Smuggling and Violence in the East Mediterranean,” International Journal of Migration, Health, and Social Care; Hove 10, no. 3 (2014): 121–33, http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/10.1108/IJMHSC-06-2013-0010..

2. Jean Daudelin, “Bad Husbandry: Property Rights and Violence Against People,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, .https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196461.

3. Jean Daudelin and José Luiz Ratton, Illegal Markets, Violence, and Inequality: Evidence from a Brazilian Metropolis, Palgrave Pivot (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319762487

4. Elinor Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action,” Agricultural Economics 41, no. s1 (2010): 155–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00497.x..

5. Elinor Ostrom: An Intellectual Biography, accessed December 1, 2019, https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781783485888/Elinor-Ostrom-An-Intellectual-Biography..

6. Elinor Ostrom.

7. Cited in: Tarko, Vlad (2017), Elinor Ostrom. An Intellectual Biography (London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield), chap. 3 “Escaping the Tragedy of the Commons,” 69-103.

8. Daudelin, “Bad Husbandry.”

9. Veronika Bilger, “Modeling Migrant Smuggling: Testing Descriptive Types against Recent Findings,” New Perspectives on Turkey; Istanbul 59 (November 2018): 33–61, http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/10.1017/npt.2018.20..

10. Theodore Baird and Ilse van Liempt, “Scrutinising the Double Disadvantage: Knowledge Production in the Messy Field of Migrant Smuggling,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 3 (February 19, 2016): 400–417, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1103172.

11. Ferruccio Pastore, Paola Monzini, and Giuseppe Sciortino, “Schengen’s Soft Underbelly? Irregular Migration and Human Smuggling across Land and Sea Borders to Italy,” International Migration 44, no. 4 (2006): 95–119, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2006.00381.x..

12. Pastore, Monzini, and Sciortino.

13. Matthias Neske, “Human Smuggling to and through Germany,” International Migration 44, no. 4 (2006): 121–63, .https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2006.00382.x.

14. Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 57–76.

15. See for instance: John Salt and Jeremy Stein, “Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking,” International Migration 35, no. 4 (1997): 467–94, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00023.

16. Paolo Campana and Federico Varese, “Cooperation in Criminal Organizations: Kinship and Violence as Credible Commitments,” Rationality and Society 25, no. 3 (August 1, 2013): 263–89, https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463113481202.

17. Pastore, Monzini, and Sciortino, “Schengen’s Soft Underbelly?”.

18. Paolo Campana, “Explaining Criminal Networks: Strategies and Potential Pitfalls,” Methodological Innovations 9 (April 5, 2016): 205979911562274, https://doi.org/10.1177/2059799115622748.

19. Pastore, Monzini, and Sciortino, “Schengen’s Soft Underbelly?”

20. Baird and van Liempt, “Scrutinising the Double Disadvantage.”

21. United States Department of State, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report - United States of America, 27 2019, n.d., 538.United States Department of State.

22. “Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.Pdf,” accessed December 1, 2019, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.pdf..

23. United States Department of State, “2019 Trafficking in Persons Report - United States of America,” 27 2019, n.d., 538.

24. Campana, “Explaining Criminal Networks.”

25. Klaus von Lampe and Per Ole Johansen, “Organized Crime and Trust:: On the Conceptualization and Empirical Relevance of Trust in the Context of Criminal Networks,” Global Crime 6, no. 2 (May 1, 2004): 159–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/17440570500096734..

26. Lampe and Johansen.

27. Peter T. Leeson, “Efficient Anarchy,” Public Choice 130, no. 1–2 (January 3, 2007): 41–53, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9071-7..

28. United States Department of State, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report - United States of America, 27 2019, n.d., 538.

29. Campana and Varese, “Cooperation in Criminal Organizations.”

30. Luigi Achilli, “The ‘Good’ Smuggler: The Ethics and Morals of Human Smuggling among Syrians,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1 (March 2018): 77–96, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716217746641.

31. See examples in: Paolo Campana, “Out of Africa: The Organization of Migrant Smuggling across the Mediterranean,” European Journal of Criminology 15, no. 4 (July 2018): 481–502, https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370817749179.

32. See Iwuamadi, Kelechi Chijioke, Rowland Chukwuma Okoli, and Adaora A. Chukwura. “Militia groups and complicity of European states in irregular migration crisis of post-Gadhafi Libya.” African Renaissance 17, no. 1 (2020): 35-53.

33. Campana, “Out of Africa.”

34. Campana.

35. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – Assessing the Collapse of the Human-Smuggling Industry in Libya and the Central Sahel,” March 2019, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.pdf.

