Читать книгу The Radical Right During Crisis - Группа авторов - Страница 39

Ruth Wodak

Displeasure with “the EU” is increasing, clearly audible among acquaintances, friends, in the media, commentators as well as among some politicians. Where is the EU in the so-called “refugee question”, i.e. “migration-crisis”?1 Why doesn’t the EU quickly help the countries particularly affected by the COVID-19 crisis? Why doesn’t the EU intervene when fundamental rights are violated, for example in Hungary or Poland?2 And so on, and so forth. We read and hear many questions. A lot of anger, rage and dissatisfaction are coming to light. And far too few differentiated and fact-based answers.

Without a doubt, Commission President Ursula van der Leyen could have spoken out louder and faster on some acute problems in respect to the global pandemic, immediately in February/March 2020. After all, the COVID-19 crisis is not the first—and certainly won’t be the last—crisis faced by the EU.3 However, if one analyses in detail the discourses on earlier national, European or global crises since the EU or EEC came into existence—such as during the Cold War (Hungary 1956, CSSR 1968, Poland 1981) or in relation to the consequences of 9/11, the bank crash and the financial crisis of 2008 or the global refugee movement in 2015/16—it becomes clear that the perspectives of individual nation states dominate,4 and that even traditional ideological conflicts (between left and right, for example) have been marginalized. ‘Has the corona virus brought back the nation state?’ asks political scientist Jan Zielonka5 in a contribution to the platform Social Europe.

In most cases, the situation was similar as in the elections to the European Parliament—incidentally, this is the only possibility of formal political participation left to us as European citizens. Characteristically, these elections are used as a battleground for political conflicts inside individual members states, rather than an opportunity for choosing specific programmes or directions in which to develop the European Union and which the European Parliament would actually be able to influence. National interests have therefore not just begun to determine the possibilities of the EU; rather, the contradiction between transnational institutions and nation states has always been inherent in the conception of the EU.

Obviously, few people really know about the highly complex network of institutions and decision-making bodies/processes.6 Few also seem to be aware that the heads of government have the final say in European Council decisions and that—in some cases—a single veto can block decisions at any time, be it on the budget, on sanctions against a member state that has violated a treaty, or on the coordination of the distribution of refugees. And even if and when, as we have learned, decisions are finally taken (such as on the distribution of refugees by quota), the EU is powerless to force member states to implement them. In the spring of 2020, we again had to witness massive populist agitation against fugitives and the fixation of related debates on “borders and walls”, where desperate people are to be stopped at all costs.7 This distracts attention away from the causes of such tragedies, from the human rights violations of refusing asylum, and from the European Union’s inability to deal with a problem that is small in relation to its size and wealth.

For example, it was only during the COVID-19 crisis that many EU citizens realized that health is a national agenda.8 Asylum and migration policies are also the responsibility of nation states. The responsibility for the success or failure of the respective health and migration policies9 therefore lies with the member states, not with the Commission, which can only make recommendations. Moreover, in April 2020, we were able to observe that initiatives such as the new “Marshall Plan” proposed by the Commission—being an important and effective measure to protect the economy, especially of increasingly indebted states, from collapse due to the COVID-19 crisis—are welcomed in solidarity by some states and rejected by others (especially Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands). In addition, the letter expressing outrage at Viktor Orbán’s abrogation10 of the Hungarian Parliament was not supported by all EU member states; among those who did not support this important initiative, incidentally, we also find Austria!

This confirms a view held by political scientist Jan-Werner Müller:11 that in no country in Western Europe or North America has a right-wing populist/far-right populist12 leader managed to get into office without help. This always required conservative collaborators from the establishment. Similarly, political scientist Cas Mudde13 notes that mainstream conservative parties are now openly discussing ‘immigration and multiculturalism as a threat to national identity and security’. It is thus legitimate to state that the “political centre” has moved to the right. In other words, right-wing populist agendas have been normalized.14 Indeed, Swiss human rights consultant at the UN and political activist Jean Ziegler15 writes about ‘Europe’s Disgrace’ when describing the horrific and untenable conditions in the refugee camps on the Greek island Lesbos.16

In Orbán’s rhetoric,17 the so-called “refugee crisis” and the global pandemic are merged into one huge “world-conspiracy”, a traditional antisemitic stereotype: the Hungarian-Jewish philanthropist George Soros is—repeatedly—accused of transporting “illegal migrants” to Europe and specifically, to Hungary. Simultaneously, these “illegal migrants” (i.e. refugees) are accused of bringing the COVID-19 virus to Europe. Hence, the fallacious argument implies that “the Jews” and the “illegal migrants” are to be blamed for the current global crisis. Of course, many other conspiracy theories regarding the pandemic are dominating the social media as well, all of which are targeting vulnerable and marginalized groups, on the one hand, and traditional media, specific countries (such as China) and influential CEOs such as Bill Gates, on the other.

Thus, I repeat and expand on the question posed in the title: Quo vadis, Europe?18 after the COVID-19 crisis? Will the EU member-states now be inclined to embrace more long-term solidarity and closer cooperation on the basis of recent crisis experiences, or will they become even more inward-looking and, in the long term, turn the EU into an economic union between independent nation states, without a contractually guaranteed consensus on human rights and peace?

