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3	Discourse on the Freedom of Thought, Speech, and Writing *

Rara temporum felicitate ubi sentire Quoe veils, equoe sentias dicere licet.

An exceptionally happy time when

it is lawful to think as one wants

and to say what one thinks.

— Tacitus, Histories, book I

If, in the time of Tacitus, the ability to think as one wanted and to speak as one thought was an uncommon happiness, in our times it would be a consummate misfortune and a quite unfavorable mark on our nation and institutions should one try to place limits on freedom of thought, speech, and written expression. Tacitus and his fellow citizens were under the rule of a master, after all, whereas we are under the leadership of a government that owes its existence to such freedom, which can last only because of this freedom, and whose laws and institutions have given this freedom all possible expanse and breadth, sparing no means to guarantee citizens this precious and inestimable right.

In the same way that we have tried to demonstrate in our first issue the importance and necessity of the scrupulous, faithful, and prompt observance of the laws, let us make an effort in this issue to settle the entire and absolute freedom in opinions, for although those laws must be fulfilled completely, opinions must be free of all censure that precedes or follows publication of the laws, because one cannot justly demand that the laws be faithfully observed if the freedom of exposing their problems is not perfectly and totally guaranteed.

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It is not possible to place limits on the faculty of thought; it is not reasonable, just, or advisable to prevent one from expressing by word or in writing what one thinks.

Precisely because in the metaphysical order acts of understanding are necessary, they must be free of all force and coercion in the political order. Human understanding is a power as necessary as is sight; it does not actually have an ability to decide for this or for that doctrine, to keep from inferring legitimate or erroneous conclusions, or to adopt evident or false principles. It will be able, happily, to apply itself to examining objects with care and maturity, or with carelessness and negligence; to explore questions more or less and to consider them completely or only under one of their aspects; but the outcome of all these preliminaries must always be an action as necessary as is that of seeing clearly or vaguely, or with more or less perfection, the object held at a suitable distance. In effect, the analysis of the word “know” and that of the complete idea it indicates cannot do less than yield this result.

Knowledge in the soul is like sight in the body, and thus as each individual of the human species has, according to the different construction of his visual organs, a necessary manner of seeing things and does so without choice, so also, depending on the differences among intellectual faculties, he has a necessary manner of knowing to know them. It is true that both powers are subject to perfection and augmentation; it is true that their errors can be corrected or prevented, the sphere within which they operate can be extended, and the acts proper to them can be made more active or intense; not just one, but many and infinitely varied are the means of attaining them; one, many, or all can be put into action; they will, in their turn, give perfect, average, and sometimes no results, but it will always be certain that choice has not played any part in it, nor can it be counted among the means for achieving those results.

Men would be very happy, or at the least they would not be so unhappy, if the actions of their understanding were the product of free choice. Then, the bitter and sad memories of the past would not come to renew unhappinesses that no longer exist; nor would they arise from nothingness only to cause us pain. Then, forecasting the future would not bring forward for us a thousand sorrows, presenting us ahead of time persons, events, and circumstances that either will not come to exist, or if they do, give in advance an indefinite extent to our sufferings. Then, finally, we would not think about or explore through reflection

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the causes and circumstances of present unhappiness, nor would we worsen its intolerable weight with reflection. There is certainly not one single man who does not wish to separate from himself everything that can cause him annoyance and make him unhappy; and at the same time there is not, nor has been nor will be anyone who has not suffered a great deal because of such considerations. And what does this prove? That it is not possible for him to put limits on his thoughts; that he is led necessarily and irresistibly to knowledge of objects, good or bad, perfectly or inadequately grasped; that the immediate or distant choice has no part whatsoever in the actions of the mental faculties; and that, consequently, in the metaphysical order, the understanding is not free.

How, then, to impose rules on a power not susceptible to them? How to effect change in what is most independent in man, making use of violence and coercion? How, finally, to put order into the class of crimes and assign punishments to an act that by its essence is incapable of goodness and evil? Man will be capable of not conforming his actions and discourses to his opinions; he will be able to give the lie to his thoughts through his conduct or language, but it will be impossible for him to disregard or get rid of those thoughts because of external violence. This method is unsuitable and at the same time tyrannical and illegal.

Whenever one attempts to attain an end, no matter what its nature may be, prudence and natural reason dictate that the means one uses to attain it be naturally suitable to it. Otherwise, the plan will come to nothing, the nature of things being stronger than the caprice of the agent. Such would be the folly of the one who tries to attack firearms with water or prevent passage through a moat by filling it with grape shot. When, then, it comes to changing our ideas and thoughts, or inspiring new ones in us, and for this purpose one uses rules, prohibitions, and punishments, the natural effect is that those who suffer such violence adhere more tenaciously to their opinion and deny to their oppressor the satisfaction he might get with victory. Persecution gives an unfortunate character to opinions without destroying them, because destroying them is not possible. Human understanding is as noble in itself as it is miserable for the ease with which every kind of passion confuses it. The first principles undeniable for everyone are few in number, but the consequences that derive from them are as diverse as the multiplicand, because the way in which their relationships are grasped is infinitely varied. Habits and customs that education has inspired in us, the