36. DTM, IOM 2019.

37. Yahia H. Zoubir, “Libya and Europe: Economic Realism at the Rescue of the Qaddafi Authoritarian Regime,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17, no. 3 (December 2009): 401–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782800903339354.

38. News articles reporting early crossings and incidents at sea are listed at: fortresseurope.blogspot.co.uk/2006/02/nel-canale-di-sicilia.html.

39. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | Libya: Stemming the Flow: Abuses Against Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees,” Refworld, accessed December 13, 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4517c8f94.html.

40. Sheldon X. Zhang, Gabriella E. Sanchez, and Luigi Achilli, “Crimes of Solidarity in Mobility: Alternative Views on Migrant Smuggling,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1 (March 2018): 6–15, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716217746908.

41. Lawrence E. Cline, “Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 8 (August 1, 2013): 617–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.802972.

42. “Understanding Libya’s South Eight Years After Qaddafi | United States Institute of Peace,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/10/understanding-libyas-south-eight-years-after-qaddafi.

43. James McDougall and Judith Scheele, Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa (Bloomington, UNITED STATES: Indiana University Press, 2012), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oculcarleton-ebooks/detail.action?docID=816834.

44. Peter T. Leeson and David B. Skarbek, “Criminal Constitutions,” Global Crime 11, no. 3 (August 6, 2010): 279–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2010.490632.

45. Refugees, “Refworld | Libya.”

46. Wehrey and Boukhars, Perilous Desert.

47. Wehrey and Boukhars.

48. Cline, “Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers.”

49. McDougall and Scheele, Saharan Frontiers.

50. Emizet F. Kisangani, “The Tuaregs’ Rebellions in Mali and Niger and the U.s. Global War on Terror,” International Journal on World Peace; New York 29, no. 1 (March 2012): 59–97.

51. Wehrey and Boukhars, Perilous Desert.

52. Sylvie Bredeloup & Olivier Pliez, The Libyan Migration Corridor, EU-US Immigration Systems Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, [year of publication].

53. Ibid.

54. Petra C Besenhard and Nikolai G Wenzel, “Circumventing the Predatory State: Lessons and Futures for the Tuareg from the New Development Economics,” International Journal of Development Issues; Bingley 16, no. 3 (2017): 245–59, http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/10.1108/IJDI-03-2017-0032.

55. Delphine Perrin, “Tuaregs and Citizenship: The Last Camp of Nomadism,” Middle East Law and Governance 6, no. 3 (2014): 296–326.

56. Perrin.

57. Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 141–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000601157147.

58. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – Assessing the Collapse of the Human-Smuggling Industry in Libya and the Central Sahel.” Paolo Campana, “The Market for Human Smuggling into Europe: A Macro Perspective,” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 11, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 448–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paw058.

59. Wehrey and Boukhars, Perilous Desert.

60. “The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – assessing the collapse of the human-smuggling industry in Libya and the central Sahel,” The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 2019. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.pdf.“Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.Pdf.“Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.Pdf.”

61. There was a mass breakout of migrants from an arbitrary prison south of Baniwalid who were held for ransom. Cited in: “Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed November 19, 2019, https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/02/illicit-trafficking-and-libyas-transition-profits-and-losses (accessed November 19, 2019.)

62. Amnesty International, “‘Libya Is Full of Cruelty’: Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence and Abuse from Migrants and Refugees,” 2015, 31.

63. They identified the criminals as the “light skinned” groups.

64. Amnesty International, “‘Libya Is Full of Cruelty’: Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence and Abuse from Migrants and Refugees.”

65. “For example, full packages from Khartoum to Libya, with the sea crossing included, sold by Eritrean and Ethiopian smugglers, had gone up from €2 500/€3 500 in 2016 to €5 000/€6 000 in 2017” cited in:“Global-Initiative-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Broken_March-2019.Pdf.”

66. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – Assessing the Collapse of the Human-Smuggling Industry in Libya and the Central Sahel.”

67. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

68. Amnesty International, “‘Libya Is Full of Cruelty’: Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence and Abuse from Migrants and Refugees.”

69. No Escape from Hell: EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya. (2019, January 21). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya#.

70. Mixed Migration Centre (2019) What makes refugees and migrants vulnerable to detention in Libya? – A microlevel study of the Determinants of Detention. Available at www.mixedmigration.com.

71. Kendra L. Koivu, “In the Shadow of the State: Mafias and Illicit Markets,” Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 2 (February 1, 2016): 155–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015600464.

72. See: Stewart, F., Brown, G. and Langer A. (2008) “Major Findings and Conclusions on the Relationship Between Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” in Stewart et. al. eds., Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Palgrave.