The current crisis urgently calls for visions for the EU and, indeed, the world post-COVID-19. Borders have been closed, but viruses do not respect borders; neither does the climate crisis, to be sure. The economic consequences of measures to combat the crisis call for a new “Marshall Plan” for EU member states, according to the Commission President. This can only be implemented on a joint basis. In an interview broadcast in the Austrian news show ZIB2 (15 April 2020), the economist Clemens Fuest argued in detail that the rich EU member states, such as Austria and Germany, depend entirely on the poorer countries (such as Italy and Spain) for their production. A possible bankruptcy of these countries would therefore also affect ‘us.’ Transnational solidarity is therefore the order of the day—not the narrow, backward-looking thinking of nation states. Many political scientists19 and sociologists20 have expressed similar views.

The COVID-19 crisis has made it abundantly clear that expert knowledge21and expertise are in demand again today (after the populist zeitgeist had relied strongly on a politics of feelings and the power of “common sense”). Hopefully, European politicians will not quickly dismiss the lessons of the crisis, but will be forced to develop and agree on sustainable solidarity with the vulnerable and social programmes in order to be prepared for new, cross-border crises—which will surely come.

Dr Ruth Wodak is a Senior Fellow at CARR and emerita distinguished professor of discourse studies at Lancaster University and affiliated with the University of Vienna.

1 Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak‚ “Borders, Fences and Limits—Protecting Austria from Refugees: Metadiscursive Negotiations of Meaning in the Current Refugee Crisis,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 16 no.1–2 (2018): 15-38.

2 Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: The Shameless Normalization of Far-right Populist Discourses (London: SAGE, 2021).

3 Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, eds. The European Public Sphere and the Media Europe in Crisis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

4 Florian Oberhuber, Christoph Bärenreuter, Michał Krzyżanowski, Heinz Schönbauer and Ruth Wodak, “Debating the European Constitution: On Representations of Europe/ the EU in the Press’, JLP 4, no. 2 (2005): 227-71.

5 Jan Zielonka, “Has the Coronavirus Brought Back the Nation State?,” Social Europe, March 26, 2020, https://www.socialeurope.eu/has-the-coronavirus-brought-back-the-nation-state.

6 Johannes Pollak and Peter Slominski, Das Politische System der EU (Munich: Facultas, 2012).

7 See “Türkei-Krise: Syrischer Arzt Schildert Dramatische Situation- ‘Massenhinrichtungsstopp’,” Merkur, March 28, 2020, https://www.merkur.de/politik/fluechtlinge-tuerkei-griechenland-syrien-erdogan-merkel-videos-asyl-eu-grenze-news-merz-zr-13566876.html.

8 EU Commission, “Kommission analysiert Gesundheitssysteme der Mitgliedstaaten,” https://ec.europa.eu/germany/news/20171123-gesundheitssysteme_de.

9 Antje Wiener, Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

10 “14 unterzeichnen Protestbrief. Unmut der EU-Staaten über Ungarns Notstandsgesetz wächst,” Kleine Zeitung, April 2, 2020, https://www.kleinezeitung.at/international/corona/5795049/14-unterzeichnen-Protestbrief_Unmut-der-EUStaaten-ueber-Ungarns.

11 Jan-Werner Müller, “What Happens When an Autocrat’s Conservative Enablers Finally Turn on Him? Right-Wing European Politicians Rebuked Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. But That Could Radicalize Him Even More,” The Atlantic, September 13, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/orban-hungary-europe-populism-illiberalism/570136/.

12 Jan-Werner Müller, “Populists are Likely to Benefit from the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna Blog, April 16, 2020, https://www.iwm.at/always-active/corona-focus/jan-werner-mullerhow-populists-will-leverage-the-coronavirus-pandemic/.

13 Cas Mudde, “The 2019 EU Elections: Moving the Center,” Journal of Democracy 30 no.4 (2019): 20-34.

14 Ruth Wodak, “Entering the ‘Post-Shame Era’—The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Populism and Neo-Authoritarianism in EUrope,” Global Discourse 9, no. 1 (2019): 195-219.

15 Jean Ziegler, Die Schande Europas (Munich: Bertelsmann, 2020).

16 Sebastian Leber and Kai Müller, “Die doppelte Hölle von Lesbos,” Tagesspiegel, March 17, 2020, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/themen/reportage/coronavirus-trifft-auf-fluechtlingskrise-die-doppelte-hoelle-von-lesbos/25649140.html.

17 Markus Salzmann, “Hungarian Government Uses Corona Pandemic to Promote Racism,” World Socialist Web Site, March 19, 2020, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/03/19/hung-m19.html.

18 Pieter Bevelander and Ruth Wodak, eds. Europe at the Crossroads. (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2019).

19 Ulrike Guérot, “Die Post-Corona Demokratie in Europa,” Vienna Lectures, April 2, 2020, https://vorlesungen.wien.gv.at/site/wv-digital-die-post-corona-demokratie-in-europa/.

20 Barbara Prainsack, “Gesellschaft im Umbruch. Was macht die Corona Epidemie mit uns? Erste Ergebnisse aus den Sozialwissenschaften,” Vienna Lectures, April 23, 2020, https://vorlesungen.wien.gv.at/site/gesellschaft-im-umbruch-was-macht-die-pandemie-mit-uns/.

21 Ruth Wodak, “Kommunikation in und über die Corona-Krise,” Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna Blog, 30 March 30, 2020, https://www.iwm.at/always-active/corona-focus/ruth-wodak-kommunikation-in-und-uber-die-corona-krise-erste-beobachtungen-und-analysen/.