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way of life we have adopted, the objects that surround us, and, above all, the persons with whom we interact, contribute, without our even being able to perceive it, to the formation of our judgments, modifying in a thousand ways the perception of objects and making them appear clothed in, perhaps, a thousand forms, with the exception of the natural and genuine perception. Thus, we see that what is for him obvious and simple is obscure and complex for others; that not all men can acquire or dedicate themselves to the same type of knowledge or excel in it; that some are fit for the sciences, others for scholarship, many for the humanities, and some for nothing; that with age the same person changes opinion, even holding as absurd what he previously deemed evident; and that no one, as long as he lives, is fixed and unwavering in his opinions, or in the concept he has formed of things. As the intellectual faculty of man does not have a precise and exact measure of the vitality with which it carries out its operations, neither does it have a measure of the amount of knowledge it needs for exercising them. To expect, then, that the majority be convinced by the judgment of some other person, even when this other person might be an authority, is to insist, says the famous Spedalieri, that they see and hear through another’s eyes and ears. It is to oblige them to let themselves be carried blindly and with no more rationale than the force they cannot resist. It is, to put it succinctly, to dry up all the sources of public enlightenment and to destroy beforehand and radically the best sources they might have been able to develop over the course of time.

In effect, what would become of us and of the entire human race if the wishes of those who have wanted to place restraints on the understanding and limits on freedom of thought had been fulfilled? What would have been the progress of the arts and sciences, the improvements of governments, and the condition of men in the state of society? What, in particular, would be the fate of our nation? Thanks to the efforts of the extraordinary creative spirits that at all times have known how to throw off the chains that despots have sought to impose on thought, societies, although not having arrived at the highest level of perfection, have made considerable progress. Governments, excluding only a few that are called free, have always been alert to anything that could diminish their power and make clear their excesses. Therefore, they use every means to put thought in chains, making crimes of opinions that do not conform and calling those who profess them criminals. But have

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they had the right to do so? Have they proceeded legally when they have made use of these means? Or, rather, have they trod upon the sacred rights of man, assuming powers that no one could give them or that they could receive? This is the point we are going to examine.

Governments have been established precisely to preserve public order, ensuring to each individual the exercise of his rights and the possession of his goods in the way and form that have been prescribed by the laws, and not in any other manner. Their powers are necessarily determined in the pacts or agreements we call constitutional charters and are the result of the national will. Those who draw them up, and their constituents, cannot make provisions in them that, by the nature of things, are beyond their powers, such as the condemnation of an innocent person; making crimes of such truly praiseworthy acts as paternal love; much less subjecting to laws functions that by nature are incapable of morality, such as the circulation of the blood, the movement of the lungs, etc. From this, it follows that for a legislative, executive, or judicial measure to be just, legal, and equitable, it is not enough that it be pronounced by the competent authority, but it is also necessary that it be intrinsically possible and indispensable for preserving public order. Let us see, then, whether those measures that have been decreed or attempted against freedom of thought are of this type.

To this point we have shown that opinions are not free and consequently are not capable of morality; it remains only to show that they can never overthrow the public order, and especially not in the representative system. In effect, public order maintains itself by the prompt and faithful observance of the laws, which is entirely compatible with total and absolute freedom of opinions. Nothing is more common than seeing men who dislike laws and whose ideas are contrary to them, but who at the same time not only observe them religiously but are personally convinced of their necessity. To say this law is bad, it has this or that problem, is not to say that it will not be obeyed or carried out. The first is an opinion, the second is an action; the former is independent of all human power, the latter must be subject to the competent authority. Men have the right to mandate that something be done in this or that way, but not in order to make doctrines into dogmas, or to obligate others to their belief. This absurd right would suppose the necessity of a symbol or body of doctrine comprehensive of all truths, or the existence of an infallible authority by whose decisions one would have

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to abide. Nevertheless, nothing is more lacking in foundation than such suppositions.

But how could the first have been formed, or who would be so presumptuous and audacious that he would dare to appropriate the second to himself? “A body of doctrine,” says the famous Daunou,¹ “supposes that human understanding has made all possible progress, opposes itself to all advancements that remain, draws a circle around all acquired understandings, inevitably includes many errors, opposes the development of the sciences, the arts, and all type of industry.” And who would be capable of having formed it? Even if, for such an unattainable project, the most celebrated men of the universe had been gathered together, nothing would have been achieved. Should their writings be recorded anyway, they will be found full of errors in the midst of some truths they have contributed to public enlightenment. The daily and continuing improvement perceived in all human actions is demonstrable proof that the perfectibility of human mental powers has no limit and of how much would have been lost in holding back their advancement, had this been possible.

We are persuaded that none of the present governments will boast of their inability to err. They and the people entrusted to their leadership are too enlightened to be able to claim and grant such privileges, but if the governments are composed of men who are as fallible as others, through what principle of justice, or by what legal right, will they proceed to determine or prohibit doctrines? How would they dare determine for us those opinions we are to follow and those we are prohibited from professing? Is this not an act of aggression with an unattainable end, which nothing can justify? Without doubt. It, nonetheless, is common and almost always serves as a pretext for classifying citizens and immediately persecuting them. It makes men responsible for the opinions they hold or assume, and these are converted into a reason for hatred and loathing. In this way factions are perpetuated, given that the triumphant dogma will one day be toppled, and it then comes to be a crime to profess it. This is how nations become demoralized, and a forced traffic

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in lies is established that compels the weak to conceal their ideas and makes those with strong spirits the targets of persecution.

Come, now, will it be lawful to express all opinions? Does not the authority have the right to prohibit the enunciation of some? Will many of them, inevitably mistaken, not be detrimental? Yes, but we assert resolutely that opinions about doctrines must be entirely free. No one doubts that the surest means, or, better said, the only means, to arrive at knowledge of the truth is examination that produces free discussion. Then not only one’s own reflections are present but also those of others, and it has happened a thousand times that, upon criticism and perhaps error or someone’s irrelevant observation, the fate of a nation has depended. No understanding, no matter how vast and universal one supposes it to be, can embrace everything or exhaust any subject matter. From this it follows that everyone, in all subject matters, especially those that treat of government, needs the help of everyone else, which they will certainly not obtain if freedom of speech and written expression is not assured, sheltering the opinions and their authors from all aggression that could be attempted against them by those who do not accept these opinions. The government, then, cannot proscribe or grant protection for any doctrine. This is beyond its jurisdiction; it is created only to observe and see that citizens observe the laws.

It is true that, among opinions, there are and must be many erroneous ones; it is equally true that all error, of whatever kind and under whatever aspect it is considered, is highly harmful. But it is not less true that prohibitions are not means of remedying error. The free circulation of ideas and the differences that result from counterviews constitute the only way to correct opinions. If the power to regulate opinions were conceded to some authority, this latter would very quickly abuse such power, and who would be charged with restraining us from error? He who is exempt from it? But governments do not find themselves in this category; very much the opposite. When one searches for causes that have most spread error and contributed to perpetuating error, they are always found in the prohibiting institutions. On the other hand, if governments were authorized to prohibit all errors and punish the foolish, the world would very soon be missing a large portion of humanity, the rest being reduced to eternal silence. We will be told that not all opinions have to be subject to the control of authority, but if one opinion is

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subject, the rest are not safe. Laws cannot make precise classification or exact enumeration of all opinions. Thus it is that such a power is necessarily arbitrary and, most of the time, will be converted into a reason for persecution. These are not unfounded suspicions. Look back at the barbarian centuries and it will be seen that the universities, the parliaments, the chancelleries, and the kings were determined to place proscriptions on the learned who were making physical discoveries and attacking the doctrines of Aristotle. Pedro Ramos Tritemio, Galileo, and innumerable others suffered what would not be believable if it were not made obvious to us beyond any doubt. And what was the fruit of such methods? Did the governments succeed in what they were attempting? Not in the least. Converts increased day by day, perhaps because of that very persecution.

In effect, if one wants to give credence to a doctrine, nothing else is needed but to forbid it. Men naturally suppose, and in this they do not deceive themselves, that a doctrine cannot be fought by reason when it is attacked by force. Strong spirits and courageous souls hold fast to forbidden doctrines, more for show than from conviction, because the spirit of novelty and making themselves the object of public excitement, attracting the attention of everyone, is so lively a passion, and as a final consequence an inappropriate remark that might have remained buried in the corner of a house degenerates into heresy that possibly undermines the supports of the social edifice because of the importance persecution bestows on it.

But does not discrediting the laws make them contemptible and inspire men to transgress them, depriving the laws of their stature? And is this not the outcome of the frank criticism that is made of them? When the laws have been dictated with calm and care, when they are the outcome of a free discussion, and when the spirit of partisanship and the fears that it instills in legislators have not contributed to their preparation, making the general interest subordinate to the private interest for reasons external to them, the fear of such outcomes is very remote; but to prevent it, governments must be very alert and not lose sight of public opinion, favoring it in everything. This is formed only by free discussion, which cannot be maintained when the government or some faction is granted the power of the press and condemns, with no sense of shame, those who either impugn the dogmas of the sect or throw light on its abuses of authority. On the contrary, when one proceeds without

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prejudice and in good faith, when one listens attentively and impartially, everything that is said or written in support of or against the laws is certainly on the road to being right. We never tire of repeating it: freedom of opinions regarding doctrine has never been disastrous for any people; but all the events of modern history prove with the greatest certainty the dangers and risks that nations have run when one faction has managed to take possession of the press, has dominated the government, and, availing itself of it, has silenced by terror those who could educate it.

But governments do not take warning despite such repeated examples. Always fixed in the present moment, they disregard the future. Their principal error consists in believing they can do anything, and it is enough to hint at its will for it to be promptly and faithfully obeyed. Perhaps they turn on themselves when there is no longer any remedy, when they have been discredited and have precipitated the nation into an abyss of evils. We conclude our reflections, then, recommending to the trustees of power that they be convinced that when they make crimes of opinions, they run the risk of punishing talents and virtues, of losing the idea, and of making famous the memory of their victims.